郑州郭艳舞蹈:中国地缘战略中的围棋智慧

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个流传2,000年的棋盘游戏对于理解中国人的真正想法非常关键。想要赢得真正的竞争，美国官员最好学会这种棋盘游戏的玩法。

中国的围棋智慧与战争艺术
围棋，一种“包围对手的游戏”，在东方盛行已久（围棋在日本被称为Go，在韩国被称为Baduk）。如今，美国军官正试图从围棋中理解中国人真正的思维方式。来看具有35年围棋经验的老将Jean-Claude Chetrit给你上一堂生动的围棋课。
这是美国陆军军事学院（Army War College）教授来永庆（David Lai）近几个月来在美国和海外向军队高级官员宣传的一种论调。来永庆说，学习这种被称作“围棋”的古老棋盘游戏（在美国被称作Go）可以教外国人以中国领导人的视角来看待地缘战略的“棋盘”。
早在孔子时代就已盛行的围棋至今在亚洲广受欢迎。围棋和西方经典的战略博弈国际象棋完全不同。围棋的目标是在开放的棋盘落下棋子，对弈时要平衡保护自我和扩大地盘的两种需要。
在一条宽泛的“战线”上，围棋可以包括好几个局部“战场”，其追求的不是那种一战决胜负的玩法。在迅速构建战术优势的同时围棋也强调长远规划，因此一盘棋可以下几个小时。在中国，围棋的意思是“包围对手的游戏”。
来永庆说，围棋是中国战略思想和作战艺术的完美体现。来永庆是看着父亲下棋长大的。在文革动乱中他的父亲失去了工作。来永庆自称是一个拥有中级段位的棋手，大约30年前来到美国。
来永庆研究围棋和中国地缘战略之间关系的最知名的一篇论文是2004年发表的《他山之石可以攻玉》（Learning From the Stones），文章全面介绍了这种361枚黑白棋子最终落满棋盘361个交叉点的对弈游戏（围棋棋盘纵横各有19条等距离、垂直交叉的平行线，故有361个交叉点）。在文中来永庆详细描述了中国为了获得影响力所采用的长期、间接的方法。来永庆在文中也将注意力集中到具体的地缘政治挑战上来，比如台湾问题。按照他的描述，用围棋术语来说，“台湾只不过是一个庞大的活棋群前一个孤立的棋子而已”。
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围棋的意思是“包围对手的游戏”
来永庆认为，在中国领导人看来，台湾是一枚脆弱的棋子，美国应该想用这枚棋子换取“棋盘”上其它更加有利的位置。相形之下，美国不仅将台湾视作一个谈判的筹码，也是过去60多年来其在外交和军事上一直支持的盟友。
来永庆的论文不仅引起了其当时在阿拉巴马州美国空军大学（Air University）的几位教授的注意，也吸引了前任国务卿基辛格（Henry Kissinger）的兴趣，他迅速成为这种思维方式的追随者。
在新书《论中国》（On China）中，基辛格通篇使用围棋智慧解释中国领导人毛泽东和邓小平是如何在朝鲜战争时期，数次台海危机期间，越南战争时期，与东南亚各国以及前苏联发生冲突之际，以及中美关系正常化过程中处理和应对各种危机的。
比如，在朝鲜战争打响之初，美国总统杜鲁门（Harry Truman）向韩国派出美军，在台湾海峡部署美国海军。基辛格写道，在中国人看来，杜鲁门已经在棋盘上落下了两枚棋子，以可怕的包抄之势对中国构成了重大威胁。所以，尽管贫困的中国人厌倦了战争，他们还是觉得有必要和美国正面对决。
此外，还可用这个围棋来解释中国最近的行为。想想中国参与印度洋反海盗行动吧，这是中国首次为支持国际联合行动执行蓝水海军任务。西方倾向于把这类合作看成是中国负责任的表现。
但中国共产党中央委员会去年12月发表的一份战略文件却提供了一种与此不同的观点：反海盗任务可帮助中国在重要地区巧妙地站稳脚跟。文件说，中国可利用这种局势来扩大自己在非洲的军事存在。
空军上将、美国空军大学前校长洛伦茨(Steve Lorenz)是来永庆首批粉丝中的一员，后者当时在美国空军大学任教。洛伦茨于2005年末听过一场来永庆的报告，后又专门找时间让他向自己全面介绍了围棋能给人们带来哪些真知灼见。
现已退休的洛伦茨回忆说，他的介绍确实激起了我的好奇心，他让整整一代空军士兵用一种不同的方式来思考世界。
最近几个月，来永庆在美国太平洋司令部(Pacific Command)、美国空军全球打击司令部(U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command)、美国陆军分析中心(Center for Army Analysis)和澳大利亚国防学院(Australian Defence College)向军官们作报告。
美国国防官员定期接受外部专家提供的策略报告，美军还定期学习中国《孙子兵法》和古希腊人色诺芬(Xenophon)的《远征记》(The March of the Ten Thousand)等古典名著，让现代官兵接受古人的教导。
今年3月，来永庆在美国空军全球打击司令部的指挥官会议上向30多位军官发表了演讲。该司令部的一位官员说，用围棋作比喻确实让人着迷，对空军军官来说也很有实用，因为他们说不定哪天会不得不把中国视作潜在对手。不过他也承认，来永庆在演讲中提到了大量学术内容，这让很多人十分头痛。
这位不愿透露姓名的军官说，你要像对手那样来思考。
来永庆的理论并没有为中国专家所普遍接受。有些专家说，对于刚听到这个理论的人来说，把国家战略思想和流行运动及游戏进行对比是一种过于简单的做法，无论如何，中国版的国际象棋在中国也受到很多人的喜欢。
此外，尽管有孙子等中国古代军事思想家为根基，但对数千年来的中国领导人特别是中国共产党领导人到底是否遵循了单一的宏观战略很难下定论，更不消说遵循围棋所提供的战略思想了。
美国海军军事学院(Naval War College)研究中国战略的专家、霍姆斯(James Holmes) 教授说，围棋对于研究中国战略是一种很有用的工具，但不要过分夸大它的有用性。
虽然霍姆斯也认为，围棋可在一定程度上描述中国和美国在东亚地区的战略对峙，但对于把理论和现实世界里的真人行动割裂开的做法应当极度谨慎。
霍姆斯指出，中国近年来在外交方面犯下的欺侮邻邦、试图将别国海军赶出公海等“业余性”失误说明，它已偏离了下围棋的耐心和机智原则。
What Kind of Game Is China Playing?
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A 2,000-year-old board game holds the key to understanding how the Chinese really think─and U.S. officials had better learn to play if they want to win the real competition.
That's the pitch that David Lai, a professor at the Army War College, has been making in recent months to senior military officials in the U.S. and overseas. Learning the ancient board game of wei qi, known in the U.S. as Go, can teach non-Chinese how to see the geostrategic 'board' the same way that Chinese leaders do, he says.
The game, already well known in the days of Confucius and still wildly popular in Asia, is starkly different from chess, the classic Western game of strategy. The object of Go is to place stones on the open board, balancing the need to expand with the need to build protected clusters.
Go features multiple battles over a wide front, rather than a single decisive encounter. It emphasizes long-term planning over quick tactical advantage, and games can take hours. In Chinese, its name, wei qi (roughly pronounced 'way-chee'), means the 'encirclement game.'
'Go is the perfect reflection of Chinese strategic thinking and their operational art,' says Mr. Lai, who grew up watching his father─who was jobless during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution─constantly play the game. A self-described midlevel Go player, Mr. Lai came to the U.S. about 30 years ago.
Mr. Lai's best-known work about the nexus between Go and Chinese geopolitical strategy is a 2004 paper called 'Learning From the Stones,' a reference to the 361 black and white stone pieces that eventually fill the 19-by-19 Go board. He described China's long-term and indirect approach to acquiring influence. He also zeroed in on concrete geopolitical challenges such as Taiwan, which he described, in terms of Go, as a single isolated stone next to a huge mass of opposing pieces.
As Chinese leaders see it, he suggested, Taiwan was a vulnerable piece that the U.S. should want to trade away for a better position elsewhere on the board. The U.S., by contrast, sees Taiwan not as a bargaining chip but as a democratic ally that it has supported diplomatically and militarily for more than 60 years.
Mr. Lai's paper caught the attention not only of his then-bosses at the Air Force's Air University in Alabama but of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who quickly became a convert to his way of thinking.
Throughout his new book, 'On China,' Mr. Kissinger uses wei qi to explain how Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping managed crises during the Korean War, disputes over Taiwan, the Vietnam War, conflicts throughout Southeast Asia and with the Soviet Union, and the normalization of relations with the U.S.
In the first days of the Korean conflict, for example, President Harry Truman sent U.S. troops to South Korea and the U.S. Navy to the Taiwan strait. He had, 'in Chinese eyes,' Mr. Kissinger writes, 'placed two stones on the wei qi board, both of which menaced China with the dreaded encirclement.' Thus, despite being war-weary and impoverished, China felt the need to confront the U.S. directly.
The game can also be used to interpret recent Chinese behavior. Consider China's participation in antipiracy efforts in the Indian Ocean─the first time that China has undertaken blue-water naval operations in support of an international coalition. The West tends to see such cooperation as responsible behavior on China's part.
But a strategy paper published last December by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party offers a different view: that antipiracy operations can help China to subtly gain a foothold in a vital region. 'China can make use of this situation to expand its military presence in Africa,' the paper said.
One of Mr. Lai's first fans was Air Force Gen. Steve Lorenz, formerly the head of Air University, where Mr. Lai then taught. Gen. Lorenz heard one of his lectures in late 2005 and summoned him for a full briefing about the insights that Go could offer.
'It really intrigued me,' recalls Gen. Lorenz, now retired. 'He made a whole generation of airmen think about the world in a different way.'
In recent months, Mr. Lai has briefed officers at Pacific Command, the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command, the Center for Army Analysis and the Australian Defence College.
U.S. defense officials regularly receive strategy briefings from outside experts, and the U.S. military regularly taps ancient classics such as Sun Tzu's 'The Art of War' and Xenophon's 'The March of the Ten Thousand' to help educate modern officers.
One officer at the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command, where Mr. Lai gave a presentation at a commander's conference in March to about three dozen officers, said 'the game analogy really sparked fascination' and was useful for Air Force officers who might have to consider China a potential adversary one day. He conceded, though, that the briefing's heavy academic content left 'plenty of heads hurting.'
'You've got to think like the other guy thinks,' said the officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
Mr. Lai's theories are not universally embraced by China experts. For starters, some say, comparing national strategic thought to popular sports and games is an over-simplification─and at any rate, the Chinese version of chess has lots of adherents in China, too.
Furthermore, despite the ancient roots of Chinese military thinkers such as Sun Tzu, it's far from clear that Chinese leaders over the millennia, especially Communist Chinese leaders, have followed a single, broad strategy at all, let alone the one sketched by the board game.
'Go is a very useful device for analyzing Chinese strategy, but let's not overdo it,' says James Holmes, an expert on Chinese strategy and professor at the Naval War College.
Though he agrees that Go helps to describe the strategic showdown between China and the U.S. in East Asia, he says that 'we have to be extremely cautious about drawing a straight line from theory to the actions of real people in the real world.'
He notes that China's 'amateurish' diplomatic blunders in recent years, including bullying neighbors and trying to push other navies out of international waters, represent a departure from the patient, subtle tenets of Go.