辽宁环宇集团招聘信息:美惊叹为什么它让中国领导人紧张？中国的美国困惑！？

When Washington shifted its focus toward terrorism and the Middle East after the September 11 attacks in 2001, Beijing experienced genuine relief. As China's leaders and strategists came to believe, an America distracted by two wars and a weak economy presented a priceless window of opportunity for China to extend its influence in Asia and beyond. But Beijing realizes that Washington's strategic attention will eventually turn eastwards, and the death of bin Laden is one small but significant step in hastening the arrival of that day. As one prominent Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) analyst put it to me recently, the American "spearhead will soon be pointed at Beijing."

当华盛顿在911之后将目光转向恐怖主义和中东的时候，北京感觉压力一松。就如中国的领导人和战略家所相信的那样，当美国被两场战争和经济衰弱所分心的时候，这表明一个无价的向亚洲和更远处施展影响力的机会正向中国敞开，但是北京知道，美国最终会将它的目光转向东方，本拉登的死亡是一件小事却对这一天的加速到来是一个具有标志性的一步。就如中国社科院最近给我的一份杰出的分析一样，“美国将会很快的把矛头指向北京”

China's focus on America is obsessive and omnipresent among its leaders and strategists. In a study of 100 recent articles by leading academics at CASS, comprising the network of official state-backed think-tanks and institutes throughout the country, I found that about four in every five were about the United States -- whether it was seeking to understand the American system and political values, or describing how to limit, circumvent, bind, or otherwise reduce American power and influence. Of these themes, several emerged that help better understand the thinking behind editorials like the one in the Global Times.

中国的领导人和战略家对于美国的关注是迷恋的和无所不在的，在中国社科院一百份相关的研究报告中，在全中国的有国家资助的官方的智库和学院里找了很多有关的文章，我发现大约五分之四的内容都是有关美国——是否寻求去理解美国的系统或者说政策取向，或者说描述怎么去限制，避免，约束，或相反去减少美国力量和其影响。在这些主题中，有几个可以帮助去更好的理解全球时报社论背后的想法。

One is that Beijing views international politics in broadly neorealist terms. Chinese strategists believe the distribution of power in the world today will determine tomorrow's conflicts. China has long seen building competition between itself and America in particular as the inevitable and defining big-picture strategic play. In Beijing's thinking, tension can be managed, but never resolved, between the established power and the emerging one. Tension is a structural inevitability.

就是说中国的战略家认为今天全球力量的格局将决定明天的冲突，中国对于美国和自己的竞争有长远的打算，尤其后者（既美国）是全球里最牛B的一个玩家。在北京的思考中，新兴国家和老牌大国之间的张力是可控的，但是却永远不会消除，这是结构性的必然。

But Chinese experts also view America as a unique superpower that relentlessly seeks not only to build and maintain its power, but also to spread its democratic values. This is of grave concern to the authoritarian Chinese leaders, because they believe that America will have difficulty accepting a greater leadership role for Beijing so long as Communist Party remains exclusively in power. Senator John McCain's "League of Democracies" might never become a formal reality, but Beijing believes that it already exists, at least in Asia, through democracies such as India, Japan, and South Korea.

中国专家认为美国是唯一的超级大国，这个超级大国不仅想维持它的力量，还想四处传播他的民主价值观，这点被中国领导人严重关切，因为他们相信美国很难接受一党专政，参议员约翰，麦肯恩的民主联盟虽然没有变成现实，但是北京相信这已经存在，至少在亚洲的民主国家中，比如印度，日本还有韩国。



Moreover, Beijing fears the American democratic process. While Americans view democracy as an advantage since it can offer United States an institutional and bloodless process for leadership and policy renewal, China views American democracy as a source of irrationality and unpredictability. Many in Beijing, pointing to President George W. Bush's rapid decisions to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, believe a new administration might actually increase the chances of uncomfortable shifts in policy that will lead Washington to suddenly focus its competitive and hostile gaze to the east.

此外，北京害怕美国的民主程序。美国将民主作为一种优势因为他可以让美国在制度的范围内不流血的交换政权，然而中国将美国式民主视为不合理的和不可预测的。在北京的一些人，指出小布什匆忙的决策让美国在911之后陷入了阿富汗和伊拉克的战争，他们相信一个新的管理实际上可能增加政策不合适转移的风险，这将使华盛顿突然将充满敌意和竞争性的眼光凝视向东方。

Some of Beijing's strategists now even argue that the United States has three advantages over China that will help preserve American strategic primacy in Asia.

一些北京的战略家现在甚至为了美国相对于中国在亚洲保持战略领先的三个优势而争吵

First, the United States has built an order based not just on American power but also democratic community. It has not escaped Beijing that few countries in East and Southeast Asia fear India's democratic rise. Whereas India's ascent is seen as natural, predictable, and welcomed, almost every country in Asia is trying to benefit from China's economic success while strategically hedging against Chinese military power by moving even closer to the United States.

第一，美国可以号令群雄，还有印度的崛起是广受欢迎的，但是中国不一样，在亚洲几乎所有的国家一边渴望从中国经济的成功中获得利益，一边又使劲对抗中国军队，甚至为了这个目的还去接近美国。

(Witness the recent speech by Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard to Congress in which she reaffirmed the alliance with America as the bedrock of Canberra's security strategy, or Singapore's leader Lee Hsien Loong urging America to remain engaged in Asia.)

Second, unlike China, America does not have land and territorial disputes with other Asian states. For example, China still claims around 80 percent of the South China Sea as its "historic waters" and is in an ongoing dispute with India over the eastern-most Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. In this sense, China's rise is inherently disruptive since a more powerful China is likely to demand a resolution to these issues that is in Beijing's favor.

第二，跟中国不一样，美国跟亚洲国家没有领土纠纷，举个例子，中国宣称南海百分之八十都是中国的，还有和印度也有领土纠纷，所以说，中国的崛起不可避免的要面临混乱，中国需要一个决议来解决这些问题。

Third, the United States is not a resident power in that it is not geographically in Asia. China now realizes that this simple fact, once seen as a handicap, instead presents America with a unique advantage. To maintain its military bases in the region and thus remain the pre-eminent strategic power in Asia, the United States requires other key states and regional groupings to acquiesce to its security role and relationships. There is broad-based regional approval of U.S. alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, as well as with partners such as India, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. This interdependent relationship means that America is not so powerful that it can easily ignore the wishes of Asian states.

第三，从地理上来说美国不是亚洲的地区力量，中国现在意识到了一个很简单的现实，一旦被视为障碍，那就是美国拥有独特的优势。为了维持美国在亚洲地区的军事基地和战略力量，美国要求其他关键性的国家和地区盟友默许它的安全角色和关系。就是说美国的盟友，澳大利亚，日本，韩国，还有它的伙伴，印度，菲律宾，新加坡，泰国都是他的小弟，但是这些相互依赖的关系让美国不能太轻易的忽略亚洲国家的意愿



In contrast, if China were in the dominant strategic position, its pre-eminence would be much harder to challenge or shift. Beijing would not need the same level of regional acquiescence. As a resident power, China would not need the "approval" of other Asian states to maintain its military footholds. As the largest Asian power, it would be easier to dominate regional institutions without an American presence -- yet one more reason why America is trusted to provide the public and security goods in Asian sea lanes while China is not.

相反，如果中国一家独大的话，它的地位很难被挑战。北京也不需要其他国家的默许。作为一个地区性的大国，中国可以不经其他国家同意就能维持他的军事力量。作为最大的亚洲力量。如果没有美国的存在，它可以轻而易举的控制亚洲，这就是为什么美国被信任来提供公共和安全货物在亚洲的海中航线而中国不能。

All this is why, instead of taking full advantage of America's terrorism obsession, Beijing has watched resentfully as the United States has built a hierarchical democratic order in which Asian states willingly aid in preserving American pre-eminence. In such an order, China remains a strategic loner in Asia, with Myanmar and North Korea as its only true friends.

（注：大概意思是说，中国非常不爽美国的孤立政策，在其他国家的同意和配合下，中国成了孤家寡人，唯一的两个朋友是缅甸和北韩。）

China is well aware of its relative vulnerabilities. Rather than lament the irretrievable loss of its better days, America should learn to better appreciate its relative strengths.

大概意思是说中国已经充分意识到了这个问题，美国应该学习更好的感谢这种相对强势，因为这比悔恨错过而不可弥补的好日子好多了。（啥意思?没看懂）