青春痘的预防:中国特色的私有制：国家资本主义潜在的成本

        2011年7月份浙江发生了甬温特大铁路交通事故，造成了大量人员伤亡，但是事故放生后官方却让推土机掩埋了列车残骸。这起事故着实让中国政府难堪了一回，也让人们意识到，中国虽然正在自己的调控下努力走向现代化，但是大跃进、劣质的安全质量标准和数量多的令人震惊的腐败都存在于这一进程中。这与官方故事里那个在共产党英明领导下成为世界经济第二大国的情节不甚矛盾。中国政府没有努力解决令它尴尬的反证问题，反而试图去掩盖它。（注：反证是为了推翻对方的主张而举出的与对方当事人所举的证据相反的事实依据，在这个事件中的所指译者不敢妄下结论，但觉得应该指的是不利于官方说法的一些证据。）

No wonder it is so hard to judge China’s state-led economic model. The government’s actions lie hidden beneath hundreds of tonnes of secrecy, and beyond easy measurement. But as our briefing this week makes clear, China’s semi-privatised companies are both more varied and less admirable than is popularly understood.

       怪不得想要评判中国政府所领导的经济模式会如此困难。中国政府的行为从来都在秘密中进行，如此秘密，无法知晓。但正如我们的简报这周报道的，中国的半私有化公司非常多样，但也没有大家理解的那样出色。

Under Mao, it was simple. The government controlled everything and ran it into the ground. Those days are gone. Since 1993 Beijing has encouraged gaizhi for state-owned enterprises, which means “changing the system”. Between 1995 and 2001 the number of state-owned and state-controlled enterprises fell by nearly two-thirds, from 1.2m to 468,000, and the proportion of urban workers employed in the state sector fell by nearly half, from 59% to 32%. Yet gaizhi is not simply a euphemism for “privatisation”; it has also created a variety of public-private hybrids.

       在毛泽东时代，事情非常的简单，因为政府控制了所有的东西。但他们搞得一团糟。那个时代已经过去了，1993年以后北京方面鼓励国有企业改革，即所谓的“改变制度”。1995年到2001年国有企业和政府管理下的企业数量减少了将近三分之二，由120万减少到了468000，并且城市中的工人被国有企业雇佣的比例减少了将近一半，从59%下降到了32%。但是“改制”不是“私有化”的委婉说法，他还创造了多种公私混合的模式。

At one end of the spectrum are the giant state-controlled enterprises in industries which the government considers “strategic”, such as banking, telecoms or transport. Such firms may have sold minority stakes to private investors, but they operate more or less like government ministries. Examples include China Construction Bank, a huge backer of infrastructure projects, and China Mobile, a big mobile-phone carrier.

       在这其中占有一席之地的是被国家认为具有战略意义的庞大的国家控制行业，如银行业、通讯业、运输业。这些公司可能向私人投资者出售了一小部分股份，但是他们多多少少像国家部门一样运营着，像中国建设银行，基础设施建设项目的大型赞助者，以及中国移动，一个大型的移动运营商。

Next come the joint ventures between private (often foreign) companies and Chinese state-backed entities. Typically, the foreign firm brings technology and its Chinese partner provides access to the Chinese market. Joint ventures are common in fields such as carmaking, logistics and agriculture.

       下一个要提到的就是私人公司（通常是国外的）与中国国有公司的合资企业，即中外合资企业。通常国外的公司会提供技术同时中国的合作伙伴会为其打开中国市场。中外合资企业在汽车制造业、物流行业以及农业比较常见。

A third group of firms appears to be fully private, in that the government owns no direct stake in them. Their bosses are not political appointees, and they are rewarded for commercial success rather than meeting political goals. But they are still subject to frequent meddling. If they are favoured, state-controlled banks will provide them with cheap loans and bureaucrats will nobble their foreign competitors. Such meddling is common in areas such as energy and the internet.

       第三种类型的公司就是完全的私营企业，政府不在其中直接拥有任何股份。私营企业的老板不会是政府任命的，而且他们的财富是因为商业上的成功而不是满足了政治上的目的。但是他们仍旧是经常性的干预的对象。如果这些公司被看重，他们就会从国有银行里拿到便宜的的贷款，官僚也会打击他们的国外竞争对手。这种干预在互联网以及能源领域是非常普遍的。

A fourth flavour of Chinese firm is fuelled by investment by local government, often through municipally owned venture-capital or private-equity funds. These funds typically back businesses that dabble in clean tech or hire locals.

       第四种中国的企业是由地方政府投资的，资金来源通常是市政拥有的风险投资与私募基金。一般这些基金都用来支持那些投资无污染的高新技术与带动当地就业的企业。

These firms with their various sorts of state influence have several strengths. They invest patiently, unruffled by the short-term demands of the stockmarket. They help the government pursue its long-term goals, such as finding alternatives to fossil fuels. They build the roads, bridges, dams, ports and railways that China needs to sustain its rapid economic growth.

       这些公司在国家中的地位不一，但他们有几大优点。他们的投资不受短期证券市场需求的影响，投资很稳定，并且可以帮助政府实现其长期的目标，如寻找化石燃料的替代品；他们还会修建公路、桥梁、水坝、港口和铁路这些中国用来支撑其经济快速增长的基础设施。

Crowding out the true bamboo capitalists

赶走了真正的“竹子资本家”1

But statism has big costs, too. The first is corruption. When local bigwigs can award contracts to firms which they themselves control, graft spreads like bird flu. Sometimes well-connected shell firms take a fat cut and then pass the real work on to subcontractors, with scant regard for standards. The second problem is that big state-backed enterprises crowd out small entrepreneurial ones. They gobble up capital that China’s genuinely private firms could use far more efficiently, amassing bad debts that will eventually cause China big trouble. They rig the game in other ways, too, enjoying privileged access to land and permits. Small private firms are often unsure whether what they do is even legal. The rise of local-government venture funds creates yet more opportunities for abuse. Some of these funds will invest wisely, but many will pursue non-commercial goals, from job creation to crony enrichment.

       但是中央集权的经济成本太高了。首先就是腐败问题。地方的要员能够给他们控制的公司搞到合同，所以贪污就想禽流感一样蔓延开来。有时一些很有背景的空壳公司在拿到一个订单之后，抽取很多利益后再将真正的工作转让给下一家公司，同时又几乎不考虑这家公司是否符合标准。另外一个问题就是大型的国有企业会排挤小型企业，并且他们侵吞了大量资金但却不能很好地利用，导致坏账不断积累，可能最终会给中国带来大麻烦。而这些资金私营企业能够更有效地利用。他们还可以用其他的方式操纵整个游戏，比如享有得到土地与许可的特权。相比之下，小型的私营企业经常会不确定自己做的是否合法。地方政府风险投资的兴起制造了更多滥用职权的机会，一些基金被理性的使用了，但是很多资金却用来达到非商业的目的，比如创造就业和拉关系发财致富。

None of this has stopped China from growing at a dizzying pace. But the quality of growth matters too, as the middle-class protesters in Zhejiang indicate (see article). China’s leaders should beware the hidden costs of state capitalism.

       所有的这些问题都没能挡住中国经济快速增长的脚步，但是增长的质量也是非常重要的，正如浙江中产阶级的一些抗议者说的那样。中国的领导者应该当心国家资本主义潜在的成本。