预防出生缺陷宣传栏:经济学人：天朝经济预测中国的崛起（图）

到2030年，中国经济可能逼急英国十九世纪七十年代或美国二十世纪七十年代的水平

Sep 10th 2011 | from the print edition 

2011.9.10 | 来自纸质版本

IT IS perhaps a measure of America’s resilience as an economic power that its demise is so often foretold. In 1956 the Russians politely informed Westerners that “history is on our side. We will bury you.” In the 1980s history seemed to side instead with Japan. Now it appears to be taking China’s part.

作为一个经常被预言灭亡的经济力量，这可能是对美国的恢复能力的预测。1956年，俄罗斯人礼貌地通知西方人“历史站在我们这边。我们将会埋葬你。”到了二十世纪八十年，历史似乎站到了日本那边去了。现在，历史又好像眷顾了中国。

These prophesies are “self-denying”, according to Larry Summers, a former economic adviser to President Barack Obama. They fail to come to pass partly because America buys into them, then rouses itself to defy them. “As long as we’re worried about the future, the future will be better,” he said, shortly before leaving the White House. His speech is quoted in “Eclipse”, a new book by Arvind Subramanian of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Mr Subramanian argues that China’s economic might will overshadow America’s sooner than people think. He denies that his prophecy is self-denying. Even if America heeds its warning, there is precious little it can do about it.

据美国总统奥巴马的前经济顾问Larry Summers称，这些预言都是“自我否定的”。预言没有实现的部分原因是美国相信了它们，然后提醒自己去防范其发生。在他即将离开白宫之前，他说：“只要我们担心着未来，未来就会变得更好。”他的演讲还被《日蚀》（全名是《日蚀：活在中国经济统治的阴影下》）所引用，该书由彼得森国际经济研究所的Arvind Subramanian著写。Subramanian先生认为，中国经济可能会以比人们想象还要快的速度掩盖了美国。他不认同说他的预言是自我否定的。即使美国留意到这个警号，但是它能做的可能为零。

Three forces will dictate China’s rise, Mr Subramanian argues: demography, convergence and “gravity”. Since China has over four times America’s population, it only has to produce a quarter of America’s output per head to exceed America’s total output. Indeed, Mr Subramanian thinks China is already the world’s biggest economy, when due account is taken of the low prices charged for many local Chinese goods and services outside its cities. Big though it is, China’s economy is also somewhat “backward”. That gives it plenty of scope to enjoy catch-up growth, unlike Japan’s economy, which was still far smaller than America’s when it reached the technological frontier.

Subramanian先生认为，将会有三股力量决定中国的崛起：人口、集结和“重力”。因为中国人口超过了美国的四倍，所以它只需要做到人均产值是美国的四分之一，就足以超越美国的总产值。实际上，Subramanian先生认为中国已经是世界最大经济体，考虑到预期数目按照本地中国商品和服务在其它城市所要的低价计算的。虽然这是个大问题，中国经济显得稍微有点“倒退”。但是却给了中国许多机会去享受追赶成长的乐趣，不像日本经济那样，即使日本走在了科技的前沿，可是日本经济仍然比美国的小很多。

Buoyed by these two forces, China will account for over 23% of world GDP by 2030, measured at PPP, Mr Subramanian calculates. America will account for less than 12%. China will be equally dominant in trade, accounting for twice America’s share of imports and exports. That projection relies on the “gravity” model of trade, which assumes that commerce between countries depends on their economic weight and the distance between them. China’s trade will outpace America’s both because its own economy will expand faster and also because its neighbours will grow faster than those in America’s backyard.

Subramanian先生推算，受到这两股力量的推动，按购买力平价计算，到2030年中国的GDP将占超过全球的23%。中国贸易将同样占到主导地位，其贸易量占美国进出口份额的两倍。这个设想是依赖于贸易“重力”模型，此模型是这样的，假设两国之间的商务是取决于它们的经济比重和两国之间的距离。中国的贸易将会超越美国是因为它自身的经济会更快扩张，还因为它的邻国的成长速度会比那些在美国后花园的要快。

Mr Subramanian combines each country’s share of world GDP, trade and foreign investment into an index of economic “dominance”. By 2030 China’s share of global economic power will match America’s in the 1970s and Britain’s a century before (see chart). Those prudent American strategists preparing their countrymen for a “multipolar” world are wrong. The global economy will remain unipolar, dominated by a “G1”, Mr Subramanian argues. It’s just that the one will be China not America.

Subramanian先生结合各国的世界GDP份额、贸易份额和境外投资份额，做出了一个经济“主导”指数。到2030年，中国的全球经济力量份额将会达到美国二十世纪七十年代和英国一个世纪前的水平（上图）。那些美国同胞为迎接一个“多级”世界作准备的精明策略是错误的。Subramanian先生认为，全球经济依然是单极的，由一个"G1"主导。只不过那一个将会是中国，而不是美国。

Mr Subramanian’s conclusion is controversial. The assumptions, however, are conservative. He does not rule out a “major financial crisis”. He projects that China’s per-person income will grow by 5.5% a year over the next two decades, 3.3 percentage points slower than it grew over the past two decades or so. You might almost say that Mr Subramanian is a “China bear”. He lists several countries (Japan, Hong Kong, Germany, Spain, Taiwan, Greece, South Korea) that reached a comparable stage of development—a living standard equivalent to 25% of America’s at the time—and then grew faster than 5.5% per head over the subsequent 20 years. He could find only one, Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania, which reached that threshold and then suffered a worse slowdown than the one he envisages for China.

Subramanian先生的结论引起了争议。然而这个假设还是保守的。他没有排除一个“严重经济危机”。他预计在未来二十年中国人均收入将会以每年5.5%的增速增长，这个数字比其过去二十年的大约少了3.3个百分点。他列出了一些具有可比发展阶段——生活标准相当于美国同时期的25%——并且之后20年以超过人均5.5%的增速增长的国家和地区（日本、香港、德国、西班牙、台湾、希腊、韩国）。最后他只找到了一个国家——尼古拉·齐奥塞斯库领导的罗马尼亚——能够达到这个门槛而且之后遭受了比他给中国设想的还要严重的经济放缓。

He is overly sanguine only on the problems posed by China’s ageing population. In the next few years, the ratio of Chinese workers to dependants will stop rising and start falling. He dismisses this demographic turnaround in a footnote, arguing that it will not weigh heavily on China’s growth until after 2030.

他只是对中国人口老龄化带来的问题过于乐观。在未来几年里，中国劳动力与非劳动力的比例将会停止上升，并且开始下滑。他在一个脚注里表明了不予考虑这个人口转变问题，认为在2030年之前这在中国成长里头不会占很大比重。

Both China and America could surprise people, of course. If China’s political regime implodes, “all bets will be off”, Mr Subramanian admits. Indonesia’s economy, by way of comparison, took over four years to right itself after the financial crisis that ended President Suharto’s 32-year reign. But even that upheaval only interrupted Indonesia’s progress without halting it. America might also rediscover the vim of the 1990s boom, growing by 2.7% per head, rather than the 1.7% Mr Subramanian otherwise assumes. But even that stirring comeback would not stop it falling behind a Chinese economy growing at twice that pace. So Americans are wrong to think their “pre-eminence is America’s to lose”.

当然，中国和美国都会有令人大跌眼镜的时候。Subramanian承认，如果中国政治体制突然崩溃，“一切打赌都玩完了”。相比之下，在经济危机结束了苏哈托总统32年的统治之后，印尼经济用了超过四年时间才能恢复过来。但是，即使是动乱也只是打断了印尼的进程，而没有让它停止。美国还有可能重拾上世纪九十年代繁盛时期的力量，以人均2.7%的增速增长，而不是Subramanian先生另外假设的1.7%。但是，即使那股力量回来也未能阻止其落后于以两倍于其速度增长的中国经济。所以美国人认为他们的“出类拔萃就是是美国的失去”这个想法是错误的。

Bratty or benign?

是顽皮还是仁慈？

If China does usurp America, what kind of hegemon will it be? Some argue that it will be a “premature” superpower. Because it will be big before it is rich, it will dwell on its domestic needs to the neglect of its global duties. If so, the world may resemble the headless global economy of the inter-war years, when Britain was unable, and America unwilling, to lead. But Mr Subramanian prefers to describe China as a precocious superpower. It will not be among the richest economies, but it will not be poor either. Its standard of living will be about half America’s in 2030, and a little higher than the European Union’s today.

如果中国真的篡夺了美国的地位，这会是一个怎样的霸主呢？一些人认为这会是一个“早熟的”超级大国。因为在它富裕之前它相当大，它会停留于其国内需求，而忽视了其全球责任。如果是这样的话，世界可能就像一个没有领头的全球经济，正如两次世界大战期间那样，英国没有能力领导，美国不愿意领导。但是Subramanian先生喜欢把中国描述成一个早熟的超级大国。它不会是最富有的经济体，但也绝对不会穷。到2030年，它的生活标准大约是美国的一半，略高于今天的欧盟。

With luck China will combine its precocity in economic development with a plodding conservatism in economic diplomacy. It should remain committed to preserving an open world economy. Indeed, its commitment may run deeper than America’s, because its ratio of trade to GDP is far higher.

运气好的话，中国将会把经济发展中的早熟和经济外交中单调乏味的保守主义结合。它应该继续致力于维护一个开放的世界经济。事实上，它的坚持可能比美国走得更远，因为其贸易占GDP的比例高很多。

China’s dominance will also have limits, as Mr Subramanian points out. Unlike America in the 1940s, it will not inherit a blank institutional slate, wiped clean by war. The economic order will not yield easily to bold new designs, and China is unlikely to offer any. Why use its dominant position to undermine the very system that helped secure that position in the first place? In a white paper published this week, China’s State Council insisted that “China does not seek regional hegemony or a sphere of influence.” Whether it is precocious or premature, China is still a tentative superpower. As long as it remains worried about the future, its rivals need not worry too much.

正如Subramanian先生所指出的，中国的主导地位还是有很多局限性。不像二十世纪四十年代的美国，战争把一切都刷得干干净净，中国不可能有一块白板来等着它去继承。经济秩序不会轻易地对大胆的新设计让步，而中国有不太可能提供任何东西。为什么要用它的主导地位去渐渐破坏唯独能帮助其稳坐首席的系统？在本周发行的一本白皮书中写道，中国国务院坚称“中国没有谋求地区霸权或势力范围。”无论它是早熟还是未成熟，中国依然是一个不确定的超级大国。只要它仍然担心着未来，它的对手没必要担心太多。