逆战礼包大全:Maliki storm signals

Resignation adds to Maliki storm signals
By Sami Moubayed

DAMASCUS - The weekend resignation of Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi raised eyebrows, coming only three weeks after he was re-appointed to the post on May 12 by President Jalal Talabani.

Abdul Mehdi, 69, a Shi'ite heavyweight and permanent prime-minister-in-waiting, is one of the top leaders of the pro-Iran Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC). In 2005-2006, he fiercely competed for the premiership with then-prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki - missing the job by a vote against him by rebel turned politician Muqtada al-Sadr.

His boss, Ammar al-Hakim, commented on the resignation


saying: "I hope this will start a push to slim down the government."

According to the SIIC's website, his resignation came in response to "reservations expressed by the Marjiyah [the top Shi'ite clerical authority in Shi'ite Islam]." In February, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani put it bluntly, saying that politicians must not "invent unnecessary government positions that cost Iraq money".

In the past, the post of vice president, ceremonial as it may have been, was intended to appease both Shi'ites and Sunnis, given that in the post-Saddam Hussein era the presidency itself had been granted to the Kurds. Talabani and Maloki, however, made sure that whatever powers the VPs had were effectively curbed as they handled all affairs of the state on their own, often sidestepping the vice president, whether he was a Sunni or Shi'ite.
As a result of the new deal hammered out by Iraqi politicians after the March 2010 elections, Iraq now has three VPs, Abdul Mehdi, Tarek al-Hashemi, a Muslim Sunni and Khudayr al-Khuzai, a Shi'ite allied to Maliki. That is in addition to 50 cabinet seats - which is a colossal drain of the country's resources and, if anything, only adds to the polarization and struggle for cabinet seats between Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds.

An economist by training, Abdul Mehdi was born in 1942 and raised in Baghdad as the son of a respected Shi'ite cleric who served as minister during the monarchy of King Faisal II. He attended an elite American high school, Baghdad College, and left Iraq in 1969 for an exile in France as a member of the opposition to the ruling Ba'ath Party.

He worked with French think-tanks and edited publications in Arabic and French, becoming a ranking communist - a complete deviation from everything his religiously conservative father had stood for. By the 1980s, the rebel politician left the Iraqi Communist Party central leadership and began cuddling up to the Iranians, inspired by the revolutionary thought of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

He eventually became a member of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which was formed in Tehran in 1982, namely by Iraqi exiles, on the payroll of the Iranian government. This was a sharp U-turn from his communist background but it earned him the trust and respect of top Iranian officials. He returned to Iraq after the collapse of Saddam in 2003, becoming finance minister and barely surviving an assassination attempt in February 2007.

Abdul Mehdi's resignation will only become official once it is approved by Talabani, who is currently in the US for medical treatment.

By most accounts, he will not veto it but whoever replaces him at the post needs to be approved by the SIIC, which controls 70 seats in parliament and used to command a majority in the 2005-2010 parliament. The sudden resignation shows day-to-day Iraqis how much of a mess their country really is in and reveals unspoken Iranian anger with how the political process is developing.

Abdul Mehdi's resignation, after all, could not have been made without direct support of either President Mahmud Ahmadinejad or Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It would be safe to say that the resignation might even have been dictated to send a strong political message to all of Iran's allies in Iraq.

Abdul Mehdi and Ammar al-Hakim, after all, are their trusted allies in Iraq - and not Maliki. They have been on Iran's payroll for years, and the SIIC was originally founded to bolster Iranian influence in Iraq, and so was their militia, the Badr Brigade. Abdul Mehdi attributed his resignation to dissatisfaction with how the Presidency Council was operating and Maliki's failure at managing the state.

It has been nearly 14 months since Iraqis went to the polls, and until today Maliki has failed at finding suitable candidates for the ministries of interior and defense. Additionally, the resignation effectively restores power and influence to Sistani, who has been relatively absent from the scene since 2005 - being overshadowed by younger, more radical Shi'ite figures like Muqtada.

Taking all of that into account, it is also probable that Abdul Mehdi is bracing himself to become the next prime minister, given that many analysts expect Maliki to collapse - having fallen out with the Iranians and unable to secure the backing of Iraq's Arab neighbors.

If Maliki does go anytime soon, Abdul Mehdi will be an immediate substitute in-waiting. By stepping down so abruptly and with no prior notice, he might want to distance himself from a sinking ship - headed by Maliki - and present himself as an acceptable alternative captain, both to the Iraqi street and the Iranians.

Ordinary Iraqis are upset with the prime minister, after all, who has failed, despite numerous promises, to end the violence in Iraq, restore confidence in the economy, or restore stability and security to the streets of Iraq.

United States support that kept him firmly in power since 2006 seemingly vanished when George W Bush left the White House, and his successor Barack Obama repeatedly signaled that he refuses to intervene in Iraqi affairs, at a micro-level.

Abdul Mehdi has good relations with many of Iraq's neighbors, including Turkey and Syria, and is liked and respected by affluent businessmen in the Iraqi Shi'ite community, both at home and abroad. Additionally he has good relations with the Kurds and has tried, to the best of his abilities, to build bridges with Iraqi Sunnis.

If such a scenario were to materialize, it would need consent of the Iranians, but it cannot happen before Maliki departs the scene, either willingly or brought down by his wide array of opponents in the Iraqi scene - Abdul Mehdi included.