超世纪战神插曲:Moving into a Post-Western World - Focus disc...

来源：百度文库编辑：九乡新闻网时间：2024/04/29 00:09:03

Moving into a Post-Western World

Simon Serfaty Simon Serfaty is the first holder of the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at CSIS. Dr. Serfaty is also a senior professor of U.S. foreign policy with theGraduate Programs in International Studies at Old Dominion University.

2.jpeg (7.64 KB)
2011-5-2 15:10

The ‘‘unipolar moment’’ that followed the Cold War was expected to start an era. Not only was the preponderance of U.S. power beyond question, the facts of that preponderance appeared to exceed the reach of any competitor.

America’s superior capabilities (military, but also economic and institutional)that no other country could match or approximate in toto, its global interests which no other power could share in full, and its universal saliency confirmed that the United States was the only country with all the assets needed to act decisively wherever it chose to be involved.2 What was missing, however, was a purpose a national will to enforce a strategy of preponderance that would satisfy U.S. interests and values without offending those of its allies and friends. That purpose was unleashed after the horrific events of September 11, 2001. Now, however, the moment is over, long before any era had the time to get started.

1.jpg (14.12 KB)
2011-5-2 15:10

1. Non-polar instead of uni-polar

Such a turn of events is not surprising. Unipolar systems have been historically rare and geographically confined, at most geostrategic interludes during which weaker nations combined to entangle Gulliver with a thousand strings. What is surprising, though, is not only how quickly this most recent moment ended, but also how quickly a consensus has emerged about an inevitable and irreversible shift of power away from the United States and the West. Moving out of this consensual bandwagon, the challenge is to think about the surprises and discontinuities ahead. In the 20th century, the post- Europe world was not about the rise of U.S. power, but about the collapse of everyone else. In the 21st century, the post-Western world, should it beconfirmed, need not be about the decline of Western powers, including the United States, but about the ascendancy of everyone else.

Lacking regulations, whether tacit or explicit, a world of several or many powers is likely to be messy, at least for a while, and even dangerous. Attempting to reassert U.S. preponderance and Western dominance may not be desirable, even if it were feasible, but the ability of any other power to achieve preponderance over the United States and the West will not be feasible either, even if it were deemed desirable. A return to unipolar conditions is thus unlikely, but so is a return to bipolar conditions, notwithstanding repeated forecasts of China as America’s principal rival. Finally, absent a major discontinuity such as the use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict, a ‘‘concert’’ remotely comparable to what emerged in Europe after 1815 is also improbable, as neither the goals nor the members of any such concert would be readily identifiable, even if limited to democratic states. Without a state able and willing to assert its preponderance, or share it with a co-partner or even a rival, unipolarity has given way to de facto zero-polarity, which has also been called ‘‘non-polarity’’ or ‘‘apolarity.’’

In an era of globalization, there is a sense of interdependence which makes interests converge, and translates into a sort of ‘‘inter-polarity’’ which relies on a collective ‘‘we’’ to achieve these interests.6 Regardless of what the new world structure is called, order looks elusive. Picking allies, making friends, containing adversaries, and deterring conflicts promises to be an unclear, ambiguous, and delicate process.

2 US power still dominant

Entering the 2010s, the United States still enjoys superiority over allies and adversaries alike_no other country can match the completeness of U.S. power, however defined_hard, soft, or smart_and however measured, aggregate or per capita.8 There are weaknesses and vulnerabilities, including a volatile public opinion, which reinforce a need for allies and partners that are not only willing but also capable given unprecedented fiscal pressures.9 Under such conditions, a U.S. strategy of preponderance is no longer achievable. But the facts of power should not be overlooked either, and a strategy of U.S. abstinence would not be desirable or even sustainable. This is not the time for the United States to step back from the world, and the U.S. role promises to remain pivotal if a measure of order is going to prevail over more chaos.

In the meantime, a post-America, post-Western world is characterized by a lack of political will and societal resilience more than a depletion of resources and fading relevance. On the European side of the Atlantic especially, the national consensus is fragile everywhere. There are coalition governments in countries that lack experience in multiparty politics, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, and there is a new populism fed by self-images that do not absorb imperial projects well. Modest and unevenly-shared economic growth frustrates an enduring culture of entitlements.

Defense budgets are falling, and there is rising frustration with an abusive world. In short, anger is directed at the bigger rival because it is too big or too powerful, and impatience at the smaller neighbor because it is too small or too poor. Is learning how to live frugally, age graciously, and retire peacefully the fate of the West in a new post-Western world?

3 Three relationships determine the future

Accommodating this large cluster of emerging world powers, and an unusually large group of other states of rising influence, all with incompatible historical cultures and clashing conceptions of their place in the world, is a pressing and daunting challenge.26 There are new friends to make, but there are also old partners to keep and rivals to remember. While much remains to be learned about what such a world might look like, at least three conclusions have already emerged to help settle into, and even construct order in, this post-Western world.

First, the United States and the states of Europe remain the least dispensable bilateral relationship in the world. Yet, however necessary the transatlantic partnership is, the framework it provides is too narrow to be sufficient for the new world order.

Second, China and India are more interested in the United States and Europe than in each other. Neither country holds a ‘‘card’’ that it can effectively play with the other, or even with others, against the West.

Third, good relations between Russia and China do not pose a serious threat to the West, and prospects of an upgrade in Russia’s relations with India are also bleak. Although Russia is not a Western power, its future is with the West.

For the United States especially, it is not an easy undertaking to move into a new world that is difficult to like and even more difficult to grasp. After the Cold War, there was some charm and even comfort during the short moment of unipolarity, when power talked and did not demand too much listening. In a unipolar world, allies are known (and sought) for their willingness, and adversaries are recognized (and defeated) for their capabilities; there is little need for diplomacy, and consensus is asserted rather than negotiated. By comparison, the emerging world order now depends on a geopolitical cartography that is fraught with perplexities and contradictions_precisely the sort of world that the Founding Fathers warned against when they urged that the new republic be kept away from, and free of, entangling alliances.

Yet, there is little that is intrinsically wrong, generally threatening, or specifically harmful in this cartography. By comparison, the all-American map of unipolarity looked simple but proved exhausting, and the bipolar map of the Cold War was stable but remained dangerous. Only the next few years will tell whether a new generation of political leaders in the United States, as well as in Europe, will be able to grasp the enormity of what their predecessors achieved during the past century for what Dean Acheson defined as ‘‘half the world,’’ and how much can still be done in the 21st century for the other half.

Moving into a Post-Western World - Focus disc... post-Osama world Female reporter taps into emotions of post-qu... When China rates the world - Focus discussion... Post-Gaddafi Era Already In Sight? - Focus di... Western fear of China may cost the world - Fo... In Libya, an Odd-Couple Alliance - Focus disc... China & US: Game on Oil in Libya - Focus disc... China's kind of new heavy bomber - Focus disc... What does the IMF scandal rock ? - Focus disc... New world order: B5 vs G7? - Focus discussion... The Future of the Liberal World Order - Focus... Insights into PPLive: A Measurement Study of ... Insights into PPLive: A Measurement Study of ... China Leader’s Limits Come Into Focus as U.S. Visit Nears Western countries should abandon illusion of world domination - People's Daily Online Occupy Wall Street movement spilled into main streets around the world Taiwan, a ticking time bomb - Focus discussio... Is China developing a VSTOL fighter? - Focus ... The world appreciates a steady yuan: World Ba... BBC - A History of the World - Home Mullen: China Now A World Power 【爵士大师】阿姆斯壮《what a wonderful world》恭喜发财！ May you come into a good fortune! -音画欣赏