贝佳斯绿泥很刺激吗:加息可能助涨中国房价

011年 04月 18日 09:51加息可能助涨中国房价评论(69)
中国最新通胀率的升高，立即引发央行收紧信贷的猜测。但加息可能并不具备在其他国家那样的抑制效应，特别是对于泡沫气息浓重的房地产市场。

EPA消费者在青岛一次房地产交易会上观看房屋模型。中国上周五发布数据显示，3月份消费价格指数涨幅上升到5.4%，高于预期。之前不久，总理温家宝说，从食品、劳动力和住房价格来看，“宏观调控仍然面临较大压力”。官方媒体新华社在有关温家宝承诺保持警惕的英文报道中，把房价描述为“runaway”，意思是如脱僵野马。

虽然房价只占消费价格指数中的小部分，但它是中国通胀加剧的主要原因和风险之一。买不起房的问题也对社会稳定构成了威胁。

经济理论认为，加息会向潜在买房人发出信号，让他们知道自己将承担更高的月供、所以应当持币观望，从而对房价起到抑制作用。

但一篇论文用量化的方式说明，中国的情况不是这样的，信贷收紧反而有可能刺激房价上涨。

诺丁汉大学(University of Nottingham)中国政策研究所(China Policy Institute)发表的一篇论文显示，从2005年6月到2010年9月，中国央行每一次收紧信贷，都伴随着房价同比上涨5%。也就是说，每加息0.5个百分点，一年后房价就上涨5%。

论文作者姚树洁、罗丹和Loh Lixia写道，每当货币政策收紧的时候，投资者非但没有逃离市场，反而争先恐后地购买房屋或股票。

中国楼市的趋势具有普世意义。

瑞士银行(UBS)经济学家安德森(Jonathan Anderson)3月中旬的一篇报告说，中国楼市是“整个全球经济中最重要的市场”，无人能及，它“渗透”于整个中国经济，推动着铜价等因素的变动。

没过几天，安德森在北京的瑞银同事汪涛在另一篇报告中说，中国在未来几年经历楼市泡沫的风险“非常高”。汪涛说，考虑到价格相关数据质量不高，我们应当密切关注建筑活动和信贷扩张来判断这种风险。

众所周知，在中国利率对信贷影响有限。这主要是因为金融体系缺乏市场机制，无法确保借贷成本的增加能够切实遏制信贷增长。事实上在中国，制定货币政策时经济并非惟一的考虑因素。

这就解释了为什么货币政策变动时，中国政府常常用各种表态以示支持，比如总理温家宝的强硬言论。

摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）中国证券和大宗商品主席李晶（Jing Ulrich）上周在上海告诉澳洲商会（Australian Chamber of Commerce），中央政府传递的信息非常清楚，即设法控制投机和投资者需求。

但是和诺丁汉大学的研究报告类似，李晶也强调了在银行信贷紧缩的同时，住房价格却在增长。李晶说当前的存款准备金率为20%，这意味着大型银行每一美元的储蓄就要在央行存入20美分。这极大抑制了银行的信贷能力，但住房价格仍然高涨。

李晶指出，中央政府控制房价计划的核心部分与利率无关：刚刚通过的“十二五”规划提出了房产税改革和房价增速低于GDP增速的目标，并计划新建3,600万套保障房。

前述诺丁汉大学的论文作者在34页的文章中11次用到“非理性”来描述中国居民的投资心理是如何令货币政策的运作受挫的。

但这篇论文也解释了这种行为的根源：城市化进程加快；对安居置业的传统态度；缺乏投资渠道；市场竞争并不完善。这些都是吹大股市和楼市泡沫的主要因素。

论文说，除了尽早开始积极行动，中国政府应该尽量拓宽投资渠道，推动建设一个更加公平合理的自由市场体系，转变经济结构，减少对投资的依赖，促进国内有效消费需求。

中国的货币政策机制可能并不完善，但要解决房价问题，货币政策必不可少。

Higher Interest Rates Might Push Up Property Prices

The latest rise in China's inflation rate immediately spurredpredictions of tighter credit by the People's Bank of China. Yet, higherrates might not have the kind of dampening impact they would elsewhere,in particular on the frothy property sector.

Shortly beforeChina said Friday that its consumer price index rose ahigher-than-expected 5.4% in March, Premier Wen Jiabao said food, laborand housing costs mean 'we are still under great pressure.' In carryingthe premier's pledge to remain vigilant, the state-run Xinhua newsagency termed home prices as 'runaway.'

Though a small componentof the consumer price index, home prices are among the primary causesand risks of soaring inflation in China. Unaffordable housing is also athreat to social stability.

Economics theory dictates that higherrates would damp prices by signaling to prospective home buyers thatthey will face higher mortgage payments and should stick to thesidelines.

Now, a study quantifies how that's not the way it works in China, where tighter credit may actually spur higher prices.

Eachcredit-tightening move by the People's Bank of China between June 2005and September 2010 has been accompanied by a 5% rise in annual homeprices, according to a study published by the University of Nottingham'sChina Policy Institute. In other words, for every 0.5-percentage-pointrate increase, property prices were 5% higher a year later.

'Insteadof running away from the market, investors rush to buy houses or shareswhenever tightening monetary actions are taken,' write the study'sauthors, professors Yao Shujie, Luo Dan and Loh Lixia.

Chinese real estate trends carry world-wide implications.

Ina mid-March report, UBS economist Jonathan Anderson described Chineseproperty as 'the single most important sector in the entire globaleconomy,' 'pervading' the country's economy and driving factors like theprice of copper.

A few days later, Wang Tao, a Beijing-basedcolleague of Mr. Anderson's at UBS, said in a separate report that risksare 'very high' China could experience a property bubble in comingyears. To gauge it, Ms. Wang said, 'Most importantly, given the poorquality of the price-related data, we should watch closely constructionactivity and credit expansion.'

It’s well known that interestrates have a limited impact on China’s credit, primarily because thefinancial system lacks market mechanisms to ensure higher borrowingcosts actually crimp credit growth. Indeed, China’s monetary policyitself isn’t solely an economic consideration.

These facts help explain why Beijing often backs up monetary policy changes with rhetoric, such as tough talk from Mr. Wen.

“Themessage from the central government is very clear. The government istrying to control speculation and investor demand,” J.P. Morgan’s ChinaChairman Jing Ulrich told the Australian Chamber of Commerce in Shanghaithis week.

But, like the Nottingham study notes, Ms. Ulrichhighlighted how housing prices have risen even as bank credit hastightened. At 20%, the prevailing “reserve ratio” means big banks needto park 20 cents of every dollar they have on deposit, she said. Thatrepresents a significant choke on their scope to lend─but still homeprices soar.

Central parts of Beijing’s plan to control housingprices, she noted, aren’t rate-related: taxes, targets, plus plans tobuild 36 million “affordable” apartments in the just-adopted five-yearplan.

The authors of the Nottingham paper use the word“irrational” 11 times in 34 pages to describe how the investmentpsychology of Chinese citizens frustrates the workings of monetarypolicy.

Yet, the paper also explains roots of the behavior:“Rapid urbanization, attitude towards home ownership, lack of investmentchannel and imperfect market competition are some of the key factorsresponsible for large stock market and housing bubbles,” it says.

“Apartfrom acting early and more aggressively, the Chinese government shouldtry to create more investment channels, to promote a fairer and betterfree-market system, to shift its economic structure, which will dependless on investment and more on effective domestic consumption,” it says.

China’s monetary policy mechanisms might be imperfect, but they are needed to tackle the problem.