腾讯影业与鹿晗:英国汽车工业兴衰对中国的启示

有这样一个国家，在二十世纪中叶的时候，它是世界汽车工业的猛虎雄狮，生产的乘用车、卡车和巴士出口到全球几乎每一个国家，其品牌以卓越的科技举世闻名，各地顾客趋之若鹜。有这样一个国家，还是所谓的发达国家，如今其自有汽车品牌的制造业务蜕变成全球规模最小的集群之一，甚至可以说几乎从人们的视线中消失，但在汽车设计领域，它仍然独领风骚。我想你我都会不约而同地脱口而出，这就是英国。

英国曾为世人带来许多标志性品牌，包括劳斯莱斯、捷豹、宾利等等，不一而足，但眼下一些观察家则视英国为一艘泊于欧洲大陆岸旁的航空母舰，成为一个组装基地，专门为日本、美国还有如今的印度汽车厂商提供业务发展的甲板。

那么，英国自有汽车品牌的崛起和急剧的衰落能否对目前中国蓬勃发展而且显然无可匹敌的汽车产业有所启迪呢？这就是笔者本文要试图阐释的问题。我曾供职于英国最大的汽车制造商，亲身经历其最为艰难的时光，故此笔者可与读者分享一些业界内幕。

1950年英国称霸于全球汽车市场。英国制造的车辆中，四分之三的乘用车和60%的商用车出口海外，而此前不到十五年，出口仅为生产量的15%。当时英国出口的车辆占世界出口总量的52%。之所以会出现这一辉煌而短暂的增长现象，其原因颇为复杂，但主要与二战（1939-45）对西方各国不同程度的影响有关。即便如此，这仍然是非凡的成就。可惜的是，英国汽车业的壮观场面昙花一现。到了上个世纪60和70年代，主要国家在全球的实力对比发生转变，英国汽车制造业开始走下坡路，逐渐解体，导致产量大幅下滑，失业人数遽升，企业大批破产。

英国汽车工业短暂的兴盛和最终的势弱，最好的代表就是著名的英国利兰集团。该集团由利兰公司(Leyland)和英国汽车公司(BMC)这两家似乎不太可能共处同一屋檐下的企业合并而成，前者是经营成功并效益良好的世界知名卡车制造商，而后者的管理乏善可陈，由多个汽车品牌匆匆忙忙地拼凑而成。该集团成为战后英国整个工业界流弊的象征。那么，问题到底出在哪里呢？

仁者见仁，智者见智，答案众说纷纭。许多才具远胜于我的人士就此争论了数十年。不过，各方对利兰集团衰落的主要原因还是形成了较为清晰的共识。这些因素包括：集团未能认识到竞争对手实力的快速增长，管理松懈薄弱，工会势力膨胀，成本居高不下，产品质量差强人意，品牌价值被完全忽略。当然，还有另外一个因素，那就是集团解体前夕政府干预的冥冥之手。这一点在中国恐怕还是颇受争议。

本文无意全面深入地剖析上述诸多原因，不过笔者愿借此机会对其进行一些简要分析，并比较一下二十一世纪头十年的中国汽车产业和当时的英国汽车工业状况。

二战结束以后，英国汽车厂商依然严重依赖在大英帝国前殖民地的销售。在二十世纪上半叶，这些地区还是属于英国的势力范围。笔者所指的主要是非洲和印度，当然也包括其它国家和地区，比如香港。这些市场为英国商品敞开大门，都具有两大特征：其一是没有本土竞争对手，其二是消费群体要求不高。它们的结合意味着重病在身的英国厂商仍然可以轻易地在当地销售二流的车辆，不用担心低劣的质量和糟糕的服务。不过，英国企业当时并没有意识到自己已疾病缠身，但投资的缺乏和竞争压力的加大表明它们确实处于水深火热之中。

显而易见的是，中国汽车产业目前的状况极其相似。相较于巨大的总产出，中国汽车的出口数量还是非常小。而且，出口大多集中于产品标准不高的市场，比如智利、乌克兰、非洲等国家和地区。这些市场没有对最新技术的渴求，尚未施行最新立法标准，尤其是在排放和安全领域。

从本质上来讲，英国汽车厂商的管理层软弱而自闭。高管缺乏决心来处理根深蒂固的劳工问题，完全未能察觉竞争对手实力的迅猛增长。英国车企的对手起初源自德国，而后其挑战又来自日本和韩国。

诚然，中国的经理人勿须挂念类似的劳工问题，但他们需要非常仔细地跟踪观察海外竞争者的所作所为。在许多情况下，境外企业的劳工政策都源于各地立法标准，而中国车企才刚刚在海内外市场逐步接纳并适应这些法规。中国新近出现的薪金上涨和劳资纠纷现象，固然影响不大，但恐怕会成为令人顾虑的趋势。

英国工会运动的历史几乎等同于英国利兰集团的沉浮。工会追求认定的劳工权利，致力于工资的提高和环境的改善。当时在利兰集团，而且应该说，同样在其它英国企业，工人罢工和劳资纠纷已然成为业界固有现象。在某种意义上，这导致生产无法正常持续地进行，并最终导致英国从制造业大国转型为服务业经济体。对社会上的许多人来讲，其后果是灾难性的。

在中国，上述问题似乎不可思议。长期来看，职业道德和社会传统上的自律意味着这些问题不太可能发生。不过，如前文所述，有一些苗头逐渐引人注目，使得业界领袖开始关注劳动力成本的攀升和劳工的忠诚度。

在上个世纪六十年代的利兰集团，劳动力密集型的生产方式和过多的车型系列使企业无法降低制造成本。英国产品的单位成本超过其日本、欧洲和美国对手。这是基本的经济现实的困境，即使最优秀的经理人也无力克服。同时，利兰集团的产品质量糟糕透顶，以至于消费者不惜一切代价避免购买英国制造。

当然，就此而言，中国似乎不太有必要从中吸取什么经验教训。中国的生产成本在全世界属最低之列，这也是中国制造在全球制造类产品中占据高比例的原因。其它一些亚洲国家正在挑战中国的低成本地位，但是中国的劳动力数量惊人地庞大，这些对手恐怕永远无法成功。不过，在产品质量方面，中国企业需要不断警醒，因为它们与业内领军企业相比仍然存在较大差距。

在鼎盛时期，利兰集团拥有一些全球汽车业内最著名的标志性品牌，包括奥斯丁（Austin）、莫里斯（Morris）、名爵（MG）、莱利（Riley）、霍斯利（Wolseley）、凯旋（Triumph）、捷豹、戴姆勒等等。这些品牌都具有独特的个性，坐拥忠实的顾客。遗憾的是，这些巨额资产大多被轻率行事的管理层白白浪费了，因为他们未能认识到这些品牌蕴含的超级力量。当你得知捷豹公司曾被短期更名为‘第二大型汽车制造厂’时，你就会明白当时利兰集团高管队伍管理品牌的能力是如何的低下。不过幸好这一运动性能优异的世界顶级汽车品牌如今又恢复了原名。

我认为，正是在这一点上中国车企可有所借鉴。尽管中国民众热爱名牌（在中国任何购物大街上，西方品牌都是满目充斥，遍布大大小小的店铺），他们对本土汽车品牌似乎令人惊讶地冷淡。中国车企尚未努力在海外受众中传播自己的品牌，包括比亚迪、长安、力帆等等，虽然它们都声称拥有雄心勃勃的出口战略。在全球范围内打造品牌需要多年的时间，耗资以百万和千万计。这一进程本来现在就该走上正轨了。

在英国政府控制利兰集团之后，各方并不愉快，最后集团陷于崩溃。在六十年代后期，面临绝望的政客们将利兰事实上国有化，孤注一掷，以图保全该集团。我作为新鲜血液于1975年加盟利兰。此时，英国政府刚刚向利兰注入相当于100亿元人民币的巨额资金，意在藉此开发出大量新车型。然而不幸的是，政客们的举措来得太迟，而且力度远远不够。

当然，许多中国车企都完全由国家控制，深受其战略方向的影响。这是中国的国情。迄今为止，恐怕无人会说此一模式的效果都是负面的。然而，政界人士不理解像品牌管理之类的事务，也不理解像产品规格和构成此类让某车型大受欢迎而让另一车型销售平平的要素。只有世界一流的职业经理人才能胜任这些工作。为强化中国汽车产业的实力，中国政界领袖眼前就可做到的要务之一，就是培养和吸引更多此类人才，并放手让他们大刀阔斧地工作，拓展公司业务。

那么，笔者要从中得出什么结论呢？在表面上看来，中国正开始称雄于全球汽车制造业。中国拥有诸多实力强大，设备精良的车企，而他们正快速地获取高新技术和优秀人才，从而参与国际竞争。中国车企有崭新的工厂，有受过良好教育和培训，渴望成功的员工。中国车企还极大地受益于世界上发展最快的国内市场。

然而事实上，中国汽车产业并非如此强盛。笔者通过本文想指出的是，在产品进入世界上最苛刻的汽车市场并参与竞争取得成功之前，中国汽车不会真正得到消费者的青睐。这些市场包括北美、欧洲和日本。到目前为止，中国的汽车品牌仍明显缺席这些国家和地区。

中国汽车业界对打造品牌所需要素缺乏认知。它需要高额的投入、连贯的运作、对品牌价值的真实理解，以及毫无疑问的是，将品牌价值传播给大量受众的切实手段。看看那些全球知名的强势品牌，包括可口可乐、麦当劳、IBM等等；或者，看看那些优秀的汽车品牌，比如奔驰、宝马和福特等，我们就会明白打造品牌的内在含义。

这些公司都一心一意专注于其品牌，在每一个市场都竭尽全力地保护、培育和推广这些品牌。在中国本土汽车品牌中，我们见到过这样的举措吗？很遗憾的是，答案是否定的。

前不久，我有机会与一家中国知名车企的高管进行交流。该公司正计划在近期打入欧洲市场。这些高管告诉我，他们将品牌管理，以及渠道开发、销售和其它所有一切，都‘分包’给其欧洲独家代理经销商。我瞠目结舌，觉得不可思议！我们无法想象奔驰、宝马或大众汽车在中国市场做出同样的举动。它们诚然坚持与中方伙伴的合作，但绝对管控自己的品牌，连细枝末节都要过问。

这才是通向成功的道路。如我此前所言，在竞争激烈的主要成熟市场塑造和推出新的品牌，其过程相当漫长。自知名但持怀疑态度的自由媒体赢得正面的报道，本身就是一个相对独立的艰巨任务。我领导的公司一直在努力协助中国品牌与这些媒体建立良好关系。不过，迄今为止，我们的进展较为缓慢。此种状况在不久的将来肯定会打击中国车企海外销售的增长。

因此，笔者以为，中国当代汽车产业的成就值得大书特书，但误区不少，当引起高度重视。

与此同时，英国虽已不再是世界汽车制造业的主力，但并非失去一切。比如说，全球80%的赛车由英国生产，大量一级方程式车队植根于英国，英国培训的许多设计师在全球各主要汽车设计团队掌舵。英国在创新和技术研发领域仍保有卓越声誉。英国仍然拥有一些顶级品牌和世界级营销人才，这绝非偶然。

数十年之前，韩国车企开始重点突击西方市场，他们主要聘用英国专才来管理并推动其业务，这也不令人感到意外。或许，将来英国对华的出口将是人才和技能服务，而非看得见摸得着的汽车？如然若此，长远看来，对英国利兰集团遗产的评价也将不会如此负面。

2011年1月《汽车导报》专栏转载

Britain’s boom to bust motor industry – are there lessons for China?

By Martin Hayes

Think of country which halfway through the 20th Century was the raging tiger of the world’s motor industry, with its cars, trucks and buses exported to just about every country in the world and with brands which were renowned for their advanced technology and customer appeal. Think of a country which – for a so-called developed nation – today has one of the smallest, indeed virtually invisible, domestically owned automotive sectors yet which is still at the forefront of vehicle design. You would be thinking of the same country - Britain.

Britain gave the world such iconic motor brands as Rolls Royce, Jaguar, Bentley and many, many more but is now viewed by some observers as being like an aircraft carrier moored off the coast of Continental Europe, serving as an assembly source for Japanese, American and now Indian car makers.

So could the rise and dramatic fall of the British-owned motor industry have lessons for the burgeoning and apparently invincible motor industry of today’s China? That’s what I am trying to address in this article – and I have inside knowledge since I was employed by Britain’s largest vehicle maker during its most difficult period.

In 1950 Britain dominated the global automotive market. Three quarters of British car production and 60% of its commercial vehicle production was exported (up from just 15% less than 15 years previously) and Britain provided 52% of the world's exported vehicles. There are complex reasons behind that meteoric growth, many to do with the consequences to Western countries of World War 2 (1939-45), but nevertheless it was a remarkable achievement yet one which was sadly short lived with real global power turning – during the 1960s and 1970s – into weakness, collapse and the decimation of output, jobs and companies.

The symbol of Britain’s transient strength and eventual weakness was the conglomerate known as British Leyland (BL). An unlikely combination of a successful, profitable and world renowned truck maker (Leyland) and a creaky, hastily assembled collection of car brands (BMC), this company came to be a metaphor for the ills of the entire industrial sector in Britain in the post war years. So what went wrong?

While this is a highly complex argument, and one which has been argued over for decades by brains much more powerful than mine, the key factors in the decline are fairly clear. They span: a failure to recognise the pace of improvement amongst competitors; weak management; overly powerful trades unions; too high costs coupled with poor product quality; and a singular failure to care for brand values. Oh, yes, and one other ingredient, contentious in the Chinese context – the dead hand, towards the end, of Government intervention.

Without trying to fully analyse each of these, let me briefly address these issues and draw some parallels with the Chinese motor industry during the first decade of the 21st Century.

Post the War, Britain’s motor manufacturers still relied heavily on sales to what had once been the British Empire and which even in the first half of the 20th Century remained areas of British influence – I’m thinking particularly of Africa and India but stretching, for example, to Hong Kong and elsewhere. Those countries shared two key attributes which opened the door to British imports – a lack of indigenous competitors and an undemanding consumer base. This combination meant that ailing British makers (they didn’t know they were ailing at the time but lack of investment and a realisation of competitive pressures meant that they certainly were) could still sell second rate and poorly produced and supported vehicles without difficulty.

The Chinese parallel here is obvious. Most of China’s vehicle exports – really quite small given total output – today are going to undemanding markets such as Chile, Ukraine, Africa etc. These are countries which do not demand the latest technological developments or impose the latest legislative standards, particularly in respect of emissions and safety.

The management of Britain’s motor makers was intrinsically weak and inward looking. It lacked the resolve to deal with some deep-seated labour issues and failed to notice the dramatic growth of competitors from Germany and, later, Japan and Korea.

Well, Chinese managers do not have to address labour issues such as those (though recent wage inflation and worker unrest, though minor, is perhaps a worrying trend) but they do need to very carefully track what overseas rivals are doing, driven in many cases by the legislative standards which China is only slowly embracing both at home and in export markets.

British trades union history – in its quest for perceived worker rights and improved pay and conditions – is almost synonymous with British Leyland and its fall. At that company (and it has to be said, at other British makers at the time) strikes and disputes were a part of the industrial scene in a way which was totally unsustainable and which led – in the fullness of time – to the switch of Britain from a manufacturing nation to a service economy, with dire results for many in society.

In China such problems seem inconceivable and both the work ethic and the traditionally disciplined society mean that they can be avoided in the long term. Yet, as I said in my last point, there are one or two minor trends becoming visible which concern labour costs and commitment and which should concern industrial leaders.

 Labour-intensive methods, and wide model ranges hindered opportunities to reduce manufacturing costs inside BL in the 1960s. Britain's unit production costs were higher than those of its major Japanese, European and American competitors. This is a fundamental economic fact which even the very best managers cannot overcome. At the same time, in BL, product quality was abysmal to the point where ‘Made in Britain’ became a label consumers avoided at all costs.

Well, here at least, there seems not much of a lesson to be learned for China. Its production costs are some of the lowest in the world – that’s why such a very high percentage of the world’s manufactured products are ‘Made in China’. Although some other Asian nations are challenging that low-cost role, the sheer scale of China’s workforce surely means that such competitors can never overtake it. In terms of quality, though, Chinese makers need to be continually alert – they still have some way to go to catch the best of the rest.

At its peak, BL controlled some of the best and most iconic car brands in the global motor industry lexicon including Austin, Morris, MG, Riley, Wolseley, Triumph, Jaguar, Daimler and many more. Yet this enormous heritage – each brand had its own distinct personality and buyers – was largely squandered by an uncaring management who failed to understand the power of these assets. When you hear that the Jaguar factory (then, and thankfully now once again, restored as one of the highest prestige sporting brands) was briefly renamed ‘Large Car Factory No 2’ you know all you need to about the brand management skills of BL management of the time.

Here, I do think, Chinese makers have some lessons to learn. Despite China being a nation of brand lovers – just go down any high street and see those Western brands plastered all over shop fronts and billboards – attitudes to Chinese motor brands seems surprisingly lax. Little effort is being made to educate audiences outside China about brands such as BYD, Changan, Lifan and the rest – yet all claim to have strong export sales ambitions. Global brand building takes years and costs millions – its a process which should be well underway right now.

Finally, BL’s end came after a unhappy period of Government control. Despairing politicians effectively nationalised the business in the late 1960’s in a desperate bid to preserve it. When I joined the company – as a fresh-faced innocent – in 1975 it had just been awarded the then unimaginable sum of RMD 10 billion with which to invest in new models. But by then the politicians efforts were too little and too late.

 In China, of course, many motor makers are completely controlled by the State and all are heavily influenced by its strategic direction. Of course, that is the way in China and few could argue that that result has been anything but positive – up to now. But politicians do not understand issues such as branding, specifications and the ingredients which make one model desirable and another less so. Professional world class managers are required for that and, if there is one thing Chinese leaders could usefully do now to consolidate the power of the Chinese motor industry, it is to grow and attract more such people and then let them get on with the job of growing their businesses without undue central control.

So what do I draw from all of this? On the face of it China is becoming the dominant power in global automotive production. It has strong, well equipped auto companies who are fast acquiring the technological resources and skills to compete internationally. Its factories are new, its workers are well educated and trained and are keen to succeed. It has the enormous benefit of the fastest growing home market in the world.

And yet – all is not quite as strong as it first appears. As I have tried to point out in this article, Chinese products will not be taken seriously until they compete and succeed in the world’s most demanding car markets – and that means in North America, Europe and Japan. So far Chinese brands are conspicuously absent there.

And there is a real lack of perception about what brand building really entails. It involves high investment, consistent application and a really understanding of the values of the brand and a sure fire means of communicating those values to a mass audience. Just look at the globally strong brands – Coca Cola, McDonalds and IBM, for example. Or in the auto sector – Mercedes, BMW and Ford.

In those companies there is a single minded commitment to the brand and a complete dedication to protecting, nurturing and growing the brand in every market. Do we see that amongst indigenous Chinese auto brands? We do not, I am afraid.

I talked with executives from one of China’s best known car companies recently, one with imminent plans for European market entry. They told me that they had ‘sub-contracted’ brand management – along with dealer development, sales and everything else – to a single distributor for Europe. I was astonished! Its inconceivable that Mercedes, BMW or VW would do that in China – they work with the JV partners of course but they control and manage their own brands in minute detail.

That is the way to succeed and, as I‘ve already said, its a long drawn out process to fashion and launch a new brand in these highly competitive and critical markets. Just getting the best from an influential but sceptical and free media is a whole chapter in itself – and one where my company has been trying to help Chinese brands develop. But progress is slow at present and that will, before very long, be a real dampener on overseas sales growth for Chinese makers.

So there is lots to praise about the modern Chinese motor industry – but there are some concerns.

Meanwhile, Britain, having gone from being a world force in vehicle supply, has not lost everything. For example, 80 per cent of the world’s motor racing cars are developed in the UK, many of the Formula One teams are based there and many British-trained designers are at the helm of major car design teams worldwide. The country’s reputation for innovation and engineering excellence remains and its no accident that some of the best brand and marketing talents are to be found in the UK.

When Korean motor industry companies focused on Western markets a couple of decades ago its no accident that they hired largely British talent to manage their businesses and drive them forward. Maybe the future for British exports to China is in brains and skills rather than cars? If that is the case then the heritage of British Leyland may not – in the long term – be viewed so negatively.