龙鳞什么的游戏:《真正的海龟交易者——传奇，传授和传承》中英对照版

The Complete TurtleTrader The Legend The Lessons The Results
《真正的海龟交易者——传奇，传授和传承》中英对照版
本翻译内容仅供投资者学习用，不可用于任何商业目的，张轶不负任何法律责任。
张轶翻译制作中英对照版word。版本越新，内容越完美。
版本：2009年01月22日。
校对：网友“鹰寂长空”——一名热心的警察，他为本书做出了大量文字上的美化工作，包括书名。他说这是送给大家的新年礼物。昨天半夜出勤，今天凌晨3点他才下班，上午告诉我，这个版本应该可以了，就匆忙上班去了。
Michael W. Covel
作者：迈克尔·W·卡沃尔
For Jake
献给杰克
Home plate collisions and winning are all that matter
本垒打和赢钱一样重要
“Every morning in Africa a gazelle wakes up. It knows it must run faster than the fastest lion or it will be killed. Every morning a lion wakes up. It knows it must run faster than the slowest gazelle or it will starve to death. It doesn’t matter whether you are a lion or a gazelle. When the sun comes up, you better start running.”
African proverb
“在非洲，每天早晨当羚羊醒来时，它知道它必须比最快的狮子还要快，否则它就会被杀。每天早晨当狮子醒来时，它知道它必须比最慢的羚羊快，否则它就饿死了。你是狮子，还是羚羊，这个不重要。当太阳起来时，你最好快跑。”
非洲格言
目录
Preface. 3
前言... 3
Acknowledgments. 10
感谢词... 10
1 Nurture versus Nature. 11
第01章 天生的，还是后天培养的... 11
2 Prince of the Pit 22
第02章 交易场内的王子... 22
3 The Turtles. 46
第03章 海龟们... 46
4 The Philosophy. 73
第04章 理念... 73
5 The Rules. 93
第05章 原则... 93
6 In the Womb. 132
第06章 在酝酿中... 132
7 Who Got What to Trade. 148
第07章 资金分配问题... 148
8 Game Over 170
第08章 实验结束... 170
9 Out on Their Own. 178
第09章 他们只有靠自己了... 178
10 Dennis Comes Back to the Game. 189
第10章 丹尼斯又回到了交易界... 189
11 Seizing Opportunity. 199
第11章 抓住机会... 199
12 Failure Is a Choice. 216
第12章 失败是一个选择... 216
13 Second-Generation Turtles. 222
第13章 第二代海龟... 222
14 Model Greatness. 240
第14章 榜样的伟大... 240
Appendix I Where Are They Now?. 245
附录1 他们现在在哪里？... 245
Appendix II Related Websites. 252
附件2 相关的网址... 252
Appendix III Turtle Performance Data. 253
附录3 海龟的业绩数据... 253
Appendix IV Turtle Performance While Trading for Richard Dennis. 256
附录4 海龟们帮丹尼斯交易时的业绩... 256
Endnotes. 283
尾注... 283
About the Author 295
关于作者... 295
“Trading was more teachable than I ever imagined. Even though I was the only one who thought it was teachable . . . it was teachable beyond my wildest imagination.”
Richard Dennis
“交易比想象的要容易传授。即使只有我这么认为……也比我想象的要容易。”
理查德·丹尼斯
This is the story of how a group of ragtag students, many with no Wall Street  experience,  were  trained  to  be  millionaire  traders.  Think  of Donald  Trump’s  show  The  Apprentice,  played  out  in  the  real  world with real money and real hiring and firing. However, these apprentices were thrown into the fire and challenged to make money almost immediately, with millions at stake. They weren’t trying to sell ice cream on the streets of New York City. They were trading stocks, bonds, currencies, oil, and dozens of other markets to make millions.
这是一个关于一群混杂学生的故事，他们中间很多人没有在华尔街工作过，这个故事讲他们是如何成为百万富翁的。想想唐纳德·特朗普的真人秀节目《学徒》（张轶注：香港翻译成《飞黄腾达》），真枪实弹，真实的聘用，真实的炒鱿鱼。这些学徒要去实战，必须立刻赚钱。但本书的主人公不用在纽约街头卖冰激凌。他们交易股票、债券、外汇、原油和很多其它市场，以赚到几百万。
This story blows the roof off the conventional Wall Street success image so carefully crafted in popular culture: prestige, connections, and no place at the table for the little guy to beat the market (and beating the market is no small task). Legendary investor Benjamin Graham always said that analysts and fund managers as a whole could not beat the market because in a significant sense they were the market. On top of that, the academic community has argued for decades about efficient markets, once again implying there is no way to beat market averages.
这个故事打破了华尔街精心塑造的成功者形象：有名望，有关系，而小人物不可能战胜市场（战胜市场是很难的）。传奇投资者本杰明·格雷厄姆经常说分析师加上基金经理都不能战胜市场，因为他们本身就是市场。再说了，学术界几十年来都在争论有效市场，也就是暗示没有办法战胜市场。
Yet making big money, beating the market, is doable if you don’t follow the herd, if you think outside the box. People do have a chance to win in the market game, but he or she needs the right rules and attitude to play by. And those right rules and attitude collide head-on with basic human nature.
如果你不人云亦云，如果你独立思考，赚大钱并战胜市场是可行的。人们有机会在市场中取胜，但是他或她需要正确的原则和态度。正确的原则和态度与人的本性正好相反。
This real-life apprentice story would still be buried had I not randomly picked up the July 1994 issue of Financial World magazine, featuring the article “Wall Street’s Top Players.” On the cover was famed money manager George Soros playing chess. Soros had made $1.1 billion for the year. The article listed the top one hundred paid players on Wall Street for 1993, where they lived, how much they made, and in general how they made it. Soros was first. Julian Robertson was second, at $500 million. Bruce Kovner was fifth, at $200 million. Henry Kravis of KKR was eleventh at $56 million. Famed traders Louis Bacon and Monroe Trout were on the list, too.
如果我没有无意中翻开1994年7月的《金融世界》杂志并看到了“华尔街顶尖高手”的文章，那么真实的学徒故事就被埋没了。封面是著名的基金经理乔治·索罗斯在下棋。当年索罗斯赚了11亿美元。这篇文章列出了1993年华尔街100位顶尖受薪交易者，包括他们的住址，赚了多少钱，以及他们赚钱的方式。索罗斯排名第一。朱利安·罗伯逊排名第二，他赚了5亿美元。布鲁斯·科夫勒排名第五，他赚了2亿美元。KKR的亨利·克拉维斯排名第十一，他赚了5600万美元。著名的交易者路易斯•培根和蒙罗·特劳特也在名单中。
The rankings (and earnings) provided a crystal-clear landscape of who was making “Master of the Universe” money. Here were, without a doubt, the top players in the “game.” Unexpectedly, one of them just happened to be living and working outside Richmond, Virginia, two hours from my home.
这个（收益）排名明显地告诉了我们谁赚的钱最多。毫无疑问，他们就是这个游戏的顶尖玩家。没想到，其中有一个人正好就住在弗吉尼亚州里士满郊区，离我家只有2小时的车程。
Twenty-fifth on the list was R. Jerry Parker, Jr., of Chesapeake Capital - and he had just made $35 million. Parker was not yet forty years old. His brief biography described him as a former pupil of Richard Dennis (who?) and noted that he was trained to be a “Turtle” (what?). Parker was described as a then twenty-five-year-old accountant who had attended Dennis’s school in 1983 to learn his “trend-tracking system.” The article also said he was a disciple of Martin Zweig (who?), who just happened to be thirty-third on the highest-paid list that year. At that moment the name “Dennis” was neither more nor less important than “Zweig,” but the implication was that these two men had made Parker extremely rich.
名单上排名第25位的是切萨皮克基金的杰瑞·帕克——他赚了3500万美元。帕克还不到40岁。文字资料说他是理查德·丹尼斯（谁？）的学生，还说他被训练成了一只“海龟”（什么？）。报道说帕克在1983到丹尼斯的学校学习“趋势跟踪系统”时只是25岁的会计。文章还说他是马丁·史维格（谁？）的徒弟，马丁·史维格正好在当年收入最高的人中排名第32位。当时“丹尼斯”这个名字还没有“史维格”重要，但是看起来好像就是这2个人把帕克塑造得超级富有。
I studied that list intently, and Parker appeared to be the only one in the top hundred advertised as having been “trained.” For someone like myself, looking for ways to try and earn that kind of money, his biography was immediate inspiration, even if there were no real specifics. Here was a man who bragged that he was a product of the “Virginia boondocks,” loved country music, and preferred to keep as far away from Wall Street as possible. This was no typical moneymaking story - that much I knew.
我认真地研究了这个名单，似乎在这100个人中间，帕克是唯一被“训练过”的。像我这样的人，正在想办法赚钱，虽然关于他的介绍不具体，我也立刻受到了启发。这小子吹他是“弗吉尼亚郊区”的人，喜爱乡村音乐，喜欢远离华尔街。这和我通常了解的赚钱故事不一样。
The common wisdom that the only way you could find success was by working in eighty-story steel- and- glass towers in New York, London, Hong Kong, or Dubai was clearly dead wrong. Jerry Parker’s office was absolutely in middle of nowhere, thirty miles outside Richmond in Manakin-Sabot, Virginia. Soon after reading the magazine, I drove down to see his office, noting its lack of pretense, and sat in the parking lot thinking, “You have got to be kidding me. This is where he makes all that money?”
一般人都说，要想找到成功，你就要到纽约、伦敦、香港或迪拜的80层钢筋玻璃大楼上班，很明显，这是错的。杰瑞·帕克的办公室在弗吉尼亚里士满郊区30英里处，并不是什么高楼大厦。看完这本杂志后，我开车去看了他的办公室，我在停车场的时候想：“这不是开玩笑吧。他能在那里赚钱？”
Malcolm Gladwell famously said, “There can be as much value in the blink of an eye as in months of rational analysis.” Seeing Parker’s country office was an electrical impulse for me, permanently dispelling the importance of location. But I knew nothing else at the time about Jerry Parker other than what was in that 1994 issue of Financial World. Were there more of these students? How did they become students? What were they taught? And who was this man Dennis who had taught Parker and others?
马尔科姆·格拉德威尔有一句名言：“瞬间行动的价值比几个月理性的分析还要大。”去帕克的郊区办公室让我激动，地点不是重点。但在当时，除了1994年《金融世界》上的报道，我对杰瑞·帕克一无所知。他还有更多的同学吗？他们是如何成为别人的学生的？他们是如何学习的？传授知识给帕克和帕克的同学的那个丹尼斯是谁？
Richard Dennis was an iconoclast, a wildcatting Chicago trader not affiliated with a major investment bank or Fortune 500 firm. As the “locals” were fond of saying on Chicago trading floors, Dennis “bet his left nut.” In 1983, by the time he was thirty-seven, he’d made hundreds of millions of dollars out of an initial grubstake of a few hundred. Dennis had done it on his own terms in less than fifteen years, with no formal training or guidance from anyone. He took calculated risks leveraging up huge amounts of money. If he liked a trade, he took all of it he could get. He lived the markets as a “betting” business.
理查德·丹尼斯这个人比较反传统，他是芝加哥的交易者，但他不是财富500家投资银行的雇员，他自己研究交易。芝加哥交易所的当地人喜欢说丹尼斯喜欢孤注一掷。在1983年，他当时37岁，他已经用几百美元赚了几亿美元。在15年内，丹尼斯没有接受任何人的训练或指导，他自己交易。他用计算过的风险撬起了很多钱。如果他喜欢一笔交易，他就能从这笔交易中得到巨大回报。他把市场当作赌场做。
Dennis figured out how to profit in the real world from an understanding of behavioral finance decades before Nobel prizes were handed out to professors preaching theory. His competitors could never get a handle on his consistent ability to exploit irrational market behavior throughout all types of markets. His understanding of probabilities and payoffs was freakish.
在诺贝尔奖被颁给理论界人士之前，丹尼斯就搞清楚了如何从真实的世界赚钱。他可以在非理性的市场行为中实现持续一致的能力，他的竞争者就永远做不到。他对概率和回报的理解是不可思议的。
Dennis simply marched to a different drum. He eschewed publicity about his net worth even though the press speculated about it extensively. “I find that kind of gauche,” said Dennis. Perhaps he was reticent to focus on his wealth because what he really wanted to prove was that his earning skills were nothing special. He felt anyone could learn how to trade if taught properly.
丹尼斯按照不同的节奏取得进步。媒体喜欢猜他的资产数字，他则回避透露。丹尼斯说：“我不太懂社交。”也许他不想透露他的财富，因为他想证明他赚钱的技术并不特殊。他觉得只要有合适的教学方法，任何人都能学会交易。
His partner, William Eckhardt, disagreed, and their debate resulted in an experiment with a group of would-be apprentice traders recruited during 1983 and 1984 for two trading “classes.” That “Turtle” name? It was simply the nickname Dennis used for his students. He had been on a trip to Singapore and visited a turtle-breeding farm. A huge vat of squirming turtles inspired him to say, “We are going to grow traders just like they grow turtles in Singapore.”
他的伙伴威廉·埃克哈特不这么认为，他们争论的结果是招聘一些学徒参加1983年和1984年的交易课程。海龟是什么意思？海龟仅仅是丹尼斯给学生们起的绰号。他曾经去过新加坡，参观了一个养海龟的农场。大量的海龟刺激了他，他说：“我们要像新加坡人养海龟那样培养交易者。”
After Dennis and Eckhardt taught novices like Jerry Parker how to make millions and the “school” closed, the experiment morphed into word-of-mouth legend over the years supported by few hard facts. The National Enquirer version of the story was captured in 1989 by a Wall Street Journal headline, “Can the skills of successful trading be learned? Or are they innate, some sort of sixth sense a lucky few are born with?”
在丹尼斯和埃克哈特培养了杰瑞·帕克这样的新手，并教他们如何赚几百万之后，课程就结束了，但这些年有很多人在口口相传这个传奇实验，也有一些事实证据。1989年《华尔街日报》头条有个全国性的调查：“成功交易的技术可以被传授吗？或者是因为他们是天才，他们幸运地拥有了第六感？”
Since the 1980s are long past, many might wonder if the Turtles’ story still has relevance. It has more relevance than ever. The philosophy and rules Dennis taught his students, for example, are similar to the trading strategy employed by numerous billion- dollar- plus hedge funds. True, the typical stock-tip chaser glued daily to CNBC has not heard this story, but the players on Wall Street, the ones who make the real money, know.
因为80年代过去好久了，很多人在想，是否海龟的故事还有意义。它的意义比过去还要深刻。丹尼斯教给学生们的理念和原则，和几十亿美元对冲基金的理念和原则是相似的。没错，那些每天看美国全国广播公司财经频道的人没听说过这个故事，但是华尔街的玩家，真正赚钱的人知道这个故事。
The inside story has not been told to a wider audience until now because Richard Dennis is not a household name today, and because so much has happened on Wall Street since 1983. After the experiment ended, the characters, both teachers and Turtles, went their separate ways and an important human experiment fell through the cracks, even though what took place is as significant today as then.
目前，大众并不知道这个故事的细节，因为现在理查德·丹尼斯不出名，因为自从1983年以后华尔街发生了很多事。虽然这个实验在当时是很出名的，但实验结束后，老师和海龟们就各奔东西了，这个实验就被淡忘了。
The effort to get the real story out there started to gain momentum in 2004, when I was invited to visit Legg Mason’s headquarters in Baltimore following the release of my first book, Trend Following. After lunch, I found myself in a classroom on the top floor with Bill Miller, the fund manager of the $18 billion Legg Mason Value Trust fund (LMVTX). Beating the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index for fifteen years straight put him in a similar league as Warren Buffett. Miller, like Dennis, had taken extraordinary calculated risks and more often than not been proven right. On this day he was lecturing a roomful of eager trainees.
在2004年，当我出版了我的第一本书《趋势跟踪》以后，有人邀请我去拜访巴尔的摩莱格·梅森的总部时，挖掘这个真实故事的计划就开始了。午饭后，我和比尔·米勒在一起，我们在顶层的一个房间，他是价值180亿美元的莱格梅森价值信托基金的经理。过去15年来，他战胜了股指，让他和沃伦·巴菲特并驾齐驱。米勒像丹尼斯一样，敢于承担风险。现在，他在给满房间的学员上课。
Out of the blue, Miller invited me to the lectern to address his class. The first questions, however, came straight from Miller and Michael Mauboussin (Legg Mason’s chief investment strategist). They were, “Tell us about Richard Dennis and the Turtles.” At that moment, I realized that if these two Wall Street pros wanted to know more about Dennis, his experiment, and the Turtles, it was clear a much larger audience would want to hear the story.
出乎我的意料，米勒邀请我到讲台上给他的学员讲课。然而，第一个问题来自米勒和迈克尔·莫伯辛（莱格·梅森的首席投资策略分析师）。问题是：“请你说说理查德·丹尼斯和海龟们。”当时，我意识到，如果说华尔街的两个专业人士都想知道丹尼斯，他的实验和他的海龟们，那么很明显，广大的听众也想听这个故事。
However, as someone not there in 1983, I knew the task of telling a complete story from an objective vantage, with so many competing characters and competing agendas, was going to be a serious challenge. Getting those who lived the experience to talk, coupled with sleuth-like research to corroborate everything, was the only way to make this story really come alive. That said, behind the scenes the soap opera of those Turtles who worked hard to prevent this book’s publication is a saga in itself.
然而，没人知道1983年的事，如果想客观地讲述这个完整的故事，那需要采访很多人，做很多日程安排，这是一个很大的挑战。要想生动地讲述这个故事，那唯一的办法就是和当年的人交谈，像侦探一样做调查。除此之外，有些海龟全力阻止本书的出版也是一个很长的故事。
Still, the biggest problem with a story like this is that most people don’t want to actually understand how the real pros make big money. They want the road to riches to be effortless. Look at the collective public fascination with Jim Cramer - a man who is the polar opposite of Richard Dennis and Jerry Parker. Cramer is no doubt intelligent, but tuning into his extremely popular Mad Money TV show is like watching a traffic accident. There is a live studio audience that hoots and hollers at Cramer’s fundamentally driven buy signals and wild prop-smashing antics. In one word: bullshit.
而且，大部分人并不能真正地理解专业人士是如何赚钱的。他们想轻松致富。请看看媒体名人吉姆·克莱默——他和理查德·丹尼斯，杰瑞·帕克正好相反。克莱默很聪明，他把自己的电视节目《疯狂金钱》搞的红红火火，就像交通事故一样吸引眼球。克莱默给出买入信号时，现场观众又喊又叫，很疯狂。简单说：（他在）胡扯。
That said, a lot of people, many highly educated, believe that Cramer’s way is the way to get rich. Instead of employing a statistical thinking toward market decisions, the general public keeps investing based on impulsive “feelings,” letting an assortment of emotional biases rule their lives. In the end, to their detriment, people are always risk-adverse toward gains, but risk-seeking toward losses. They are stuck.
很多人，包括接受过高等教育的人，都相信运用克莱默的方法能致富。大众不知道运用统计学的思想研究市场，他们根据冲动做投资，结果各种情绪偏见控制了他们的交易结果。最终，他们很受伤，人们总想回避风险，有所收获，但结果却是追求风险，走向亏损。他们被卡住了。
The average newbie investor’s method for success is not pretty. He gets in because his friends are doing it. Then the news media start up the stories of little guys doing well during a bull market. They all start to “invest” by picking stocks with “low” prices. As the market roars in their favor, thoughts of crashes never enter their mind (“With all the money in there, it could never go down!”). They never see their own slaughter coming, even though their market bubble is never different from past ones.
新手的投资方法并不能带来成功。他做投资是因为他的朋友在做投资。然后媒体开始报道，说小人物在牛市做的很好。他们一开始都是投资于低价股。随着市场的飙升，他们从没想到会崩盘（我投资了很多钱，它是不会跌的！）。他们从没见过自己被屠杀，即使市场的泡沫和过去一样。
The media tell us that average investors now supposedly understand the concept of risk, yet worrying about possibilities while ignoring probabilities is at epidemic levels. People gamble away fortunes on money-losing hunches or double down when logic says to fold. At the end of a lifetime they are never any closer to learning how to do it right. But outside of the herd there are the special few, who have the uncanny knack for knowing when to buy and sell, combined with an uncanny knack to properly assess risk.
媒体告诉我们，现在的一般投资者对风险已经有了了解，但是他们还是不懂概率。人们根据直觉不停地亏钱，人们喜欢摊低成本，结果也是亏钱。即使快死了，他们也不知道什么是对的。但是，除了这些人，还有极少数人，他们非同寻常，他们知道何时买，何时卖，他们也知道如何评估风险。
Richard Dennis mastered that uncanny knack by his early twenties. Unlike the general public wedded to their “feelings” to make decisions Dennis used mathematical tools to calculate risk and used it to his advantage. What he learned and what he taught students never resembled Jim Cramer barking stock tips. More important, Dennis proved that his ability to make money in the markets was not luck. His students, mostly novices, made millions for him and themselves.
理查德·丹尼斯在20出头就掌握了这个非同寻常的能力。他和大众不同，大众靠感觉做决策，丹尼斯用数学工具计算风险，并把数学工具当作他的优势。他学到的东西和他教给学生的东西和吉姆·克莱默叫嚣的技巧不同。更重要的是，丹尼斯证明了他赚钱的能力并非运气。他的学生，大多是新手，帮他和自己赚了几百万。
What was the real story, and how did the Turtles learn their craft? What trading rules were they taught, and how can an average trader or investor use those insights today in his portfolio? What happened to them after the experiment, in the ensuing years? Finding the answers to those questions, with and without Dennis and his students’ cooperation, has kept me passionately curious since 1994.
真实的故事如何，海龟是如何学习的？他们学的原则是什么，现在的投资者要如何运用这些知识？实验结束以后，他们表现如何？无论丹尼斯和他的学生们是否愿意配合我找到答案。从1994年开始，为了找到这些答案，我痴迷不已。
I am not alone in that curiosity. As author Steve Gabriel wrote on Yahoo! Finance recently, “The experiment has already been done that shows that we can all learn to trade for a living if we want to. That is why the ‘Turtles’ matter.” The Turtles are an answer to the age-old question of nature versus nurture, the living proof of the single most famous Wall Street school for making money.
除了我好奇，还有其他人也好奇。最近作者史蒂夫·加百利在雅虎财经上面说：“过去的实验已经表明，只要我们愿意，我们都能以交易为生。这就是海龟们的价值。”海龟们回答了优秀的交易者是天生的还是后天培养的这个老问题，他们就是活生生的赚钱证明。
“Do not speak to me of rules. This is war! This is not a game of cricket!”
Colonel Saito, from the movie The Bridge on the River Kwai
“不要跟我谈原则，这是战争！不是曲棍球赛！”
来自电影《桂河大桥》西都上校的话
Justin Vandergrift assisted in bringing the Turtle trading rules to life, and also developed many of the accompanying charts. Celia Straus served as editor extraordinaire for the life of the project. Justin and Celia’s value as sounding boards can’t be stated strongly enough. A special thanks goes out to Shaun Jordan for finding me “access” and to Art Collins for all of his invaluable insights. Sara Sia, Tricia Lucero, and Maria Scinto provided help along the way. The following people also made significant contributions that allowed this book to come to life:
贾斯廷·范德格里夫特坚持公布海龟交易法则，还画了很多图。西莉亚·施特劳斯是出色的编辑。他们2个的贡献太大了，无以言表。特别要感谢肖恩·乔丹，因为肖恩·乔丹帮我找到了方法；特别感谢阿特·柯林斯，因为阿特·柯林斯提供了有价值的见解。莎拉·希雅，崔西亚·卢塞罗，和玛丽亚· 欣托一直在提供帮助。以下的人都为本书的出版做了很多贡献：
Mark Abraham, Salem Abraham, Jody Arlington, Christian Baha, Randy Bolen, Peter Borish, Ken Boyle, Sarah Brown, William Brubaker, Lindsay Campbell, Michael Carr, Michael Cavallo, Eva Cheung, Rebecca Clear, Jerome Covel, Johanna Covel, Jonathan Craven, Gary DeMoss, Sam DeNardo, Jim DiMaria, Adam Elend, Elizabeth Ellen, Charles Faulkner, Ethan Friedman, Michael Gibbons, Jeffrey Gordon, Roman Gregorig, Christian Halper, Martin Hare, Esmond Harmsworth, Larry Hite, Grace Hung, Wither Hurley, Ken Jakubzak, Ajay Jani, Erle Keefer, Peter Kline, Jeffrey Kopiwoda, Eric Laing, Charles Le Beau, Eleanor Lee, Jeff Marks, Howard Lindzon, Michael Martin, Michael Mauboussin, Bill Miller, Brian Mixon, Archie Moore, Robert Moss, Jerry Mullins, Robert Pardo, Jerry Parker, T. Boone Pickens, Paul Rabar, Barry Ritholtz, Chris Roberts, James O. Rohrbach, Tom Rollinger, Jay Rosser, Bradley Rotter, Mike Rundle, George Rush, Jack Schwager, Paul Scrivens, Ed Seykota, Tom Shanks, Michael Shannon, Mark Shore, Barry Sims, Aaron Smith, Peter Sparber, Bob Spear, Celia Straus, Randall Sullivan, Gisete Tay, Irve Towers, John Valentine, David Wachtel, Sol Waksman, Robert Webb, Herschel Weingrod, Joel Westbrook, Paul Wigdor, Thomas C. Willis, and Thomas R. Willis.
马克·亚伯拉罕，塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕，乔迪·阿灵顿，克里斯蒂安·巴哈，兰迪·博伦，彼得·波里什，肯恩·波义耳，莎拉·布朗，威廉·布鲁贝克，林赛·坎贝尔，迈克尔·卡尔，迈克尔·卡瓦洛，伊娃·张，丽贝卡·可里亚，杰罗姆·卡沃尔，乔安娜·卡沃尔，乔安娜·卡文，（张轶注：翻译这里很郁闷，不想翻译人名了。我把后文会再次提到的人名用红色标记出来，其他的人名和此书内容无关。）
Throughout TurtleTrader I have sourced material extensively. Material not sourced (i.e. assorted Turtle quotations and comments) was direct from interviews conducted specifically for this book.
为了本书，我找到了很多资料。非找到的资料（也就是海龟的话和评论）则是通过访谈得到的。
章 天生的，还是后天培养的
“Give me a dozen healthy infants and my own specific world to bring them up in, and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select - doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant, chef and yes, even beggar and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.”
John B. Watson, early twentieth-century American psychologist
“如果给我一批健康的婴儿，不管他们的天赋如何，爱好如何，倾向如何，能力如何，使命如何，种族如何，我保证能用自己的特殊方式把他们养大，对于任意一个，我想让他成为什么专家，他就能成为什么专家——医生，律师，艺术家，商人，厨师，是的，还包括乞丐和小偷。”
约翰·B·华生，20世界初的美国心理学家
In the early 1980s, when Chicago’s reigning trader king, Richard Dennis, decided to conduct his real-life social experiment, Wall Street was heating up. The stock market was at the start of a huge bull market. On the world stage, Iraq had invaded Iran. Lotus Development had released Lotus 1-2-3, and Microsoft had put their new word processing program (“Word”) on the market. President Reagan, much to the liberally minded Dennis’s chagrin, declared it “The Year of the Bible.”
在80年代初，当芝加哥的交易之王理查德·丹尼斯决定做一个真人实验时，华尔街正在热闹中。股市刚开始走牛。世界范围内，伊拉克入侵了伊朗。莲花软件公司刚发布莲花软件，微软的新word刚上市。里根总统，让倾向于自由党的丹尼斯失望，总说宣布当年是“圣经元年。”
In order for Dennis to find his special breed of student guinea pigs, he circumvented conventional recruitment methods. His firm, C&D Commodities, budgeted $15,000 for classified ads in the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and the International Herald Tribune seeking trainees during late fall 1983 and 1984. Avid job seekers saw this:
丹尼斯为了找到自己的学生，他采用了全国招聘的方式。他的公司叫C&D商品公司，公司花了15000美元在《华尔街日报》、《巴伦周刊》和《国际先驱论坛报》做广告，为1983年和1984年秋天招聘学员。急着找工作的人看到了以下文字：
Richard J. Dennis
of C&D Commodities
C&D商品公司的理查德·J·丹尼斯
is accepting applications for the position of
Commodity Futures Trader
to expand his established group of traders.
因为生意扩大，想扩招一批商品期货交易者
Mr. Dennis and his associates will train a small group of applicants in his proprietary trading concepts. Successful candidates will then trade solely for Mr. Dennis: they will not be allowed to trade futures for themselves or others. Traders will be paid a percentage of their trading profits, and will be allowed a small draw. Prior experience in trading will be considered, but is not necessary. Applicants should send a brief resume with one sentence giving their reasons for applying to:
丹尼斯先生和他的同事想用自己的交易理念培训一小批应聘人。应聘成功的人将会为丹尼斯先生单独做交易：他们是不能为自己或别人做交易的。交易者可以从利润中提成，但提成不多。应聘者最好有交易经验，但不一定要经验。应聘者应该在简短的简历上附加一句话，以解释为何要应聘，并把简历寄到：
C&D Commodities
141 W. Jackson, Suite 2313
Chicago, IL 60604
Attn: Dale Dellutri
邮政编码60604，伊利诺伊州芝加哥，2313大楼，杰克森西大街141号，
C&D商品公司
待尔·德鲁崔（收）
Applications must be received by October 1, 1984. No telephone calls will be accepted.
1984年10月1日为截止日期。不接受任何电话访问。
Lost in the back pages of national dailies, the ad attracted surprisingly few respondents when you consider what Dennis was offering. But then, people don’t usually expect the road to riches to be in plain sight.
这些大报纸的广告太多了，这个广告没有吸引很多应聘者。在当时，人们不相信走向富裕的道路是平坦的。
The ad invited anyone to join one of Chicago’s most successful trading firms, making “experience” optional. It was as if the Washington Redskins had advertised open positions regardless of age, weight, or football experience.
这个广告邀请人们加入芝加哥最成功的交易公司，没有经验也可以。这相当于华盛顿红皮队公开招聘，不管年龄，体重，也不管是否有（打）球的经验。
Perhaps most stunning was that C&D Commodities was going to teach proprietary trading concepts. This was unheard of at the time (and still is today), since great moneymaking trading systems were always kept under lock and key.
更吃惊的是，C&D商品公司将传授私人的交易理念。当时从没听说过（现在也没听说过），因为人们一般不会公开赚钱的交易系统。
Dennis’s recruitment process took place long before the chain-reaction flow of Craig’s List ads that attract in thousands of résumés within hours for any job. However, it was 1983, and reaching out to touch the world with the flick of a blog post was not yet reality.
丹尼斯早就开始了招聘过程，（但是有一天）克雷格上面的广告突然在几个小时内引来了几千份简历。然而当时是1983年，靠博客来接触这个世界还不太现实。
Potential students who were ultimately hired recall being stunned. “This can’t be what I think it is” was a common refrain. It was, unbelievably, an invitation to learn at the feet of Chicago’s greatest living trader and then use his money to trade and take a piece of the profits. One of the greatest educational opportunities of the century garnered responses ranging from a sentence written on a coconut to the mundane “I think I can make money for you.” Let’s face it, guessing what would make a wealthy, reclusive, and eccentric trader take notice of you in order to get to the next step - a face- to- face interview - had no precedent.
最终应聘上的学生现在回想起来还是感到吃惊。他们激动地说：“我真的没想到。”受到芝加哥最伟大的交易者邀请，用他的钱交易，还能分到他的利润，不敢想象。上世纪最伟大的培训机会引来了不同的应聘行为，有人在椰子上写了一句话，有人就是普通的“我想我能帮你赚钱。”让我们继续观察，看看这个有钱的，隐居的，古怪的交易者如何注意到你，并和你面试的，这是史无前例的。
This casting of a wide net was all part of Dennis’s plan to resolve his decade- long nature-versus-nurture debate with his partner William Eckhardt. Dennis believed that his ability to trade was not a natural gift. He looked at the markets as being like Monopoly. He saw strategies, rules, odds, and numbers as objective and learnable.
这张大网的撒开是因为丹尼斯和他的伙伴威廉·埃克哈特10来年的争吵，他们一直在争论优秀的交易者是天生的，还是后天培养的，后来丹尼斯想结束这个争吵。丹尼斯认为他的交易能力不是天生的。他对市场有专断的看法。他知道的策略、原则、概率和数据都是客观的，都是可以被传授的。
In Dennis’s book, everything about the markets was teachable, starting with his very first prerequisite: a proper view of money. He didn’t think about money as merely a means to go buy stuff at the mall, the way most people do. He thought of money as a way to keep score. He could just as easily have used pebbles to keep count. His emotional attachment to dollars and cents appeared nonexistent.
丹尼斯在书中说，只要对金钱有正确的看法，任何关于市场的东西都是可以传授的。他并不认为有钱就是去超市买东西，但大部分人是这么做的。他认为钱是让自己优秀的东西。他用鹅卵石都能把账算清楚。但是我们看不出他迷恋金钱。
Dennis would say, in effect, “If I make $5,000, then I can bet more and potentially make $25,000. And if I make $25,000, I can bet that again to get to $250,000. Once there, I can bet even more and get to a million.” He thought in terms of leverage. That was teachable in his book, as well.
实际上丹尼斯喜欢说：“如果我能赚到5000美元，那么我就能赌更多，可能赚到25000美元。如果我能赚到25000美元，我会再赌，并赚到250000。如果做到了，我还能赚，并赚到100万。”他说的是杠杆。他在书中说这些都是能传授的。
On the other hand, William Eckhardt was solidly rooted in the nature camp (“either you’re born with trading skills or you’re not”). Dennis explained the debate, “My partner Bill has been a friend since high school. We have had philosophical disagreements about everything you could imagine. One of these arguments was whether the skills of a successful trader could be reduced to a set of rules. That was my point of view. Or whether there was something ineffable, mystical, subjective, or intuitive that made someone a good trader. This argument had been going on for a long time, and I guess I was getting a little frustrated with idle speculation. Finally, I said, ‘Here is a way we can definitely resolve this argument. Let’s hire and train people and see what happens.’ He agreed. It was an intellectual experiment.”
另一方面，威廉·埃克哈特坚信优秀的交易者是天生的（不管你是不是天生就懂技术）。丹尼斯解释说：“我和比尔（张轶注：指威廉·埃克哈特）在中学时就是好朋友。我们的任何理念都不相同。我们的争论之一就是，是否成功交易者的原则可以归纳为一套原则。我相信是可以的。否则别人就可以靠不能明说的方法，神秘的方法，主观的方法，或直觉成为优秀的交易者。我们吵了很长时间，我也被这种空想所困扰。最后我说：‘我有办法解决这个争吵。我们招聘并培训一批人，看看结果如何。’他同意了。这是一个关于智力的实验。”
Even though Eckhardt did not believe traders could be nurtured, he had faith in the underdog. He knew plenty of multimillionaires who had started trading with inherited wealth and bombed. Eckhardt saw them lose it all because they didn’t feel the pain when they were losing: “You’re much better off going into the market on a shoestring, feeling that you can’t afford to lose. I’d rather bet on somebody starting out with a few thousand dollars than on somebody who came in with millions.”
即使埃克哈特不相信优秀的交易者可以被培养出来，但他对处于劣势的人有信心。他知道很多千万富翁是靠继承的财富做交易暴富的。埃克哈特又看着他们把钱亏掉，因为他们在亏钱时感觉不到痛苦。“你开始要用小额资金做交易，这样可以体会到再也不能再亏时的感觉。我保证用几千美元开始做交易的人比用几百万开始做交易的人要做的好。”
The ramifications of Dennis and Eckhardt’s intellectual experiment opened a Pandora’s box of opinions and biases. Measuring and judging people by their IQ board scores, LSAT, GPA, degrees, or whatever other metric, is the way most of society operates. Yet if an IQ measure or test score was the only ticket needed for success, then all smart people would be loaded, which is obviously not the case.
丹尼斯和埃克哈特的智力实验打开了关于观点和偏见的潘多拉盒子。我们这个社会靠智商，考试，成绩来衡量一个人。如果智商或考试成绩是通向成功的唯一门票，那么所有聪明的人都很富有了，但现实明显不是这样。
Stephen Jay Gould, the late great American paleontologist, evolutionary biologist, and historian of science, was always quick to eschew society’s misconceptions about intelligence: “We like to think of America as a land with generally egalitarian traditions, a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” However, Gould saw America slipping toward measures and ratios as a sole means of predicting life success and was appalled at the increasing predilection of Americans to use a hereditarian interpretation of IQ as a limiting tool.
斯蒂芬·杰·古尔德是美国伟大的古生物学家，进化学家，历史科学家，他总是这样反驳对智力的误解：“我们认为美国是一个讲究平等的国家，宪法说所有的人生来就是平等的，我们相信自由。”然而，古尔德发现美国人用衡量的方式预测一个人是否成功，还以为智商很重要，这种偏见太可怕了。
Dennis, like Gould, was not about to be taken in by a hereditary interpretation of IQ. His aim was to implant his mental software into the brains of his students, and then place them into his controlled environment to see how they would react and perform.
丹尼斯像古尔德一样，不相信智力的遗传效果。他的目标就是把自己的想法告诉他的学生，然后看他们在一定的控制下如何表现。
That someone of Dennis’s stature and success would be so determined to prove nurture over nature that he would teach his proprietary trading methods to others was extraordinary. Certainly his partner was surprised that he was willing to put so much of his own money in the hands of amateurs.
丹尼斯的能力和成功让他有决心证明优秀的交易者是后天培养的，所以他把自己的交易方法告诉别人是了不起的。当然，他的伙伴后来很吃惊地发现他把很多钱交给业余选手交易。
With a dark beard and sideburns and a receding hairline, William Eckhardt bore an uncanny resemblance to Lenin and cut a sinewy, energetic figure, the polar opposite of the over-six-foot-tall rotund Dennis. Of the two, he was the true mathematician, with a master’s in mathematics from the University of Chicago and four years of doctoral research in mathematical logic. But for the purpose of their nature-versus-nurture debate, Eckhardt was the unapologetic biological determinist, certain that his partner was a savant, an introverted genius with special genetic talents.
威廉·埃克哈特与6英尺多高，长相圆胖的丹尼斯完全不同，他有黑胡子，络腮胡，头发向后，像健壮的有活力的列宁。两人中，他才是真正的数学家，他有芝加哥大学的数学学位，还有4年数序逻辑博士研究经验。但是，关于天生的，还是后天培养的争论，埃克哈特决心不道歉，他相信生物决定论。当然，他的伙伴是一个很有学问，内向的天才。
Today, there are plenty of people who would still argue against Dennis, insisting that “biological determinism,” or the notion that genetics predicts the physical and behavioral nature of an organism, can’t be overcome. That’s bad news for a potentially successful trader or entrepreneur in any field who doesn’t have the so-called pedigree or right IQ score. The irony is that even though Dennis’s experiment proved otherwise over twenty years ago, success in the markets is still perceived by many as a virtual IQ caste system.
现在，还有很多人反对丹尼斯，他们坚信“生物决定论”，或者说他们认为基因决定了人和行为，这点不能克服。对于没有相关遗传或智商不高的人来说，这真的是坏消息。讽刺的是，虽然丹尼斯在20多年前的实验证明了并非如此，很多人还是认为只有高智商才能在市场中成功。
Skeptics of Dennis’s Turtle experiment have long rolled out barrages of excuses about how serendipitous answering that little ad was. They argue it would have been impossible for anyone, except insiders, to have known that ad was the ticket to cracking Wall Street’s Top 100 paid traders (like Jerry Parker did). How could anyone know that an ad could potentially bypass what Warren Buffett has affectionately called “the ovarian lottery” and give a random group of people the chance to make millions? It’s hard to accept that fact. It’s too much like a Hollywood script.
正因为这种怀疑，所以当时注意到那个广告的人不多。人们争论说，除非是内部交易者，否则不可能会相信他的广告是通向华尔街顶尖100位受薪交易者的排名（像杰瑞·帕克）。沃伦·巴菲特说这样的广告就像是低概率的彩票，怎么可能随便让一批人有机会赚到几百万？事实很难接受。就像是好莱坞的电影剧本。
It’s a Small World
这个世界很小
Richard Dennis wanted a mishmash of personalities, similar to MTV’s Real World and their diverse casting calls. He selected both far-right-wing conservatives and bleeding-heart liberals. A high school graduate and an MBA were picked from the thousand-plus applicants who threw their hats into the ring. The wild cross-section of his final Turtle picks demonstrated Dennis’s diversity desires.
理查德·丹尼斯希望招聘不同性格的人，就像真人电视节目一样。他同时聘用了很保守的人和很喜欢自由的人。他还在1000多个应聘者中聘用了一个高中毕业生和一个工商管理硕士。这种交叉选择说明丹尼斯希望人要杂点。
There were college graduates from the State University of New York at Buffalo (business), Miami University in Ohio (economics), the New England Conservatory of Music (piano, music theory), Ferrum College in Virginia (accounting), Central Connecticut State University (marketing), Brown University (geology), the University of Chicago (Ph.D. in linguistics), Macalester College (history), and the United States Air Force Academy.
他招聘的大学毕业生来自，布法罗的纽约州立大学（商业学），俄亥俄州迈阿密（经济学），新西兰音乐学院音乐系（钢琴，音乐理论），弗吉尼亚钢铁学院（会计学），康涅狄格州州立中心大学（营销学），布朗大学（地质学），芝加哥大学（语言博士），麦卡利斯特大学（历史学）和美国空军学院。
Others Dennis students had recently held jobs at Cushman/Wake-field (security guard), Caterpillar Tractor (salesperson), Collins Commodities (broker), the Ground Round Restaurant (assistant manager), A.G. Becker (phone clerk), Palomino Club (bartender), and Dungeons and Dragons (board game designer). One student simply declared his status as “unemployed.” Earlier job histories of those who made the final cut were even more mundane: kitchen worker, teacher, prison counselor, messenger, accounting assistant, and waiter.
丹尼斯聘用的学生最近的工作分别为，Cushman（保安），Caterpillar拖拉机（业务员），柯林斯商品（经纪人），大圈餐馆（主力经理），A.G. Becker（电话文员），Palomino俱乐部（服务员），龙和地下城（游戏设计）。有一个学生说他没工作经验。这些人之前的职业更普通，分别是：厨师，教师，监狱顾问，邮差，会计助理，服务员。
Dennis selected one woman from the ad, a rarity in the 1980s “all boys” world of Chicago trading. He also selected gay students, whether he knew their orientation at the time or not. His picks ran the gamut from mild-mannered, professional academics to regular-guy blue-collar types, to some with wildly volatile personalities.
丹尼斯还聘用了一位女生，在80年代的芝加哥，交易是男人的天下。不管他知不知道，他还聘用了一个同性恋。他选择的人各种各样，有中层管理人员，有专业的大学生，有蓝领。
There were certain things Dennis was looking for. He wanted students who showed a willingness to take calculated risks. Those who stood out from the herd in some kind of an unconventional way had a leg up. This wasn’t a normal hiring process in the early 1980s, nor would it be normal now. Today, MBA types, for example, are geared to the intellectual rigors of running a company but are reluctant to get their hands dirty. They are the ones who think IQ and connections are all they need. They don’t want to do the hard work. They don’t want to really take a risk.
丹尼斯当时也在寻找确定的东西。他希望学生愿意接受计算过的风险。这样的人就有机会被聘用。在80年代初期，这种招聘不同寻常，现在也不同寻常。现在的工商管理硕士更喜欢开公司，而不是把自己搞的灰头土脸。他们是智商高，交际广的人。他们不想太辛苦。他们不想承担风险。
Dennis didn’t want those people. He was searching for people who enjoyed playing games of chance. He was looking for people who could think in terms of “odds.” Think like a Vegas “handicapper”? You were more likely to get an interview. None of this was surprising to those who knew Dennis. Reacting to opportunities that others never saw was how he marched through life.
丹尼斯不想要这样的人。他在寻找享受概率游戏的人。他在寻找的人都会用“概率”思考。像拉斯维加斯的创业者那样思考？你最好去问问他们。知道丹尼斯的人都明白这些道理。用别人从不知道的概率来解决问题。
With a story like this, it’s not hard to imagine the legend that has built up over the years. The experiment has inspired a cultlike reverence, often passed along by word of mouth. However, Charles Faulkner, a modeler of great traders, was instantly struck by the deeper meaning of Dennis’s experiment. He wondered how Dennis knew, saying, “I would have sided with Bill’s skepticism. Even if . . . it was teachable, it certainly should have taken more effort and a much longer time than Dennis allowed for learning it. The experiment, and more significantly the results, violated all of my beliefs around effort and merit and reward. If something was that easy to learn, it shouldn’t pay so well and vice versa. I marveled at the range of thinking, awareness, and inference, this implied.”
像这样的故事，不难想象为何如此具有传奇性。这个实验像巫术一样，引起了人们的崇敬，不过是口头传播的。当时的模范交易者查尔斯·福克纳，很快被丹尼斯实验的深刻含义吸引了。他在想，丹尼斯是如何知道：“我应该是和比尔一样持怀疑态度的。即使那是可以传授的，肯定还需要更多的努力和时间，至少比丹尼斯培训的时间要长。但是这个实验的结果打破了我对努力、价值和回报的信念。如果这么简单就可以学好，那么结果就不会太好，如果结果太好，就不会那么容易学。我对这些想法，意识和推理感到不可思议。”
Dennis and Eckhardt taught their students everything they needed in only two weeks to trade bonds, currencies, corn, oil, stocks, and all other markets. Their students did not learn to trade from a screaming mosh pit on the trading floor with wild hand signals, but rather in a quiet office with no televisions, computers and only a few phones.
丹尼斯和埃克哈特只用了2周时间就把所有知识教给了学生们，教会他们如何交易债券、外汇、玉米、原油、股票和所有的市场。他们的学生并没有在又吵又闹，狂打手势的交易场内学习，而是在一个安静的办公室学习，没有电视，没有电脑，只有几部电话。
Each student received $1 million to trade after his classroom instruction. They were to get 15 percent of the profits, while Dennis got 85 percent. No surprise that he would get the lion’s share; it was, after all, his money.
课程结束以后，每个学生得到了100万美元用来交易。他们可以拿15%的利润，丹尼斯拿85%的利润。他如此狮子大张口是可以理解的，毕竟那都是他的钱。
Dennis was honest about taking the majority of the profits when he said in November 1983, right before launching the experiment, that there would be no charity involved. He viewed the experiment as a way to diversify his portfolio. While he knew his “no experience necessary” students could be wiped out, he viewed it all as a way to gain more control of how his millions were being put to use, saying, “I’m tired of investing in someone else’s condominium in Timbuktu.”
丹尼斯很老实地说，在1983年11月，也就是开始实验之前，他拿走了大部分的利润，他不是做慈善事业。他把实验当作分散投资的方式。他知道一些没有经验的学生可能会被淘汰，他把这个实验看做控制几百万的方法，用他的话说：“我可不想投资廷巴克图那里别人的房子。”
Replacing condo investment ideas with a group of surrogates was a smart move. Many of his students went on to make 100 percent or more per year over four years. That’s monster moneymaking. Even more important than those successes from the early 1980s is the current track record of three of the participants. Long after the experiment’s ending, Eckhardt, along with two of Dennis’s former pupils, Jerry Parker and Paul Rabar, manage in excess of $3 billion in 2007. They still trade in a very similar fashion to how they did back in the day.
不投资房子，而是用其它方法，这是聪明的做法。很多学生在连续4年内每年都取得了100%甚至更多的利润。赚钱太厉害了。更重要的是，其中3个人的交易记录更厉害。这个实验结束后，埃克哈特和丹尼斯的2个学生，杰瑞·帕克和保罗·拉巴在2007年管理的资金超过了30亿美元。他们现在的交易风格和过去相似。
Beyond Turtles-related successes, there are hundreds of others, traders of big achievements, who owe a debt of gratitude to Dennis for sharing his knowledge and experience. Additionally, men considered to be trading peers of Dennis (not trained by him), men of similar macro trading backgrounds such as Bruce Kovner, Louis Bacon, and Paul Tudor Jones, are to this day regularly the highest paid on Wall Street.
除了海龟的成功，还有成千上万的人因为得到了丹尼斯的知识而取得了很大的成就，他们也感激丹尼斯。另外，人们（不是他的学生）喜欢把丹尼斯当作目标，像布鲁斯·科夫勒，路易斯•培根和保罗·都铎·琼斯都是现在在华尔街受薪最高的人，他们都是如此。
Of course, the $3 billion traded by Dennis’s trading progeny doesn’t seem that large when headlines today scream out with stories of new hedge funds launched with billions out of the gate. When Jon Wood, formerly of UBS, started his new fund with more than $5 billion and when Jack R. Meyer, the former investment manager of Harvard University’s assets, raised more than $6 billion for Convexity Capital, the $3 billion from Dennis’s associates sounds less impressive.
当然了，和现在几十亿的对冲基金相比，丹尼斯的学生管理的30亿不算多。之前在UBS的乔恩•伍德的新基金是50多亿美元，哈佛大学基金的前投资经理杰克·R·迈耳管理的凸面资金，开始是60多亿美元。丹尼斯的学生管理的30亿美元听起来就不算多了。
In fact, some argue that Dennis’s “lack of pedigree” approach has been passed by. One recent story profiled a twenty-seven-year-old trader from Goldman Sachs. A “well-bred” product of Massachusetts’s tony Deerfield Academy and Duke University, he was described as having all of the ingredients of a grade-A trader. One of his peers gushed. “He’s smart, competitive, and a hard worker. Keep your eye on this kid.”
实际上，有人说丹尼斯的“师出无门”的方法已经不流行了。最近有人提到了一个来自高盛集团的27岁的交易者。他是迪尔费尔德学院和杜克大学的高材生。人们说他具有顶级交易者的所有素质。他的一个同行说：“他聪明，有竞争力，很努力。你要关注他。”
That praise has to be put into perspective. If a trader starts a career with a prominent investment bank, he becomes valuable by using Goldman Sachs’s money, offices, and connections. The access he has sitting in the catbird seat at a top bank is a major secret of his success.
我们要用长远的观点看待这种赞美之词。如果一个交易者从著名的投资银行起步，他是通过使用高盛的钱，办公室和关系而让自己值钱的。他能成功地登上那个位子才是他的关键秘密。
Investment banks were simply never the career paths of the great entrepreneurial traders. That is why Dennis brings hope. Independent-minded rebel traders, like him, never got to where they were by moving up bureaucratic ladders. They did not bide their time for twenty years engaging in office politics. Dennis and his peers were never part of a Fortune 500 hierarchy. They had one objective: to make absolute-return money trading the markets on their terms. It was high risk and high reward.
对于伟大的企业家交易者来说，投资银行绝对不是一条职业道路。这就是丹尼斯带来希望的原因。像丹尼斯这样的人，绝不会通过搞关系往上爬。他们不想花20年时间搞政治斗争。丹尼斯和他的同行绝不会在世界500强这样等级森严的公司做事。他们有一个目标：自己交易赚到绝对高的回报。交易是高风险，高回报的。
Dennis’s Turtle experiment proved, all things being equal, that his students could learn to trade to make millions. However, all things being equal, after they learned the “right” trading rules to make those millions, if they did not exhibit, like Boston Red Sox slugger David Ortiz does in baseball, a “walk-off home run” mentality every day, they would fail. Great training alone was not enough to win for the long run. In the end, a persistent drive for winning combined with a healthy dose of courage would be mandatory for Dennis’s students’ long-term survival.
丹尼斯的海龟实验证明了，所有事物都是平等的，因为他的学生通过学习赚到了几百万。然而，只有学到了正确的原则，所有的事物才是平等的。如果他们像心不在焉的球员那样，他们也会失败。仅仅是很好的培训并不能让你长期赢。最终，对赢的不懈追求，加上健康的激励，可以让丹尼斯的学生长期生存。
Before getting into what really happened with the Turtles, who the winners and losers were and why, it’s crucial to get acquainted with what made Dennis tick in the first place. Knowing how a regular guy from the South Side of Chicago made $1 million by the age of twenty-five in the early 1970s and $200 million by the age of thirty-seven in the early 1980s is the first step toward understanding why nurture won out.
在谈真正的海龟故事，谁是赢家，谁是输家，和具体原因之前，先了解丹尼斯的起步也很关键。要想知道为什么后天培养也能取胜，首先就要了解一个平常的家伙，他从芝加哥南部起家，在70年代初25岁赚了100万美元，在37岁，也就是80年代初赚了2亿美元。
章 交易场内的王子
“Great investors conceptualize problems differently than other investors. These investors don’t succeed by accessing better information; they succeed by using the information differently than others.”
Michael J. Mauboussin, chief investment strategist of Legg Mason Capital Management
“伟大的投资者看待问题的方式和其他投资者不同。他们不是靠更好的信息成功的，他们靠使用信息的方式和别人不同而成功的。”
迈克尔·J·莫伯辛，莱格·梅森资金管理的首席投资策略分析师
Nineteen eighty-six was a huge year for Richard Dennis. He made $80 million (about $147 million in 2007 dollars). That kind of money-making put him squarely at the center of Wall Street alongside George Soros, who was making $100 million, and then junk bond king Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert, who was pulling in $80 million.
对理查德·丹尼斯来说，1986年是重要的一年。他赚了8000万美元（相当于在2007年赚了1.47亿美元）。这样的赚钱方法让他和华尔街的一些人站在一起，这些人包括乔治·索罗斯，他赚了1亿美元，然后是债券之王迈克尔·米尔肯，他是德崇证券的，他赚了8000万。
Profits like those for Dennis came with heartburn. He was down $10 million in a single day that year before bouncing back, a roller-coaster ride that would have made mere mortals lose serious sleep. Yet Dennis cockily said that he slept like a baby during all that volatility.
对丹尼斯来说，这样的利润带来的是心痛。他的利润在一天内缩水了1000万美元，一年后才涨回来，这样的过山车会让有些人晚上睡不着。然而丹尼斯逞能地说他在波动期间睡得像小孩一样。
His moneymaking style was about mammoth home runs and many smaller strikeouts. If there was a “secret,” he knew that you had to be able to accept losses both psychologically and physiologically. Still, 1986 was a long time ago, and memories dull when an old pro starts talking about the benefits of taking “losses.”
他赚钱的风格就是赚大钱，亏很多小钱。如果说这就是秘密，他知道你必须在心理上，在生理上接受亏损。然而，1986年离我们很远了，当一个老练的专业人士谈论接受亏损有好处的时候，很多人的记忆是模糊的。
During his heyday in the 1970s, 1980s, and mid-1990s, Dennis was described in a number of ways by those who knew of him. There was Dennis the legendary floor trader, Dennis the trading system’s trading guru, Dennis who started funds with investment bank Drexel Burnham, Dennis the philanthropist, Dennis the political activist, and Dennis the industry-leading money manager. He was a difficult man to stereotype, and he liked it that way.
丹尼斯的高峰期在70年代、80年代和90年代中期，很多认识的人都在谈论他。谈论的方式各种各样，丹尼斯是传奇性的场内交易者，丹尼斯是交易系统大师，丹尼斯帮德崇证券投资银行操作基金，丹尼斯是慈善家，丹尼斯活跃于政治活动，丹尼斯是基金经理的领袖。很难准确地描述他，他喜欢这样。
“Dennis the gambler” was the only label that offended him, because he never considered himself a gambler in the Las Vegas sense. He understood financial Darwinism (read: “odds”) through and through. He always played the “game” knowing that everyone else was out to beat him. Financial futures pioneer Richard Sandor put Dennis in perspective: “The name of the game is survival when the markets are this chaotic. From that perspective, he may go down as one of the most successful speculators in the 20th century.”
“丹尼斯是赌徒”，这是唯一攻击他的话，因为他从不承认自己是赌徒。他懂金融界的进化论（其实就是概率论）。他知道所有人都会袭击他，但他总是在玩这个游戏。期货先锋理查德·桑德尔这样描述丹尼斯：“当市场是混沌的，这个游戏的名字就是生存。从这个角度来说，他也许会像20世纪最成功的投机者一样走下神坛。”
Dennis’s success started long before he launched the Turtle experiment. He grew up in Chicago during the 1950s, a street kid from the old South Side neighborhoods. There was no privileged childhood with wealthy parents and well-placed friends. He did not have a silver spoon or the right connections.
丹尼斯在海龟实验开始之前很早就成功了。50年代，他在芝加哥南区长大。他没有有钱的父母，也没有有势力的朋友，没有任何优势。他并非含着金钥匙出生的，也没有社会关系。
The teenage Dennis was introverted and wore thick glasses and polyester pants. His first stab at trading, while attending the all-boys’ St. Laurence Prep School in Chicago, was to buy ten shares of a $3 “phonograph” stock. The company folded. While his first attempt at trading failed, he was a natural at poker, intuitively understanding the odds.
丹尼斯在10多岁的时候性格内向，他戴着厚玻璃眼镜，穿着尼龙裤。当他在芝加哥圣劳伦斯预备学校读书时，他买了10股价格是3美元的电唱机股票，这是他第一次买股票。这个公司后来倒闭了。虽然第一次交易是失败的，但他喜欢打扑克，他天生就懂概率。
His teachers did not forget him. James Sherman, who taught theology and European history to Dennis, said that he never would take anything at face value. Dennis and his friends enjoyed the mental gymnastics of taking sides in an argument. Sherman added, “If somebody had said back then that Richard Dennis would become a very wealthy man as a commodity trader, I probably wouldn’t have believed them.” His former teacher would have predicted Dennis to be in front of the fire, with a sweater and a pipe, expounding on the cosmos.
他的老师都记得他。詹姆士·谢尔曼当时教神学和欧洲历史，他说丹尼斯从不相信任何表面的价值。丹尼斯喜欢和他的朋友们争论。谢尔曼补充说：“如果当时有人说丹尼斯会成为有钱的商品交易者，我是不会相信的。”他以前的老师是这样预测他的，他拿着水管站在火灾前面，不知所措。（张轶注：这句可能翻译错了。不会翻。）
At seventeen, Dennis landed a summer job as a runner ($1.60 an hour) at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Each day the exchange floor was mobbed by hundreds of traders fighting and screaming to place their trades. They were exactly like auctioneers buying and selling their wares except that they were in a trading pit battling it out. An indoor game of tackle football would be a good description of the scene.
丹尼斯在17岁的时候找到了一个工作，在芝加哥商业交易所跑单（工资是每小时1.60美元）。每天都有几百个人在场内又喊又叫地交易。他们就像拍卖一样，只是他们在交易所场内而已。场内足球有点像这个场景。
Dennis longed to be there, but to trade on the floor you had to be twenty-one. He found a way over that hurdle by talking his father into trading for him. A blue-collar worker for Chicago’s city government, the father became a proxy guided by his son’s hand signals from the sidelines.
丹尼斯早就想做交易了，但是在场内做交易的年龄限制是21岁以上。他找到了一个办法，他劝说他爸去帮他做交易。他爸是芝加哥政府的蓝领工人，丹尼斯在旁边打手势，他爸代他交易。
Despite some trading success in his teens, Dennis headed off to college at DePaul University, where his passion for philosophy (after flunking out of an accounting class) from high school days was rekindled. He was most taken with British philosophers David Hume and John Locke, who had a relatively simple way of viewing the world. “Prove it to me” was their basic perspective.
他在10多岁的时候赚了一些钱，然后丹尼斯到迪保罗大学读书去了，他在中学时对哲学的激情再次被点燃了。之前他还学过会计，结果考试不及格被退学了。他跟英国哲学家大卫·休姆和约翰·洛克学哲学，他们看待世界的方法很简单，他们的基本观点就是：“证明给我看。”
Hume thought the mind a blank slate (tabula rasa) on which experience could be written. He believed that since human beings live and function in the world, they should try to observe how they do so. Discovering the causes of human belief was his key principle. Locke, on the other hand, argued that there were no innate ideas. He asked the question, “How is the mind furnished?” He wanted to know where reason and knowledge came from. His answer was one word: “experience.”
休姆说思想就是白板，经验是可以写上去的。他相信自从人类开始在这个世界活动之时，他们就在努力观察自己做事的方式。关键原则就是发现引起人们信念的原因。洛克则相反，他争论说没有天生的思想。他问了一个问题：“如何提供思想？”他想知道理由和知识来自哪里。答案只有一个：“经验。”
Both Hume and Locke belonged to the school of thought known as Empiricism. Empiricism is rooted in the notion that knowledge is derived from experiment, observation, and experience. Little nuggets of simple common sense from these two eighteenth-century British philosophers connected with an impressionable college student. They became his idols.
休姆和洛克都是经验主义者。经验主义就是说知识来自实验、观察和体验。这两位英国哲学家的一点共同之处给这个大学生很深的印象。他把他们两个作为偶像。
Dennis was not shy about his leanings, asserting, “I’m an empiricist, through and through. David Hume and Bertrand Russell. I’m solidly in the English tradition.” Dennis saw Hume as ruthlessly skeptical. Hume took on the sacred cows of his generation, and Dennis loved that attitude.
丹尼斯在学习方面并不害羞，他断言说：“我一直是经验主义者。我相信大卫·休姆和伯特兰·罗素。我坚决相信英国的传统。”丹尼斯发现休姆喜欢怀疑。休姆是那个时代比较爱怀疑的人，丹尼斯喜欢他的态度。
It wasn’t only British philosophy that turned Dennis into a skeptic. Growing up in the late 1960s and early 1970s gave him an anti-establishment view of the world. He witnessed protesters being beaten by the Chicago police during the 1968 riots, right next to the venerable Chicago Board of Trade. It was a turning point in his life:
不仅仅是英国的哲学家让丹尼斯喜欢怀疑。他在60年代末，70年代初开始怀疑一切。1968年骚乱时，就在芝加哥交易所旁边，他亲眼看见抗议者被警察打。那是他生命的转折点：
Trading has taught me not to take the conventional wisdom for granted. What money I made in trading is testimony to the fact that the majority is wrong a lot of the time. The vast majority is wrong even more of the time. I’ve learned that markets, which are often just mad crowds, are often irrational; when emotionally overwrought, they’re almost always wrong.
交易告诉我不要相信传统的智慧。我通过交易赚的钱已经告诉了我，大部分人在大部分时间都是错的。甚至绝大部分的人在大部分时间都是错的。我已经知道了，疯狂的大众有时候就是市场，市场常常是非理性的，只要他们情绪不安，他们几乎总是错的。
After graduating from DePaul University he received a fellowship to Tulane University graduate school, but promptly dropped out and returned to Chicago within days to start trading full time. Dennis bought a seat on the MidAmerican Commodity Exchange with money borrowed from his parents (part of it from a life insurance policy in his name). He still needed cash to trade, however. His initial war chest of $100 came from his brother Tom’s earnings delivering pizzas.
从迪保罗大学毕业后，他又到杜兰大学去读研究生，但他很快就退学了，然后他回到芝加哥开始全职交易。他从爸妈那里借钱（部分来自他名义下的寿险金），在中美商品交易所买了一个席位。然而，他还要更多的现金用来交易。他找哥哥汤姆，把汤姆送比萨赚的100美元借来了，这是他的起始资金。
This was not a family of market operators. Dennis was always honest about his father’s “hatred” of the market, explaining, “My grandfather had lost all his money in the stock market in the Depression. The urge to speculate kind of skipped a generation.” He knew his father’s perspective would never work for him:
他家人并不喜欢交易。丹尼斯很老实地说他爸讨厌市场，他解释说：“在大萧条的时候，我爷爷在股市把钱亏光了。投机的细胞似乎是跨代遗传的。”他知道他爸的态度永远不会与自己一致：
You can’t have a standard attitude about money and do well in this business. What do I mean by that? Well, my father, for instance, worked for the city of Chicago for 30 years, and he once had a job shoveling coal. So, just imagine coming from his frame of reference, and thinking about losing $50 in a few seconds trading commodities. To him, that means another eight hours shoveling coal. That’s a standard attitude about money.
如果你对金钱持有传统的态度，你就不能做好这门生意。我的意思是什么？以我爸为例，他为芝加哥服务了30年，他过去还挖过煤。从他的角度思考，在商品市场几秒钟就能亏损50美元。对他来说，那就是挖8小时煤的收入。这就是对金钱的传统态度。
It didn’t take long for his father to recognize Dennis’s unique abilities to make money. By the beginning of 1973, at twenty-four, Dennis had made $100,000. Around that time he cockily preached to the Chicago papers, “I just wanted to be able to get up and say, ‘I once made $100,000 a year, and I still think you are an ass.’ That rhetoric may not be wholesome motivation, but I do think it’s part of what drives me.” He was making so much money fast that whatever the context or content of an interview, it was outdated in weeks or even days.
没过多久，他爸就发现丹尼斯真的有赚钱能力。1973年初，丹尼斯24岁，他已经赚了100000美元。当时他自大地向芝加哥报纸宣称：“我希望每天早上能起来对自己说‘我一年赚了100000美元，我还认为我是笨蛋。’这种修辞手法不太像自我激励，但我确实用它来激励我自己。”他赚钱的速度太快了，无论报纸上面关于他的访谈内容是什么，报纸在几周内，甚至几天内就过时了。
A rebel at heart, Dennis cultivated being a character from the outset. He was fond of saying that he never liked the idea of sharing a birthday with Richard Nixon - a gentle stab at all those conservative traders surrounding him in the pits on LaSalle Street. He was an anti-establishment guy making a fortune leveraging the establishment, while wearing jeans.
丹尼斯一开始内心就反叛。他喜欢说他不想和理查德·尼克松一起庆祝生日——他在拉萨尔街和很多保守的交易者在一起这么说的，他这句话刺伤了他们的心。他反传统，却赚了很多钱。他喜欢穿牛仔裤。
Society was splintered during the time Dennis earned his first big money. Nineteen seventy-four was a difficult year in which to focus. What with G. Gordon Liddy having been found guilty of Watergate charges and the Symbionese Liberation Army kidnapping Patricia Hearst, it was a wild time of constant turmoil. To top it off, Richard Nixon became the first President of the United States to resign from office.
当丹尼斯第一次赚大钱时，社会动荡不安。1974年不好过。G·高登·利迪在水门事件中被判有罪，共生解放军绑架了帕特里西亚·赫斯特，当时的混乱接二连三。更有甚者，理查德·尼克松是美国第一个辞职的总统。
Current events did not stop Dennis from leveraging a 1974 run-up in the price of soybeans to a $500,000 profit. By the end of the year, at age twenty-five, he was a millionaire. Even though he downplayed his success, he couldn’t hide it. When he showed up late one day to the soybean pit explaining that his beat- up 1967 Chevy had broken down, other traders gave him flack, knowing full well he could afford a new car hundreds of times over.
这些事件并没有阻止丹尼斯在1974年做大豆赚了500000美元。到了年底时，他25岁，他已经是百万富翁了。虽然他低调处理他的成功，但是他无法隐藏自己的成功。有一天他到交易所迟了点，他就解释说他破旧的雪佛莱坏了，其他交易者大骂他，说他的钱完全可以再买100辆新车了。
Not only was his persona different, his trading was different. Dennis read Psychology Today (no government economic or crop reports for him) to keep his emotions in check and to remind him of how overrated intuition was in trading. He took delight in boasting, in contrast to most traders who got up early to read all they could from weather reports to daily Department of Agriculture assessments, that he stayed in bed until the last minute before getting to the exchange just as trading started.
他不但性格不同，交易方式也不同。丹尼斯阅读《今日心理学》（而不是政府经济学或谷物报告）以查看自己的情绪状态，他想知道自己是否太相信直觉了。大部分交易者每天起床就开始阅读所有的报告，从天气预报到农业部的评估都要看。丹尼斯把媒体当作娱乐，他在床上睡到最后一分钟，然后在交易开始前才赶到交易所。
At one point during this time, Dennis was in the middle of an interview with a reporter as he went to the bank to make a deposit. He was depositing a $325,000 check (in 1976, that represented two to three weeks of work for him). Depositing an amount like that in the mid-1970s was not normal. Dennis always got hassled when he tried to deposit checks that size. He was oblivious to the fact that that the teller was looking at a check that likely would exceed her total career earnings. Yet Dennis, probably younger than she was, couldn’t sign his name straight.
有一次，丹尼斯去银行存钱，记者跟着他采访。他当时存325000美元（在1976年，这代表他2，3周的交易收入）。在70年代中期，存这么多钱是不正常的。所以丹尼斯存这么多钱总是遇到麻烦。很明显，银行女职员发现他要存的钱总是比她一辈子的的收入还要多。也许丹尼斯比这位女职员还年轻，他连签名都签不好。
As his notoriety continued to grow, national newspapers like the Chicago Tribune, the New York Times, and Barron’s trumpeted his youth and success. This was not standard operating procedure in a tight-lipped world where the big Chicago traders typically kept silent. Dennis enjoyed and even reveled in his upbringing and the unique perspective it afforded him:
随着他的名声远扬，全国性的报纸，比如《芝加哥论坛报》、《纽约时报》和《巴伦周刊》都在宣扬他的年轻和成功。芝加哥的交易者一般都喜欢保持沉默。丹尼斯却很享受这种方式：
I grew up in an Irish-Catholic family on the South Side of Chicago. My institutional values were very strong, if somewhat confused. My holy trinity consisted of the Catholic Church, the Democratic Party, and the Chicago White Sox. I would describe my early value system as nourishing, if limited. When my father took me to Hurley’s Tavern, I saw people falling off their bar stools - about what you’d expect from people who called whiskey “Irish pop.”
我成长在芝加哥南区，家里人信天主教。我的价值观由来已久。我同时相信天主教、民主党和芝加哥白袜队。我早期的价值系统很丰富。当我爸带我去爱尔兰酒吧时，我看见有人从凳子上摔落在地——人们说威士忌就是爱尔兰酒。
The Church, baseball, Democratic politics, and Irish drinking weren’t only an influence on his youth:
教堂、棒球、民主政治、喝爱尔兰酒，在他年轻的时候，影响他的不止这些：
How much of my holy trinity informs me as an adult? In the White Sox I have a deep and abiding faith. In the Democratic Party I have shallow and fading faith, which is almost never rewarded. In the church, well . . . I fear 16 years of Catholic education left me a skeptic.
我的这些爱好对我的成长有什么影响？我对白袜队有很深的，持久的信心。我对民主党没什么信心，他们从不知道回报。我对教堂，嗯……16年的天主教教育让我喜欢怀疑。
Look at that 1976 New York Times photo of the then twenty-six-year-old multimillionaire, lounging on the couch with his dad seated to his left, seemingly oblivious to the photographer, and it is easy to see anti-establishment staring into the camera. The photo caption only reinforced Dennis’s differences: “He drives an old, inexpensive car, he dresses in cheap knits; his money tends to pile up, unused.”
1976年的《纽约时报》刊登了他的照片，他当时26岁，已经有了几百万，懒洋洋地躺在沙发上，他爸坐在他的左边，他似乎不把摄影师当回事，很明显，他那个时候就比较反叛了。照片的标题是这样强调丹尼斯的不同之处的：“他开着一辆老旧，便宜的轿车，他穿着便宜的毛衣，他的钱在增加，但他不用钱。”
However, all this press at such a young age left Dennis confronted by something he probably wasn’t expecting: people with their hands out, asking for money. “Most of them were very sad,” he recalled. “One person said, ‘Help me to learn how to trade. I’m in debt.’ Some people made it sound as if $5,000 or $10,000 were all they needed to make them happy. Those were the only letters worth answering - to explain that money won’t really make a difference.”
然而，媒体这样报道这个年轻人让丹尼斯遇到了一些没想到的问题：人们向他伸手要钱。他回忆说：“大部分人都很伤心。有一个人说‘教我如何交易吧，我负债了。’还有一些人，似乎只要给他们5000美元或10000美元，他们就会开心。我只回复这样的人——向他们解释钱不会解决问题。”
Not many twenty-six-year-olds would have been mature enough to handle the press using such folksy wisdom. Yet Dennis never let the swirl around him interfere with what he was doing to make money. Quite simply, his trading technique was to trade seasonal spreads. In other words, he wanted to take advantage of seasonal patterns in markets like soybeans - his initial specialty. Dennis would hold “long” (bets to profit as the market increased) and “short” (bets to profit as the market decreased) positions in futures contracts simultaneously in the same or related futures markets.
很少有26岁的人成熟到如此娴熟地回复媒体。但丹尼斯绝不会让这些事影响他赚钱。很简单，他的交易技术是交易季节性价差。换句话说，他想利用市场季节性模式的优势——比如大豆就是他最初的特长。在相同的或相关的期货市场，丹尼斯会同时持有多头仓位和空头仓位。
The MidAm Exchange Experience
中美交易所的经验
Once he had his MidAm seat (formerly called the Chicago Open Board), Dennis was off and running. Initially he had no clue what he was doing, but he was a fast learner who learned to think like a casino operator:
一旦买到了中美的席位（之前叫芝加哥交易所），丹尼斯就达到目的了。一开始他不知道如何操作，但是他学的很快，他知道要像赌场经营者那样思考：
When I started out, I had a system called “having no idea whatsoever.” For four years, I was just taking edges. If someone was giving me a quarter cent edge to buy an Oat contract, I didn’t think he knew anything either. I just knew that I was getting a quarter cent edge, and at the end of the day, the edges would approximately equal my profit. Obviously, on an individual basis that doesn’t have to happen, but over a longer period of time, it will. I tried to be like the house in the casino. It wasn’t that novel. People at the Board of Trade had been doing it forever. But for the MidAm, it was kind of revolutionary because no one would understand that you could balance your risk with a lot of volume. That’s how I started.
当我一开始的时候，我的系统叫“无论如何，不要有自己的观点。”4年来，我一直使用这个优势。如果有人给我一个消息，叫我买燕麦，我并不认为他知道任何东西。我只知道我有一点点优势，当天结束时，这个优势大约等于我的利润。很显然，短期来说，这样的事不一定会发生，但是长期来说，它一定会发生。我尽量把自己当作赌场经营者。这并不新奇。交易所的人一直这么做。但是对于中美来说，它有一个优点，因为没有人知道你可以用很大的成交量来平衡风险。我就是这样开始的。
Dennis went from zero to sixty on the MidAm in record time, and no one knew how he learned to do what he was doing. He knew that traders had a tendency to self-destruct. The battle with self was where he focused his energies: “I think it’s far more important to know what Freud thinks about death wishes than what Milton Friedman thinks about deficit spending.” Go down to Wall Street today after work with the hot-shot traders all earning $500,000 a year at the big banks and you’ll find very few who talk about Freud being the ticket to making millions.
丹尼斯在中美交易所交易，在很短的时间内从一无所知到掌握知识，没人知道他是如何学习的。他知道交易者有自毁倾向。战胜自我的重点是把能量聚焦在何处：“我认为搞懂弗洛伊德如何理解死亡意愿比搞懂米尔顿·弗里德曼如何理解赤字花费重要很多。”如果你下班后与在华尔街银行工作，年收入500000美元的著名交易者谈话，你会发现很少有人认为弗洛伊德是通向百万的道路。
However, trading was harder than Dennis let on. The early ups and downs took a toll on him, but he learned the hard lessons within months. “You have to have mentally gone through the process of failure,” he said. “I had a day during which I made every mistake known to modern man. I took too big risks. I panicked and sold at the bottom of every break. I had built my net worth up to about $4,000 coming into that day and I lost about $1,000 in two hours. It took me about three days to work through that experience emotionally, and I think it was the best thing that ever happened to me.”
然而，交易要比丹尼斯讲的难。早年的起起落落造就了他，几个月的痛苦教训使他明白了交易的道理。他说：“你必须在思想上接受亏损的过程。我有一天犯了现代人犯的所有错误。我的风险太大。我恐慌了，总在底部卖出。我曾经有一天下注4000美元，结果2个小时就亏了1000美元。大约3天后我才从这种情绪中解脱出来，但我想这是发生在我身上最好的事。”
It was about this time, in 1972–73, that fellow traders Tom Willis and Robert Moss met Dennis. They would go on to work together for years as close friends and business associates, with Dennis as their leader. The star did not wear a polished Armani suit, nor did his buddies. They sported used-car- salesman jackets, with muttonchops and bad hair, but their appearance disguised calculated gamers looking to beat the pants off their peers every day of the week.
大约在1972——73年，交易者汤姆·威利斯，罗伯特·莫斯和丹尼斯会面。他们将在一起工作很多年，既是朋友，又是生意伙伴，丹尼斯是他们的领导。这个明星不穿阿玛尼服装，他的朋友也没穿。他们身穿二手车业务员穿的夹克，留着络腮胡，头发很乱，但是他们的业绩却比同行强多了。
Willis, like Dennis, was brought up in a working-class family. His father, who worked first as a milkman and then delivering bread, helped him buy a seat on the MidAm for $1,000 at age twenty-one. Willis had never heard of the exchange until he saw an article in the Chicago Tribune with the headline “Altruistic Grain Trader Successful.” It was about 22.5-year-old Richard Dennis.
威利斯和丹尼斯一样出生于工人家庭。他爸一开始是挤奶工人，然后又送面包，他爸帮他在中美买了一个席位，花了1000美元，他当时21岁。威利斯从没听说过交易所，直到有一次他在《芝加哥论坛报》上看到了标题“无私的谷物交易者成功了。”那篇文章讲的是22.5岁的丹尼斯。
Willis immediately identified with his peer’s anti-establishment way of viewing the world. Dennis was not afraid to say that he had voted for Eugene McCarthy and didn’t think that just because he had radical ideas he should be driving a cab. Years later, Dennis was even more direct, saying that “the market was a legal and moral way to make a living. Being a trader doesn’t oblige one to be a conservative.”
威利斯立刻确认了他的同行很反叛。丹尼斯毫无畏惧地说他投票支持尤金·麦卡锡，他有种族想法，他不怕去开出租车。几年后，丹尼斯更直接，他说：“以交易为生是合法的，符合道德的。做交易者不一定就是保守派。”
Yet Dennis’s political stance was not what first caught Willis’s attention; it was his attitude about making money in a world where class and distinction were always barriers to entry. Without a second thought, Willis hopped in his Jeep and drove to the Fisher Building in the Chicago Loop to check out the exchange. When he arrived at the MidAm for the first time, his soon-to-be role model dominated the landscape: “Rich was in the pit. I knew him by the photo from the Tribune.”
引起威利斯注意的并不是丹尼斯的政治主张。引起威利斯注意的是他的态度，他说阶级差别总是赚钱的障碍。威利斯不再多想，他走进吉普车，开到了芝加哥的费希尔大厦去看交易所。当他第一次到中美交易所时，他的未来偶像影响了他：“理查德在交易场内。我看了《论坛报》上他的照片，我认出了他。”
Willis started trading with his MidAm seat, but had no immediate contact with Dennis even though they were the two youngest traders in the pit. Nearly everybody else was sixty-five to eighty years old, and they actually had chairs and spittoons in the trading pit. A young Dennis, towering above a sea of old guys lounging on chairs, must have been a sight.
威利斯开始交易，虽然他们两个是场内最年轻的交易者，但他们没有联系。差不多别人都是65——80岁，这些人真的在场内有椅子和痰盂。年轻的丹尼斯懒洋洋地躺在椅子里，面对这么多的老头，场面一定壮观。
Situated only a few blocks from the Chicago Board of Trade, the MidAm was a bit player at the time. It was small, perhaps fifteen hundred square feet. While Willis didn’t know how his start at the MidAm would unfold (he ended up building a thirty-plus-year trading career), he was certain Dennis saw a much bigger future.
中美交易所和芝加哥交易所的位置相差几个街区，当时中美交易所还算不错。它比较小，只有1500平方英尺。威利斯也不知道他在中美的前途如何（他最终交易了30多年），但他确定丹尼斯前途无量。
Even then, big wigs from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) were coming over in their limos to pick young Dennis’s mind. Ultimately, Dennis approached Willis most likely because he was good enough not to go broke and because they were both about the same age.
当时，芝加哥商业交易所的大亨也坐车来向丹尼斯学习。最终丹尼斯和威利斯开始联系了，因为这样不会破产，再加上2人年龄几乎一样大。
Dennis told Willis, “If you’re buying wheat and it’s strong and the beans are too low and the wheat is five higher, why don’t you sell soybeans instead of selling the wheat you bought?” It was a very sophisticated insight. In fact, buying “strength” and selling “weakness” short still befuddles investors. It is counter- intuitive to buying low and selling high.
丹尼斯告诉威利斯：“如果你在小麦走强的时候买入小麦，同时小麦比大豆高5个点，为什么你不直接做空大豆，避免卖出你刚买入的小麦呢？（做空大豆不是因为大豆的价格低，而是因为大豆在走弱。）”这是很复杂的见解。实际上，“买强卖弱”的方法现在也让投资者迷惑不解。他和直觉上的低买高卖是相反的。
Dennis was already sharing his knowledge with other traders. He was a natural-born teacher. Dennis was teaching the young exchange members at either his or Willis’s apartment. Willis would buy two hundred pieces of chicken and a barrel of potato salad. There were fifty or sixty guys in his one-bedroom apartment with Dennis holding court, explaining how to trade.
丹尼斯很早之前就在和其他交易者分享知识了。他是一个中性的老师。丹尼斯在自己的房间和在威利斯的房间都会教年轻的交易所会员。威利斯每次都会去买200份鸡肉和一桶的土豆沙拉。在他的单身公寓里面会有50，60人在听课，丹尼斯则讲解如何交易。
There was a practical need for this. The MidAm was selling new memberships to all kinds of traders, many with no experience. Dennis and Willis were teaching “liquidity.” To give the market confidence in the viability of the MidAm exchange, there had to be a critical mass of buyers and sellers. This culture of education was creating a better exchange with better traders. And those better traders were starting to make money. It could all be traced to Dennis.
这么做是有实际含义的。当时中美交易所在销售会员资格，当时很多人没有经验。丹尼斯和威利斯教他们，可以制造流动性。中美交易所要想生存，就必须有足够的买家和卖家。这种教育可以产生好的交易所，也可以产生好的交易者。好的交易者也可以开始赚钱。这都是丹尼斯的功劳。
Craig and Gary Lacrosse, Ira Shyman, John Grace, Wayne Elliott, Robert Tallian, and David Ware are all Chicago traders who learned from Dennis. While they may not be household names, they became hugely successful in part because of the generosity of the young Dennis, who felt no compunction about sharing his skills with others.
克雷格，加里·勒可斯，艾拉·夏门，约翰·格雷斯，韦恩·艾略特，罗伯特·泰廉，大卫·维亚都是芝加哥的交易者，都向丹尼斯学习过。年轻的丹尼斯很大方，他把自己的技术都分享给别人了，这些人都取得了巨大的成功。
After the apartment-training sessions everyone would go home, and they would meet the next day in the pits. During market hours they would ask Dennis, “Is this what you meant?” and he’d say, “Yeah.” Dennis freely gave away his knowledge.
这种公寓培训结束后，每个人都回家，然后第二天在场内见面。在交易的时候他们会问丹尼斯：“你是这个意思吗？”丹尼斯会说：“是的。”丹尼斯在分享知识的时候是很大方的。
The Chicago Board of Trade
芝加哥交易所
Great experiences and profits aside, it wasn’t long before Dennis needed a bigger playing field than the minor-league MidAm. He was already plotting how to beat the big boys at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the world’s largest futures exchange. Once at the CBOT, his placid demeanor contrasted sharply with the hoarse shouts and wild gestures of other floor traders, many of whom were millionaire traders with decades of experience. He was soon beating them at their own game with a “betting” style that was often so relaxed that his trading cards would literally slip out of his hand onto the floor.
除了经验和利润，丹尼斯觉得中美交易所规模小了，他需要更大的场所。他早就想好了如何打败芝加哥交易所的大人物，芝加哥交易所是全世界最大的期货交易所。一旦到了芝加哥交易所，他的温和方式和别人的喊叫，狂野的手势形成了（鲜明）对比，这里很多交易者交易了几十年，都是百万富翁。很快，丹尼斯用一种“赌”的交易风格很快教训了他们，只要报价单报出去了，他就放松了。
Dennis’s move to the CBOT was historic. Willis could hardly believe it: “Richard goes to the Board of Trade and knocks the cover off the ball. They’ve never seen anything like this. I mean this kid takes the whole pit off. Not because he can or not because he wants to show off, but corn is up, beans are up two and the corn is down three and they sell him a million bushels of soybeans up one and a half and the next thing you know they close up seven and they’re talking about him, ‘Who’s this new kid?’ ” Willis refrained from divulging the names of old-timers that Dennis was beating the pants off when he first hit the CBOT, since many of those losing traders are still around today.
丹尼斯转到芝加哥交易所是历史性的。威利斯简直不敢相信：“理查德到了芝加哥交易所，结果大获全胜。他们从没见过这样的事。我是说这家伙在交易场内发达了。不是因为他有能力，也不是因为他想炫耀，而是因为，玉米上涨，大豆上涨2个基点，玉米下跌3个基点，他们都把上百万蒲式耳的大豆以贵1.5个基点的高价卖给他，结果他们发现大豆收盘时涨了7个基点，他们都在谈论他：‘这个新来的小子是谁？’” 威利斯不方便说第一次交锋就被丹尼斯打败的老家伙们的名字，因为其中有很多人现在还在交易。
One of Dennis’s students said that their teacher believed his physical attributes to be behind his pit-trading success: “You ever heard why he considered himself really successful? He is six feet something and the size of a freight train. He could see over people and more importantly, people could see him. People always knew that he was there. He honestly felt that’s why he was successful.”
丹尼斯的一个学生说他们的老师相信身材对场内交易的成功有帮助：“你听过丹尼斯分析他为什么会成功吗？他6英尺高，体形像大货车。他能看见别人，更重要的是别人也能看见他。人们总是能知道他在场内。他觉得这就是他成功的原因。”
Dennis’s attributing his height and weight as the reason he was successful is not the full story. There was more to becoming a millionaire by twenty-five than being “six foot something” and three hundred pounds plus. Even with excess weight, his peers described him as having cat-quick reflexes on the trading floor.
丹尼斯说他成功的原因是他的身高和体重，这并不完整。如果仅仅是身高6英尺左右，体重超过300磅，这并不能保证在25岁成为百万富翁。除了超重之外，他的同行说他在场内反应像猫一样快。
The Move from the Pit
放弃场内交易
Trading on the floor, down in the pit, might have been exciting during this era, but today the Chicago Board of Trade floor is silent. That doesn’t mean trading is dead today - far from it. Electronic trading outdated the old ways faster than anyone ever thought could happen.
在那个时代，也许在场内交易很刺激，但是现在的芝加哥交易所场内很安静。并非交易停止了——肯定没有停止。电子交易比任何人想象中的传统交易方式快多了。
However invigorating the trading floor may have been in the 1970s, the only way for Dennis to expand his trading success was to move away from it. The Chicago trading floors were designed with multiple pits and each pit traded a different market. To trade more than one market, he had to physically move back and forth across the floor to the various pits.
不管70年代的交易场内如何生机勃勃，对于丹尼斯来说，要扩大生意，就要离开交易场内了。芝加哥的场内被分成了很多小块，每一块交易的市场都不同。要想在不同市场交易，他要在场内不同的区域跑来跑去。
Dennis’s solution allowed him to remain faithful to buying in strength and selling in weakness. He knew that if his system worked in soybeans and corn, then it would also work in gold and stocks and all other markets.
丹尼斯的方法就是买强卖弱，这个方法让他有信心。他心理清楚，如果他的方法对大豆和玉米有用，那么对黄金、股票和任何市场都有用。
At the same time, he saw Wall Street changing, with new markets appearing fast and furiously as economies around the world opened and expanded. Fixed income futures were launched, and by 1975 the International Monetary Market (IMM) was allowing anyone to trade currencies the way they did stocks. Dennis knew what this would all mean.
同时，他发现华尔街在变，随着全球经济的快速发展，新市场也在快速的出现。1975年国际货币市场同意任何人自由交易外汇。丹尼斯知道它的深刻含义。
To trade in that bigger world, Dennis moved into an office on the twenty-third floor of the CBOT, leaving the turmoil of screaming traders behind. Concurrent with his move, in November 1975, Dennis and Larry Carroll formed a partnership. Known simply by the first initial of their last names, C&D Commodities was born.
为了在全世界交易，丹尼斯搬到了芝加哥交易所23楼的一个办公室，离开了那些又喊又叫的交易者们。同时，在1975年11月，丹尼斯和拉里·卡罗尔合伙。所以用他们姓氏的第一个字母组建了C&D商品公司。
There is little public information on Larry Carroll (they did meet on the MidAm floor). And, although Dennis’s “D” came second, theirs was not a partnership where the decisions and profits were split fifty-fifty. Dennis was always the man. Within short order, C&D Commodities became one of the largest independent trading firms in the world. They quickly rivaled such established institutional investors as Salomon Brothers and the Pillsbury Company.
这里有点关于拉里·卡罗尔的公开信息（他们在中美交易所的场内就认识了）。虽然丹尼斯名字里面的D排在第二位，但是他们的决策和利润并不是对半分成的。丹尼斯总是分的多。在很短的时间内，C&D商品公司成为全世界最大的独立交易公司之一。他们很快就赶上了大型的投资机构，比如所罗门兄弟公司和皮尔斯伯里公司。
However, other traders who had seen him dominate the pits were shocked when Dennis left the floor. They thought he was crazy. To compete against the likes of Pillsbury and Salomon Brothers was considered suicide, because no one thought he could maintain that floor “edge.” Dennis himself had always said the pit was the safest place to be.
然而，当丹尼斯离开场内时，其他交易者都感到吃惊。他们以为他疯了。与所罗门兄弟公司和皮尔斯伯里公司竞争等于是自杀，因为没有人相信他能保持在场内的优势。丹尼斯本人也经常说场内是最安全的。
The transition did almost sink Dennis. When he went off floor, he struggled. In the late 1970s, the markets were getting to him. Tom Willis saw the struggle and recalled, “He was a little disillusioned, a little off balance frankly.” Both men went out to a bar to discuss the situation. Dennis was not throwing in the towel. He looked at Willis and said, “Tom, I got stuff that’s so good that used off floor in the right hands it would make $50 million a year.”
这种转变并没有让丹尼斯失败。当他离开场内之后，他在努力挣扎。70年代末，市场对他不利。汤姆·威利斯见证了这种挣扎，他回忆说：“他有点失望，有点动摇。”当时2个人到酒吧去讨论行情，丹尼斯没有认输。他看着威利斯说：“汤姆，我有更好的场外交易方法，我可以一年赚5000万美元。”
In today’s terms, this would be like someone saying he has a way of trading that’s so good he can make $200 million a year. Or think of some number that is fifty times more than is rationally achievable by any normal measure. With anyone else, Willis would have been skeptical: “If I didn’t know Rich. I would have said, ‘Gee, he really does sound a little more off balance than I’m even thinking.’ Saying $50 million in 1979 is a crazy thing to do, but I believed it. And he did it. If an edge is good or the idea is good, let’s get in front of the screen and trade them all. If it’s that good, let’s get in front of the screen and have 20 people do this. As a matter of fact, it’s very, very consistent to expanding geometrically the ability to take advantage of this good idea.”
用现在的话说，他就像一个人声称自己可以一年赚2000万美元。这个数字比理性的数字大了50倍。威利斯和其他人一样表示怀疑：“如果我不了解理查德，我可能会这样说‘他真的不正常了。’在1979年说赚5000万美元，那太疯狂了，但我相信他。他也做到了。如果说有优势，或者说有好的想法，那么就让我们坐到屏幕前大干一场。如果结果不错，我们就找20个人来交易。事实上，确实需要慢慢地越做越大。”
The goal of trading every market he could and making more money in the process was reached within a year, just as Dennis had predicted. Yet making that much more money didn’t change him one bit. His new office was not marble and glass. The outside hallway to the office had dingy brown paneling. On his office door was “C&D Commodities, Richard J. Dennis and Company.” No flash. The men’s room for the floor was next door.
正如丹尼斯想的那样，他在一年内就能在所有市场交易了，他赚了更多的钱。但是更多的钱并没有改变他一点点。他的新办公室没有大理石和漂亮的玻璃。外面的走廊地板是又灰又脏。办公室就是C&D商品公司，里面只有他一个人，没有什么发光的东西做装饰。他的办公室就在隔壁。
Martin Hare, a nephew of Larry Carroll’s, was sixteen and in high school when he was working for Dennis. Now an executive with Merrill Lynch in San Diego, he worked in Dennis’s unconventional office environment from 1982 to 1989. Hare still gets enthusiastic when he thinks about his after-school job: “I cut out the Wall Street settlement prices for three summers. My weekly salary at C&D was $120. That was up from $90 the summer before. The C&D office was royal blue in color. There was a sleeping room for those that needed to nap, mostly for Rich, and a refrigerator full of the best beer.”
拉里·卡罗尔的侄子叫马丁·黑尔，他当时16岁，还在读中学，那时他已经为丹尼斯做事了。现在他在圣地亚哥的美林公司当主管。他1982——1989年在丹尼斯的办公室做事，当时的环境和传统的不一样。一旦想到毕业后他做的工作，他就很有激情：“我有3次搅乱了华尔街的收盘价。我当时的周薪是120美元。之前的夏天是90美元。C&D办公室的主要颜色是蓝色。还有一个休息室，主要是理查用的，冰箱里面装满了最好的啤酒。”
Dennis may have physically disappeared from the trading floor, but the hermit- like trading wizard hovered over the markets like Zeus. Everyone knew he was there when a huge order came into the pits. Traders also knew not to get in front of his orders, or they could be potentially wiped out. Critics and regulators at times thought he was too big and moved markets unfairly. Dennis scoffed, “Sour grapes.”
虽然丹尼斯本人已经离开了交易场内，但是他的精神像宙斯一样地影响着市场。一旦有一个超级大单进入场内，每个人都知道是丹尼斯的单子。交易者还知道不要对抗丹尼斯的单子，否则就会被洗出局。有时评论家和管理者都认为他太大了，他在不公平地操纵市场。丹尼斯嘲笑说：“吃不到葡萄说葡萄酸。”
The criticisms were an excuse for people who had learned to lose. Dennis had no patience for people targeting his success. “I cringe a little when I’m identified as a millionaire,” Dennis said after reading that his $250,000 contribution to Adlai Stevenson was the largest individual political gift ever in Illinois. “If somebody just had $100,000, he wouldn’t be called a thousandaire, and if a pauper gave a dollar, they wouldn’t say, ‘Pauper gives his last buck.’ ”
对于亏钱的人来说，这些批评只是亏钱者的借口。别人攻击他的成功，丹尼斯不高兴。有报道说他给阿德莱·斯蒂文森的250000美元是伊利诺伊州有史以来最大的个人政治礼物，他看到后说“我不会因为自己是百万富翁就有丝毫畏缩。如果某人只有10万美元，没人会说他是千万富翁。但是如果一个穷人献出了1美元，他们会说‘穷人把最后一块钱都献出去了。’”
Although he grew wealthier by the day, he still kept an antinuclear poster hanging in his office and remained outside the chummy atmosphere of the exchanges. He was not prone to travel in the limelight. “We don’t have much contact with him,” remarked one Board of Trade player.
虽然他越来越富，他还是在办公室挂了一个反核武器的海报。他不喜欢被大众包围。一个交易所的交易者说：“我们没机会和他接触。”
While his peers collected vintage cars and mansions, Dennis kept wearing those out-of-date polyester pants hiked over an ever-expanding waist. He exercised by eating cheap hamburgers at noisy grills. Dennis in a short- sleeved shirt, no tie, religiously pouring over arcane baseball statistics from the Baseball Abstract, was a common sight. In fact, he would eventually buy a piece of the White Sox baseball team. Once he was an owner, his 1980s attempt to get White Sox management to see the benefits of Bill James – style “Moneyball” fell on deaf ears.
虽然他的同行买好车，买别墅，但丹尼斯还是穿过时的尼龙裤。他在吵闹的小摊吃便宜的汉堡包。丹尼斯穿着短袖衫，不打领带，虔诚地阅读《棒球摘要》以研究棒球统计学，他就是这个样子。事实上，他会买白袜队的股票。80年代，他想搞到白袜队的管理权，以研究比尔·詹姆斯的“魔球理论”，这个理论一直不被人重视。
One of his students, Michael Shannon, watched his friends try to dress him up by moving him from his South Side studio apartment, and recalled, “Bill Eckhardt and others actually forced him to move into something that was a little bit more parallel to his station.”
他的一个学生叫迈克尔·仙农，他记得朋友们把丹尼斯从南区的公寓拖出来去打扮，他回忆说：“比尔·埃克哈特和其他人真的要逼着他做点和他身份相符合的事。”
Money for Dennis was just a way to keep score in the game. He was frank about it: “Trading is a little bit like hitting a ball. If you’re thinking what your batting average should be, you’re not concentrating on the right thing when you bat the ball. Dollars are the batting average of the trader.”
对于丹尼斯来说，金钱只是在这个游戏中的记录方式。他坦白地说：“交易有点像打球。如果你总是想着成功率，你就没有专注正确的击球方式。交易者的成功率就是钱。”
This original thinker and big-time baseball fan left a visual image on everyone. Several confidantes talked about Dennis’s socks. One of his students smiled, “You need to make sure he’s wearing a matched pair of the same color.”
这个思想家和棒球迷给大家留下了生动的印象。他的一些好朋友谈到了他的袜子。一个学生笑着说：“你要注意他穿的2只袜子是不是同一个颜色。”
Bradley Rotter, a former West Point graduate and often called Dennis’s first investor, witnessed his eccentricity: “I was at his house for a Fourth of July tennis party and Richard Dennis couldn’t be found . . . at the end of the party he came out of his house wearing a white tennis shirt, white tennis shorts, and black shoes and black socks. I’ll never forget that picture.”
毕业于西点军校的布拉德利·罗特总是说自己是丹尼斯的第一个投资者，他见证了丹尼斯的古怪：“国庆节到他家去参加网球聚会，结果找不到丹尼斯……等球打完了，他出来了，他穿着网球衣，黑色的鞋和黑色的袜子。我永远都不会忘记这个场景。”
Rotter was not mocking Dennis. He respected Dennis’s testicular fortitude to trade trends no matter what. In baseball, testicular fortitude means everyone can talk about the game, but if you’re going to get into the game, you must swing the bat. Dennis swung and swung hard. No singles. His was Babe Ruth, home-run, swing-for-the-fences-style moneymaking.
罗特并不是嘲笑丹尼斯。其实他尊敬丹尼斯交易趋势时的坚毅。在棒球中，坚毅是指每个人都可以谈论棒球，但是一旦你上场了，你必须主动出击。丹尼斯打的很出力。他就是贝比·鲁斯，不停地赚钱。
However, the Babe Ruth of trading was near oblivious to the basics of everyday life. Mail and personal bills were handled by C&D’s back office because of his inattention. His office would even send over toilet paper to his apartment. The weight room in his Gold Coast condo was virtually unused. “I pat the weights once in a while.” said Dennis. He enjoyed using a third of his time to do absolutely nothing.
然而，他只会交易，不太注意生活。C&D的后勤部门要帮他处理信件和个人的账单。他的后勤部门还要帮他买卫生纸，然后送到他家。他在黄金海岸别墅的健身室几乎没用过。丹尼斯说：“有时候我会用的。”他有三分之一的时间无所事事。
Another Dennis student, Erle Keefer, went beyond his eccentricities: “Rich is probably the greatest trigger puller that I personally have ever known: he has the ability under tremendous pressure to stand there with his own money and pull the trigger when other people wilted. And when he was wrong, he could turn on a dime. That’s amazing - that’s not trading, that’s genetic.” The genetic line was debatable; after all, that was the point of his Turtle experiment.
丹尼斯的另一个学生，尔勒·科夫谈到了他更古怪的地方：“理查是我认识的人中间最善于把握时机的人。他可以在巨大的压力下等待，直到别人都受不了了，他就出手了。如果他错了，他能立刻停止错误。这太惊奇了——这不是交易，这是遗传的。”就是这个遗传的说法引起了争论，然后才有了海龟实验。
Political Ambitions
政治雄心
Dennis’s success eventually caused more serious problems. In the mid-1980s, critics accused him of strong-arming the market. They blamed him for too much market volatility. Words like “collusion” were thrown around. Dennis was not buying it. He said, “One man’s volatility is another man’s profit.”
丹尼斯的成功最终导致了严重的问题。80年代中期，批评家说他控制了市场。责怪他导致了太多的市场波动。都说他“耍阴谋”。丹尼斯不买账。他说：“一个人的波动就是另一个人的利润。”
When Dennis was a guest on a radio show in 1984, a caller assured him that if he traded long enough, he would give it all back.
1984年，电台邀请丹尼斯去做节目，一个听众打电话告诉丹尼斯，如果你继续交易下去，你会把钱亏光的。
You could feel the anger. Some people simply did not want to hear about a young guy making millions. Even though everyone knew exchanges needed speculators, too many people didn’t want those same risk-takers to make a profit. Dennis himself appeared before Congress as they investigated the “efficiency of the markets” - unable to define what that phrase meant. His detractors were silenced after government regulators testified that the total buying and selling by Dennis did not breach exchange limits.
你可以体会到这样的愤怒。有些人就是不愿意听到一个年轻人赚了几百万。即使每个人都理解交易所需要投资者，但是大部分人还是不希望投机者赚钱。议会在调查“有效的市场”理论时，丹尼斯被传唤到场——有效的市场，这个说法很难定义。政府领导后来确认丹尼斯的买卖行为并没有违反交易所的限制，这样诋毁他的人就不说话了。
Soon, Dennis would join the political fight at a whole new level. He became one of the largest Democratic donors in the country, often focusing his generosity on standard politicians and assorted underdogs. From donating millions to battered women’s shelters to the decriminalization of marijuana, causes without wide publicity appealed to him (he would give away 10 percent of his earnings every year). While calling himself a liberal libertarian, he once donated $1,000 to former Black Panther Bobby Rush.
很快，丹尼斯参与了政治斗争。他是捐款给民主党最多的人之一，他关注普通的政治人物和受压迫者。从维护女权到反对大麻，这些事本来对他的政治没什么影响（他把每年利润的10%捐献了）。他说自己是自由党，他有一次捐了1000美元给黑豹鲍比·鲁什。
Dennis did more than just write checks. He became good friends with Bill Bradley and supported Walter Mondale (1984) and Bruce Babbitt (1988) for President. He lobbied hard against conservative stalwart Robert Bork. There was a rational justification in Dennis’s mind for his political ideals: “If it’s something everyone hates but you think is right, those are the important things to do because no one else is going to do them.”
丹尼斯不仅仅是捐钱。他和比尔·布拉德利成为好朋友，他支持沃尔特·蒙代尔（1984）和布鲁斯·巴比特（1988）竞选总统。他极力反对保守的罗伯特·伯克。丹尼斯理想的政治观点是：“如果某件事，所有人都痛恨，只有你认为是对的，那么这件事就是很重要的事，一定要去做，因为其他人都不想去做。”
However, becoming a successful politician on the basis of supporting the have-nots of society was not as easy as trading to make millions. It wasn’t enough merely to fund his causes; Dennis also wanted to “work” them, and immediately ran into roadblocks. Politics was not a zero-sum game, and he got frustrated. “Politicians, at worse, are mindless replicas of what their constituents think. People . . . don’t want to hear painful truths.”
然而，和通过交易赚几百万不同，想帮助穷人的这条政治路不好走。找到原因并不够，丹尼斯还想为穷人做事，他很快就遇到了障碍。政治就是零和游戏，他疲惫了。“政治家很无知。人们不想知道痛苦的真相。”
When invited to participate in the diplomatic dances that made up Washington politics, he stepped on toes, and seldom refrained from voicing his opinions. Former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker was once introduced to Dennis. He told Dennis that he didn’t “like those casinos you have out there in Chicago.”
当他走上政治舞台时，他得罪了别人，他从不怕说出自己的观点。前美联储主席保罗·沃尔克是这样评论丹尼斯的。他告诉丹尼斯，他不喜欢芝加哥的赌场。
Dennis was well aware that he was being indulged because he was rich and would be listened to only if he had something significant to say. Soon after he founded his new 1982 think tank, the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., it began to flounder.
丹尼斯知道自己有点放纵，因为他有钱，人们难免会听他的。当他1982年在美国建立了新的智囊团，也就是美国政策研究罗斯福中心时，他开始挣扎了。
Washington was a tough market no matter how many millions you had. And now Democrats were frustrating him, too. He said, “My principal irritation with liberals in general: they don’t understand how it can possibly be true that you make the poor richer by making everyone richer. I don’t understand that they don’t even consider that possibility.”
不管你有多少钱，华盛顿这个市场都不好玩。民主党人也让他疲惫不堪。他说：“我对自由党同样生气：他们不相信让每个人富有就是让穷人富有。他们认为这不可能，我不明白他们为什么这样想。”
The problem in a political world was that Dennis couldn’t work the floors of Congress the way he had the Chicago trading floors. It was one thing to own one of the six original copies of the U.S. Constitution (which he did) and an entirely different thing to try to influence modern political leaders. He was impatient.
政治问题和交易所的问题不同。得到6份原版的宪法复印件是一件事（他做到了），影响政治领导却是另外一件事。他受不了。
Ultimately, over time he would become a board member of the libertarian Cato Institute, serving with such notable peers as John C. Malone, chairman, Liberty Media Corporation, and Frederick W. Smith, chairman and CEO, FedEx Corporation. He also joined the board of the Reason Foundation, another libertarian think tank.
最终，他加入凯托研究所，为自由媒体公司主席约翰·C·马隆服务，为联邦快递公司的主席弗雷德里克·W·史密斯服务。他还加入了另外一个叫理性基金会的自由党智囊团。
Dennis’s political forays were never easy. One political critic of his thought Dennis was a bully because he didn’t adjust his thinking to accommodate others. Dennis saw that criticism as coming from a typical Washington careerist being afraid to rock the boat.
丹尼斯的政治生涯绝不容易。有政治评论家说他只会威胁别人，不知道站在别人的角度思考。丹尼斯知道这些批评来自华盛顿的坏蛋，他们害怕打破现状。
His stance on the decriminalization of narcotics best illustrated what made him tick. He knew the “drug czar” of the day, Bill Bennett, would never defeat drug violence with his “just say no” approach.
他对待致幻毒品的立场说明了他的观点。他知道毒品沙皇是比尔·班尼特，他说仅仅靠说是不能打击毒品暴利的。
Dennis thought people should be allowed to do what they wanted to do, even if they injured themselves, as long as they did not hurt others. He commented:
丹尼斯认为人们应该做自己想做的事，即使是伤害自己的事，只要他们不伤害别人。他这样说的：
The drug war violates the Golden Rule of doing unto others as you would have them do unto you. None of us is free of vice or temptation. Does any one of us really want to be jailed for our moral shortcomings? If our teenaged child is arrested for drug possession - a distinct possibility, since 54 percent of teenagers admit trying illicit drugs - do we really want him or her sent to prison for falling victim to the curiosity of youth?
毒品战争打破了这个黄金原则，你不应该把毒品用在别人身上。没有人能回避罪恶和诱惑。是不是每个人真的要因为道德缺陷而坐牢？如果年轻人因为持有毒品而被捕——54%的年轻人被容许非法吸毒——真的要因为他们的好奇而把他们送进监狱吗？
Here was a man making millions in the pits by winning as much money from others as possible, but at the same he was clearly worried about others well being. He was a mass of contradictions.
他通过交易赚了几百万，同时，他真的关心别人。他是一个矛盾的人。
Rough Seas
狂暴的海
Dennis had some severe down periods before that banner year of 1986. Perhaps his political ambitions had caused a loss of focus. Adding to his responsibility, by this time he had moved beyond trading only his own money. He was trading for others, and managing their money was not his strongest suit. He said, “It’s drastically more work to lose other people’s money. It’s tough. I go home and worry about it.”
在1986年之前，丹尼斯有过不爽的日子。也许他的政治野心引起了很多关注。考虑到他的责任，现在他只交易自己的钱。他过去帮别人交易，但是管理别人的钱不是他的优势。他说：“帮别人亏钱太恐怖了。太难受了。我每天回家都担心这个。”
This was not what his clients wanted to hear. In 1983, when his assets under management peaked at over $25 million, his accounts for clients hit turbulence. After a 53 percent rise in January, accounts dropped 33 percent in February and March. That drop was enough to prompt George Soros to yank the $2 million he had invested with Dennis only two months earlier. After a partial rebound in April and May, Dennis’s funds dived another 50 percent in value. His 1983-era computer that cost $150,000 did little to console nervous clients.
他的客户可不想听到这样的话。1983年，他管理的资产达到了2500万美元，他客户的账户遇到了麻烦。在1月，赚了53%，在2月和3月则跌了33%。乔治·索罗斯刚投资了200万美元，这种下跌可能会让乔治·索罗斯抽回投资。4月和5月间有一点反弹，然后丹尼斯的基金又跌了50%。他花了150000美元买的83年的电脑并没有让紧张的客户安心。
It took many of his investors more than two years to get back to even with their investment. Most didn’t stick around, and Dennis closed down some accounts in 1984. He rebated all management fees to losing accounts and conceded that trading client money as aggressively as his own money was not something clients could psychologically handle. What did that aggression look like on a month-by-month basis?
他的投资者花了2年多时间才打平。大部分人撤资了，丹尼斯在1984年关闭了一些账户。亏损账户的手续费他也要，他承认他操作客户的账户猛了点，客户在心理上不能接受。根据每个月的表现，我们就能知道他操作的有多猛。
Table 2.1: Richard Dennis Trading Performance:
July 1982 – December 1983.
图2.1 理查德·丹尼斯1982年7月——1983年12月的业绩
Date      VAMI     ROR     Yearly    ROR      Amount Size
Jan-83  3475     53.33%
Feb-83 3284     -5.49%
Mar-83  2371     -27.82%                      $18.7M
Apr-83  3058     29.01%
May-83 3184     4.11%
Jun-83  2215     -30.42%                      $19.0M
Jul-83    1864     -15.88%
Aug-83 1760     -5.57%
Sep-83 2057     16.87%                       $14.6M
Oct-83  2671     29.89%
Nov-83  2508     -6.10%
Dec-83 2160     -13.90%   -4.70%             $13.5M
VAMI (Value Added Monthly Index): An index that tracks the monthly performance of a hypothetical $1,000 investment as it grows over time.
VAMI是每月增值指数：用虚拟的1000美元来衡量每个月的业绩。
ROR: Rate of return.
ROR：回报。
Source: Barclays Performance Reporting (www.barclaygrp.com).
来源：巴克莱业绩报告
Dennis was famous for those big returns, and that was what his clients wanted - to become rich like Rich. They got on board knowing full well the voyage would get rocky, but conveniently forgot that fact when rough sailing made them seasick. At the first sign of troubled waters, when they were puking losses, they cut short the voyage and blamed Dennis. He was learning the hard way about people’s irrational expectations.
丹尼斯因为回报高而出名，这就是他的客户想要的——像理查德一样富有。他们上船的时候就知道旅途不会那么顺利，但是他们忘了海浪太厉害了，他们都晕船了。当海浪冲来时，他们亏损了，他们下船了，并责怪丹尼斯。他从此明白了人们的期望是非理性的。
In 2005, Dennis looked back on his troubled times in the fund management arena:
2005年丹尼斯回忆这些不顺的日子：
I think the problem is that a money manager very rarely ever sits down with the person whose money it is. There’s always a representative of a firm of a firm of a firm. When you have customer money, you generally try to please the people who want “passable,” whereas you might be able to explain it to the ultimate end user whose money it is that “this might look brutal, but we’re trying for something spectacular.”
我想问题是，基金经理没有用心打理客户的钱。总是层层转包。一旦你拿了客户的钱，你要让客户高兴，你要向最终客户解释，“这看起来很可怕，但我们在努力。”
However, at that time in 1983, Dennis needed a way out of the customer rat race. He wanted to divert even more attention to big-picture strategies, from philosophizing to an even greater focus on decriminalization of pot to anything but being beholden to impatient and uninformed clients.
然而，在1983年，丹尼斯不想要客户。他不想要没有耐心的客户，不想要没有优势的客户，他想研究更大的策略。
In many ways his Turtle teaching experiment was his second act, and he knew it. He said, “You shouldn’t, I suppose, live in your trading children’s reflective glory, but I am. I think [training the Turtles] is the single best thing I’ve done in commodities.” Yet there was no way he could have known at the time that the single best thing he would do would change his life and the history of speculative trading in ways never imagined.
从很多角度来说，他的海龟实验是他的第二次行动，他也知道这点。他说：“你不应该生活在自己学生的光辉里，但我却是这样。我想培训海龟是我做的最好的事。”当然，他当时也不知道这件最好的事改变了他的生活和投机交易的历史。
Glory and legend aside, in 1983, with a clear plate, Dennis’s most immediate task was to select his Turtle students from the thousands who responded to his want ad.
先不谈光辉和传奇，在1983年，丹尼斯的首要任务是从几千个应聘者找到海龟学生。
章 海龟们
“How much of a role does luck play in trading? In the long run, zero. Absolutely zero. I don’t think anybody winds up make money in this business because they started out lucky.”
Richard Dennis
“运气在交易中起多少作用？长期来说，运气的作用是0，绝对是0。我不相信最终真的赚钱的人是因为一开始运气好。”
理查德·丹尼斯
Over the years, almost every time the subject of Dennis’s training experiment (starting in winter 1983) comes up, those people who have heard of it invariably compare it to the spring 1983 classic movie Trading Places, staring Eddie Murphy and Dan Aykroyd. Millions have seen the movie over the last twenty years, either in the theater or on television.
这些年来，一旦有人谈到丹尼斯的培训实验（1983年冬天开始的），人们就会拿它和1983年的经典电影《颠倒乾坤》相比，电影是艾迪·墨菲和丹·艾克罗伊德主演的。过去20年来，有上百万人看了这部电影，无论是在电影院看的，还是在电视上看的。
The idea for the movie appears to have sprung from Mark Twain’s 1893 short story “The ￡1,000,000 Bank Note.” Twain’s famous story speculated on what would happen if a perfectly honest American visitor was turned loose in London with nothing but a million-pound bank note in his pocket and no explanation of how it got there.
这部电影的构思来自马克·吐温1893年的短篇故事《百万英镑》。马克·吐温的这个著名故事是想看看，如果一个很老实的美国客人在伦敦除了百万英镑的钞票，什么都没有的情况下，他会做什么。
In Trading Places, ultra-rich commodity brokers, brothers Mortimer and Randolph Duke, make a bet that they can turn a blue blood (Aykroyd, as Louis Winthorpe III) to crime and turn a street hustler (Murphy, as Billy Ray Valentine) into a successful trader. In the movie Mortimer, arguing against Hume and Locke, exclaims, “With his genes, you could put Winthorpe anywhere and he’s going to come out on top. Breeding . . . same as in race horses. It’s in the blood.”
在《颠倒乾坤》中，超级富有的商品经纪人莫迪默和兄弟伦道夫·杜克打赌，他说他能把贵族血统的人（丹·艾克罗伊德演路易斯·温苏普3世）变成罪犯，同时把乞丐（艾迪·墨菲演比利·雷·瓦伦丁）变成成功的交易者。在电影中，莫迪默和休姆，还有洛克争吵，他说：“只要骨子里有贵族血统，他就像良种马一样，不管你把温苏普放到哪里，他都能成为人上人。”
When I was trying to nail down with 100 percent certainty that the screenplay came before Dennis’s Turtle training experiment, the film’s screenwriter, Herschel Weingrod, shed some light. He flatly said that he had never heard of Richard Dennis when his script was completed in October 1982. He was researching and writing a script in the early 1980s about Chicago trading and didn’t immediately hear of Richard Dennis? That seemed implausible.
我当时想100%地证明这部电影的剧本比丹尼斯的海龟实验要早时，当时的编剧赫歇尔·温洛给我一丝希望。他平淡地说他的剧本在1982年10月就完成了，在这之前他从没听说过理查德·丹尼斯。他在80年代初为了剧本寻找芝加哥交易的素材，但他说没听说过理查德·丹尼斯？似乎不太真实。
Yet it’s very plausible to assume the movie’s basic premise had an influence on Dennis’s experiment. I wasn’t alone in that view. Mike Carr, one of Dennis’s students, often received the same reaction when the subject of the experiment came up: “Whenever you describe the program to anybody, they say, ‘Oh it’s like Trading Places,’ and of course, that’s a logical parallel. I think you’d have to ask Rich and Bill, but I never viewed it as anything other than coincidental.”
但可以说，这个电影的基调对丹尼斯的实验有影响。不仅仅我一个人这么看。迈克·卡尔是丹尼斯的学生之一，只要有人谈这个实验，他就会这样说：“不管你问谁，他们都说‘噢，就像《颠倒乾坤》一样’，当然了，逻辑是一样。我想你可以去问理查和比尔，但我想这是巧合。”
It is easy to see why Carr would say that; Dennis was an empiricist before the movie was on the drawing board. But at a bare minimum the movie must have been a catalyst, the trigger for him to take action. When he was asked whether his training experiment was inspired by Trading Places, Dennis denied it: “Oh God, no! Actually I think the movie came after. I certainly hope that’s true! I did like that movie more than I wanted to. We did [the experiment] because everyone believed in intuition including Bill who is a very logical guy. And I thought about intuition and about trading and it didn’t seem right.”
卡尔这么说不难理解。这部电影还没出现前，丹尼斯就是经验主义者。但是这部电影肯定是催化剂，刺激他去行动。当有人问丹尼斯是不是受《颠倒乾坤》的影响才做培训实验时，丹尼斯会否认：“噢，上帝，不是的！我想这部电影比我的想法迟。我当然希望那是真的！我也确实很喜欢这部电影。我们做这个实验是因为包括比尔在内的每个人都相信直觉，比尔还是一个很有逻辑性的人。我则不认同比尔的观点。”
A third student of Dennis’s Mike Shannon, with respect for Dennis in his voice, disagreed wholeheartedly with Carr: “Let me put it this way, and bluntly, you bet your ass it had a freaking role in [the experiment]. It absolutely did. Whether he denies it or not, of course it did.”
丹尼斯的第三个学生是迈克·仙农，他很尊重丹尼斯，他不同意卡尔的话：“这么直说吧，我肯定这个试验中有个怪胎。绝对是的。不管他是否否认，事实如此。”
Despite Dennis’s denial, the parallels seem to be too close to be coincidental. Dennis was watching Randolph and Mortimer play out his debate on the big screen. Randolph was convinced Eddie Murphy’s character was the product of a poor environment; Mortimer thought that view was babble.
不管丹尼斯的否认，这个事确实像巧合。丹尼斯在屏幕上看着伦道夫和莫迪默争吵，争吵的内容和他和比尔争吵的内容一样。伦道夫确信艾迪·墨菲扮演的角色是糟糕环境的产物，莫迪默则说他是胡言乱语。
Unlike the movie, the exact nature of Dennis and Eckhardt’s wager, if any existed, is not known. However, the movie Trading Places did gross over $100 million before the training experiment was even on the drawing board.
和电影不同，丹尼斯和埃克哈特的赌注到底是什么，没有人知道。然而，电影《颠倒乾坤》的收入超过了1亿美元。而丹尼斯的培训实验还没开始。
Dennis was about to become the new Willy Wonka. He was about to let people into his “factory,” C&D Commodities, just like Wonka let kids into his chocolate factory. There were risks for him. His students might let him down or, worse, steal his secrets. He was undeterred: “Some people tell you ‘no,’ but I think it [trading] is transferable. It seemed to me so clear that it is transferable, that there are no mysteries. If it isn’t a mystery, then I ought to be able to get people to do that. I don’t want to spend so much time working anymore and also I want to prove to people that there’s no great mystery to it.”
丹尼斯想成为新的比威利·万卡。他像万卡让很多小孩走进巧克力工厂一样，让人们走进他的工厂——C&D商品公司。这是有风险的。他的学生们也许会害了他，更惨的是，偷走他的秘密。他不害怕：“有人叫我不要做，但我想交易是可以转移的。我很清楚地知道可以转移，因此没有神秘的东西。如果它不神秘，那么我就可以让人们交易。我再也不想花那么多时间工作，我也想向人们证明交易是没有什么神秘的。”
Life Is Random . . . Sometimes
生活是随机的……有时是的
People were willing to do just about anything to get Dennis’s attention. Of all the approaches his students took to get themselves admitted to his trading school, Jim Melnick’s was the most extreme and inventive. He was an overweight, working-class guy from Boston who was living over a saloon in the Chicago suburbs. However, Melnick was determined to get as close to Dennis as possible. He actually moved to Chicago just because he’d heard about Richard Dennis. He ended up as a security guard for the Chicago Board of Trade and every morning would say, “Good morning, Mr. Dennis” as Dennis entered the building. Then, boom, the ad came out and Melnick got selected.
为了引起丹尼斯的注意，人们愿意做任何努力。在所有的努力中，吉姆·梅尼尔克的方法最极端，最有创造性。他是波士顿的工薪阶层，他体重超重，当时他在芝加哥郊区参加一个聚会。梅尼尔克想努力接近丹尼斯。自从他听说了理查德·丹尼斯，他就搬到了芝加哥。他到芝加哥交易所做了保安，每天早上都会在丹尼斯进大楼时说：“早上好，丹尼斯先生”。结果梅尼尔克被聘用了。
Dennis, who was loaded with millions and power, took a guy off the street and gave him the opportunity to start a new life. The story of Melnick is pure rags- to-riches. How did he know that getting that close to Dennis could lead to something? He didn’t, of course, but he hoped it would. His self-confidence was prophetic.
丹尼斯有钱，有能力，他能随便从街上找到一个人，给他机会让他从头开始新的生活。梅尼尔克的故事就是从乞丐到富人。他是如何知道接近丹尼斯就能致富的？当然了，他并不知道，他只是如此希望。他的自信就是预言。
Another of Dennis’s students described Jim’s “everyman” qualities: “He reminded me of a truck driver and like magic became a ‘Turtle’ and he still couldn’t believe why or how . . . as far as where he is today, I have no clue at all.”
丹尼斯的另外一个学生描述吉姆的特点时说：“他让我想起了一个卡车司机，就像是变魔术一样，他也成了一只海龟，即使是现在，他也不知道为什么他能成为海龟，我也想不透。”
Mike Shannon, a former actor who had left school at the age of sixteen, made it to Dennis’s door, too. He recalled, “I was working as a broker, and I was a very bad commodity broker.” Through a bunch of floor brokers Shannon found out about the ad, but he knew his résumé was problematic. He had a solution to that: “I made up a phony resume, and I sent it off to Richard Dennis. I used the school of audacity to get the job.” People get fired or, at the very least, don’t get hired because of falsifying a résumé, but that was not how it worked with the eccentric head of C&D Commodities.
迈克·仙农，以前是演员，16岁离开学校，去敲丹尼斯的门。他回忆说：“我是经纪人，我是很差的商品经纪人。”仙农知道自己的简历有问题。他有办法：“我做了一个假简历寄给了丹尼斯。我靠大胆得到了这份工作。”一般做假简历的人，要么被炒，要么不被聘用，但是对于古怪的丹尼斯来说，做假有效。
On the other hand, Jim DiMaria, a Notre Dame graduate and family man straight from the Ozzie and Harriet back lot, was already on the trading floor working for Dennis when he applied. DiMaria remembered that every now and again there would be a “1,000 lot” (jargon for a huge order of one thousand futures contracts) that would come through on the trading floor. Finally, he said, “Who is this client with the enormous orders?” He thought he’d heard it was a rich dentist, which was plausible since doctors often dabbled in trading. Eventually he put two and two together, realizing that Rich Dennis was the “rich dentist.”
另一方面，圣母学院毕业的居家男人吉姆·迪玛利亚在应聘之前就在交易场内为丹尼斯做事了。迪玛利亚回忆说，（当时）时不时有1000份合约订单下到场内。最后，他说：“什么样的客户能下这么大的订单？”他听说是有钱的牙科医生，但不太可能啊，医生一般很少做交易。最后，他做了推理，发现理查德·丹尼斯就是那个有钱的牙科医生。
Dennis, however, was not looking solely for doormen and floor traders. He went after the highly educated, too. Michael Cavallo had a Harvard MBA. With a mop of brown hair and wire-rimmed glasses, he was a preppy corporate warrior working in Boston when he caught wind of the ad that would change his life.
然而，丹尼斯并非只想聘用看大门的人和场内交易者。他也要高学历的。迈克尔·卡瓦洛是哈佛大学工商管理硕士。他棕色头发，戴铁丝边眼镜，他在波士顿的公司做储备干部，然后看到了这个广告。
When he saw the ad, Cavallo had already heard of Dennis. He re-called, “I nearly fell out of my seat when I saw it. He was looking for starting shortstop. I couldn’t believe it. This is sort of a dream job for me. I immediately responded.”
当他看见广告时，卡瓦洛早就听说过丹尼斯。他回忆说：“当我看见广告的时候，我太激动了。他在寻找三垒手。我不敢相信。这是我梦想的工作。我立刻做出了行动。”
There was plenty of serendipity as other potential students learned of the experiment. Former U.S. Air Force pilot Erle Keefer’s path to Dennis was pure coincidence as well. He was sitting in a New York City sauna when he picked up a newspaper and spotted the Dennis ad.
真是缘分天注定啊。之前的美国空军飞行员尔勒·科夫找到丹尼斯也是巧合。他在纽约洗桑拿，拿起报纸一看，就发现了丹尼斯的广告。
At that moment the female star of the movie Trading Places, Jamie Lee Curtis, was sitting in the same sauna with her boyfriend. Keefer was sitting there reading Barron’s. “I am looking at this ad and I knew who Rich was. I said, ‘Wow! This guy did it.’ ” Keefer thought there was little chance he would get accepted.
当时，《颠倒乾坤》的女主角婕咪·李·柯蒂斯和她的男朋友也在洗桑拿。科夫正坐在那里读《巴伦周刊》。“我在看广告，我知道理查德是谁。我说‘哇！他开始招人啦。’” 科夫认为自己被聘上的机会不大。
In the strictly man’s world of commodities trading in the early 1980s, women did apply. Liz Cheval, the diminutive and flamboyant Katie Couric look-alike, was one of them. She must have known that she would stand out from other applicants by being female. At the time she was actively considering a career in filmmaking, even though she was working for a brokerage firm as a day job.
80年代，商品交易者都是男性，也有女生应聘。莉斯·雪娃长的像凯蒂·库瑞克一样小，一样漂亮，她也应聘了。她肯定知道女生有优势。当时，她在经纪公司做事，但她在想拍电影。
Cheval’s former boss, Bradley Rotter, knew the offer was a big deal: “Dennis had already been managing money for me, and I did very well. Liz came to me and said she was thinking about applying and asked whether or not she should do it and I said absolutely. It was an opportunity of a lifetime.”
雪娃的老板叫布拉德利·罗特，他知道这个广告的份量：“丹尼斯帮我打理过钱，他做的很好。莉斯找我说她想应聘，问我是否能成功，我说绝对能成功。这是一生的机会。”
Jeff Gordon, an attorney and small business owner at the time, just happened to be thumbing through the newspaper and saw the ad. Gordon, five foot eight, a slender man who could have been a former member of the Revenge of the Nerds cast, knew the opportunity could be huge: “Everybody wanted to be able to trade, to make money like Richard Dennis.” Firing off a résumé was a coincidental and fortuitous life-changing decision that Gordon made in a heartbeat.
杰夫·戈登，当时是一个律师，有自己的小公司。他无意中翻报纸，然后看到了这个广告。戈登5.8英尺高，身材细长，差点去演《菜鸟大反攻》，他知道这个机会非常好：“每个人都希望像理查德·丹尼斯那样交易赚钱。”给他寄简历，可能就会改变自己的一生，这个想法让戈登心跳不已。
Given Dennis’s eccentric personality, it was no shock that Jiri “George” Svoboda, an immigrant from then communist Czechoslovakia and a monster underdog in most people’s eyes, was selected. He was a master blackjack player beating Las Vegas like a drum long before Breaking Vegas and 1990’s famed M.I.T. blackjack team.
考虑到丹尼斯的古怪性格，那么就不奇怪在大多数人眼里是穷人的吉里·“乔治”·斯沃博达，从共产主义的捷克斯洛伐克移民过来的人会被聘用。他会玩21点，曾经在拉斯维加斯大获全胜，90年代还打败了麻省理工学院队。
Dennis also selected Tom Shanks. Handsome, dark-haired, and smooth with the ladies, Shanks was working as a computer programmer for Hull Trading as his day job and beating Vegas at night with his blackjack skills.
丹尼斯还聘用了汤姆·桑克斯。他长相英俊，黑发，和女性关系融洽，桑克斯白天在赫尔交易公司编程，晚上在拉斯维加斯玩21点赚大钱。
Shanks and Svoboda knew each other from the blackjack underground. When they bumped into each other in Chicago, Svoboda said to Shanks, “Hey, I’m here for an interview with Richard Dennis. Have you heard?” Shanks had no clue, but said, “You’ve got to get me an interview!” They both ended up getting hired that same afternoon.
桑克斯和斯沃博达在赌场玩21点时就互相认识。当他们在芝加哥相遇时，斯沃博达对桑克斯说：“嘿，我要去接受理查德·丹尼斯的面试。你听说过他吗？” 桑克斯根本不知道，但他说：“你得帮我争取一个面试机会。”结果他们在同一个下午被聘用了。
Erle Keefer knew about their wild backgrounds. He said, “George ran the Czech team, and Tom was essentially with the Dingo computer in a boot.” Shanks used to say, “I never want to see another Dingo boot in my life.” He had to learn how to take it apart to put the computer in and was mighty sick of boots after a while. Other inventions allowed Shanks to be almost dead accurate as to the sequence of cards as they were dealt.
尔勒·科夫知道他们的底细。他说：“乔治负责对付捷克人，汤姆则负责玩赌博机。桑克斯过去总是说‘我再也不想玩赌博机了。’他把赌博机拆了。桑克斯这方面的研究让他非常了解牌序。”
How could Dennis not hire a guy who had put a computer in a boot during the 1970s? That effort just screamed, “Do anything to win.”
为什么丹尼斯聘用一个在70年代玩赌博机的人？因为他说明了一个道理：“尽力去赢。”
Mike Carr, on the other hand, had built a name for himself at the role-playing game firm Dungeons and Dragons, where he developed a cult following with his “wargaming” authorship. He had also developed a board game, “Fight In The Skies,” which modeled World War I - style air combat. He just happened to pick up the Wall Street Journal for the first time in six months and saw the ad. He called it “Divine Providence.”
迈克·卡尔则相反，他在角色扮演游戏《龙与地下城》中出名了，他迷恋玩战争游戏。他自己还开发了一个游戏《空战》——模仿第一次世界大战——也就是空战。半年来，他第一次看《华尔街日报》，就看到了这个广告。他说这是神的旨意。
Jerry Parker, who would make the cut, knew the potential life-changing ramifications of being selected. The unassuming accountant and evangelical Christian, with a proper side part to his hair, was not headed down the trading path prior to seeing the C&D ad. He said, “I was a small town person [from Lynchburg, Virginia] and Richard Dennis rescued me from leading a normal life.”
杰瑞·帕克，他知道被聘用就能改变一生。他是会计，信基督教，在看到广告前他并没有交易过。他说：“我来自小地方（弗吉尼亚州林奇堡），丹尼斯把我从普通的生活中拯救出来。”
Before any of the average - Joe pupils were officially “rescued,” as Parker had so aptly phrased it, they had to continue through the selection process. After sending in their résumés, applicants who made the first cut received a letter and a test.
就像帕克说的那样，每个学生都是被拯救的。他们都要经历这个选择过程。寄出去简历之后，第一轮过关的人收到了信件和测试。
The letter was formal and utilitarian. It reflected none of that Dennis “energy and spirit.” In by-the-book attorney-speak, it said if selected, Turtles would get 15 percent of the profits as salary after they completed a short training period and then a short trial trading period. All potential students were told that they would have to relocate to Chicago. Prospective students at this stage of the process were asked for their college entrance exam scores. If they didn’t have those, they needed to explain why.
这个信件是正式有效的。它没有反映丹尼斯的思想。用律师的话说，如果被选中了，短期的培训后，他们会得到利润的15%做为工资，然后再开始实验性的交易。所有的潜在学生都被告知要搬到芝加哥。有希望的学生被要求出示高考分数。如果他们没有高考分数，他们要解释为什么没有。
There was more. Candidates had to complete a 63-question true-false test. The true–false questions all appeared to be easy at first glance, but perhaps tricky on second thought. A cross-section of true-false questions included:
还有更多的东西。应聘者要完成63个对错题。第一眼看上去，这些对错题都很简单，但再仔细想想，里面有很多陷阱。典型的对错题是这样的：
1.        Trade long or short, but not both.
要么做多，要么做空，但不能既做多，又做空。
2.        Trade the same number of contracts in all markets.
在市场中，一直交易固定数量的合约。
3.        If you have $100,000 to risk, you should risk $25,000 on every trade.
如果你用100000美元来冒险，那么每笔风险是25000美元。
4.        When you enter, you should know where to exit if a loss occurs.
一旦你进场了，如果发生了亏损，你应该知道出场点在哪里。
5.        You can never go broke taking profits.
只要坚持兑现利润，你永远不会亏损。
6.        The majority of traders are always wrong.
大部分交易者总是错的。
7.        Average profits should be about 3 or 4 times average losses.
平均利润应该是平均亏损的3，4倍。
8.        A trader should be willing to let profits turn into losses.
交易者应该接受利润变成亏损。
9.        A very high percentage of trades should be profits.
高比例的交易应该是赚钱的。
10.   Needing and wanting money are good motivators to good trading.
需要钱是做好交易的最好动机。
11.   One’s natural inclinations are good guides to decision making in trading.
一个人自然的倾向可以很好地指导交易决定。
12.   Luck is an ingredient in successful trading over the long run.
长期来说，运气是成功交易的组成部分。
13.   It’s good to follow hunches in trading.
跟着直觉做交易很好。
14.   Trends are not likely to persist.
似乎趋势不会坚持太久。
15.   It’s good to average down when buying.
向下摊平很好。
16.   A trader learns more from his losses than his profits.
交易者从亏损中学到的东西比从利润中学到的东西多。
17.   Others’ opinions of the market are good to follow.
要相信别人的市场观点。
18.   Buying dips and selling rallies is a good strategy.
低买高卖是一个很好的策略。
19.   It’s important to take a profit most of the time.
大部分时间都要兑现利润，这很重要。
Just as on college entrance exams, there were also essay questions to answer. On the back of the true–false answer sheet, prospective students had to answer these essay questions with one sentence:
和高考一样，还要回答问题。在对错题的后面，潜在的学生还要用一句回答这样的问题：
1.        Name a book or movie you like and why.
写出你喜欢的一本书或电影，为什么。
2.        Name a historical figure you like and why.
写出你喜欢的历史人物，为什么。
3.        Why would you like to succeed at this job?
为什么你想在工作上成功？
4.        Name a risky thing you have done and why.
写出你冒险的一件事，为什么。
5.        Is there anything else you’d like to add?
你还有要添加的内容吗？
Dennis also listed essay questions that asked what good or bad qualities students might have and whether those would help or hurt in trading. In addition, he wanted to know whether prospective students would rather be good or lucky. There was seemingly no primer to answer these questions!
丹尼斯列出的简单题还包括什么是好素质，什么是坏素质，它们对交易会有什么影响。另外，他想知道潜在的学生是优秀，还是运气。这些问题都没有现成的答案！
The answers to the fourth essay question ranged from a prospective student who drove an hour to a basketball game without having a ticket to someone who drove around Saudi Arabia for several months with whiskey in his car trunk - not exactly something you should do in that part of the world. The person without the basketball ticket was hired, but the person who took a risk for the sake of risk-taking was not.
第四个问题的答案各种各样，比如：虽然没票，还是要开车一个小时去看篮球赛。比如：车厢里装着威士忌，开车在沙特阿拉伯转几个月——这不是你应该做的事。没有篮球票的人被聘用了，那个冒险的人没有被聘用。
Dale Dellutri, who was Dennis’s programmer at C&D and ended up as the day-to-day manager of the students, said the hiring strategy had a “wing-it mentality,” adding, “We were looking for smarts and for people who had odd ideas. There was some experimental part to it.”
待尔·戴尔崔在C&D编程，后来成为学生们的管理员，他说招聘策略是有目的的：“我们在找聪明人，找懂概率的人。这是实验时需要的。”
Dennis, however, was clear about what he was looking for. He wanted people who had high math aptitude and high ACT (American College Testing) scores. He wanted people with some interest in computers or market methods. Those who worked to systematize things had an advantage. Dennis added, “The majority of people we wound up hiring had some interest in games. They were chess players or backgammon players, enough so that they would even mention it on a resume.”
丹尼斯很清楚他在找什么样的人。他想找高考分数高的人。他希望他找的人喜欢电脑或市场方法。系统化工作的人有优势。丹尼斯补充说：“被聘用的人大多喜欢博弈。他们要么是赌牌的，要么是下棋的，如果他们在简历中提到了这点，那就够了。”
Math ability was not the sole determinant for hiring by any stretch. Dennis and Eckhardt knew long-term trading success did not correlate one-to-one with high IQs. They were trying to assess the applicants’ ability to think in terms of odds - the same kind of thinking needed to win at blackjack in Las Vegas. And they wanted applicants with the emotional and psychological makeup to treat money abstractly so they could focus on how to use it as a tool to make tons more.
数学能力并非是被聘用的唯一决定因素。丹尼斯和埃克哈特知道长期交易成功和高智商没有关系。他们努力评估应聘者的概率思想——在拉斯维加斯需要靠这种思维赢21点。他们希望应聘者在情绪上和心理上都能运用这种思维对待金钱，这样才能赚很多钱。
More than anything, Dennis was interested in choosing people who could subsume their egos. None of the chosen few ever would have wanted to be on the cover of Time magazine (at least, that is, when they were chosen). He ultimately chose people who he thought had the ability to accept learning. While they were with Dennis, they had to be tabulae rasae - blank slates.
更重要的是，丹尼斯想要不自负的人。想上《时代》杂志的人是不会被聘用的（当时确实如此）。最后，他需要愿意学习的人。他们跟丹尼斯学习的时候——大脑必须是空白的。
It is worth repeating: The selected students were a seriously eclectic bunch. The group was as culturally, sociologically, sexually, and politically diverse as you could assemble. Walt Disney and his famed “It’s a Small World” would have been proud of Dennis’s open-arms approach.
还要重复讲一次：被聘用的学生们很杂。他们在文化上、社交上、性倾向上、政治上都是不同的。沃尔特·迪斯尼有一句名言：“这个世界真小”，很好，丹尼斯确实采用了这个方法。
The Interview of Your Life
面试你的生活
Those candidates who passed the test were then asked to interview in person at C&D Commodities’ offices during the Chicago winter. The process was the same across the board. Dale Dellutri escorted them in and out of the room, and both Dennis and Eckhardt interviewed everyone. Interviewees were struck by how informal and, in most cases, friendly their interviewers were.
通过测试的应聘者就要在芝加哥的冬天到C&D商品公司办公室接受面试。整个过程是一致的。待尔·戴尔崔带着他们进进出出，丹尼斯和埃克哈特则面试每个人。应聘者感觉他们俩都很友好。
Mike Shannon, the candidate with the padded résumé, did some serious research in advance of his interview. He went down to the Chicago Tribune basement to learn everything he could about Dennis. He later discovered, “Over 90 percent of the answers to the questions on the test were in those articles.” Shannon had even researched what Dennis liked to wear: “I knew that he didn’t like to wear shoes. He hated suits and all that. I just wore a beat-up old sport coat, pair of jeans, and pair of topsiders with no socks.”
迈克·仙农，简历做假的这个人，他在面试前做了很多研究。他翻看所有《芝加哥论坛报》以了解所有关于丹尼斯的信息。他发现“90%的测试问题答案和报纸文章是接近的。” 仙农没有研究丹尼斯喜欢穿什么衣服：“我知道他不喜欢穿鞋。他讨厌穿正规的衣服。我就穿运动服，牛仔裤，平底鞋，没穿袜子，这样去面试。”
It turns out Dennis and Shannon had one thing in common: They both grew up playing the board game Risk. Shannon said, “I knew he played when he was a teenager. I think that kind of helped and that definitely broke the ice.”
结果说明丹尼斯和仙农确实有一个共同点：他们都是靠玩图板游戏《风险战争》长大的。仙农说：“我知道他在10多岁的时候还在玩这个游戏。我想这个游戏能帮助我们实现突破。”
For those unfamiliar with Risk, it is a game of world domination, where the object is to conquer the world. To win, you must attack and defend - attacking to acquire territory, and defending to keep it from your opponents. Dennis may have been quirky, but he lived to win. That was exactly what playing Risk meant: Beat the other guy and win.
对于了解《风险战争》的人来说，这个游戏的目标是占领世界。要想赢，你既要进攻，又要防守——进攻是为了获得领地，防守是怕别人抢你的领土。也许丹尼斯有点诡异，但是他生存下来了，他赢了。这就是《风险战争》的含义：打败其他人，获得胜利。
Paul Rabar, another student candidate, just happened to have been the most experienced trader of all student hires. Rabar had dropped out of UCLA Medical School. Before that, he was a classically trained pianist. However, before being hired by Richard Dennis, he was trained and mentored by Chuck Le Beau. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Le Beau was a regional director for the E. F. Hutton & Co. brokerage on the West Coast. It was there that he taught Rabar.
保罗·拉巴是所有学生中交易经验最多的人。拉巴被洛杉矶加州大学医学院退学了。在此之前，他是钢琴师。在被丹尼斯聘用之前，他在接受查克·勒·博的培训和指导。在70年底末，80年代初，勒·博是西海岸E·F·赫顿经纪公司的区域总监。他就是在那里教拉巴的。
In one of those small-world stories, their E. F. Hutton office ended up handling some brokerage for the infamous Billionaire Boys Club (BBC) during the early 1980s. The BBC was started by Joe Gamsky (who later renamed himself Joe Hunt, and became the focus of several TV movies). Gamsky was trading serious-sized money across the Chicago Mercantile Exchange from 1980 to 1984, making a big name for himself. Before he was exposed as a con, Gamsky was getting Dennis-like attention on the Chicago trading floors and in the press. He, too, was called a boy wonder.
世界真小啊，E·F·赫顿分公司后来在80年代初为臭名昭著的亿万富翁男孩俱乐部做经纪。亿万富翁男孩俱乐部是乔·贾思奇（后来他改名叫乔·亨特，并演了电视电影，受到关注）创立的。1980——1984年期间，贾思奇在芝加哥商业交易所交易量特别大，所以他出名了。在他的骗局被揭开前，贾思奇像丹尼斯一样引起了交易界和媒体的关注。人们也认为他是少年奇迹。
Le Beau and Rabar, however, did nothing wrong. They were simply brokers placing trades for an assortment of clients. Still, was it possible that Dennis was interested in going through the interview process with Rabar just to see what he may or may not have known about Gamsky’s trading? That’s the kind of opposition research of which Dennis was certainly capable.
勒·博和拉巴并没有犯错。他们只是替各种各样的客户下单的经纪人。那么丹尼斯面试拉巴是不是因为想了解贾思奇的交易方式呢？丹尼斯是可以这么做的。
Rabar’s interview did evolve into a discussion of the finer points of trading. At one point Dennis asked a trick question: “What if you get bounced out of the same ‘long’ trade five times in a row?” Rabar was cocksure: “If it goes up again, I will buy it again.” Rabar’s knowledge had a lot to do with his hiring, but he was the exception. Dennis didn’t want a room full of Rabars.
和拉巴的面试确实谈到了更好的交易方式。有时候丹尼斯的问题有陷阱：“如果你连续5次做多同一个品种，结果都止损了，该怎么办？”拉巴很自信：“如果它又涨了，我还会买它。”拉巴被聘用，很多程度上是因为他的知识，但他只是例外。丹尼斯不想要太多拉巴这样的人。
Erle Keefer, on the other hand, started talking about British empiricism with Dennis. They were discussing “what is reality?” and quickly dove into a deep debate about George Berkeley’s book Hylas and Philonous. Keefer later learned that one of the things Dennis was looking for was the ability to suspend your belief in reality.
尔勒·科夫不同，他开始和丹尼斯开始谈英国的经验主义。他们讨论“什么是现实？”，然后又深入地谈论乔治·贝克莱的书《海拉司和费罗诺斯的对话》。科夫后来才知道，丹尼斯在寻找能把信念和现实结合起来的人。
Then, quickly, Eckhardt changed the subject from philosophy in order to test Keefer. He asked, “Do you believe in the central limit theorem?” Keefer replied, “I believe the central limit theorem is like a stop clock, which is right twice a day.” He later said, “Little did I realize the game we were going to play.”
然后埃克哈特很快转换了话题，他想测试科夫。他问道：“你是否知道中心极限定理？”科夫回答：“我想中心极限定理就像是一个停止的钟，每天有2次时间是对的。”后来他说：“我没想到会有这样的问题。”
Eckhardt was signaling that their trading strategy relied upon the idea that if you were tossing dice, a string of 6 sixes in a row happens more often than people know or expect. In other words, Eckhardt was saying that they were not mean reversion traders. Mean reversion traders make bets that markets stay in tight ranges and that if they veer out of the range, they typically revert to the average or mean. He was saying in plain terms that markets trend, and those trends come unexpectedly. Keefer knew it meant that they were not options traders.
埃克哈特其实在暗示他们的交易策略，就像连续掷色子一样，不停地掷色子的结果。换句话说，埃克哈特的意思是，他们不是均值回归交易者。均值回归交易者赌市场在一定的范围内波动，如果它们的价格跳出了一定的范围，它们会回到均值。他简单地说市场有趋势，趋势来的是出人意料的。科夫明白，言下之意就是他们不交易期权。
Michael Cavallo had a different vantage on the interview. He said it was the only job interview that he ever truly enjoyed. He didn’t care whether or not he got the job because he had “this great conversation with people that were incredibly intelligent.” Dennis and Eckhardt peppered Cavallo with questions. They asked him how much he knew about markets, on a scale of a zero to one hundred. He recalled, “I answered, ‘sixty,’ being not just an interview gamesmanship response, just the kind of response where I thought I was at.”
迈克尔·卡瓦洛在面试时有其它方面的优势。他说那是他唯一一次真正享受的面试。他不在乎是否被聘用，因为他已经“和超级聪明的人谈过话了。”丹尼斯和埃克哈特接二连三地提问。他们问他对市场有多么了解，如果是从1到100算的话。他回忆说：“我回答的是60，这么说不是因为面试才这么说，我是真的这么想的。”
Later, Dennis liked to tell the story that he had asked that question of everybody and that Curtis Faith had replied “ninety-nine” and Liz Cheval had replied “one.” Dennis always fondly said, “I hired both of them because that way I figured I had everything that you could know about commodities.”
随后，丹尼斯讲了一个故事，问了个问题，对于问题的答案，柯蒂斯·费思回答“99”，莉斯·雪娃回答“1”。丹尼斯总是深情地说：“我把他们两个都聘用了，这样你才能全面地了解商品。”
There was obviously no way you could second-guess what answers Dennis was looking for. And let’s face it; The odds were stacked against potential students if they gave pat “Harvard Business School graduate” responses. Cavallo knew in the Fortune 500 world that people would not get a job answering the way Faith and Cheval did. As he commented, “A lot of places would say, ‘Oh well, this guy is too arrogant and he thinks he knows more than he does and he’s headed for a fall.’ And they might say, ‘She’s too timid.’ But in fact, certain things that they liked most other places wouldn’t necessarily like.”
很明显，你无法知道丹尼斯在寻找什么样的人。让我们面对现实吧。其实关于概率的问题存在于“哈佛商学院毕业”这个问题里面。卡瓦洛知道世界500强里面的人不会像费思和雪娃那样回答问题而被聘用的。他评论说：“很多人会说‘哦，这个人太自大了，他以为他什么都知道，结果他失败了。’他们也许会说‘她太胆小了。’但实际上，有时候他们最喜欢的事物并不值得他们喜欢。”
On the other hand, Mike Carr’s answer to Dennis’s question about what person he admired the most could easily have been interpreted as politically incorrect. Carr recalled, “I remember Rich asking me, ‘Why Rommel?’ I was the only one who cited Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the famed ‘Desert Fox,’ as the person from history I most admired. Despite being a German general during the Second World War, he was not a Nazi. Most telling of all, he was highly respected by military men on both sides, as a general and as a man.”
另一方面，迈克·卡尔被问道他最崇拜什么样的人，这是问政治倾向。卡尔回忆说：“我记得理查德问我‘为什么是隆美尔？’我是唯一一个崇拜战地元帅沙漠狐狸埃尔温·隆美尔的人。在第二次世界大战时，他是德国人，但不是纳粹。更重要的是，敌对双方的军人都尊敬他，他既是将军，又是一个男子汉。”
After the interview was over, Mike Cavallo was the only Turtle to mention that he was on to the clever ploy that the interview didn’t end after he left the room. After the interview, Dale Dellutri took Cavallo to the elevator and said, “Well, how did it go?” Cavallo told him how great he thought the interview was, but he quickly realized that question was part of the interview itself: “I said I liked Rich and Bill so much. Whereas other people might have said, ‘Oh God, they really put me through the ringer’ or something like that.”
面试结束后，迈克·卡瓦洛是唯一一个谈到其实面试后走出房间时，面试还没结束。面试后，待尔·戴尔崔带卡瓦洛到电梯时说：“面试如何？”卡瓦洛告诉他面试非常好，但他很快意识到这也是面试的一部分：“我说我非常喜欢理查德和比尔。然而其他人可能说‘哦，上帝啊，我都被榨干了’，或类似的话。”
The Dennis brain trust was showing their hand. You had to play their “game.” The elevator filter must have eliminated students from the process who otherwise would have made it. That’s brutal. Perhaps, as they read this, former interviewees who did not make the cut will realize that when they said something foolish to Dale Dellutri at the elevator, it was at that point that they were eliminated from the candidate pool. No one ever said life was fair.
你必须按照丹尼斯的游戏规则玩。坐电梯这一时段的问题可能会筛除了很多有希望的人。这很残忍。如果有些面试者事后看到自己是在电梯时回答待尔·戴尔崔的问题时才被拒绝的，他们一定觉得自己很傻。没人说生活就是公平的。
Mike Cavallo was under no false illusion and knew that obvious candidates with his type of résumé were not what Dennis had in mind. He was surprised that he was even in the running. At the end of the day, Dennis and Eckhardt figured too many Cavallos and Rabars would have too many bad habits to unlearn.
迈克·卡瓦洛没想到简历做假还通过了面试。当天结束时，丹尼斯和埃克哈特说卡瓦洛和拉巴还有很多坏习惯。
Those who think a Harvard MBA is the only ticket to business success, wake up. Cavallo was the exception, not the rule. Dennis and Eckhardt clearly believed that hiring all Harvard MBAs would have been a bust.
那些说只有哈佛工商管理硕士学位的人才能成功的人，醒醒吧。卡瓦洛就是例外。丹尼斯和埃克哈特都相信全部聘用哈佛工商管理硕士将会很糟糕。
All these potential students saw the interview process from different vantage points. Jeff Gordon thought the selection process came down to a “games” aptitude: “I didn’t have a résumé at the time so I wrote him a letter that indicated that I had spent more time playing chess than attending law school. The funny thing is my girlfriend read the letter and said, ‘You can’t say that!’ I said, ‘No, that’s not true, Rich Dennis is a different kind of guy, I think he’ll be looking for people who are a little bit different.’ ”
所有潜在的学生从不同的地方看到了这次面试过程。杰夫·戈登认为面试到最后就是对“博弈”的倾向：“我当时没有简历，所以我给他写了一封信，告诉他我喜欢下棋，不喜欢学法律。有趣的是我女朋友看了这封信说‘你这能这样写！’我说‘要这样写，丹尼斯是非一般的人，我想他在寻找非一般的人。’”
During his interview, Gordon was logically assuming that he had a lot to learn from Dennis and Eckhardt, but they said to him. “Well, you might actually be disappointed.” Dennis was worth hundreds of millions at the time, yet he was self-deprecating and humble.
在面试的时候，戈登认为他必须从丹尼斯和埃克哈特那里学很多东西，但是他们说：“你会感到失望的。”当时丹尼斯身价上亿，但是他很谦虚。
Mike Carr’s previous job for Dungeons and Dragons may have been the key to convincing the C&D brain trust to hire him because both Dale Dellutri and William Eckhardt said their sons enjoyed playing the game and, as Carr commented, “I knew that couldn’t hurt!” That said, Carr had no real idea of Dennis’s style of trading and fumbled through parts of the interview. He recalled, “Richard Dennis was renowned as a technical trader, but I wasn’t aware of that at the time.” During the interview, he had asked Dennis, “Do you trade technically or fundamentally?” Dennis replied, “We trade technically.” Carr then said, “Is fundamental trading dead?” Dennis sarcastically shot back, “We hope not.”
迈克·卡尔以前为《龙与地下城》工作，这是他被聘用的关键，因为待尔·戴尔崔和埃克哈特都说他们的儿子喜欢玩这个游戏，卡尔说：“我知道这不是坏事！”卡尔并不了解丹尼斯的交易风格，在面试的时候有点不知所措。他回忆说：“丹尼斯是著名的技术交易者，但我当时不知道。”在面试的时候，他问丹尼斯：“你是技术派还是基本派？”丹尼斯回答：“我是技术派。”然后卡尔说：“难道基本面不起作用了？”丹尼斯讽刺地说：“希望不是这样。”
Jim DiMaria, the relative insider already working for Dennis as a broker, knew the importance of his hometown for his trading ambitions: “It’s just part of the fiber of Chicago. If I were from Baltimore or Los Angeles. I probably would never have done anything like this.” But before DiMaria was ever picked for the experiment, he knew he ultimately wanted to be the person making the trading decisions, not just someone else’s floor broker. He had to find a way to get there, and Dennis’s experiment was it. DiMaria, however, was completely bamboozled by the selection process: “For whatever reason I was selected. I don’t know if anyone knows why they were selected. I’ve heard that some of the people from Rich’s entourage were selected as a control group. Like let’s just grab this guy. Like maybe me? I don’t know.”
吉姆·迪玛利亚基本上早就在替丹尼斯做经纪人，知道自己留在家乡的野心：“还好我搬到了芝加哥，要是在巴尔的摩或洛杉矶，我就没机会了。”但是迪玛利亚在被聘用之前就知道自己迟早要做交易，而不是做经纪人。他需要找到一条路，正好丹尼斯在招人。然而迪玛利亚确实被面试过程迷惑了：“不管我是因为什么原因被聘用的，我怀疑别人都不知道自己是如何被聘用的。我听说有人本来就是丹尼斯身边的人也被聘用了。让我们找到他，也许那个人就是我？我不知道。”
All the prospective students knew the chance of a lifetime was staring them in the face whether or not they understood exactly what they were getting into. For example, near the end of her interview, when she realized she might be making a good impression, Liz Cheval’s knees went weak: “I couldn’t have gotten through the interview, had I known [it might work out; it was] like winning the job lottery.” She was confident in the interview because she couldn’t believe she had gotten that far. She knew her worst-case scenario if selected was that her résumé would be enhanced by even a few weeks spent under Dennis’s tutelage. There was nothing to lose.
不管他们是否真的明白，所有的潜在学生都知道他们有可能改变自己的一生。比如，在面试结束前，她意识到自己给对方留了一个好印象，莉斯·雪娃的腿都软了：“如果我知道像买彩票那么难，我可能通不过面试。”她在面试的时候很自信，因为她自己也没想到会走这么远。最差就是在自己的简历上加上几句，说自己接受过丹尼斯的指导。反正没什么损失。
All in all, the hiring process was far from headhunter precise. Dennis and Eckhardt had no formal training in job recruitment or in developing questionnaires designed to select those people most able and ready to learn. It was one thing for them to trade and make fortunes, but it was a very different thing to execute a “nature versus nurture” experiment with live human beings.
总之，招聘过程比猎头还复杂。丹尼斯和埃克哈特没有招聘经验，也没有设计特殊题目的经验。他们只知道通过交易赚钱，但是用真人实验来搞清楚“先天的，还是后天的”是很难的。
The Turtle Contract
海龟合同
Once accepted into Dennis’s program, Turtles had to adhere to a strict confidentiality agreement. It was titled “Synopsis of Contract for Trading Advisor Trainees” and said in part that each participant would have a five-year contract, which could be terminated without notice by Dennis at any time. There was no assurance of staying in the program, but the agreement did clearly state students would not be held accountable for losses that they might generate trading Dennis’s money: “The trainee will not be obligated to repay advances, which are not covered by earned performance fees, nor will the trainee be liable for losses due to adverse trading performance.” And for those students thinking ahead about how to get-rich-quick now that they had Dennis’s “secrets,” the agreement had no flexibility. During the term of the contract they were prohibited from trading for their own account and prohibited from trading for anyone other than Dennis. The agreement went on to clearly preclude competing against Dennis or disclosing any confidential or proprietary information the participants might learn. Lastly, at the end of the agreement all students were prohibited from disclosing Dennis’s proprietary trading methods for another five years.
一旦加入了丹尼斯的实验，海龟们就要签保密协议。这个协议叫《交易顾问学员合同大纲》，合同期是5年，但丹尼斯可以随时终止。这个协议没什么保障，但协议确实说了，学生们为丹尼斯赚钱时是不承担亏损的：“学员不会提前拿到收入，赚钱除外，学员亏损时不必赔钱。”那些想快速致富的学生们现在知道了丹尼斯的“秘密”，这个协议很死板。在合同期间，他们不能为自己交易，不能为别人交易，只能为丹尼斯交易。协议还禁止学生和丹尼斯对着干，不能泄漏秘密的或私人的信息。最后，所有的学生都不可以在5年内透露丹尼斯私人的交易方法。
For those with a legal background, this agreement could have been a deal- breaker. That said, no one declined to join the Turtle program even though there were no real guarantees and many potential restrictions on their future activity. Once the agreement was signed, the Turtles headed off to class.
对于懂法律的人来说，这个协议很刻薄。这个协议没有什么真实的保证，还有很多限制，但是大家都签字了。签字后，就要去上课了。
Chicago was a different place when the Turtles entered class in January 1984. Harry Caray was the announcer at Wrigley Field, and Ryne Sandberg’s rookie year was underway. The Apple Macintosh had just been introduced, and Hulk Hogan defeated The Iron Sheik for the World Wrestling Federation Championship. Politically, Dennis would be very unhappy with Reagan heading toward a landslide defeat of Mondale.
当1984年1月海龟们开始上课时，芝加哥已经不同了。哈利·凯瑞在瑞格里球场做主播，雷恩·山伯格的时代开始了。苹果电脑刚上市。在世界摔跤协会竞标赛上巨人霍肯打败了钢铁酋长。政治上，里根打败了蒙代尔，可能丹尼斯不太高兴。
In the context of that world, the lucky few chosen to learn how to trade for big money still had to absorb trading rules that would have made investors like Warren Buffett cringe. There would be no buying and holding, or buying low and selling high. What they were about to learn was the antithesis of what was and still is taught in finance departments at the world’s finest universities. Run this story by a college finance professor today and take note of his reactions.
在这个世界上，这10多个幸运儿首先要学习交易原则，这样才能成为沃伦·巴菲特这样的投资者。但这些原则不是买入并持有，也不是低买高卖。他们要学的东西和全世界最好的大学教的东西不一样。现在的大学还是老样子。
The Classroom
教室
If Dennis had been worth only $100,000 at the time of the experiment, would the Turtles have listened as intently? No. Dennis knew the Turtles were the “dumb stumps” and that the only reason that they bought into everything was that he had made $200 million.
如果说开始实验的时候丹尼斯只有100000美元，那么海龟们会认真听课吗？不会。丹尼斯知道这些海龟都是“傻瓜”，他们来学的唯一原因是他赚了2亿美元。
If he said, “On Monday, you will buy the S&P 500 stock index when it’s up exactly 35 ticks no matter what’, all of the Turtles would have gone over a cliff to follow orders. One Turtle said that when a guy has made $200 million and he says, ‘You can walk on water’, people are going to say, ‘Okay I can walk on water.’ You have just crossed that unbelievable emotional hump that we all have in our brains.”
如果他说：“周一上午，不管怎么样，只要标准普尔500股指期货上涨了35基点，你们就要买入，所有的海龟都会去下单。一个海龟说只要赚了2亿美元的人说‘你能在水面上走’，人们就会说‘是的，我能在水面上走。’你必须避免这种想法。”
Crossing the “emotional hump,” whether in trading or baseball, is reaching that point at which you are intellectually and emotionally challenged and respond by saying, “I can do it.” Between Dennis’s reputation and the self-confidence that came from being chosen from over a thousand applicants, the Turtles crossed that hump with ease. The bottom line was that two trading superstars had selected them as students. Motivation was a given.
不管是交易，还是打棒球，到了某种程度，你会说：“我做得到。”丹尼斯的名声，加上从上千个应聘者中脱颖而出的自信，海龟们认为自己能做到。关键还是2个交易巨星教他们学习。动机则是天生的。
That same kind of aura surrounded Jim Leyland, manager of the 2006 pennant-winning Detroit Tigers baseball team. This was a team that only a few years prior had lost over a hundred games in one year - a horrendous record. But now they had a manager, Leyland, in whom everyone believed. There wasn’t a Detroit Tiger who didn’t suddenly feel like he could deliver in the clutch. “If I walk in there tomorrow and find my name and I’m batting cleanup, I’d expect to get a hit,” pitcher Todd Jones said. And, of course, pitchers are not counted on to hit!
同样的氛围发生在吉姆·利兰身上，他是2006年冠军底特律老虎棒球队的经理。这个球队在一年内输了上百场球——可怕的记录。但是现在他们有了一个经理叫利兰，他们都相信利兰。底特律老虎队中每一个人突然觉得自己能传关键球了。投手托德·琼斯说：“如果我明天上场，我能打好的。”当然了，投手是不能打球的。
The Turtles had the same attitude. The two weeks of training consisted of Dennis and Eckhardt figuratively yelling “jump” and the Turtles responding, “How high?” However, years of legend-building have made the entire process of the Turtles’ training sound a great deal more elegant and sophisticated than it really was.
海龟们也是同理。在2周的培训中，丹尼斯和埃克哈特象征性地大喊“跳”，海龟们就会说：“跳多高？”然而，多年的传奇已经让这个培训过程变得更简练精细。
They were put up in the Union League Club in downtown Chicago. Mike Cavallo described it as “sort of one of those old-fashioned fancy clubs where there were elderly people dozing under their newspaper.”
他们在芝加哥中心的联盟俱乐部上课。迈克·卡瓦洛说：“这个俱乐部很旧，有些老人拿着报纸就睡着了。”
He was not exaggerating. Tom Willis and I tried to have lunch there in 2006, but were asked to leave because I was wearing jeans. The Union League Club remains an old-world bastion for those who made their market fortunes way back when. With dark wood paneling, worn Oriental carpets, and leather- upholstered furniture, and staffed by elderly union workers moving in slow motion, it is well past its prime.
他没有夸张。我2006年和汤姆·威利斯到那里去吃中餐，他们说我穿着牛仔裤，不让进。联盟俱乐部很老旧。门板是黑色的，地毯是破旧的，家具是皮革的，里面的工人年老，行动缓慢，总之，黄金时代过去了。
Clearly, not much had changed at the club since the Turtles walked in the door. That Richard Dennis should belong to such a club in 1983 was amusing given how anti-establishment he was. However, he was simply being practical, because the club was close to the Chicago Board of Trade and C&D Commodities’ offices.
很明显，海龟们来了，也不会有什么变化的。虽然丹尼斯很反叛，但没想到在1983年他是俱乐部的会员。丹尼斯就是实际，因为这个俱乐部和芝加哥交易所，C&D商品公司的办公室一样老旧。
The Turtles spent their two weeks of training at the Union League Club as well. They all had to wear a jacket and tie at all times - including Dennis. Only half of the more than two dozen students in the training room were Turtles, if you defined Turtles as those students who would trade only Dennis’s money. It was HBO’s hit show Entourage for sure.
反正海龟们要在联盟俱乐部接受2周的培训。他们要始终穿夹克，戴领带——丹尼斯也是。如果你把海龟定义为帮丹尼斯交易的学生，20多个学生中只有一半是海龟。其他人是随从。
Right before training began the Turtles attended a welcoming party, since Dennis liked to throw lavish cocktail parties during the Christmas holidays. The newcomers got a glimpse of what passed for Dennis’s Chicago social scene and had the chance to meet each other. But the party did little to assuage the jitters. The first day of training had many feeling the stomach clutch of starting grade school all over again. They walked into the classroom fully unnerved.
在培训之前，海龟们参加了一个欢迎派对，因为丹尼斯想在圣诞节假期多浪费点钱给大家买鸡尾酒喝。这些新人短暂地了解了丹尼斯的社交活动，并互相打招呼。但这个派对并没有让大家放松下来。第一天的培训让大家很不安。大家走进教室时都很紧张。
Richard Dennis, William Eckhardt, and Dale Dellutri handled the training the same way they had managed the interview process. It turns out that the C&D Commodities brain trust had met each other at St. Laurence Catholic High School. As fate would have it, they became close friends only because they were seated in alphabetical order.
理查德·丹尼斯，威廉·埃克哈特和待尔·戴尔崔像面试时一样进行培训。似乎C&D商品公司的智囊团在圣劳伦斯天主教中学就互相认识了。也许是命运安排，他们的座位是按照名字字母顺序排列的，所以他们成为了很好的朋友。
On the first day of Turtle class you could hear a pin drop. Palpable excitement was in the air. The possibility of making money like Dennis had everyone jacked. The first hours consisted of Dellutri discussing how things would work procedurally and laying out “housekeeping” matters for people who had never traded.
海龟们第一天上课时真是鸦雀无声。很明显，大家都很激动。像丹尼斯一样赚钱，这个想法让大家激动。第一个小时内，戴尔崔谈论程序化交易，讲了一大串别人没用过的方法。
Dellutri was assigned the role of Turtle “team mom.” He encouraged the Turtles to ask questions during class, but few did at the outset. To everyone’s disappointment, Dennis was not there during that first class. Instead, it was Eckhardt who launched into the challenge of “managing risk” as the first topic.
戴尔崔的角色是海龟的组长。他鼓励海龟们在上课的时候提问，但是只有少数人提问。让大家失望的是，第一堂课丹尼斯竟然没来。反而是埃克哈特率先讲到了风险管理。
Managing risk was not what new traders would assume as a logical starting point. That Eckhardt would choose to begin with risk management was the first indication that the Turtles were starting an unconventional journey. Instead of introducing the course with a lecture on making money, he was laying the foundation for what the students had to do when they lost money.
新手一般不会想到一开始要讲管理风险。埃克哈特选择先讲风险管理，这说明海龟们的起点确实不同。他不是先讲如何赚钱，而是先讲如何防止亏钱。这为以后打好了基础。
Another C&D colleague, Robert Moss, was brought in on several occasions to discuss order execution. He wanted the class to understand what really was going on in the pit when their orders went in. “I think Bill and Rich wanted them to have a pretty good understanding given that some of them had never really been involved in the industry before,” he said.
C&D的同事罗伯特·莫斯有时候被喊来讲如何下单。他想让同学们知道下单到场内后，订单是如何被处理的。他说：“我想比尔和理查德想让他们很好的了解这个过程，因为很多人并没有接触过。”
Once the students were past the initial jitters there was some give and take, with questions and discussion. However, the class was primarily a lecture with note-taking. The Turtles with experience quickly realized that Dennis and Eckhardt knew far more than they did. Mike Cavallo said, “A lot of the stuff that they were talking about I knew, but I had no idea they weighted some stuff at so much more importance.”
一旦学生们不再紧张之后，他们就开始提问了，并开始讨论。这个课程基本上都是传授，不用做笔记。有经验的交易者很快就发现丹尼斯和埃克哈特比他们厉害多了。迈克·卡瓦洛说：“他们讲的很多东西我都知道，但是我没想到它们是那么重要。”
Contrary to popular belief among those familiar with the Turtle experiment, Dennis’s absence that first day of class was not an aberration. William Eckhardt taught the Turtles a great deal of what they learned during those two weeks in the classroom (there was only one week of training the second year).
和很多人想象的不同，丹尼斯第一天没来，但并非故意犯错。2周内，埃克哈特讲了大部分的培训内容（第二年缩短为1周了）。
The irony is that while it was Eckhardt who bet against people being able to learn how to trade, in the classroom he taught much of “the meat and potatoes.” It was Dennis who added a succession of trading war stories and anecdotes.
讽刺的是，埃克哈特说交易是不能传授的，结果上课的时候他讲的最多。而丹尼斯只是补充了一些交易界的战争故事和逸闻趣事。
To those who saw them up close, Dennis had the capacity to make an observation in an instant that would take someone else weeks of painstaking math to figure out. Even Eckhardt marveled as Dennis’s knack to intuitively see “it”: “Look what this means. Look at the deep axiom in here. It works.” That said, Eckhardt was the mathematical genius. He was the master of probability. Combining their observations was the magical mixture.
对于了解他们的人来说，丹尼斯有能力让你手到病除。埃克哈特感到很惊奇，丹尼斯凭直觉就能知道一些道理。“要明白它的意思。要明白这句话的深刻含义。很有作用。” 埃克哈特是数学天才。他是概率大师。把他们两个的知识加在一起就是神奇。
Mike Shannon saw the importance of their symbiotic relationship: “In fact, a lot of the system development wasn’t Richard Dennis. It was indeed Bill Eckhardt. They both hatched it up between them and they’re both certainly responsible for it.”
迈克·仙农知道他们两个组合的重要性：“实际上，系统不是丹尼斯开发的，是埃克哈特开发的。他们在一起使系统更完美，所以他们两个都有责任。”
To many it seemed Eckhardt was along for the ride, appreciating the Turtle experiment from a psychological point of view, but he definitely wanted his credit for the Turtles after it was over. Today, his regulatory disclosures emphasize that he “co-developed” the systems “co-taught” to the Turtles. Without Eckhardt, there would have been no Turtles.
对很多人来说，似乎埃克哈特参与了整个过程，从心里的角度加强了这个海龟实验，但是他绝对希望这个实验有他的名分。现在，他披露说他共同开发并共同培养了海龟们。没有埃克哈特，就没有海龟。
Mike Cavallo thought there was a more important, though subtle, aspect in their collaboration: “Bill did a lot of the real mathematical work on developing the systems. I think he didn’t have Rich’s trading genius, which is why I think in their discussion, he thought the trading genius was the main part whereas Rich thought the system was the main part.”
迈克·卡瓦洛认为他们的组合还有一个很重要的方面，虽然很细微：“比尔在开发系统时做了很多数学计算。我想他没有理查德的交易天才，这就是为什么他们争吵时他认为天才是关键，而理查德认为系统才是关键。”
To this day, Eckhardt has had a terrific trading career. He has arguably achieved much greater wealth over the long term than Dennis. His hedge fund is now near $800 million USD. Yet when Eckhardt and Dennis first started working together, Dennis was the one who had made the fortune trading and Eckhardt was the original Turtle learning from him.
直到现在，埃克哈特的交易生涯也非常好。他的财富听说总是比丹尼斯多。他的对冲基金接近8亿美元。当埃克哈特和丹尼斯开始一起工作时，丹尼斯是交易天才，埃克哈特则向丹尼斯学习以成为原版海龟。
It was clear to Mike Shannon that Dennis had a massive head start over Eckhardt in terms of wealth and trading experience. He said, “Bill was more inclined at the time to intellectually pursue the concept of trading more so than he was in it for serious financial gain.” Over time, Eckhardt realized that he had to strike a balance between the business end and the actual trading. Shannon added, “I think Bill probably is worth more, but once you get over being worth a quarter of a billion dollars . . .”
对迈克·仙农来说，很明显丹尼斯的财富和经验都比埃克哈特多。他说：“比尔当时的主要目的是多学点交易概念，这样他的收入就会多些。”后来，埃克哈特意识到他要在培训和交易之间找到一个平衡。仙农补充说：“我认为比尔更有价值，他后来赚了2500万美元……”
Eckhardt always good-naturedly admitted that he had lost the nurture-versus-nature battle, in which he had taken the point of view that their systems could not be taught to kids off the street: “I assumed that a trader added something that couldn’t be encapsulated in a mechanical program. I was proven wrong. By and large, [the Turtles] learned to trade exceedingly well. The answer to the question of whether trading can be taught has to be an unqualified yes.” He also scoffed at the argument that the Turtles’ success was based on sheer luck: “The probability of experiencing the kind of success that we have had and continue to have by chance alone has to be near zero. The systems worked for us year after year. We taught some of these systems to others, and it worked for them. They then managed other people’s money, and it worked again.” He acknowledged the possibility that their achievement could have been the result of luck, but he saw the probability of that being infinitesimally small.
埃克哈特一直好说话，他承认关于天生的还是后天的的争吵，他是输了，他还搞明白了，他们的系统是不能教给别人用：“我以为交易者无法掌握机械系统。我错了。海龟的交易成绩其实是非常好。是的，交易是可以传授的。”他还嘲笑别人说海龟的成功仅仅是运气：“我们再继续做实验的概率为零。系统年年都在为我们工作。我们把其它系统教给其他人，也是有效的。他们管理别人的钱，也有效。”我承认他们的成就也许是运气，但运气的成分是很小的。
Nor did Eckhardt buy into the infinite monkey theorem that says out of the millions of monkeys in the world, one, simply by randomly hitting the keyboard, would eventually produce the collected works of Shakespeare. To this day, many regularly push the notion that successes such as Eckhardt and the Turtles were simply the lucky survivors from the whole monkey population.
埃克哈特并不相信无限的猴子理论，这个理论说世界上有几百只猴子，他们只要随便乱敲键盘，都能最终打出莎士比亚的全集。直到现在，还有人说埃克哈特和海龟的成功只是运气，像猴子理论一样。
Some critics have attempted to explain away the Turtles as a careful selection of very smart students. Michael Cavallo, after all, could play five people at once at chess while blindfolded and beat them fast. He exemplified the fact that brainpower wasn’t lacking in the C&D office. Eckhardt disagreed, saying that he had not seen much correlation between good trading and intelligence:
有些评论还说被聘用的海龟都是非常聪明的学生。说迈克尔·卡瓦洛可以蒙住眼睛同时和5个人下棋，且能打败他们。他举例说明C&D办公室的人都很聪明。埃克哈特不同意，他说他并没发现优秀的交易和智商之间有什么关系。
Some outstanding traders are quite intelligent, but a few aren’t. Many outstandingly intelligent people are horrible traders. Average intelligence is enough. Beyond that, emotional makeup is more important. This is not rocket science. However, it’s much easier to learn what you should do in trading than to do it.
有些优秀的交易者确实很聪明，但也有一些优秀的交易者不聪明。很多超级聪明的人是糟糕的交易者。平均的智商就够了。除此之外，情绪更重要。这不是火箭科学。学交易比学火箭要简单多了。
Eckhardt was saying that, as with anything in life, most people know what the right thing to do is but fail to do it. Trading is no different.
埃克哈特说在生活的很多方面，大部分人都知道什么是正确的事，但是他们没有做到。交易也是同理。
Dennis’s partner and right-hand man personally learned how hard it was to do the right thing as an early acolyte of Dennis - just like the many other young traders in Chicago during the 1970s. His galvanizing experience with Dennis was on the morning of November 1, 1978. President Carter was trying to halt a sinking U.S. dollar. It was a lesson in “emotional fortitude” forever etched in Eckhardt’s memory.
丹尼斯的伙伴和助理说，一开始跟丹尼斯做事是很难的——就像70年代的很多年轻交易者一样难。他是1978年11月1日开始跟丹尼斯做事的。当时卡特总统正在努力阻止美元的下跌。对埃克哈特来说，情绪上的坚毅让他不能忘怀。
There was a rate hike and intervention in the currency markets - not good news for Dennis and Eckhardt, who held large long positions in gold, foreign currencies, and the grains. The markets collapsed on the open. Gold opened below the $10-an-ounce trading limit, so they could not exit. Silver, though down sharply, was still trading. The Comex in New York told them they could still trade it. So they started selling silver “short,” aiming to profit as it decreased in order to protect themselves against further losses from the gold. But they were also concerned that silver might rally. Decisions had to be made, and fast. There was a lot at stake.
有人在干预外汇市场——对丹尼斯和埃克哈特来说，不是好消息，他们大量做多黄金、外汇和谷物。开盘时市场崩溃了。黄金的开盘价每盎司跌了10美元以上，是跌停，他们无法出场。虽然白银跌的很厉害，但还是可以交易。纽约商品交易所告诉他们还可以交易。所以他们开始做空白银，目标是利用白银的利润对冲黄金的亏损。但他们也担心白银要上涨。必须快速做决定。风险太大了。
Dennis asked Eckhardt calmly, “What should we do?” Eckhardt panicked and froze at the controls. Dennis shorted silver and seconds later it was limit down, too (a big winner). Eckhardt enthused, “In my book that was Rich’s best trade ever because he did it under maximum duress. If he hadn’t done it, we both would have been bankrupted by the subsequent slide in gold.”
丹尼斯冷静地问埃克哈特：“我们该怎么办？” 埃克哈特恐慌了，不知道怎么办。丹尼斯就做空了白银，几秒钟后白银就跌停了（赚了不少）。埃克哈特很兴奋：“在我的书中，这就是理查德有史以来最棒的交易，因为他是在最大的压力下做到的。如果他没有这么做，我们两个会因为黄金的下跌而破产。”
One Turtle gushed in awe that Dennis still had the “balls” to execute that trade “when they were dumb, deaf, and broke”: “They were going the wrong way and for Dennis to just totally cover and totally reverse was amazing. He was one of the few people who could pull the trigger on big numbers and pull the trigger intelligently. There are some people that just go nuts and they melt down. Especially when they’re on the wrong side of the trade and it’s going to send them to the poor house.”
有一个海龟说在他们都麻木、聋了、崩溃的时候，丹尼斯还是有“胆量”去做那样的交易：“他们都做错了，丹尼斯全部回补，并全部反转仓位。他是极少数的那种人，在关键时候大笔操作，很聪明。很多人早就疯了，败了，尤其是当他们知道自己做错了，又要回到破房子的时候。”
Many people can trade small amounts day in and day out and not worry about losing money. But as the size of their trading is increased, say by 100 percent, their trading decisions become more significant and problematic. They begin to think about how much they’re winning or losing, and it becomes harder to keep a level head about trading “big.” Emotions rise to the surface, and objectivity becomes harder and harder to maintain. Disassociating the dollars from the trading was a huge part of what was instilled in the Turtles.
很多人用小账户每天倒来倒去，不担心亏钱。但是随着他们账户的缩水，比如说亏光了，他们的交易决定就变得至关重要了。他们开始思考会赚或亏多少，头脑不再清醒，也不能做大。情绪上涨，就越来越难做到客观。把钱和交易分开是海龟要提炼的重要知识。
Robert Moss saw the qualities in Dennis that allowed that silver trade to happen: “There are some people who can trade one lot or two lots or a five lot and handle that position and perform not thinking about the money.” Moss had never seen anybody better. Tom R. Willis, the son of Tom Willis and close enough to Dennis to consider him an uncle, said that Dennis simply had a sense of proportion that was different from the rest of the world’s: “When he perceived that he had an edge, he would go all into a position with mammoth trading size.”
罗伯特·莫斯看到了让丹尼斯做白银交易的素质：“很多人可以交易1份，2份，或5份合约，而不必担心钱的问题。” 莫斯从没见过更强的人。汤姆·R·威利斯是汤姆·威利斯儿子，他和丹尼斯很亲近，把丹尼斯当作叔叔，他说丹尼斯的平衡能力和别人都不同：“如果他认为他有优势，他会重仓进场，仓位非常大。”
Dennis may have been able to pull the trigger, but that disastrous first year came close to wiping him out. He lost $2 million that first day of November. It was touch-and-go for a while. The experience forced Dennis and Eckhardt to reevaluate everything they had learned about trading. They began to test by computer “every idea or piece of conventional wisdom that had ever passed their way. The successful trader is the one who codifies, the one who turns things into rules. Every idea that’s market-worthy must then be tested.”
也许丹尼斯有能力交易，但是灾难来临时，几乎让他破产。11月1日，他亏了200万。钱从手中流走了。这次经历逼着丹尼斯和埃克哈特重新评估交易的方方面面。他们开始用电脑做测试：“放弃所有的思想和传统智慧。成功的交易者就是把所有事都变成法典，变成原则的人。任何有价值的思想都要经过测试。”
Don’t discount this story by saying, “It was $2 million; this is a game for rich people, not me!” That is the dead wrong view. There will always be someone with more or less money than someone else. If you have $100 million and you lose $2 million, that is not a big deal. If you have $50,000 and you lose $1,000, that is not a big deal. Both losses are 2 percent.
不要怀疑这个故事，说：“200万，这是富人玩的，不是我玩的！”这个观点绝对是错的。每个人的钱总是有多又少。如果你有1亿美元，你亏了200万，那不是什么大问题。如果你有50000美元，你亏了1000美元，那不是大问题。但都是亏了2%而已。
That is not to say losses are easy to accept, but Dennis and Eckhardt taught the Turtles not to consider their trading in terms of amounts of money. They wanted them to think of money as a variable, because in that way, regardless of account size, they could make the correct trading decisions at all times.
这不是说很难接受亏损，丹尼斯和埃克哈特告诉学生们不要用金钱的数量来思考交易。他们希望学生把钱当作变数，因为这样做的话，不管账户的大小，他们要做的就是正确的交易决定。
However, first and foremost Dennis and Eckhardt wanted the Turtles to understand that their kind of speculation had virtually no external limits. It took place in a limitless environment. They could bet any amount on any potential market movement at any time, but if the Turtles entered this no-limit environment and didn’t protect their scarce capital, then sooner or later the probabilities would catch up with them.
然而，丹尼斯和埃克哈特更想让海龟们知道，投机是没有任何外部限制的。完全没有任何限制。他们可以在任何市场，任何时间赌任何数量的金钱，如果海龟们在没有限制的状态下不保护自己有限的资金，可能的事迟早会发生在他们身上。
The lessons they put forward in the classroom solved the dilemma of “speculation.” Since the markets are a zero-sum game, the Turtles learned that even a marginally profitable trader must win money from other market players. By definition, they must use different methods than everyone else in the game.
后面的课程解决了投机的两难。既然市场是零和游戏，交易者必须从其他交易身上赚钱。根据定义，你必须使用和别人不同的方法。
What this means is that only when “good” trades, not necessarily profitable trades, are consistently made over the long run, the chances of profitable results increase dramatically. A bad month, a bad quarter, or even a bad year does not mean much in the grand scheme. The Turtles learned that the most important thing was to have a sound trading approach tested in the real world.
也就是说，优秀的交易者只要长期持续一致地交易，他的利润就会快速地增长。一个月、一个季度或一年交易不好，长期来说，并不重要。海龟们学到了，最重要的事就是使用一个在真实世界测试有用的好方法。
Dennis and Eckhardt had that real world of making money figured out. Their philosophy and rules taught in the Turtle classroom were the equivalent of a two-week seminar on how to fly a plane without ever getting in the plane.
丹尼斯和埃克哈特已经搞清楚了真实世界赚钱的方法。他们传授的理念和原则等于2周的研讨会，就好像你不用进飞机学习，就会开飞机。
章 理念
“. . . when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (Sherlock Holmes)
“……如果你不去想不可能的事，那么有可能一定就是真实的。”
阿瑟·柯南·道尔爵士（夏洛克·福尔摩斯）
Dennis and Eckhardt’s two weeks of training was heavy with the scientific method - the structural foundation of their trading style and the foundation on which they had based their arguments in high school. It was the same foundation relied upon by Hume and Locke.
丹尼斯和埃克哈特2周的培训充满了科学方法——交易风格的结构基础和争论的基础。他和休姆，洛克基础是一样的。
Simply put, the scientific method is a set of techniques for investigating phenomena and acquiring new knowledge, as well as for correcting and integrating previous knowledge. It is based on observable, empirical, measurable evidence, and subject to laws of reasoning. It involves seven steps:
简单说，科学方法就是一套技术，以调查现象，获得知识，并修改和整合以前的知识。它的基础是观察、经验、可测量的证据、合理。包括7个步骤：
1.        Define the question.
定义问题。
2.        Gather information and resources.
收集信息和资源。
3.        Form hypothesis.
形成前提。
4.        Perform experiment and collect data.
进行实验，收集数据。
5.        Analyze data.
分析数据。
6.        Interpret data and draw conclusions that serve as a starting point for new hypotheses.
分析数据，得出结论，形成新的前提。
7.        Publish results.
得出结果。
This is not the type of discussion you will hear on CNBC or have with your local broker when he calls with the daily hot tip. Such pragmatic thinking lacks the sizzle and punch of get-rich-quick advice. Dennis and Eckhardt were adamant that their students consider themselves scientists first and traders second - a testament to their belief in doing the “right thing.”
美国全国广播公司财经频道不会谈这个的，每天给你热门消息的经纪人也不会谈这个。这种实事求是的思想是不会告诉你如何赚快钱的。丹尼斯和埃克哈特坚决要求学生们先把自己当作科学家，然后再是交易者——通过做正确的事以证明他们的信念。
The empiricist Dennis knew that plugging along without a solid philosophical foundation was perilous. He never wanted his research to be just numbers bouncing around in a computer. There had to be a theory, and then the numbers could be used to confirm it. He said, “I think you need the conceptual apparatus to be the first thing you start with and the last thing you look at.”
经验主义者丹尼斯知道，如果没有坚实的理论基础，拼命干活是危险的。他绝不希望他的研究仅仅停留在电脑中。必须有一个理论，而且有数字支持。他说：“首先你要有理论，然后再做事。”
This thinking put Dennis was way ahead of his time. Years later, the academic Daniel Kahneman would win a Nobel prize for “prospect theory” (behavioral finance), a fancy name for what Dennis was actually doing for a living and teaching his Turtles. Avoiding the psychological voltage that routinely sank so many other traders was mandatory for the Turtles.
这个思想让丹尼斯走在时代的前面。几年后，学院派的丹尼尔·卡尼曼因为“预期理论”获得了诺贝尔奖。而丹尼斯已经靠这个理论谋生并教给了他的海龟们。这个心理关让很多交易者失败了，海龟们必须过这关。
The techniques that Dennis and Eckhardt taught the Turtles were different from Dennis’s seasonal spread techniques from his early floor days. The Turtles were trained to be trend-following traders. In a nutshell, that meant that they needed a “trend” to make money. Trend followers always wait for a market to move; then they follow it. Capturing the majority of a trend, up or down, for profit is the goal.
丹尼斯和埃克哈特教给海龟们的技术和丹尼斯当年在交易所场内的技术不同。海龟们被训练成趋势跟踪交易者。简单地说，他们需要趋势才能赚钱。趋势跟踪者总是等待市场波动，然后他们跟踪市场。不管趋势是上涨的或下跌的，目标就是抓住趋势的绝大部分。
The Turtles were trained this way because by 1983, Dennis knew the things that worked best were “rules”: “The majority of the other things that didn’t work were judgments. It seemed that the better part of the whole thing was rules. You can’t wake up in the morning and say, ‘I want to have an intuition about a market.’ You’re going to have way too many judgments.”
海龟们之所以被如此培训，是因为丹尼斯在1983年明白了最好的方法就是原则：“没用的大多是判断。似乎比较好的就是原则。你可以在早上起来说‘我想对市场有一个直觉。’你将会有很多判断的。”
While Dennis knew exactly where the sweet spot was for making big money, he often fumbled his own trading with too many discretionary judgments. Looking back, he blamed his pit experience, saying, “People trading in the pit are very bad systems traders generally. They learn different things. They react to the [price] ‘tick’ in your face.”
虽然丹尼斯知道赚钱的关键在哪里，他自己却因为主观判断而跌跌撞撞。回头来看，他痛恨自己有场内的经验，他说：“在场内交易的人一般是糟糕的系统交易者。他们学的东西不一样。他们根据眼前（几个）基点的跳动而做出反应。”
Dennis and Eckhardt did not invent trend following. From the 1950s into the 1970s, there was one preeminent trend trader with years of positive performance: Richard Donchian. Donchian was the undisputed father of trend following. He spoke and wrote profusely on the subject. He influenced Dennis and Eckhardt, and just about every other technically minded trader with a pulse.
趋势跟踪不是丹尼斯和埃克哈特发明的。从50年代到70年代，有一个杰出的趋势交易者，他多年取得了很好的业绩：他叫理查德·唐奇安。唐奇安是名正言顺的趋势跟踪之父。关于这个话题，他讲了很多，也写了很多。他影响了丹尼斯、埃克哈特、几乎每个技术交易者。
One of Donchian’s students, Barbara Dixon, described trend followers as making no attempt to forecast the extent of a price move. The trend follower “disciplines his thoughts into a strict set of conditions for entering and exiting the market and acts on those rules or his system to the exclusion of all other market factors. This removes, hopefully, emotional judgmental influences from individual market decisions.”
唐奇安的一个学生笆笆拉·迪克森说趋势跟踪者并不预测价格的波动。趋势跟踪者“把进场和出场都形成了纪律，无论市场如何，都严格按照自己的原则或系统行动。这样就避免了情绪判断对市场决定的影响。”
Trend traders don’t expect to be right every time. In fact, on individual trades they admit when they are wrong, take their losses, and move on. However, they do expect to make money over the long run. In 1960, Donchian reduced this philosophy to what he called his “weekly trading rule.” The rule was brutally utilitarian: “When the prices moves above the high of two previous calendar weeks (the optimum number of weeks varies by commodity), cover your short positions and buy. When the price breaks below the low of the two previous calendar weeks, liquidate your long position and sell short.”
趋势交易者不指望每次都对。实际上，他们勇于承认单笔交易的错误，并接受亏损，且继续交易下去。然后，他们希望长期下来是赚钱的。1960年，唐奇安把他的理念浓缩成“周线交易原则。”这个原则很有用：“当价格高于前2周（根据不同的商品，这个数字不同）的最高价时，回补空头仓位并买入。当价格低于前2周的最低价时，平掉多头仓位并做空。”
Richard Dennis’s protégé Tom Willis had learned long ago from Dennis why price, the philosophical underpinning of Donchian’s rule, was the only true metric to trust. He said, “Everything known is reflected in the price. I could never hope to compete with Cargill [today the world’s second-largest private corporation, with $70 billion in revenues for 2005], who has soybean agents scouring the globe knowing everything there is to know about soybeans and funneling the information up to their trading headquarters.” Willis has had friends who made millions trading fundamentally, but they could never know as much as the big corporations with thousands of employees. And they always limited themselves to trading only one market. Willis added, “They don’t know anything about bonds. They don’t know anything about the currencies. I don’t either, but I’ve made a lot of money trading them. They’re just numbers. Corn is a little different than bonds, but not different enough that I’d have to trade them differently. Some of these guys I read about have a different system for each [market]. That’s absurd. We’re trading mob psychology. We’re not trading corn, soybeans, or S&P’s. We’re trading numbers.”
丹尼斯的门徒汤姆·威利斯很早就明白了为什么价格是唯一的标准，这也是唐奇安原则的理念基础。他说：“任何东西都是通过价格反应的。我绝不会和卡吉尔竞争（目前是世界第二大的私人公司，2005年的收入是700亿美元），他有遍布全球的大豆经纪人，这些经纪人每天向总部汇报情况。” 威利斯的一些朋友通过基本面也赚了几百万，但是这样的朋友绝不会像拥有几千个员工的大公司那样无所不知。而且他们只交易一个市场。威利斯补充说：“他们不懂债券。他们不懂外汇。我也不懂，但我有很多钱去交易它们。它们仅仅是数字。玉米和债券区别不大，我在交易的时候更是没有区别。我也了解到有些人用不同的系统交易不同的市场。那是荒唐的。我们交易的是大众心理。我们不是在交易玉米、大豆或标准普尔股指期货。我们交易的是数字。”
“Trading numbers” was just another Dennis convention to reinforce abstracting the world in order not to get emotionally distracted. Dennis made the Turtles understand price analysis. He did this because at first he “thought that intelligence was reality and price the appearance, but after a while I saw that price is the reality and intelligence is the appearance.”
“交易数字”是丹尼斯对这个世界的提炼，也就是不要受情绪的影响。丹尼斯让海龟们理解了价格分析。他这么做的原因是他“一开始以为消息是真相，价格是表象；但是后来他明白了价格是真相，消息是表象。”
He was not being purposefully oblique. Dennis’s working assumption was that soybean prices reflected soybean news faster than people could get and digest the news. Since his early twenties, he had known that looking at the news for decision-making cues was the wrong thing to do.
他并非故意拐弯抹角。丹尼斯的前提是，大豆价格反应速度比人们吸收和消化消息的速度快。他在20多岁的时候，他就知道根据消息做决定是错的。
If acting on news, stock tips, and economic reports were the real key to trading success, then everyone would be rich. Dennis was blunt: “Abstractions like crop size, unemployment, and inflation are mere metaphysics to the trader. They don’t help you predict prices, and they may not even explain past market action.”
如果说根据新闻、消息和财经报道就能成功，那么任何人都能致富。丹尼斯很直率：“对交易者来说，谷物的收割量、失业率、通货膨胀，这些东西都是很虚的。它们不能帮助你做价格预测，它们只能解释市场过去的行为。”
The greatest trader in Chicago had been trading five years before he ever saw a soybean. He poked fun at the notion that if “something” was happening in the weather, his trading would somehow change: “If it’s raining on those soybeans, all that means to me is I should bring an umbrella.”
这个伟大的交易者在芝加哥交易大豆5年以后才知道大豆长什么样子。他开玩笑地说，如果天气有变化，我的交易行为也有变化：“如果大豆区下雨了，这仅仅意味着我要打伞出门。”
Turtles may have initially heard Dennis’s explanations and assumed he was just being cute or coy, but in reality he was telling them exactly how to think. He wanted the Turtles to know in their heart of hearts the downsides of fundamental analysis: “You don’t get any profit from fundamental analysis. You get profit from buying and selling. So why stick with the appearance when you can go right to the reality of price?”
海龟们一开始听丹尼斯这么解释，还以为他装可爱或腼腆，但事实上他是在教他们如何思考。他希望海龟们在内心深处明白基本面分析的弱点：“基本面分析不能让你赚钱。你是通过买卖赚钱的。既然你能理解价格的真相，为何还要去研究表象呢？”
How could the Turtles possibly know the balance sheets and assorted other financial metrics of all five hundred companies in the S&P 500 index? Or how could they know all the fundamentals about soybeans? They couldn’t. Even if they did, that knowledge would not have told them when to buy or sell along with how much to buy or sell.
对于标准普尔500股指期货引用的500家公司，海龟们如何去研究他们的资产负债表和各种报表？他们如何去了解大豆的各种基本面？他们根本做不到。即使他们做到了，这些知识也不会告诉他们何时买，何时卖，数量是多少。
Dennis knew he had problems if watching TV allowed people to predict what would happen tomorrow - or predict anything for that matter. He said, “If the universe is structured like that, I’m in trouble.” Fundamental reporting from CNBC’s Maria Bartiromo would have been called “fluff” by the C&D Commodities teaching team.
如果看电视能让人们预测明天——哪怕是一点点——丹尼斯知道都是有问题的。他说：“如果世界是这个样子，我肯定有麻烦了。”对于丹尼斯的教学团队来说，美国全国广播公司财经频道的基本面报道是失败的。
Michael Gibbons, a trend-following trader, put using “news” for trading decisions in perspective: “I stopped looking at news as something important in 1978. A good friend of mine was employed as a reporter by the largest commodity news service at the time. One day his major ‘story’ was about sugar and what it was going to do. After I read his piece, I asked, ‘how do you know all of this?’ I will never forget his answer; he said, ‘I made it up.’ ”
迈克尔·吉本斯是一个趋势跟踪交易者，他是这样描述利用消息做交易的：“1978年开始，我不再通过报纸看重大消息了。当时，我的一个朋友在一家最大的商品服务报做记者。一天，他写了一篇关于白糖的重大报道，还有预测。我读到以后就问他‘你是如何知道这一切的？’我永远不会忘记他的回答‘我自己编的。’”
However, trading à la Dennis was not all highs. Regular small losses were going to happen as the Turtles traded Dennis’s money. Dennis knew the role confidence would play. He said, “I suppose I didn’t like the idea that everyone thought I was all wrong, crazy, or going to fail, but it didn’t make any substantial difference because I had an idea what I wanted to do and how I wanted to do it.”
然而，根据丹尼斯的方法交易不是全部。用丹尼斯的钱交易也会有很多小亏损。丹尼斯知道信心会起作用。他说：“我也不希望每个人都认为我错了，疯了，或要失败了，但是我的思想确实不同，因为我知道这个思想是按照我的意思走的。”
The Turtles’ core axioms were the same ones practiced by the great speculators from one hundred years earlier:
海龟的核心思想和100年前伟大的投机者的思想是一样的：
“Do not let emotions fluctuate with the up and down of your capital.”
不要把情绪的波动和资金的上下联系起来
“Be consistent and even-tempered.”
要持续一致，情绪稳定
“Judge yourself not by the outcome, but by your process.”
用过程来判断自己，不是用结果来判断自己。
“Know what you are going to do when the market does what it is going to do.”
当市场处于不同状态时，知道你要怎么做。
“Every now and then the impossible can and will happen.”
不管是现在，还是将来，任何事都有可能发生。
“Know each day what your plan and your contingencies are for the next day.”
每天都知道自己的计划和意外分别是什么，第二天也是如此。
“What can I win and what can I lose? What are probabilities of either happening?”
我能赚多少，我能亏多少？概率是多少？
However, there was precision behind the familiar-sounding euphemisms. From the first day of training, William Eckhardt outlined five questions that were relevant to what he called an optimal trade. The Turtles had to be able to answer these questions at all times:
然而，经验主义也需要精确。在第一天培训时，埃克哈特总结了5个问题，这5个问题涉及到最佳的交易。海龟们必须在任何时候都能回答这5个问题：
1.        What is it the state of the market?
市场是什么状态？
2.        What is the volatility of the market?
市场的波动性如何？
3.        What is the equity being traded?
交易的资金是多少？
4.        What is the system or the trading orientation?
系统如何？
5.        What is the risk aversion of the trader or client?
交易者或客户对这个风险有多大程度的厌恶？
There was no messing around in Eckhardt’s tone, as he suggested that these were the only things that had any importance.
埃克哈特认为这些问题很重要。
What is it the state of the market? The state of the market simply means. “What is the price that the market is trading at?” If Microsoft is trading at 40 a share today, then that is the state of that market.
市场的状态如何？意思是“现在的价格是多少？”如果今天微软的价格是40美元1股，那么这就是市场的状态。
What is the volatility of the market? Eckhardt taught the Turtles that they had to know on a daily basis how much any market goes up and down. If Microsoft on an average trades at 50, but typically bounces up and down on any given day between 48 and 52, then Turtles were taught that the volatility of that market was four. They had their own jargon to describe daily volatilities. They would say that Microsoft had an “N” of four. More volatile markets generally carried more risk.
什么是市场的波动性？埃克哈特告诉海龟们，必须知道市场每天的涨幅和跌幅。如果微软的均价是50，但是每天在48和52之间波动，那么海龟就知道这个市场的波动是4。他们有每天描述波动性的术语。他们会说微软的N是4。波动越厉害，风险越大。
What is the equity being traded? The Turtles had to know how much money they had at all times, because every rule they would learn adapted to their given account size at that moment.
什么是要交易的资金（数）？海龟们必须随时知道自己的资金是多少，因为每个原则都和账户的资金有关系。
What is the system or the trading orientation? Eckhardt instructed the Turtles that in advance of the market opening, they had to have their battle plan set for buying and selling. They couldn’t say, “Okay, I’ve got $100,000; I’m going to randomly decide to trade $5,000 of it.” Eckhardt did not want them to wake up and say, “Do I buy if Google hits 500 or do I sell if Google hits 500?” They were taught precise rules that would tell them when to buy or sell any market at any time based on the movement of the price. The Turtles had two systems: System One (S1) and System Two (S2). These systems governed their entries and exits. S1 essentially said you would buy or sell short a market if it made a new twenty-day high or low.
什么是系统？埃克哈特告诉海龟们，在交易前必须有买卖计划。他们不能说：“好，我有100000美元，我将随意地拿5000美元做交易。” 埃克哈特不希望他们早上起床后说：“如果谷歌到了500我就买入；或，到了500我就卖出？”会有具体的原则告诉他们如何买卖。海龟们有2个系统：系统1和系统2。这些系统决定他们的进场和出场。系统1的核心就是告诉当价格到达20天最高点或最低点是你是做多或做空。
What is the risk aversion of the trader or client? Risk management was not a concept that the Turtles grasped immediately. For example, if they had $10,000 in their account, should they bet all $10,000 on Google stock? No. If Google all of a sudden dropped, they could lose all $10,000 fast. They had to bet a small amount of the $10,000, because they didn’t know whether or not a trade was going to go in their favor. Small betting (for example, 2 percent of $10,000 on initial bets) kept them in the game to play another day, all the while waiting for a big trend.
什么是交易者或客户对风险的厌恶？海龟们不能立刻明白风险管理的概念。比如，如果他们的账户里有10000美元，是不是要用所有的10000美元买谷歌的股票？不。如果谷歌突然下跌，他们很快就会亏掉10000美元。他们必须用10000美元的一部分来赌，因为他们不知道这笔交易会不会赚钱。小赌（比如，一开始只赌10000美元的2%）能让他们每天继续玩这个游戏，同时等待大趋势。
Class Discussion
课堂讨论
Day after day, Eckhardt would emphasize comparisons. Once he told the Turtles to consider two traders who have the same equity, the same system (or trading orientation), and the same risk aversion and were both facing the same situation in the market. For both traders, the optimal course of action must be the same. “Whatever is optimal for one should be optimal for the other,” he would say.
每天，埃克哈特会强调比较的重要性。只要2个交易者的资金一样，系统一样，风险厌恶一样，市场一样，就要做比较。对于这个2个交易者来说，他们的行动要一样。他会说：“一个人的优势就是另一个人的优势。”
Now this may sound simple, but human nature causes most people, when faced with a similar situation, to react differently. They tend to outthink the situation, figuring there must be some unique value that they alone can add to make it even better. Dennis and Eckhardt demanded that the Turtles respond the same or they were out of the program (and they did end up cutting people).
这听起来很简单，但是人性会影响大部分人。即使情况一样，反应却不同。他们一般会深入思考，也许会找到独特的价值。丹尼斯和埃克哈特要求海龟们的反应必须是一样的，否则就要裁员（他们确实裁员）了。
In essence Eckhardt was saying, “You are not special. You are not smarter than the market. So follow the rules. Whoever you are and however much brains you have, it doesn’t make a hill of beans’ difference. Because if you’re facing the same issues and if you’ve got the same constraints, you must follow the rules.” Eckhardt said this in a far nicer, more professorial and academic way, but that was what he meant. He did not want his students to wake up and say, “I’m feeling smart today,” “I’m feeling lucky today,” or “I’m feeling dumb today.” He taught them to wake up and say, “I’ll do what my rules say to do today.”
埃克哈特的含义是：“你没有什么特别的。你没市场聪明，所以还是要遵守原则。无论你是谁，无论你多么聪明，你也是不值一文。因为如果你遇到了同样的问题和麻烦，你必须遵守原则。” 埃克哈特用非常专业，非常学术的方式解释了这个问题。他不希望学生们起床后说：“我感觉今天变聪明了”“我感觉今天运气好”或“我感觉今天很笨拙。”他教他们起床后说：“今天我按照原则办事。”
Dennis was clear that it would take stick-to-itiveness to follow the rules day to day and do it right: “To follow the good principles and not let fear, greed and hope interfere with your trading is tough. You’re swimming upstream against human nature.” The Turtles had to have the confidence to follow through on all rules and pull the trigger when they were supposed to. Hesitate and they would be toast in the zero-sum market game.
丹尼斯要求坚忍不拔地每天遵守原则：“遵守好的原则，不让恐惧、贪婪和希望干扰你的交易，这是很难做到的。你在逆流而上，而你逆反的就是人性。”海龟们必须遵守原则并在必要的时候行动。如果忧郁，就会被零和市场吞噬了。
This motley crew of novices quickly learned that of the five questions deemed to be most important by Eckhardt, the first two, about the market’s state and the market’s volatility, were the objective pieces of the puzzle. Those were simply facts that everyone could see plain as day.
这些混杂的新手很快就明白了，这5个问题对埃克哈特非常重要。头两个是关于市场的状态和波动性，是价格目标。每个人都能清楚地看出来。
Eckhardt was most interested in the last three questions, which addressed the equity level, the systems, and the risk aversion. They were subjective questions all grounded in the present. It did not make a difference what the answers to these three questions were a month ago or last week. Only “right now” was important.
埃克哈特最关心后面3个问题，它们涉及到了资金、系统和风险。它们是客观的问题。在任何时候都有用。只有现在是重要的。
Put another way, the Turtles could control only how much money they had now, how they decided to enter and exit a trade now, and how much to risk on each trade right now. For example, if Google is trading at 500 today, Google is trading at 500. That’s a statement of fact. If Google has a precise volatility (“N”) today of four, that’s not a judgment call.
换句话说，海龟们只能控制现在他们手头上有的钱，现在如何进出，现在冒多大的风险。比如，如果谷歌今天的价格是500，现在的价格就是500。如果谷歌今天的波动性N是4，那就不能交易。
To reinforce the need for objectivity on issues such as “N” Eckhardt wanted the Turtles to think in terms of “memory-less trading.” He told them, “You shouldn’t care about how you got to the current state but rather about what you should do now. A trader who trades differentially because of swings in confidence is focusing on his or her own past rather than on current realities.”
埃克哈特为了让他们客观地看待N，他让海龟们不要用大脑交易。他告诉他们：“你不要管过去，而是管现在该怎么做。交易者能根据过去的经验自信地应对波动，但他不是根据现在的现实做的。”
If five years ago you had $100,000 and today you have only $50,000, you can’t sit around and make decisions based on the hypothetical $100,000 you used to have. You have to base your decisions on the reality of the $50,000 you have now.
如果5年前你有100000美元，现在你只有50000美元，你不能还当自己有10000美元。你应该根据手头的50000美元做决定。
How to handle profits properly is a separation point between winners and losers. Great traders adjust their trading to the money they have at any one time.
赢家和输家处理利润的方式也不同。伟大的交易者总是根据自己手头的钱来安排交易。
If crude oil had just traded above $40 for the first time, the Turtles were not to sit around and kibitz about it. They were to take action if it hit their S1 or S2 entry or exit signals. Why or how it got to $40 was irrelevant. Eckhardt threw out the examples fast and furious.
如果原油的价格第一次上了40美元，海龟们不要坐在那里乱想。一旦价格碰到系统1或系统2的进出场信号，就要行动。它的价格为什么是40美元，那没关系。埃克哈特快速而激动地讲了这个例子。
He started with a commonplace idea that most people are willing to accept. If you make some profits with your original money, you can take more risks, because now you’re playing with their money. He said, “It’s certainly a comforting thought. It certainly can’t be as bad to lose their money as yours. Can’t it? Why should it matter whom the money used to belong to? What matters is whom it belongs to now (you) and what to do about it now.”
他开始讲大部分人都能接受的普通思想。如果你用最初的钱赚到了利润，你可以冒更多的风险，因为你在用别人的钱做交易。他说：“这么想当然很好。亏别人的钱总比亏自己的钱好，是不是？为什么要在乎这钱是谁在用？为什么要在乎现在谁（你）在用，怎么用。”
For instance, assume you start with a $100,000 account, quickly making another $100,000. You now have $200,000. Although you made a profit, you can’t say, “I can now take crazier risks with that $100,000.”
比如，你用100000美元起步，很快又赚了100000美元。你现在有了200000美元。虽然你赚钱了，你不能说：“我现在用100000美元要冒更大的风险。”
Why would you view your money as funny money or lucky money? The Turtles were taught to treat that additional $100,000 as they did their original $100,000. They had to use the same concern, care, and discipline. The five questions didn’t change, even if their account balances did.
为什么要把自己的钱看作是有趣的或靠运气赚来的钱？海龟们要把赚来的100000美元和原来的100000美元一样看待。他们要使用一样的态度、关注和纪律。即使账户变了，这5个问题也不变，。
Traders who face the same opportunity must trade the same. Personal feelings can’t interfere.
交易者在同样的情况下必须做出同样的交易。不能让个人的感情干预交易。
Pretend there are two traders, John and Mary. John and Mary are exactly alike in all respects. They have the same risk aversion and the same system. There is one small difference between the two: John has 50 percent more money. John then decides to go on vacation and while he’s away having fun at South Beach, Mary makes 50 percent. Now they have exactly the same amount of money. How or why they got to the point of having the same amount of money is not relevant. The correct course for John is the correct course for Mary.
假如说有2个交易者，分别是约翰和玛丽。他们在很多方面都是一样的。他们的风险厌恶是一样，系统是一样的。只有一个小区别：约翰的钱多50%。然后约翰决定去旅游，当他在南海岸玩的时候，玛丽赚了50%。现在，他们的钱一样多了。他们的钱是如何一样多的，这没关系。他们各自的理由都是对的。
Eckhardt did not want the Turtles to say. “I had a period where I made some money, so now I can do something different.” They had to take the same steps regardless.
埃克哈特不希望海龟们说：“我有一段时间赚钱了，所以我可以做点其它事。”他们必须采取相同的步骤。
Logically, upon first hearing that Mary had just made 50 percent more, most people might want to debate Eckhardt’s contention that they should trade the same way. The rule was designed to keep traders with a big profit run-up in their trading account from acting irrationally or breaking a rule. Many people with a big profit run-up don’t want to lose those paper gains. They are anxious to take their profits off the table so they can feel secure.
当第一次听说玛丽赚了50%时，大部分人都不同意埃克哈特的话，说他们的交易应该一样。这个原则是让交易者长期赚钱，而不是非理性地交易或打破原则。很多人赚了很多钱以后就害怕亏钱。他们急着兑现利润，这样才会感到安全。
Eckhardt slammed home the point that the security craved by humans was bad for proper trading: “The distinction between open trade equity and closed-out trading profits is completely vacuous. How much do you have in open trade equity? How much do you have in closed-out equity? This is a bookkeeper’s artifact. It has absolutely no relevance to correct trading.”
埃克哈特强调说人性对安全的渴望是不适合交易的：“其实起始资金和平仓后账户资金（交易后的资金）的差别是没有实际含义的。你的起始资金是多少？你的平仓后资金是多少？这是记账的事。这和正确的交易是没有任何关系的。”
While it might have zero relevance, people go the wrong way all the time. Instead of trading as they should today, based on their money now and their rules, they trade based on the money they once had. They are clearly trying to recoup. “How much money you use to have has no significance. It’s how much money you have now,” implored Eckhardt.
虽然它们之间没有关系，人们总是犯错。他们不是根据现在的钱决定交易，而是根据过去曾经有的钱进行交易。他们想扳本。埃克哈特说“过去你有多少钱不重要，重要的是你现在有多少钱。”
If the Turtles started with $100,000 but now had $90,000, they still had to make trading decisions based on what they had now. If the Turtles were supposed to risk 2 percent of their trading capital, then they had to risk 2 percent of their current $90,000, not 2 percent of their original $100,000.
如果海龟们开始交易时有100000美元，但是现在只有90000美元了，他们应该根据90000美元做交易决定。如果海龟只能亏损资金的2%，那么就是90000美元的2%，不是100000美元的2%。
If the Turtles lost money in a market, they had to move on. Accepting and managing losses are part of their game.
如果海龟亏钱了，他们还要继续交易。接受并管理风险只是游戏的一部分。
The whole notion of holding on to the past was a big issue for the team at C&D Commodities. Eckhardt was stern about the mistake losing traders make when they look backward in time. The losing trader is trying to make money back in the same market and on the same position. Eckhardt described it as a “market vendetta.”
沉迷于过去是一个大问题。埃克哈特很讨厌这个错误。亏损的交易者总是想扳本。埃克哈特说想扳本就是想报复市场。
Suppose John lost money in Cisco. That market “hurt” him. Instead of focusing on what the best opportunity might be now, he only wants his money back in Cisco. All John can think about is his Cisco position, and in turn his loss just keeps growing. According to Eckhardt, this is the kind of personal memory mistake that always leads to disaster.
假如说约翰在思科上亏了钱。那个市场伤害了他。他不知道专注于最好的交易机会，他只是想着如何通过思科扳本。约翰只知道想着思科的仓位，结果他亏的更多。埃克哈特认为这是记忆错误，会导致灾难。
The Turtles were taught not to fixate on what particular market made money that month or year or what market lost money. They learned to be agnostic and accept whatever trending market created opportunity.
海龟们被告知，不要关心哪个市场在本月或本年赚钱，也不要关心哪个市场亏钱了。他们被培养成什么都不知道的人，只接受任何市场提供的趋势。
The same principle was seen with “losses.” For example, when the Turtles were taught that they had to exit with a small loss, because they don’t know how far it could drop, they got out. What they didn’t want to do was look at the initial small loss and say, “I had $100,000 of Microsoft and now I have $90,000, so I’m going to put another $10,000 of my money into MSFT because now it’s cheap.”
亏损也是同理。比如，海龟们被告知，在亏损很小时出场，因为他们不知道要亏多少，只好出场。他们不能看着最初的小亏损说：“我本来有100000美元的微软，现在只有90000美元了，我准备再买10000美元的微软，因为它现在更便宜了。”
Dennis said that to add to a losing position was like being the kid who’s been burned on a hot stove once already but puts his hand back on the stove just to prove it was the stove that was wrong. However, that said, if after taking a small loss the Turtles got a signal to get into the market again, they got back in. An example using legendary hedge-fund manager Paul Tudor Jones best explains the point.
丹尼斯说，向下摊平成本就等于一个小孩被火炉烧了，结果你把他的手又放到火炉上以证明是火炉的错。如果亏损后，市场又再次给出信号，他们还要进场。传奇的对冲基金经理保罗·都铎·琼斯用一个例子很好地说明了这个道理。
In one of Jones’s best trades, he got an entry signal. He got in. The trade went against him and he lost 2 percent, forcing him to get out. All of a sudden, the entry signal came right back as the market moved in his favor again. He could not debate it. He had to get back in. Then it went against him again for another 2 percent loss, forcing him to get out again. He went through this process ten or so times in a row until he got a position that actually kept trending. That final big trend made enough money to pay for all those false starts and then some, but to get there in the first place he had to follow his rules religiously.
在琼斯的一笔最好的交易中，他看见了进场信号。他进场了。结果交易不利，他亏了2%，逼他出场了。突然，进场信号又出现了。他无法拒绝，他又进场了。然后又亏了2%，逼他又出场了。这个过程发生了连续10次以上，最后他才跟上趋势。最后大趋势的利润弥补了所有假信号的亏损，还有赚。要想实现这点，必须牢牢地遵守原则。
The same lesson is seen in sports. Even though Larry Bird was one of the best basketball three-point shooters ever, he wasn’t perfect. Let’s say on an average he hit 40 percent of his three-point shots. But if all of a sudden he went on a streak where he missed fifteen in a row, what did that mean? Could Bird afford to stop taking three-point shots? No. That was what Dennis and Eckhardt were teaching.
体育也是同理。即使拉里·伯德是最好的3分球投手，他也不完美。假如说他3分球的命中率是40%。但是他连续错过了15次机会，这意味着什么？伯德会停止投3分球吗？不会。这就是丹尼斯和埃克哈特所要教的知识。
Another great example of the statistical mindset Dennis and Eckhardt were teaching the Turtles can be found in baseball. Assume you bat .300 for ten years straight. All of a sudden you go 0 for 25. Does that mean you are no longer a .300 batter? No. It means you still have to go up to the plate and swing like you’ve always swung, because that’s the discipline of being a .300 hitter. The Turtles played the odds for the long haul.
另外一个统计学的思想是丹尼斯和埃克哈特从棒球中发现的。假如说你连续10年都打0.300。突然变成了25.0。这是否意味着你再也没有0.300那么好了？不。这意味着你还要上场，像过去那样挥棒击球，因为0.300的击球手就是这样的（张轶注：我不懂棒球，翻译不一定对）。海龟就是长期利用概率赚钱。
The Turtles were taught not to fixate on when they entered a market. They were taught to worry about when they will exit.
海龟们被告知不要担心何时进场。要担心何时出场。
Pretend again there are two traders, John and Mary. They are exactly the same except in the amount of trading capital each of them has. Assume John has 10 percent less money, but enters a trade before Mary. By the time Mary gets in her trade, they both have the same amount of money. Eckhardt clarified, “What this means is that once an initiation is made, it should not matter at all to subsequent decisions what the initiation price was.” He wanted the Turtles to literally trade as though they didn’t know what their entry price was.
再次假设有2个交易者，约翰和玛丽。除了资金不同，其它都一样。假如约翰亏了10%，但比玛丽先进场。当玛丽进场时，他们的资金一样多。埃克哈特说：“这意味着，一旦开始了，就不要在乎以前的价格了。”他希望海龟们在交易时几乎忘了进场价是多少。
Dennis kept bringing his teachings back to losses “The trader who is averse to losses is in the wrong business.” The “secret” was what he did with the wrong positions, not with the right ones. Managing the losing trades (what Dennis called the “wrong positions”) allowed traders to wait for the right ones (big trends). This is why the entry price was only so important.
丹尼斯总是谈亏损：“讨厌风险等于入错了行。”秘密是如何应付亏钱的仓位，而不是赚钱的仓位。处理亏损的交易（丹尼斯称为错误的仓位）能让交易者等到赚钱的交易（大趋势）。这就是为什么进场价如此重要。
What Dennis and Eckhardt were teaching was the exact opposite of Warren Buffett’s buying “value.” The Turtles were supposed to say, “I want to buy or sell short markets that are in motion, moving up or down, because markets in motion tend to stay in motion.” If markets are moving higher, that’s a good thing. If markets are moving lower, that’s a good thing, too. Dennis and Eckhardt wanted the Turtles to profit from both.
丹尼斯和埃克哈特教的东西和沃伦·巴菲特的买入价值完全相反。海龟们会这样说：“我想在上涨或下跌的市场中买或卖，因为市场会继续上涨或下跌。”如果市场上涨，那很好。如果市场下跌，那也很好。丹尼斯和埃克哈特希望海龟们双向赚钱。
Dennis was pushing his students go against basic human nature. He said, “The single hardest thing I have to do to make people understand how I trade is to convince them how wrong I can be about things, how much of a guess it is. They think that there’s some magic involved and that it’s not just trial and error.”
丹尼斯逼学生们违背基本的人性。他说：“教学中最难的就是让人们相信我也错的很厉害，我也是猜的。他们以为我有魔法，其实我就是尝试和犯错。”
C&D’s trading inspired a great deal of mystification, but in reality they were a mass merchandiser who sold 90 percent of their products as loss leaders so they could make a gigantic profit on the remaining 10 percent. Sometimes they had to wait a long time for good things to happen. Most people can’t psychologically handle the wait.
C&D的交易引起了一些神秘感，其实，他们就是商人，他们90%的商品是亏损卖出的，10%的商品赚了很多钱。有时候他们要等很久才赚到一大笔钱。大部分人在心理上不愿意等待。
Look at this logic from a media company perspective. Like Dennis and Eckhardt, movie producers and publishing executives know they will have “losers.” A movie studio will fund ten movies. A book publisher will fund ten books. In both cases, the producers or publishers often have no idea which one exactly of the ten is going be successful. In fact, they might be lucky if one of the ten is successful. Since they don’t know which one is going be successful, they still have to fund all ten. If nine of those books aren’t successful, well, the publisher is only going to print a small batch to begin with - that equals a small loss. If those movies or books don’t do well, fine. They’re done. The companies cut their losses and get out. However, the movie or book that does really well, the tenth one, pays for the losses from the nine losers.
从传媒公司的角度来看，丹尼斯、埃克哈特、电影制片人、出版人都知道他们会亏。电影公司会投资10部电影。出版社会出10本书。制片人和出版人都不知道哪个作品会成功。实际上，如果其中有一个作品成功了，他们就觉得很幸运。因为他们也不知道哪个作品会成功，所以他们必须同时支持10部作品。如果9本书都失败了，那么出版人少印刷点就行了——等于小亏损。如果电影和书不好卖，没事。过去就过去了。这些公司止损了，然后就不管了。对于成功的电影或书，它们的收入会抵消其它的亏损。
The Turtles were taught to think of themselves as the publisher, the movie studio, or the casino “house.”
海龟们被告知要把自己想象成出版人，电影公司，或者是赌场。
Don’t try to predict how long a trend either up or down will last. It is impossible.
不要去预测趋势何时结束。这是不可能的。
Eckhardt gave the Turtles an example of a market moving rapidly through the point where they were supposed to buy, but for whatever reason had missed. Now they are sitting there waiting for a “retracement.” While they wait for the cheap place to buy, the market keeps racing higher and higher. Eckhardt said there was “a great temptation to reason that now it’s too high to buy. If you buy it now you’ll have an initiation price that’s too high. However, it is imperative that you make this trade. The initiation price simply won’t have the kind of significance you suppose it will have after the trade is made.”
埃克哈特举了一个例子，以说明市场波动很快，本来应该买入，结果错过了机会。现在，他们坐等回调。当他们等待更便宜的买入机会时，市场涨的越来越高。埃克哈特说：“此时觉得价格太高，不敢买是合理的。如果你现在买了，你又会觉得不高。这点非常重要。”
The Turtles were not to wait for a retracement. There was no statistical justification to think like that. If they were trading soybeans at $8.00 and they went to $9.00, the Turtles were taught to buy them at $9.00 rather than wait for them to retrace to $8.00. They might never retrace to $8.00.
海龟们不等回调。统计学没有证明等回调的好处。如果他们在8美元买入大豆，然后价格到了9美元，海龟们被告知要在9美元加仓，而不是等它回调到8美元。也许价格再也不回调到8美元了。
How would the Turtles have acted if they’d received a buy signal for Google for the first time at $500? They would buy. Get on board now was the thinking. Dennis always came back to the scientific method, saying that when you have a position, you put it on for a reason and you’ve got to keep it on until the reason no longer exists: “You have to have a strategy to trade, know how it works and follow through on it.”
如果谷歌到了500美元，出现了买入信号，海龟们会怎么做？他们会买入。只管上车。丹尼斯总是这么说，一旦你持有了仓位，你是根据一个理由持有的，那么你就持续持有，直到这个理由消失了为止：“你要有交易的策略，知道它的原理，并跟随它。”
There is a flip side to this mentality, however. For example, on Wednesday, November 22, 2006, Google opened the day at over $510 a share. Within five days, by Wednesday the 29th, Google was trading at $483, which means Google had pulled back nearly thirty points. When it got to $510, could you know it was going to keep going up or that it was going to go down? You couldn’t know either way. What could you do? All you could do was let the price tell you what to do.
然而，这种思想也有相反的一面。比如，在2006年11月22日周三，谷歌的开盘价超过了510美元1股。5天后的29日，谷歌的价格到了483美元，这意味着谷歌几乎下跌了30基点。当它的价格到达510美元时，你怎么知道它是涨，还是跌？你什么都不知道。你该怎么做？只有让价格告诉你怎么做。
Eckhardt was teaching math and rules to manage the emotions felt in the face of uncertainty. He said, “Are you involved in emotional personal memories as opposed to objective knowledge? What I’m advising against is letting factors that are personal, emotional and idiosyncratic to your own history influence your trading.”
埃克哈特在传授数学和原则，以管理面对不确定性的情绪。他说：“你过去是否不客观？我让你做的就是不要让个人的情绪和偏见影响你的交易。”
Measuring volatility was critical for the Turtles. Most people then and today ignore it in their trading.
对海龟来说，衡量波动性很关键。大部分人都忽略了这点。
The question Dennis and Eckhardt always asked was, “How big should you trade based on current volatility?” In other words it’s not so much the current price of a given stock or futures contract that is paramount, but rather knowing at all times the market’s volatility. For example, it’s important to know that Microsoft is at a price level of 40 today, but it’s even more important to know Microsoft’s volatility (“N”) now so you can buy or sell short the right amount of Microsoft based on your limited capital.
丹尼斯和埃克哈特总是问：“根据目前的波动性，你应该交易多大的仓位？”换句话说，不要优先考虑价格，而是知道市场的波动性。比如，微软今天的价格是40，知道这点很重要，但更重要的是知道微软的波动性（N），这样，你就可以根据你的资金知道自己要买卖多少股微软。
Near the end of the breakneck training, Dennis and Eckhardt reiterated the obvious to their newly trained Turtles. The successful students in the class would be the ones who followed the rules and did not deviate. They did not want creative geniuses; It must have been ego-deflating for Turtles once they realized, what Dennis and Eckhardt were looking for was the equivalent of robots.
培训快结束前，丹尼斯和埃克哈特反复重申。成功的交易者将是遵守原则，不越轨的学生。他们不想制造天才。海龟们到后来才明白，丹尼斯和埃克哈特需要的是机器人，而不是自负的人。
Investor Bradley Rotter, who has been called the very first investor with Dennis, saw their conundrum:
投资者布拉德利·罗特被称为是丹尼斯的第一个投资者，他知道这个谜：
Applaud the genius of Richard Dennis. The program was well put together. It was focused on discipline. It didn’t matter if a trade felt good or felt bad, they had to just [do it]. It was a very, a very simplistic trend following system that had an aggressive matrix to add to winning positions and subtract from losing positions and all those people who are very successful are those who just followed the formula and did not deviate.
恭喜天才丹尼斯。这个实验搞的很好。关键就是纪律。不管交易好不好，他们必须做交易。这个趋势跟踪系统非常简单，赚钱时加仓，亏钱时减仓，要想成功，必须遵守公式，不能越轨。
Note: For some readers, chapter 4 will be the only chapter on the Turtle philosophy and rules worth examining. This book has been designed in such a way that you can continue and dive into the “math” that makes up the exact Turtle trading rules in chapter 5, while the casual reader can jump ahead to chapter 6 without skipping a beat.
注意：第04章是唯一讲解海龟理念和原则的一章。本书如此设计，这样你就可以在第05章研究数学的部分，读者也可以直接看第06章，也不会错过什么的。
For those interested in reading chapter 5, the following basic Wall Street terms from Wikipedia.com should be assumed:
对第05章有兴趣的读者，首先要知道以下术语：
Long: One who has bought futures contracts or owns a cash commodity.
做多：买期货合约。
Short (noun): One who has sold futures contracts or plans to purchase a cash commodity.
空头（名词）：卖出期货合约的人。
Short (verb): To sell futures contracts or initiate a cash-forward contract sale without offsetting a particular market position. Short selling or “shorting” is a way to profit from the decline in price of a security, such as a stock or a bond. Most investors “go long” on an investment, hoping that price will rise. To profit from the stock price going down, a short seller can borrow a security and sell it, expecting that it will decrease in value so that he can buy it back at a lower price and keep the difference.
做空（动词）：卖出期货合约。做空是利用下跌赚钱。你可以做空股票或债券。大部分投资者只会做多，以希望价格上涨。要想从下跌的股票中赚钱，做空的人可以先借证券，然后再卖出，以希望能够价格下跌，这样就可以在更低的价格买入，并获得差价利润。
Volatility: A measurement of the change in price over a given period.
波动性：衡量一段时间内价格的变化。
Futures contract: A standardized contract, traded on a futures exchange, to buy or sell a certain underlying instrument at a certain date in the future, at a specified price. The future date is called the delivery date or final settlement date. The preset price is called the futures price. The price of the underlying asset on the delivery date is called the settlement price. The settlement price normally converges toward the futures price on the delivery date. Both parties of a futures contract must fulfill the contract on the settlement date. The seller delivers the commodity to the buyer, or, if it is a cash-settled future, then cash is transferred from the futures trader who sustained a loss to the one who made a profit. To exit the commitment prior to the settlement date, the holder of a futures position has to offset his position by either selling a long position or buying back a short position, effectively closing out the futures position and its contract obligations. Futures contracts, or simply futures, are exchange-traded derivatives.
期货合约：在期货交易所交易的标准合约，它规定了在未来的日期以规定的价格买卖一定数量的商品。未来的日期也叫交割日或到期日。提前设置的价格叫期货价格。交割当天的价格叫交割价。交割价和期货未来的价格是一致的。在交割日，买卖双方都要履行责任。卖家把商品交给买家，如果涉及到现金，那么钱就从亏钱的交易者转到了赚钱的交易者。如果想在交割日前退出，持有人可以清仓，这样就没有责任了。期货合约，简称期货，是可以交易的衍生物。
Market order: A buy or sell order to be executed by the broker immediately at current market prices. As long as there are willing sellers and buyers, a market order will be filled.
市价单：一个买单或卖单，经纪人可以以市价执行。只要有人买卖，市价单就能被成交。
Stop order (sometimes known as a stop loss order): The complement of a limit order. It is an order to buy (or sell) a security once the price of the security has climbed above (or dropped below) a specified price, known as the stop price. When the specified price is reached, the stop order is entered as a market order.
止损单（有时候也叫止损订单）：是限价单的补充。价格到达制定的价格，就执行买或卖的订单。一旦到达制定的价格，这个止损单就进场成为市价单。
Moving average: In finance, and especially in technical analysis, one of a family of similar statistical techniques used to analyze time series data. A moving average series can be calculated for any time series, but is most often applied to stock prices, returns, or trading volumes. Moving averages are used to smooth out short-term fluctuations, thus highlighting longer-term trends or cycles.
均线：技术分析用的，分析一段时间内的数据。任何时间段都可以。均线用来平滑短期的波动，这样可以显示长期的趋势或循环。
章 原则
“We have a pretty strict definition of a systematic trader. They basically follow a set series of rules, established in a computer program, that tell you when to buy or sell, how many, as well as when to get out.”
Michael Garfinkle, Commodities Corporation
“系统交易者的定义很严格。他们要遵守一套原则，建立电脑系统，这个系统能告诉你何时进场买或卖，买卖多少，何时出场。”
迈克尔·加芬克尔，商品公司
While the rules taught by Dennis and Eckhardt were not meant as a statistics class, the Turtles did learn some basic statistics including two “errors”:
虽然丹尼斯和埃克哈特教的原则不是统计学经典，海龟们还是学到了基础的统计学，包括2个错误：
A Type I error, also known as an error of the first kind or a false negative, is the error of rejecting something that should have been accepted.
错误1，拒绝本应该被接受的东西。
A Type II error, also known as an error of the second kind or a false positive, is the error of accepting something that should have been rejected.
错误2，接受本应该被拒绝的东西。
If the Turtles made those errors on a regular basis, they would be finished with mathematical certainty. Said another way, they learned that it was better to risk taking many small losses than to risk missing one large profit. The concept of statistical errors was an admission that acknowledged ignorance could be quite beneficial in trading.
如果海龟们总是犯以上的错误，他们就不懂数学上的确定性。换句话说，接受很多小亏损的现实总比错过大利润好。统计学上的错误就是认为无知对交易有利。
At the root of Dennis and Eckhardt’s statistical thinking was Occam’s razor (a principle attributed to the fourteenth-century English logician William of Ockham). In more contemporary jargon people express it as, “Keep it simple, stupid!” For Dennis and Eckhardt’s rules to work, to have some statistical reliability, they had to be simple.
丹尼斯和埃克哈特的统计学思想就是奥卡姆剃刀（是14世纪奥卡姆提出的一个逻辑定律）。现代术语则是：“保持简单，做个傻瓜！” 丹尼斯和埃克哈特的原则要想起作用，要想有统计学上的可靠性，就要保持简单。
Expectation: How Much Does Your Trading Method Earn in the Long Run?
期望值：你希望你的交易方法长期下来赚多少？
“What can you expect to earn on each trade on average over the long run from your investing decisions or your trading rules?” Or, as a blackjack player would say, “What is your edge?” A first step for the Turtles was to know their edge.
“你的投资决定或交易原则长期下来平均每笔交易赚多少？”或者是21点玩家说的：“你的优势是什么？”海龟们的第一步就是知道自己的优势在哪里。
A good analogy is being a batter at the plate in a baseball game, as trades and success rates aren’t much different from batters and their averages. Dennis expanded on this: “The average batter hits maybe .280 and the average system might be successful 35 percent of the time.”
以篮球赛做比喻，因为交易和成功率与运动员的平均命中率差不多。丹尼斯是这样解释的：“就好比篮球平均的命中率是0.280，而交易系统的平均成功率是35%。”
More importantly what kind of hits did you get in hitting .280. Did you hit singles or home runs? In trading, the higher the expectation, the more you can earn. A trading system with an expectation of $250 per trade will make you more money than a system with a $100 per trade expectation (all other things being equal in the long run). The Turtle rules themselves had a positive expectation per trade because their winning trades were many multiples larger than their losing trades. Expectation (or edge, or expected value) is calculated with a straightforward formula:
关于0.280的命中率，还要看是哪种进球。是篮板球还是三分球？（张轶注：不懂球类术语，原文是说棒球）在交易中，期望值越高，赚的就越多。每笔交易期望值是250美元的系统比每笔交易期望值是100美元的系统赚的钱多（其它条件相同，长期的结果）。海龟原则的每笔交易是正期望值，因为赚钱的交易比亏钱的交易赚的多。期望值（也叫优势）用以下公式计算：
E = (PW X AW) - (PL X AL)
Where:
E = Expectation or Edge
PW = Winning Percent
AW = Average Winner
PL = Losing Percent
AL = Average Loser
E=期望值或优势
PW=胜率
AW=平均盈利
PL=败率
AL=平均亏损
For example, assume a trading system has 50 percent winning trades. Now, assume the average winning trade is $500 and the average losing trade is $350. What is the “edge” for that trading system?
比如，一个交易系统的成功率是50%。赚钱时每笔赚500美元，亏钱时每笔亏350美元。那么这个交易系统的优势是多少？
Edge =(PW x AW) - (PL x AL)
Edge =(.50 X 500) - (.50 X 350)
Edge =250 - 175
Edge =$75 on average per gain per trade
优势=每笔交易赚75美元
Over time you would expect to earn $75 for each trade placed. For comparison, another trading system might be only 40 percent accurate with an average winner of $1,000 and an average loser of $350. How would that system compare to the first one?
长久下来，你每笔交易能赚75美元。再比较一下，另一个交易系统，成功率是40%，平均每笔赚1000美元，平均每笔亏350美元。这个系统和第一个系统相比如何？
E = (PW x AW - (PL x AL)
E = (.40 X 1,000) - (.60 X 350)
E = 400 - 210
E = $190 on average per gain per trade
优势=平均每笔交易赚190美元。
The second trading system’s “edge” is 2.5 times that of the first even though it has a much lower winning percent. In fact, the second system breaks even with a winning percent of 25.9. The first system breaks even at 41.1 percent. Clearly, when you hear the media and talking heads talking about “90 percent winning trades,” that talk is misleading. Percent accuracy means nothing.
虽然第二个交易系统的成功率比第一个交易系统的成功率低，但是它的优势却是第一个系统的2.5倍。实际上，第二个系统在成功率为25.9%时不赚不亏，第一个系统在41.1%时才能不赚不亏。很明显，如果你听媒体说90%成功率的交易，那其实是误导。成功率不能说明任何问题。
Look at it this way. Think about Las Vegas. A small edge keeps casinos in business. That’s how those monster hotels in Las Vegas and Macau are paid for - by exploiting the edges. Dennis always wanted his trading to resemble being the house.
请这样思考。在拉斯维加斯，小小的优势就让赌场长久发展。拉斯维加斯和澳门的宾馆——都是靠优势赚的钱盖的。丹尼斯一直希望他的交易像赌场那样。
It didn’t necessarily matter how little the Turtles lost on any individual trade, but they needed to know how much they could lose in their whole portfolio. Eckhardt was clear: “The important thing is to limit portfolio risk. The trades will take care of themselves.”
对海龟们来说，单笔交易亏一点没关系，但是要知道整个投资组合会亏多少。埃克哈特很明确：“重要的是要控制投资组合的风险。交易者要处理好它们。”
Trading Your Own Account Tip #1:
You need to calculate your edge for every trading decision you make, because you can’t make “bets” if you don’t know your edge. It’s not about the frequency of how correct you are; it’s about the magnitude of how correct you are.
交易你自己的账户，提示1：
你必须为每笔交易计算你的优势，因为如果你不知道优势，你就是在赌博。不是你正确的频率，而是你正确的程度。
Comparing the expected values of various Turtle and Turtle-style trading money management firms to various stock indexes gives more perspective about the importance of expectation:
把海龟的方法和股指期货比较一下，就能知道期望值的重要性。
Table 5.1: Turtle Trader Expectations from Inception to August 2006.
图5.1：从开始到2006年海龟交易者的期望值
Trader
交易者
Average Winning Month %
平均盈利，月%
Average Losing Month %
平均亏损，月%
Percentage Winning Months
盈利百分比，月
Expectation
期望值
Salem Abraham
塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕
8.50
(5.77)
55.36
2.13
Jerry Parker
杰瑞·帕克
5.06
(3.59)
57.40
1.38
Liz Cheval
莉斯·雪娃
12.45
(6.64)
49.62
2.83
Jim DiMaria
吉姆·迪玛利亚
4.16
(3.17)
54.34
0.81
Mark J. Walsh
马克·J·沃尔什
10.06
(7.15)
55.78
2.45
Howard Seidler
霍华德·辛德勒
6.57
(4.90)
55.56
1.47
Paul Rabar
保罗·拉巴
9.26
(4.89)
52.51
2.54
Table 5.2: Stock Index Expectations from Inception to August 2006.
图5.2 从开始到2006年8月股指期货的期望值
Market Index
股指期货
Average Winning Month %
平均盈利，月%
Average Losing Month %
平均亏损，月%
Percentage Winning Months
盈利百分比，月
Expectation
期望值
Dow Jones
道琼斯
3.87
(3.85)
58.09
0.63
NASDAQ
Nasidake
4.98
(4.61)
57.75
0.93
S&P 500
标准普尔500
3.83
(3.92)
58.37
0.60
The expectation generated by the trend traders generally beats the monthly expectation of buying and holding market indexes. Why? The average winning months of Turtle traders is much larger than their average losing months.
趋势交易者打败了股指期货。为什么？海龟交易者的月平均盈利比月平均亏损大很多。
Entries and Exits: “It’s Always Better to Buy Rallies”
进场和出场：“在上涨时买入总是比较好的”
Everyone wants to know, “How do you know when to buy?” The Turtles were taught to enter trades via “breakouts.” A breakout occurs when a market - any market (Cisco, gold, yen, etc.) - “breaks through” a recent high or low. If a stock or futures contract made a fifty-five-day breakout to the upside (long), meaning that its current price was the highest price of the last fifty-five days, Turtles would buy.
每个人都想知道：“你怎么知道何时买入？”海龟们被告知要在突破时进场交易。突破就是市场——任何市场（思科、黄金、日元等等）——突破了最近的最高点或最低点。如果一个股票或期货合约突破了55天并上涨，这意味着目前的价格是过去55天的最高价，海龟们会买入。
If a stock made a fifty-five-day breakout to the downside, meaning that its current price was the lowest price of the last fifty-five days, Turtles would sell short, aiming to profit as the market dropped. In isolation there was nothing special about these simple rules for entry. Philosophically, Turtles wanted to buy a market going up (becoming more expensive) and wanted to sell short a market dropping in price (becoming cheaper).
如果一只股票突破了55天并下跌，这意味着现在的价格是过去55天的最低价，海龟们会做空，希望市场下跌而赚钱。这个简单的进场原则没有特别的地方。理论上，海龟们希望在上涨时买入，在下跌时做空。
What about the standard Wall Street refrain of “buy low and sell high”? The Turtles did just the opposite! And unlike most people’s understanding of the markets, pro or beginner, the Turtles actively aimed to make money by “shorting” declining markets. They had no bias to being long or short.
那如何理解华尔街的低买高卖？海龟们正好相反！和专业人士与新手都不同，海龟的目标就是通过在下跌的市场做空而赚钱。他们对做多或做空没有任何偏见。
While breakouts were the reason to enter, those breakouts did not mean a trend would continue by any measure. The idea was to let price movement lead the way, knowing at any time the price could change and go in a different direction. If a market went sideways, back and forth, you could see how and why Turtle price breakouts produced many small losses while they waited for a price breakout that might produce the big trend.
虽然突破是进场的理由，但突破不代表趋势就会继续下去。让价格的波动主导方向，心理要明白价格随时会改变方向。如果市场是振荡的，你就会发现突破进场产生了很多小亏损。
No matter what price is the variable that the great traders have lived and died by for decades. Making trading decisions more complicated than the simple heuristic of “price” has always been problematic. Eckhardt knew it was hard to do much better: “Pure price systems are close enough to the North Pole that any departure tends to bring you farther south.”
几十年来，伟大的交易者都是靠价格生存。如果交易决定比简单的价格复杂，那么这样的交易决定是有问题的。埃克哈特知道想做的更好是很难的：“纯粹的价格系统就能让你知道价格在上涨，其它方法可能让你亏钱。”
Trading Your Own Account Tip #2:
交易你自己的账户，提示2：
Now that the concept of using price for your decision-making is clear, stop watching TV! Stop looking at financial news. Start keeping track of the open, high, low, and close of each market you are tracking. That is the key data you need to make all of your trading decisions.
现在你已经知道了如何做交易决定，不要看电视！不要看财经新闻。开始记录你所关心的市场的开盘价、最高价、最定价和收盘价。这些数据是你做交易决定的关键数据。
Trading Your Own Account Tip #3:
交易你自己的账户，提示3：
You need to be able to wrap your arms around the concept of “shorting” a market. Or said another way, you have to relish the opportunity to make money in a decreasing market. Shorting was never unique to the Turtles; they just did it effectively.
你要做好做空的准备。换句话说，你必须珍惜在下跌的市场做空赚钱的机会。不仅仅是海龟们会做空，别人都做的很好。
System One and System Two: The Two Turtle Systems
系统1和系统2：2个海龟系统
The Turtles learned two breakout variants or “systems.” System One (S1) used a four-week price breakout for entry and a two-week price breakout in the opposite direction of the entry breakout for an exit. If a market made a new four-week high, the Turtles would buy. They would exit if/when it made a two-week low. A two-week low was a ten-day breakout - counting trading days only.
海龟们学到了2个系统。系统1把4周的突破做为进场信号，把反向的2周突破做为出场信号。如果一个市场创造了4周新高，海龟们就会买入。如果它创造了2周新低，那么他们就退出。2周新低就是10天的突破。
While the System One entry rule is straightforward, the Turtles were taught extra rules to confirm whether or not they should take the four-week breakout. The extra rules were called “filters,” and they were designed to increase the odds that when the Turtles took a four-week breakout signal, it would continue as a potentially big trend.
虽然系统1的进场原则很直接，海龟们还是学到了一个原则，以判断是否要接受这个4周突破。这个原则叫过滤器，目的是提高4周突破信号的概率。
The filter rule: The Turtles ignored the System One four-week breakout signal if the last four-week breakout signal was a winner. Even if they did not take the last four-week breakout signal, or even if it was just “theoretically” a winning trade, the Turtles still didn’t take the System One breakout. However, if the trade before a current four-week breakout was a 2N loss, they could take the breakout (“N” was simply their measure of volatility, discussed in the next section).
过滤器原则：如果之前的4周突破信号是赚钱的，那么海龟们就忽略系统1的4周突破信号。即使他们没有采用之前的4周突破信号，或那只是理论上的盈利交易，海龟们仍然不采用系统1的突破。然而，如果一个4周突破前的交易亏损了2N，那么他们才用这个突破（N是他们衡量波动性的东西，下节会谈论的）。
Additionally, the direction of the System One four-week breakout was irrelevant in terms of the filter rule. If their last trade was a short losing trade and a new long or short breakout hit, they could take that breakout and get in.
另外，系统1的4周突破方向和过滤器的原则没有关系。如果之前一笔是做空的且亏钱的交易，一个新的做多或做空突破发生了，他们可以采用这个突破并进场。
But this filter rule had a built-in problem. What if the Turtles skipped the entry breakout (since the last trade was a “winner”) and that skipped breakout was the beginning of a hugely profitable trend that roared up or down? Not good to be on the sidelines with a market taking off!
但是这个过滤器有一个内在的问题。如果海龟们错过了这个进场的突破（因为之前一笔交易是赚钱的），结果错过的突破是一个超级大的趋势，那怎么办？错过了大行情可不好！
If the Turtles skipped a System One four-week breakout and the market kept trending, they could and would get back in at the System Two eleven-week breakout (see below). This fail-safe System Two breakout was how the Turtles kept from missing big trends that were filtered out.
如果海龟们错过了系统1的4周突破，结果趋势在发展，他们可以用系统2的11周突破（看下面）。系统2就是为了防止海龟们错过了大趋势。
System Two was the Turtles’ longer-term trading system. It used an eleven-week breakout (fifty-five days) for an entry signal and a four-week breakout (twenty days) in the opposite direction for an exit.
系统2是海龟们的长线交易系统。它把11周（55天）突破作为进场信号，把4周（20天）反向突破作为出场信号。
Trading Your Own Account Tip #4:
交易你自己的账户，提示4：
The price “breakout” was Turtle jargon to describe a market that had just made a new high or new low over “x” period. Do traders use other values beyond twenty and fifty-five days for entry? Yes. The selection of these values for your trading will always be subjective. Test or practice these rules on paper and/or trading software (such as wealth-lab.com and mechanicasoftware.com) so you can see the ups and downs and gain confidence. The Turtles typically put half of their money toward each system.
突破是海龟们用的一个术语，以说明市场创造了n天内的新高或新低。除了20天和55天，海龟们还用其它参数吗？是的。你交易时选择的参数总是主观的。你可以用交易软件模拟操作（比如wealth-lab.com和mechanicasoftware.com），这样你就能找到信心。海龟们一般是一个系统用一半的资金。
Each Turtle had discretion over which of the two systems, System One (S1) and System Two (S2), Dennis and Eckhardt gave them to use. Mike Carr combined S1 and S2, allowing for more entry and exit points. He was trying to smooth out his trading results.
每个海龟都可以任意选择系统，系统1或系统2，也就是丹尼斯和埃克哈特教的系统。迈克·卡尔同时使用系统1和系统2。他想让结果平滑点。
Jeff Gordon preferred S1, but mixed in S2 for smoother returns. Gordon, like some other Turtles, traded System Three (S3). He said the systems were Dennis’s attempt to teach the Turtles that they should follow his methodology and not venture off the reservation, so to speak. Gordon added, “It was do anything you want to do, but don’t lose more than $50,000 doing it. Once you crossed $50,000 and one dollar, you were out of the Turtle program.”
杰夫·戈登喜欢用系统1，但用系统2来平滑结果。戈登像有些海龟一样，用系统3交易。他说丹尼斯的意思是让他们跟随丹尼斯的理念。戈登补充说：“就是做你想做的，但不要亏太多。一旦你亏的钱超过了50000美元，你就被辞退了。”
Dennis called System Three (S3) the dreaded flair account. Erle Keefer saw why S3 was not taking hold, adding, “You could do whatever it was and everybody did it to a small degree, but within about six weeks everybody just canned that account.”
丹尼斯说系统3是可怕的。尔勒·科夫知道系统3为何很少使用，他补充说：“你想怎么做就怎么做，每个人都小小尝试了一下，但是在6周后都把它放弃了。”
It was canned because the Turtles had already lived emotionally losing seven out of ten trades. They knew that was the right thing to do. Keefer minced no words: “That was the only way you were ever going to hook the real trend. We saw it work. I don’t know anybody that’s writing really good books called Counter Trend Trading to Win.”
海龟们放弃它是因为他们经历了10笔交易要亏损7笔。他们知道什么是正确的事。科夫扭扭捏捏地说：“这是唯一抓住趋势的方法。我们知道它有用。我不希望有人写本说叫《逆势交易制胜》。”
Trading Your Own Account Tip #5:
交易你自己的账户，提示5：
Feel free to experiment on breakout lengths. Do not fixate on specific values. The key will be to accept a breakout value and stick with it consistently. Testing and practice are wise for confidence. Trust, but verify.
关于突破用的参数，你可以自己做实验。不要只用一个参数。关键是你要找到一个突破参数，然后持续一致地用它。测试和实验能增加信心。
It is not surprising that over the years some traders - those who knew the Turtle rules - became obsessed with the specific System One and System Two entry and exit values as if they were the long-lost Holy Grail. Traders who fixate like that are looking at the tree instead of seeing the whole forest. For Turtle trading to work, the simplest of entry rules must continue to work. To get into debates about whether entering on a fifty-day breakout or a fifty-one-day breakout is better is misguided. In reality, a minor change of a variable in any robust trading system should not cause significant performance changes. If it does, you are in trouble.
有些了解海龟系统的人，他会一直使用系统1和系统2，似乎它们就是早已失传的圣杯，这一点都不奇怪。如此坚持的交易者是只见树木，不见森林。要想让系统起作用，那就是坚持用简单的方法。讨论是50天突破好，还是51天突破好，这是误导。实际上，只要是耐用的交易系统，你改变它的参数，但结果是不会有很大变化的。如果你发现结果变化很大，你就有麻烦了。
Jerry Parker uses “robustness” as his guiding precept: “I think it’s important to stay fairly simple - not a lot of variables. I think the reason we make money? It’s the simple moving average systems. They need to continue to do well.”
杰瑞·帕克把耐用性做为指导箴言：“简单才是重要的——不是用很多参数。我想我们赚钱的原因？是用简单的均线系统。它们会一直很好用。”
Parker used the Mount Lucas Management Index to make the point. It is a trend-following index based on a fifty-two-week moving average that goes back to the 1960s. Parker knows that core concept is his edge:
帕克用上涨卢卡斯管理指数说明这点。它是60年代根据52周均线做的趋势跟踪指数。帕克知道它的核心思想就是他的优势：
Two-thirds of that is what drives our profits. Our little filters to get in early, to get out quicker, volatility filters, if that is how we’re going to essentially generate returns, we’re going to be in bad shape. The core simple moving average or breakout systems [are key]. I think making our parameters longer term is important, but the minute it takes too much thinking and too much analysis and too much fancy work, it is going to be . . . a very bad situation.
三分之二是产生利润的原因。我们的小过滤器提前进场了，提前出场了，如果这就是赚钱的方式，这就太糟糕了。简单的均线或突破系统才是关键。我想参数大点是重要的，但是如果你想的太多、分析的太多、研究太多，那么结果还是很糟糕。
The market ‘gurus’ who pretend that a complex approach must be used to make money miss Parker’s point about keeping it simple. They want the equivalent of quantum physics for trading rules. That kind of thinking is mental masturbation, or as trader Ed Seykota calls, it “math-turbation.”
有些“大师”装模作样地说复杂的方法才能赚钱，这个观点和帕克提倡的简单是相违背的。他们把量子力学当作交易原则。这种想法就是意淫，或者用艾德?塞柯塔的话说，是数字意淫。
Consider this September 1995 Japanese yen chart to illustrate the System One price breakout in action:
请看看1995年9月份日元的图，它说明了系统1的价格正在突破：
Chart 5.3: Turtle Entry Example Using Japanese Yen.
图5.3：用日元说明海龟的进场
Price Chart of a September 1995 Japanese Yen Future Contract,
1995年9月份日元期货合约，1995年2月——1995年4月。
The September 1995 Japanese yen futures made a new four-week high on February 16, 1995. Turtles rules called for an entry on the next trading day. The position was held through all subsequent new highs and exited on a new two-week low on April 26, 1995. Source: Price-Data.com.
1995年9月份合约在1995年2月16日创造了4周新高。海龟原则要求第二个交易日进场。这个仓位一直被持有到1995年4月26日，并平仓。来源：Price-Data.com。
The market “broke out” to a new four-week high early in 1995. Then the market moved upward until a two-week breakout in the opposite direction in late April. The Turtles exited.
在1995年初，市场突破了4周新高。然后市场上涨，直到在4月反向的2周突破时，海龟们就出场了。
A great example of this process was seen early in Liz Cheval’s career. She bought 350 oil contracts for under $20 a barrel in July 1990 and hung on as prices rose above $40. On October 15, 1990, she started liquidating at $38 a barrel and completed her liquidation at just over $30 with an average exit price of $34.80.
另外一个很好的例子是莉斯·雪娃创造的。她在1990年7月，以低于每桶20美元的价格买入350份原油合约，并一直持有到40美元。在1990年10月15日，她开始以每桶38美元的价格平仓，在30美元前全部平仓，平均平仓价是34.80美元。
There was no discussion about OPEC, government reports, or other fundamental factors used in Cheval’s decision-making. It was all about the price action telling her to enter and exit. It is important to note that Turtles always exited after the market went against them, thus having to endure the painful experience of giving back profits. You can’t pick the bottom and you can’t pick the top, so trying to end up with the “middle” of a trend was the goal.
雪娃在做决定的时候并没有讨论石油输出国组织、政府报告或基本面。只是因为价格的波动叫她进场和出场。你要注意，这很重要，海龟们总是在市场对他们不利之后才出场，因此必须忍受利润回吐的痛苦。你不能抓到底部和顶部。所以，尽量在趋势中间结束才是目标。
Chart 5.4: Turtle Long Entry Example Using Natural Gas.
图5.4：用天然气说明进场做多的例子。
（图中文字：2005年12月份天然气期货合约，2005年6——10月）
A new fifty-five-day high was made in November 2005 Natural Gas on July 12, 2005. The market continued making new highs until a peak on October 5, 2005. Source: Price-Data.com.
2005年7月12日2005年12月份天然气合约创造了55天新高。这个市场一直在上涨，直到2005年10月5日到达顶部。
Experiencing that trade made Cheval a believer. She said, “I remember giving back $4 million out of $8 million profit of Rich’s money in a few minutes in the silver market in 1987.” That lesson helped her to hang on when crude oil dropped from $30 to $25.
这个交易让雪娃相信了。她说：“我记得1987年交易理查德的资金，结果在几分钟内把800万的利润回吐了400万。”这个教训帮助她在原油从30美元跌到25美元时持有仓位。
Consider another example (chart 5.4), from November 2005 in Natural Gas Futures. Each dot represents a new fifty-five-day high. The first breakout happened in mid-July 2005. There was no way to know entering that breakout that a trend would continue higher, but it did, and the Turtles just followed along making money.
看看另外一个例子（图5.4），关于2005年11月份的天然气期货。每个黑点代表55天新高。第一个突破发生在2005年7月中旬。当时没人知道它会涨很多，但它确实涨了很多，海龟们只要跟随就能赚钱。
However, that breakout could just as easily have been a loser. In fact, Turtles could have had a string of losers in a row with multiple false breakouts. Phil Lu used to say, “When you have a losing trade, you say to yourself, ‘Hey, it seemed like the right thing to do at that time.’ ” Exactly, following the rules means there will be losses. Trend-following trader Larry Hite has long said, “There are four kinds of bets. There are good bets, bad bets, bets that you win and bets that you lose.”
然而，这样的突破也许最终还是亏损的。实际上，海龟们会因为假突破而形成一连串的亏损。飞利浦·卢过去常说：“如果你持有亏损的仓位，你对自己说‘嘿，现在这么做是对的。’”按照这个原则意味着你要亏损。趋势跟踪交易者拉里·海特说：“有四种赌博。赚钱的赌博、亏钱的赌博、你赢的赌博，你亏的赌博。”
Dealing with and handling losses is not easy. Jerry Parker has lived the struggles of taking losses to win in the long run. He advises:
处理亏损并不容易。杰瑞·帕克经历过亏损的挣扎，并实现了长期赚钱。他建议：
I used to say we take a small loss, but I think it’s better to take an optimal loss. You don’t want to take one that’s too large and yet you don’t want to have your stops so close that you’re going to get bounced out. [Just] hang on to the trade. Don’t get too excited. If you’re not making very much money, that’s fine. If you got a little loss, that’s fine. If you make a decent profit that turns into a loss, that’s fine. Just hold onto it and then really get aggressive when you’ve been rewarded by a big, huge profit.
我过去常常说要接受小亏损，但我想最好是接受最优的亏损。你不想亏损太大，你也不希望止损点离进场点太近。持有仓位就行了。不要太激动。如果你没有赚很多钱，没事。如果你有小亏损，没事。如果你把很多利润变成了亏损，没事。只要你持有，你就会等到一个超级大的利润。
December 2006 Eurodollars is yet another good example to illustrate the Turtle rules in action. However, this time the chart shows the opportunity to make money in a falling market. It was a “go short” opportunity. Each dot represents a new fifty-five-day low. The first “short” breakout occurred in February 2006 and the market continued to fall before reaching a low in June.
2006年12月的欧洲美元又是一个很好的例子说明海龟原则起了作用。不过这次是靠下跌赚钱。是做空的机会。每个黑点代表了55天的新低。第一次下跌突破发生在2006年2月，然后一直下跌，直到6月的新低才结束。
Chart 5.5: Turtle Short Entry and Exit Example Using Eurodollars.
图5.5：用欧洲美元来说明海龟做空的进场点和出场点
（图中文字：2006年12月欧洲美元期货合约价格图表，2006年1月——8月。55天新低，20天出场，20天出场）
The December 2006 Eurodollars made a new 55-day low, signaling an entry, on February 20, 2006. The market briefly moved lower before making a new twenty-day high on March 16, 2006. Short positions in the market were exited with a loss. On March 29, 2006, the market made a new low and short positions were reestablished. The market continued making new lows before an exit signal, a new twenty-day high, occurred on July 14, 2006. Source: Price-Data.com.
2006年2月20日2006年12月份欧洲美元创造了55天新低，是进场信号。市场开始下跌，直到2006年3月16日创造了20天新高。做空就以亏损出场。在2006年3月29日，市场创造了新低，又重新建立空头仓位。市场继续下跌，直到出现出场信号，那就是2006年7月14日的20日新高。
By overlaying the twenty-day breakout exit on the Eurodollar chart, the full trade can be seen in context. An initial “short” breakout occurred in February, with a twenty-day high breakout in mid-March. That forced an exit. That first breakout resulted in a small loss.
2月份第一突破做空，在3月中旬遇到了20天新高反向突破，因此被迫出场了。第一次突破是亏损的。
However, the market resumed downward in late March and another breakout signal was hit. Turtles got right back in short again. The final exit occurred when a clear twenty-day breakout high was made in July. This is seen on the chart by the slightly larger dot. Profits generated on the second trade covered the loss from the first trade and then some.
然而，市场在3月底继续下跌，遇到了另一个突破信号。海龟们又做空了。直到7月出现了明显的20天反向突破才出场。图中比较大的黑点说明了这点。第二次的利润可以弥补第一次的亏损，还有赚。
That’s the process. The Turtles could not afford to ignore the second breakout just because the first breakout resulted in a loss. They had to get back on the horse. The second breakout was the trade they were hoping for, and there was no way to predict it.
这就是过程。海龟们不能因为第一个突破是亏损的就忽视第二个突破，他们必须重新进场。第二个突破正是他们在等待的突破，但无法预测。
It was all a waiting game. Erle Keefer described to me their day-to-day process in rapid-fire summation terms: “First, you use channel breakout theory with a couple of filters. Second, you are going to size your bet by volatility. Third, you are going to have two hard stops on every trade. You are going to have the natural liquidation and you are going to have the firm hard stop. That’s what saved everybody. Rich’s systems inherently said, ‘You got to stay in the game all the time as you never know when trends are going to hit.’ ”
交易就是一个等待的游戏。尔勒·科夫告诉我他们每天的过程：“首先，你用通道突破理论，加上一些过滤器。第二，你要计算市场的波动性。第三，每笔交易要强制止损。你要自然地平仓，你的止损要坚决。这样才能拯救每个人。理查德的系统在说‘你必须一直持有仓位，因为你不知道何时趋势会开始。’”
Random Entries
随机进场
When a breakout occurred, whether long or short, there was no way to know what would happen next. Maybe the market would go up for a short time and then go down, giving a loss. Perhaps the market suddenly goes higher, giving a nice profit.
一旦有了突破，无论做多或做空，反正你不知道下一步会如何。也许市场上涨了很短的时间，然后下跌，结果亏损。也许市场突然上涨，利润很多。
Eckhardt witnessed many systematic traders spending great deal of time searching for the “good” places to enter. He cautioned against it: “It just seems to be part of human nature to focus on the most hopeful point of the trading cycle. Our research indicated that liquidations are vastly more important than initiations. If you initiate purely randomly, you do surprisingly well with a good liquidation criterion.”
埃克哈特看见很多系统交易者花大量的时间寻找好的进场机会。他提出警告：“人性都想找到最好的交易机会。我们的研究表明平仓比建仓还重要。如果你的建仓是随机的，运用好的平仓标准，也能做的很好。”
Dennis actually challenged the Turtles to randomly enter the market and then manage their trades after getting in. That was a real Zen moment for many Turtles. If they applied appropriate risk management, they could handle the worst that came down the pike once they were in any trade.
丹尼斯不同意海龟们随机进场，然后再做打理。这就是很多海龟们真正的禅。如果他们运用了合理的风险管理，他们就可以在危险到来时处理好风险。
Trading Your Own Account Tip #6:
交易你自己的账户，提示6：
Stop worrying only about how you enter a trade. The key is to know at all times when you will exit.
不要只担心进场点。关键是要一直关心你的出场点。
Risk Management: How Much Do You Bet on Each Trade?
风险管理：每笔交易赌多少？
Risk management has many names. You will find it called money management, bet sizing, or even position sizing. It was the very first concept Eckhardt addressed in class and ultimately the most important.
风险管理有很多名字。也叫资金管理，头寸规模，赌注大小或仓位大小。这是埃克哈特在课堂上一开始就讲的概念，也是最重要的概念。
Turtle risk management starts with the measurement of daily market volatility. The Turtles were taught to measure volatility in terms of “daily ranges.” It was nicknamed “N” (also known as the Average True Range, or ATR). They were taught to take the maximum of the following for any market to derive “N”:
一开始要计算市场的日波动率。海龟们被告知用日内振幅来计算。简称N（也叫平均真实振幅，或ATR）。计算任何市场的N方法：
1.        The distance from today’s high to today’s low
今天的最高价和昨天的最低价之间的距离
2.        The distance from yesterday’s close to today’s high
昨天的收盘价和今天的最高价之间的距离
3.        The distance from yesterday’s close to today’s low
昨天的收盘价和今天的最低价之间的距离
If the result is a negative number, it is turned it into an “absolute value.” In mathematics, the absolute value of a real number is its distance from zero on a number line. So, for example, 3 is the absolute value of both 3 and -3.
如果结果是负数，要变成绝对值。在数学中，绝对值是正数。比如，3和-3的绝对值都是3。
The maximum value of the three choices is the “true range,” or technically the absolute distance (either up or down) the market traveled in a given twenty-four-hour period. The Turtles then took a twenty-day moving average of true ranges. This gave a sample volatility for the last few weeks for each market traded.
上面计算的3个结果的最大值就是真实振幅，技术上叫24小时内绝对的距离（不管是上涨，还是下跌）。海龟们然后计算真实振幅的20天均线。这是计算过去几周的波动性。
Trading Your Own Account Tip #7:
交易你自己的账户，提示7：
You can determine the average true range for any stock or futures contract. Simply take the last fifteen true ranges, add them up, and divide by 15. Repeat each day, dropping off the oldest true range. Many software packages will do this automatically.
你可以计算任何股票或期货的平均真实振幅。简单的做法是，把最后15个真实振幅相加，再除以15。每天重复，去掉最老的那个真实振幅。很多软件可以自动计算的。
Eckhardt explained the logic behind “N”: “We found that volatility is something that can be described as a moving average process. Our incorporation of a volatility element in our trading - something that tells us how large our positions should be - has both kept us out of trouble during the tough times and allowed us to capture large gains when things are going our way.”
埃克哈特解释了N的逻辑：“我们发现波动性可以通过移动平均的方式来描述。我们在交易中使用波动性的原因是——告诉我们仓位应该有多大——一方面在困难的时候避免麻烦，一方面在顺利的时候赚大钱。”
The Turtles were taught multiple uses of “N,” but first they had to calculate it. Consider this example of “N” calculation:
首先，海龟们要学会计算N，以下是计算N的例子：
Table 5.6: September 2006 Kansas City Wheat Futures
ATR Calculations Example.
图5.6：2006年12月份堪萨市小麦期货
计算ATR的例子。
（下图中的文字从左到右分别是：日期，开盘价，最高价，最低价，收盘价，TR1，TR2，TR3，真实振幅，真实振幅的20天移动平均值）
If the “N” for corn was 7 cents and the market was up 5.25 cents, then the market was up three-quarters of an “N.” That’s Turtle jargon. So “N” is a volatility measurement and a useful rule of thumb to classify how far a market has trended. Erle Keefer rattled off Turtle jargon: “When we put a bet on, we never said, ‘I am putting on a $1,000 bet.’ We were taught to think in terms of ‘N.’ ‘I got a one-half N on.’ We were taught that way because for most people, if they start to think, ‘I’ve got $34 million in bonds on,’ then the concept of money gets into their lizard brain and they start saying, ‘Oh, my God!’ We learned the correct way to think was, ‘How much did the market move today?’ It didn’t move thirty-one ticks in the bonds, it moved one and one-quarter ‘N.’ ”
如果玉米的N是7基点，而市场涨了5.25基点，那么市场涨了四分之三个N。这是海龟们的术语。所以N能衡量市场的波动性，并知道市场向趋势的方向前进了多少。尔勒·科夫飞快地说出这个术语：“当我们下注时，我们绝不说‘我下注1000美元。’我们用N思考‘我下注0.5N。’我们被如此培训是因为大多数人是这样想的‘我买了3400万债券。’这样金钱的概念进入了他们的大脑，他们就会说‘噢，上帝啊！’我们学到的正确思维是‘市场今天波动了多少？’债券不会波动超过31个基点的，它只是波动了1.25个N。”
The below chart shows “N” plotted below a bar chart of Dell. Notice how “N” can and does change. These values had to be up-dated. Eckhardt updated his volatility estimates every day. He said, “That’s my routine. Two or three times a year I make an adjustment intra-day.”
下图是戴尔电脑的N。请注意N是如何变化的。这些数据需要更新。埃克哈特每天更新波动性的计算结果。他说：“这是我的例行工作。我1年内调整2，3次。”
Chart 5.7: Chart Showing Dell Daily Bars with Daily ATR.
图5.7：戴尔的日线竹线，还有日线ATR的图表
（上图中的文字：戴尔电脑的股票价格。2006年3月——9月。）
Daily Price Chart of Dell Computers with ATR valued in dollars plotted below.
ATR值用美元表示在价格图表的下面。
Athe ATR fluctuates as the market moves up and down on any given day. Source: Price-Data.com.
ATR的值每天随着市场的上涨和下跌而波动。
Once they had a feel for “N,” the Turtles were instructed about how much to “bet.” They bet a fixed 2 percent of their capital on hand on each trade. If they had $100,000, they would bet (or risk) 2 percent ($2,000) on each trade. Each 2 percent bet of their equity was called a “unit.” The “unit” was jargon that they used every day to measure risk.
一旦他们对N有了感觉，海龟们就要学习赌多少。他们每笔交易只赌总资金的2%。如果他们有100000美元，他们会赌（或者说是冒险）2%，每笔交易都是如此。每一个2%叫一个单位。单位是他们每天衡量风险的术语。
They had unit limits on any market sector and unit limits on the total portfolio. The unit fluctuated so that every day the Turtles knew how many contracts to have on based on how much money they had in their trading account at that instant.
他们对每笔交易有单位的限制，对整体投资组合也有单位的限制。海龟们根据资金就能知道该持有多少份合约。
Trading Your Own Account Tip #8:
交易你自己的账户，提示8：
Take your account (whatever size it is) and multiply by 2 percent. For example, a $100,000 account would risk 2 percent, or $2,000 per trade. It is always better to bet a small amount initially on any trade in case you are wrong - which can easily be greater than 50 percent of the time. While the Turtles typically used a 2 percent bet, you can reduce your risk and reduce your return by decreasing that number to, for example, 1.5 percent, etc.
把你的账户乘以2%。比如，100000美元账户的2%就是每笔交易只冒2000美元的风险。最好是一开始下注要小，以防止你错了——50%以上的机会你都是错的。海龟们总是赌2%，你可以少赌点，比如只赌1.5%，等等。
The Turtle risk management dictated their stops, their additions to positions, and their equalization of risk across their portfolios. For example, a corn futures contract (a standard corn contract is worth $50 per cent) with an “N” of 7 cents has a risk of $350 (7 cents × $50). If the Turtles received a corn breakout signal (using a 2N stop), they would have had a “contract risk” of $350 × 2, or $700.
海龟的风险管理对止损，加仓，投资组合都有规定。比如，玉米合约（标准玉米合约每基点的价格相当于50美元的合约）的N是7基点，风险就是350美元（7基点×50美元）。如果海龟们接到了一个玉米的突破信号（止损是2N），他们合约的风险就是350美元×2，也就是700美元。
Assuming a $100,000 account, they would have had an “account risk” of $2,000 (2% × $100,000). The number of contracts to buy or sell is determined by taking the 2 percent account risk and dividing it by the contract risk. That gives 2.67 ($2,000/$700) futures contracts. Turtles rounded down to the nearest whole number. So when their breakout signal was hit, they traded two corn contracts for their $100,000 account.
假如账户是100000美元，单笔交易风险就是2000美元。要买卖的合约数量就是用合约风险除以2%所代表的风险。那就是买卖2.67（2000美元/700美元）份期货合约。当然，合约只能买整数，那就是2份合约。所以，当突破信号出现时，他们交易2份玉米合约。
The rules made a corn unit equal to a gold unit equal to a Coca-Cola unit. This was how Dennis was able to trade markets as “numbers” with no fundamental expertise in any of those markets. It was how the Turtles were able to trade such a wild cross-section of unrelated markets with only two weeks of training.
这个原则对玉米的规定和黄金，可口可乐都是一样的，用单位来表示。这就是丹尼斯不用基本面而用数字交易任意市场的原因。这也是为什么2周的培训就能教海龟们交易所有的市场。
Table 5.8: Contract Calculation Method Using ATR in $ Terms.
图5.8：用美元来计算合约的ATR
Market
市场
ATR in $
用美元表示的ATR
2 ATR in $
用美元表示的2个ATR
Account Risk
账户风险
Contracts Traded at 2 ATR stop
用2个ATR作为止损的合约数
Corn
玉米
$350
$700
$2,000
2.0
Lean Hogs
生猪
$420
$840
$3,000
3.0
Japanese Yen
日元
$725
$1,500
$1,875
1.0
Ten-Year Notes
10年期债券
$525
$1,050
$2,000
1.0
However, the Turtles learned another use of “N” beyond a measure of volatility. It was also used as their primary stop (or exit rule, as first mentioned with S1 and S2). The Turtles used a 2N stop. This simply means that their primary stop, or hard stop, was two times the daily “N.”
除了用N计算波动性，海龟们还学到了另外一个用法。它也是初始的止损点（也叫出场原则）。海龟们把2N做为止损点。简单说，他们的初始止损点，或叫强制止损点，是日线N的2倍。
For example, if there was a breakout in corn, and assuming a closing price of $250, Turtles quickly determined their “N” stop. If the “N” was 7 cents, a 2N stop would have been 14 cents. The stop would have been 14 cents behind the entry price. An entry at $250 would have a hard stop at $236 (250 - 14). You would exit if the stop at price level $236 was “touched.” No second-guessing. No overthinking. Follow the rules.
比如，如果玉米有突破，收盘在250美元，海龟们快速计算N为单位的止损点。如果N是7基点，2N的止损就是14基点。那么止损点就比进场价低14基点。如果进场是250美元，那么止损就是236美元（250-14）。如果价格到了236美元，你应该出场。不要怀疑。不要多想。按照原则做。
Trading Your Own Account Tip #9:
交易你自己的账户，提示9：
Assume you are trading Google stock and its ATR is 20. A 2ATR (2N) stop would be 40. If you lose 40 points on Google, you must exit, no questions asked.
假如你在交易谷歌，它的ATR是20。2ATR（2N）止损就是40。如果谷歌跌了40个基点，你必须出场，不要多问。
Chart 5.9: Chart Showing Soybean Daily Bars with Daily ATR.
图5.9：大豆日线图，还有日线ATR。
（图中文字：2004年5月份大豆期货合约。2003年8月——2004年5月）
Daily price chart of May 2004 Soybean Futures shows a smaller ATR at the beginning of the trend. A smaller ATR allows for more contracts to be traded via Turtle money-management rules. By the end of the trend, ATR has expanded greatly, reducing the size of the position you can have on. Source: Price-Data.com.
图表显示一开始的ATR很小。海龟资金管理原则同意小ATR则交易更多的合约。到了趋势结束前，ATR变大了，减少了你持有的合约数量。
On the other hand, a small “N” allowed Turtles to trade a larger position or take on more units. Soybean units purchased in August (chart 5.9) at the beginning of the breakout were 2.50 times larger than units that could have been bought at the end of the trend. This example is a great reminder of the relationship between market volatility and unit size: A low “N” value always means more contracts (or shares).
另一方面，小N同意海龟们交易大仓位或交易更多单位。图5.9中，在突破时的单位是趋势结束时单位的2.5倍。这个例子提示了市场波动性和单位大小的关系：小N意味着更多的合约（或股数）。
Jerry Parker found that his best trends often start with very low volatility at the initial breakout entries. He said, “If the recent volatility is very low, not $5 in gold, but $2.50 in gold, then we’re going to throw in a very large position.”
杰瑞·帕克发现他最好的交易都是从很低的波动性开始的突破进场。他说：“如果最近的波动性很低，黄金不是5美元，而是2.5美元，那么我们就持有很大的仓位。”
Parker’s analysis kept showing that a low “N” measurement at the time of entry was a good thing. He said, “I can have on a really large position. And when volatility is low, it usually means that the market has been dead for a while. Everyone hates the market, has had lots of losers in a row, tight consolidation. And then as it motors through those highs, we get on board.”
帕克的分析说明在进场时选择小N值的市场总是不错的。他说：“我可以持有大仓位。波动性低，它通常意味着市场死了一段时间。很多人憎恨市场，很多人连续亏损，不停地整固。当它突破新高时，我们就上车。”
Unit Limits
单位限制
It didn’t matter whether the markets were futures, commodities, currencies, FOREX, or stocks. One unit of corn, through the Turtle rules, had now roughly the same risk as one unit of dollars, bonds, sugar, or any other market in the Turtles’ portfolio.
市场是期货、商品、外汇、股票，这个不重要。一单位的玉米，和海龟投资组合中的以单位美元、债券、白糖等等都一样。
However, the Turtles could not trade unlimited units. Each unit, after all, represented 2 percent of their limited and finite capital. The Turtles had unit guidelines to keep them from overtrading. For example, they were limited to four to five units for any one market traded.
然而，海龟们不能交易无限的单位。每个单位代表了有限资金的2%。海龟们有指导原则，不能过度交易。比如，任何市场只能交易4，5个单位。
Thus, trading like a Turtle could leave you with a $100,000 portfolio that might have purchased one bond contract, but a $1 million portfolio might have purchased five. As the bond contracts gained in value, others would be added.
100000美元的投资组合可以买1份债券合约，但是100万美元的投资组合可以买5份。如果债券合约增值了，可以多买点其它品种。
Examples of Initial Risk Determination
举例子讲风险管理
The following examples show the basic Turtle trading process in action.
这个例子讲海龟们的行动过程。
1.        Assume a trading account of $150,000, risking 1.5 percent on each trade and seeking to trade Swiss franc futures using a 2N stop. The Swiss franc has a single “N” dollar value of $800.
假如交易账户有150000美元，每笔交易承担的风险是1.5%，准备交易瑞士法拉，止损是2N。瑞士法郎的N相当于800美元。
$150,000 X 1.50% = $2,250
2N stop = $1,600
The number of contracts to trade on this unit is 1.40, rounded down to 1.0.
可以交易的合约数是1.40份，整数就是1份。
2.        Assume a trading account of $25,000, risking 2.0 percent on each trade and seeking to trade mini corn futures using a 3N stop. Mini corn has a single “N” dollar value of $70.00.
假如说账户是25000美元，每笔交易承担的风险是2.0%，准备交易玉米的迷你合约，止损是3N。迷你玉米的一个N相当于70美元。
$25,000 X 2.0% = $500
3N stop = $210
The number of contracts to trade on this unit is 2.38, rounded down to 2.0.
可以交易的合约数是2.38份，整数就是2.0份。
The unit rules make good intuitive sense once the light bulb goes off. However, that light bulb did not turn on immediately. One Turtle described the learning curve: “When somebody says, ‘N is volatility and N is your unit size,’ I say, ‘How do I know the difference between them?’ It’s really like wrapping yourself around a conundrum, but after a while it was easy. Pretend I am talking to Liz Cheval, ‘I have got a half unit on and I am three N up’ or ‘I have got a half N unit on and I am half N positive.’ I totally understand the difference between them. Don’t even have to think about it. This is burned into your brain.”
如果突然迷失了方向，这个单位原则是很好的直觉。然而，你也无法立刻找到方向。有个海龟是这样描述学习曲线的：“当某人说‘N是波动性，N是你的单位大小。’我说‘它们的区别是什么？’这就像置身于迷宫中，你要先熟悉一下。假如我对莉斯·雪娃说‘我建仓0.5N，涨了3N’或‘我建仓0.5N，我亏损了0.5N。’我完全理解这些话的含义，根本不用去思考。它已经刻在我脑子里了。”
Pyramiding: “Adding to Winners”
金字塔加仓
Once they understood S1 and S2 entry and exit rules, once they understood “N” and units, Eckhardt then instructed the Turtles to pile profits back into winning trades. This maxing out of their big winners was part of what helped to create the Turtles’ fantastic positive expectancy, or “edge.”
一旦他们理解了系统1和系统2的进场，出场原则，一旦他们理解了N和单位，埃克哈特开始指导海龟们加仓。就是这个加仓让海龟们具有极好的期望值，或者说是极好的优势。
For example, a market bought at a price breakout level of 100 could have additional units added as the market moved through price levels of 102, 104, and 108. Assume a long breakout entry at 100 with an “N” value of 5. Assume that you will add another unit each 1N move. A new unit will be added at 105, 110, etc. Turtles could pyramid a maximum of 5 units. They set their stops at 0.5N on the first day of trading and from that point forward, 2N stops were used. Then, once the second unit was bought, both stops were brought up to the new unit’s 2N stop. As new units were added, all stops were brought up to the stop of the newest unit added.
比如，当市场在100突破后，可以在102，104和108加仓。假如说在100突破做多时的N是5。假如你准备在每涨1N时加仓。那么就要在105，110等价位加仓。海龟们最多加仓5个单位。他们的止损是0.5N，之后就是2N。然后，一旦买入了第二个单位，那个仓位的止损点都是新的2N止损。如果加了新的单位，所有的止损点都是新加的单位的止损点。
This process protected open profits, but not to the extent that it would jeopardize catching a very big trend. This thinking also aimed to guarantee that profits would be plowed back into those big unpredictable trends. This was how Dennis and Eckhardt taught the Turtles to “bet their left nut.”
这个过程保护了账面利润，也不影响抓住大趋势。这个想法的目的是保证在无法预测的大趋势时投入利润。这就是丹尼斯和埃克哈特教给海龟们的“用剩下来的资金去赌。”
Trading Your Own Account Tip #10:
交易你自己的账户，提示10：
If you want to make Turtle-like money, you will need to use leverage. The key is to always manage your leverage use and not let it get past your limits.
如果你希望像海龟一样赚钱，你需要使用杠杆。关键就是总是使用杠杆，但不能过度使用。
Sample Trade to Demonstrate Pyramiding
金字塔加仓的例子
This sample trade illustrates how the Turtles pyramided their winning trades.
这个例子说明了海龟们如何金字塔加仓。
First Unit
第一个单位
Starting account size: $50,000.
开始的账户大小：50000美元。
Account risk of 2%, or $1,000 per signal.
账户风险是2%，或每个信号1000美元。
Long signal generated in live cattle at 74.00.
活牛在74发出了做多信号。
1N value is 0.80, 1 point in live cattle is $400, so the dollar value of 1N is $320.
1N是0.80，活牛的1个基点是400美元，所以美元的1N是320美元。
2N value is 1.60, dollar value of $640.
2N是1.60，美元是640美元。
Contracts to trade: $1,000/640 = 1.56 rounded down to 1.0.
交易的合约是1000美元/640=1. 56，取整数就是1.0。
Add the next position at 1N, or 74.00 + 0.80 = 74.80.
下个1N加仓，或是74.00 + 0.80 = 74.80。
Stop setting is 74.00 - 1.60 = 72.40.
止损点是74.00 - 1.60 = 72.40。
Table 5.10: Purchase First Unit of Live Cattle at $74.00.
图5.10：在74.00美元买入第一个单位的活牛
Unit
单位
Entry
进场点
No.Contracts
合约数
Stop
止损点
Profit/Loss
利润/亏损
Risk to Original Equity
原资金的风险
1
74.00
1
72.40
$0.00
$640 (1.28% of original equity)
（原资金的1.28%）
Addition of Second Unit
第二个单位
Account value is now $50,320 ($50,000 + unit one gain of $320).
现在账户的价值是50320美元（50000美元+第一个单位赚了320美元）。
Account risk of 2%, or $1,006.40.
账户风险的2%，或1006.40美元。
Second position added at 74.80.
在74.80加第二个仓位。
1N value remains 0.80, or $320.
1N还是0.80，或320美元。
2N value remains 1.60, or $640.
2N还是1.60，或640美元。
Contracts to trade $1,006.40/$640 = 1.57, rounded down to 1.0.
要交易的合约数1006.40美元/640美元=1.57，取整数就是1.0。
Add the next unit at 1N, or 74.80 + 0.80 = 75.60.
在1N处加一个单位，或是74.80 + 0.80 = 75.60。
Stop setting on both positions is 74.80 - 1.60 = 73.20.
两个仓位的止损点是74.80 - 1.60 = 73.20。
Table 5.11: Purchase Second Unit of Live Cattle at $74.80.
图5.11：在74.80美元买入第二个单位的活牛
Unit
单位
Entry
进场点
No.Contracts
合约数
Stop
止损点
Profit/Loss
利润/亏损
Risk to Original Equity
原资金的风险
1
74.00
1
73.20
$320.00
$320 -0.64%
2
74.80
1
73.20
$0.00
$640 -1.28%
Total
2
$320.00
$960 -1.92%
Addition of Third Unit
第三个单位
Account value is now $50,960 ($50,000 + unit one gain of $640 + unit two gain of $320).
现在账户是50960美元（50000+第一个单位赚了640美元+第二个账户赚了320美元）。
Account risk of 2% or $1,019.20.
账户2%的风险，或1019.20美元。
Third position added at 75.60.
在75.60加第三个仓位。
1N value decreased to 0.70, or $280.
1N的值减少到0.70，或280美元。
2N value decreased to 1.40, or $560.
2N的值减少到1.40，或560美元。
Contracts to trade $1,019.20/$560 = 1.82 rounded down to 1.0.
交易的合约数1019.20美元/560美元=向下取整数是1.0。
Add the next unit at 1N, or 75.60 + 0.70 = 76.30.
在1N处再加仓一个单位，或是75.60 + 0.70 = 76.30。
Stop setting on all units is 75.60 - 1.40 = 74.20.
所有单位的止损点是75.60 - 1.40 = 74.20。
Table 5.12: Purchase Third Unit of Live Cattle at $75.60.
图5.12：在75.60美元买入第三个单位的活牛。
Unit
单位
Entry
进场点
No.Contracts
合约数
Stop
止损点
Profit/Loss
利润/亏损
Risk to Original Equity
原资金的风险
1
74.00
1
74.20
$640.00
$0-0.00%
2
74.80
1
74.20
$320.00
$240-0.48%
3
75.60
1
74.20
$0.00
$560-1.22%
Total
3
$960.00
$800-1.60%
Addition of Fourth Unit
加第4个单位
Account value is now $51,800 ($50,000 + unit one gain of $920 + unit two gain of $600 + unit three gain of $280).
现在账户是51800美元（50000美元+加第一个单位赚的920美元+第二个单位赚的600美元+第三个单位赚的280美元）。
Account risk of 2%, or $1,036.00.
账户风险的2%，或1036.00美元。
Fourth unit added at 76.30.
在76.30加第4个单位
1N value remained 0.70, or $280.
1N保持在0.70，或280美元。
2N value remained at 1.40, or $560.
2N保持及在1.40，或560美元。
Contracts to trade $1,036.00/$560 = 1.85 rounded down to 1.00.
交易的合约数1036.00美元/560美元=1.85，向下取整数是1.00。
Add the next unit at 1N, or 76.30 + 0.70 = 77.00.
在1N加下一个单位，或76.30 + 0.70 = 77.00。
Stop setting on all units is 76.30 - 1.40 = 74.90.
所有单位的止损点在76.30 - 1.40 = 74.90。
Table 5.13: Purchase Fourth Unit of Live Cattle at $76.30.
图5.13：在76.30美元买入第4个单位的活牛。
Unit
单位
Entry
进场点
No.Contracts
合约数
Stop
止损点
Profit/Loss
利润/亏损
Risk to Original Equity
原资金的风险
1
74.00
1
74.90
$920.00
$0-0.00%
2
74.80
1
74.90
$600.00
$0-0.00%
3
75.60
1
74.90
$280.00
$280-0.56%
4
76.3
1
74.90
$0.00
$560-1.12%
Total
4
$1800.00
$840-1.68%
Addition of Fifth and Final Unit
加第5个单位
Account value is now $52,920 ($50,000 + unit one gain of $1,200 + unit two gain of $880 + unit three gain of $560 + unit four gain of $280).
现在账户额是52920美元（50000美元+第一个单位赚的1200美元+第二个单位赚的880美元+第三个账户赚的560美元+第4个单位赚的280美元）。
Account risk of 2%, or $1,058.40.
账户风险的2%，或1058.40美元。
Fourth unit added at 77.00.
在77.00加仓第4个单位。
1N value increased to 0.85, or $340.00.
1N增加到0.85，或340.00美元。
2N value increased to 1.70, or $680.00.
2N增加到1.70，或680.00美元。
Contracts to trade $1,058.40/$680 = 1.55, rounded down to 1.00.
交易的合约数1058.40美元/680美元=1.55，向下取整数为1.00。
Stop setting on all units is 77.00 - 1.70 = 75.30.
所有单位的止损点是77.00 - 1.70 = 75.30。
Table 5.14: Purchase Fifth Unit of Live Cattle at $77.00.
图5. 14：在77.00美元买入第5个单位的活牛
Unit
单位
Entry
进场点
No.Contracts
合约数
Stop
止损点
Profit/Loss
利润/亏损
Risk to Original Equity
原资金的风险
1
74.00
1
75.30
$1200.00
$0-0.00%
2
74.80
1
75.30
$880.00
$0-0.00%
3
75.60
1
75.30
$560.00
$120-0.24%
4
76.30
1
75.30
$280.00
$400-0.80%
5
77.00
1
75.30
$0.00
$680-1.36%
Total
5
$1800.00
$1200-2.40%
Turtle stops were adjusted to break even with each 1N market move up.
市场每上涨1N，海龟的止损就打平。
Position Exit
平仓
Live cattle rallies to 84.50 and their exit criteria are met.
活牛涨到84.50，那么出场标准就达到了。
Table 5.15: Exit Live Cattle at $84.50.
图5.15：在84.50美元平掉活牛。
Unit
单位
Entry
进场点
No.Contracts
合约数
Exit
出场点
Profit/Loss
利润/亏损
Risk to Original Equity
原资金的风险
1
74.00
1
84.50
$4200.00
8.4%
2
74.80
1
84.50
$3880.00
7.8%
3
75.60
1
84.50
$3560.00
7.1%
4
76.30
1
84.50
$3280.00
6.6%
5
77.00
1
84.50
$3000.00
6.0%
Total
5
$17920.00
35.8%
With this kind of pyramiding, you could have a $300,000 account that was long five units containing Canadian dollars, U.S. dollar indexes, the S&P 500 index, unleaded gas, orange juice, yen, Swiss francs, gold, soybean oil, and cotton. By Turtle trading logic, they would be net long one unit, or 2 percent of the total portfolio.
用这种金字塔加仓法，你可以用300000美元的账户做多5个单位，包括加拿大元，美元指数，标准普尔500股指期货，无铅汽油，橘子汁，日元，瑞士法郎，黄金，豆油和棉花。根据海龟交易的逻辑，他们只能做多1个单位，或是总投资组合的2%。
Risk of Ruin: “Will You Live or Die?”
破产的风险：“你会生存下去，还是破产？”
Aggressive pyramiding of more and more units had a downside. If no big trend materialized, then those little losses from false breakouts would eat away even faster at the Turtles’ limited capital. How did Eckhardt teach the Turtles to handle losing streaks and protect capital? They cut back their unit sizes dramatically. When markets turned around, this preventive behavior of reducing units increased the likelihood of a quick recovery, getting back to making big money again.
这种激进的金字塔加仓也有缺点。如果没有大趋势，那么假突破造成的亏损会很快导致海龟们亏损，速度比想象的要快。埃克哈特是如何教海龟们面对一连串的亏损的，如何保护资金的？他们快速地减少仓位单位。当市场反转时，又开始增加仓位，再次去赚大钱。
The rules were simple. For every 10 percent in drawdown in their account, Turtles cut their trading unit risk by 20 percent. For example, if they were trading a 2 percent unit and if an 11 percent drawdown happened, they would cut their trading size from 2 percent to 1.6 percent (2.0 × 80%). If their trading capital dropped down 22 percent, then they would cut their trading size by another 20 percent (1.6 × 80%), making each unit 1.28 percent.
原则很简单。如果他们的账户回吐10%，海龟们就把交易的单位减少20%。比如，如果他们交易的单位是2%，而他们的账户回吐了11%，他们就会把交易仓位从2%减少到1.6%（2.0 × 80%）。如果他们的资金跌了22%，那么就把仓位再减少20%（1.6 × 80%），这样每个单位就是1.28%。
When did they increase their unit sizes back to normal? Once their capital started going back up. Erle Keefer remembered one of his peers saying, “Oh my God, I am down so much that I have to make 100 percent just to get back to even.” But that Turtle ended up the year with a nice bonus, because the markets finally started clicking (and trending). Keefer added, “When the statistics finally all work and all those markets start moving, those ‘hot wires’ can start pulling you up pretty fast from a drawdown.”
他们何时把仓位单位恢复到正常？资金开始上涨了就恢复。尔勒·科夫记得一个同事说：“哦，上帝啊，我亏了很多，要赚100%才能打平。”但是这个海龟年终时拿到了很多奖金，因为市场最终又形成了趋势。科夫补充说：“当统计数字被证明正确之后，所有的市场开始波动，那些厉害的品种能把你快速从亏损变成赚钱。”
For example, let’s say you are at $10,000 and you keep losing, then you win a little, then you lose a little. You are now down to $7,500. You are probably trading 40 to 50 percent of your original unit size. All of a sudden everything goes back up to $7,800. It goes up to $8,000, and you start restoring unit size. The Turtles could be down eleven months and one week into the year and then in the last three weeks of the year go from being down 30 or 40 percent to up 150 percent. Look at their month-by-month data from 1984 to 1988 (see Appendix). When the markets kicked in, it was a wild ride.
比如，你有10000美元，你一直在亏，然后你赚了一点，然后又亏了一点。现在你的资产是7500美元。也许你交易的是你原始单位大小的40——50%。突然，你的资产又到了7800美元。再涨到了8000美元，你开始恢复你的单位大小。海龟们可以在1年零1周的时间里亏损30%或40%，然后在最后3周赚到150%。请看1974年到1988年之间他们每月的图（附件）。当市场来的时候，是很猛的。
By reducing positions when they were losing money, the Turtles countered the arithmetic progression toward “ruin” effectively. Dennis and Eckhardt’s logic makes good conceptual sense, even for non-math novice traders.
亏损时减仓，海龟们计算连续亏损的过程。对于没有数学概念的新手来说，丹尼斯和埃克哈特的逻辑非常有道理。
Eckhardt did not want the Turtles to worry about linear decreases in their accounts. The slightest exponential curve from a big trend would eventually surpass the steepest linear curve they saw while losing. Discipline, money management, and patience were the only ways it would work.
埃克哈特叫海龟们不要担心账户的线性下跌。大趋势的指数曲线最终会超过亏损时最陡峭的线性曲线。唯一有用的办法就是纪律、资金管理和耐心。
This day-to-day routine, however, was mundane. Every day they would come in and there would be an envelope with their name on it. That envelope would have their printouts with their positions. It included updated “N” values, too. That’s right, the Turtles did not have to worry about the basics of calculating “N.” Of course, they learned the hows and whys of “N” from Eckhardt, but the time-consuming calculations were done for them. The Turtles simply picked up their envelopes and checked to make sure their positions and orders were all as they were supposed to be.
每天的例行工作是平淡的。每天他们来的时候，会看到一个信封，上面有他们的名字。里面有他们的仓位打印件。包括N值。没错，海龟们不用自己的计算N。当然了，埃克哈特告诉了他们关于N的所有知识，并为他们花时间计算N值。海龟们只要拿起信封，检查自己的仓位和订单就行了。
Liquidation (Exit) Rule Summaries
出场原则总结
There were two basic “stops” or exits to get Turtles out of their trades:
有2个基本的止损或出场：
1.    The 2N stop.
2.    The S1 or S2 breakout exits.
1.        2N止损
2.        系统1或系统2的突破出场。
The Turtles were instructed to take whichever stop hit first. For example, assume you enter any market. Your 2N stop is quickly hit, and you exit with a small loss. That’s easy. On the other hand, perhaps you enter a market and it takes off. A monster trend zooms either up or down. In that case, your S1 or S2 breakout stop would get you out with a profit.
不管是哪种情况，碰到了止损点，就要止损。比如，你正在交易一个市场。很快你的2N止损点到了，你就要出场，并接受小的亏损。那很简单。另一方面，也许你刚进场，大行情就启动了。超级行情不是上涨就是下跌。如果是那样，用系统1或系统2的突破止损能帮助你兑现利润。
This was stomach-churning. David Cheval lived this process working with his then wife Liz Cheval. He said, “When we have good profits, then we’re very aggressive with those profits. We’ll risk 100 percent of the profit in a trade if it doesn’t follow through based on our system.” The Turtles could have had a 50 percent profit in a market, but their stop still might be at their predesignated risk of 2 percent. It was possible for them to lose all of that profit plus the 2 percent.
这有点紧张。大卫·雪娃和当时的妻子莉斯·雪娃一起经历了这个过程。他说：“当我们有很好的利润时，我们就很积极进取。我们会把利润100%地投入。”海龟的利润会有50%，但他们的止损还是事前定好的2%。把利润加上2%都亏掉是可能的。
Portfolio Selection and Position Balancing
投资组合的选择和仓位的平衡
This philosophy applied to all markets, meaning as long as liquidity and a selection of quality markets existed (and today there is no shortage of those) and there is some inherent volatility in that market (Turtles need movement after all to make money), any market could be traded like a Turtle.
这个理念对所有的市场都适合，也就是说，只要有市场，只要有流动性，只要有波动性（海龟们通过波动赚钱），那就适合，任何市场都能像海龟那样交易。
The Turtles initially traded these markets:
海龟们最初交易这些市场：
Table 5.16: Markets Traded Initially By Turtles.
图5.16：海龟们最初交易的市场
30-Year T-Bond
30年债券
Deutschmark
马克
90-Day T-Bill
90天债券
10-Year T-Bond
10年债券
British Pound
英镑
Gold
黄金
Cotton
棉花
French Franc
法国法郎
Silver
白银
Sugar
白糖
Japanese Yen
日元
Copper
铜
Cocoa
可可
Canadian Dollar
加拿大元
Crude Oil
原油
Coffee
咖啡
S&P 500
标准普尔500股指期货
Heating Oil
取暖油
Swiss Franc
瑞士法郎
Eurodollar
欧洲美元
Unleaded Gas
无铅汽油
Trading Your Own Account Tip #11:
交易你自己的账户，提示11：
There is no one set portfolio you can trade. Today, traders trade Turtle-like rules across widely differing portfolios (stocks, currencies, bonds, commodities, etc.). It is a primary reason traders have differing performances. There is also no one starting capital number that can be promised as an elixir for all traders. Some start with small money and get huge. Some start with big money and don’t make it. You will see in later chapters the other pieces of the trading puzzle beyond these rules that separate winners and losers.
投资组合需要自己研究。现在，使用类似海龟原则交易者的投资组合各不相同（股票、外汇、债券、商品等）。所以他们的交易结果也不同。对于所有的交易者来说，起步资金用多少，这是没有明确的答案的。有些人的起步资金很少，但他拥有优势。有些人起步资金很大，却失败了。通过后面的章节，你会知道赢家和输家的区别是什么。
However, it was critical to avoid having one of highly correlated markets. In simple terms, think of correlated markets typically moving together in lockstep. Too many potentially correlated markets in a portfolio and the Turtles increased their unit risk.
然而，避免高度相关的市场，这是很关键的。简单说，相关的市场涨跌是一致的。如果投资组合中相关的市场太多，就增加了海龟们的单位风险。
For example, the Dow Jones Industrials stock index and the S&P 500 stock index are highly correlated. Both move up and down together. Buying one unit in the Dow and then buying one unit in the S&P is like having two units in either market alone.
比如，道琼斯工业指数和标准普尔500股指期货就是高度相关的。2者同涨同跌。买入1单位道琼斯工业指数并买入1单位标准普尔就等于在同一个市场买了2个单位。
Or, assume both Apple and Dell were in a Turtle’s portfolio. Both stocks go up and down together like clockwork. Proper Turtle trading strategy would dictate one unit of Apple. However, if one unit of Dell was also bought, since these two stocks have high correlation, this would be essentially trading double the amount of Apple that should be traded. To trade both stocks was to take twice the risk you should take.
或，加入苹果电脑和戴尔电脑都在海龟的投资组合中。这2个股票也会同涨同跌的。正常的海龟交易策略会建议建仓一个单位的苹果电脑。然而，如果还买了一个单位的戴尔电脑，这两个股票是高度相关的，那么就等于在交易2个单位的苹果电脑。这样风险就增大了一倍。
Table 5.17: Table to Show Correlation Effect Between Portfolios.
图5.17：相关的市场表
More Risk (Highly Correlated)
更多的风险（高度相关）
Less Risk (Loosely Correlated)
风险小（很少相关）
Longs
做多
Shorts
做空
Longs
做多
Shorts
做空
Corn
玉米
Gold
黄金
Soybeans
大豆
Gold
黄金
Soybeans
大豆
Silver
白银
Japanese yen
日元
Five-year notes
5年债券
Japanese yen
日元
Ten-year notes
10年债券
Five-year notes
5年债券
Live cattle
活牛
Sugar
白糖
Crude oil
原油
Look at table 5.17. Notice that both columns in each table have the same number of markets. They could easily have the same number of units. However, the “More Risk” table has more markets highly correlated to each other. Corn and soybeans, gold and silver, and the two note contracts are all highly correlated. Essentially, Turtles would be trading only four markets. The “Less Risk” table shows a broader grouping of markets with less correlation. For example, historically the Japanese yen and crude oil do not move together.
请看图5.17，请注意每个表格中的数字一样。然而，更多的风险一栏中的市场相关度很高。玉米和大豆，黄金和白银，2个债券都是很相关的。本质上，海龟们只能交易4个市场。风险小一栏显示了很少相关的市场。比如，日元和原油就不会同涨同跌。
The Turtles were also taught that combining long and short units into their portfolio offered further diversification. In fact, when they combined long and short units, Dennis and Eckhardt discovered that they could actually trade more overall units. This was how they were able to load up on so many positions. While they appeared overleveraged in others’ eyes, Dennis and Eckhardt had the Turtles safely under risk management (unit) guidelines.
海龟们还被告知在投资组合中既要做多，也要同时做空，这样就更分散。实际上，一旦他们结合了多头和空头的单位，丹尼斯和埃克哈特就发现可以多交易几个单位。这就是他们仓位很多的原因。也许别人会觉得他们过分使用了杠杆，丹尼斯和埃克哈特却能让海龟们在风险管理的指导下安全地交易。
Consider another portfolio example. Assume it is long units in corn, feeder cattle, gold, and Swiss francs, for a total of four long units. Also, assume it has short units in British pounds, copper, and sugar, for a total of three short units.
还有一个投资组合的例子。假如在做多玉米、饲牛、黄金和瑞士法郎，一共4个多头单位。同时空头仓位是英镑、铜、白糖，一共3个空头单位。
To calculate the total Turtle unit risk, you would take the smaller number and divide it by two. Then you would subtract that number from the larger number. In this example it would be 4-(3/2), giving 2.5 units of risk. This is how the Turtles added more units without adding more risk.
计算出海龟总的风险单位，用最小的数字除以2。用大数字减去这个结果。在本例中是4-(3/2)，也就是风险是2.5个单位。这就是为什么海龟建立了更多的单位，但风险却没有增加。
Why did the Turtles diversify so much? There was no way they could predict which market would trend big, nor could they predict the magnitude of any trend’s move. Miss only one big trend and their whole year could be ruined.
为什么海龟们要如此分散？他们没理由预测到哪个市场有大趋势，也不能预测到任何市场的趋势波动情况。只要错过一个大趋势，他们的一整年都白费了。
Table 5.18: (2) Charts That Demonstrate Long/Short Rule Calculations.
图5.18：做多和做空原则的计算。
Example One:     Long/Short Rule
例子1：做多/做空原则
Example Two:      Long/Short Rule
例子2：做多/做空原则
Longs
做多
Shorts
做空
Longs
做多
Shorts
做空
Corn (1)
玉米
Wheat (1)
小麦
Coffee (3)
咖啡
Crude oil (4)
原油
Live cattle (3)
活牛
Sugar (2)
白糖
Natural gas (1)
天然气
Australian dollar (3)
澳元
Cocoa (1)
可可
Ten-year notes (1)
10年债券
Soybeans (2)
大豆
Swiss francs (2)
瑞士法郎
S&P 500 (2)
标注普尔500
Total: 7
共7个
Total: 3
共3个
Total: 8
共8个
Total: 7
共7个
Total units of risk: (7 -(3/2)) = 5.5
总的风险单位：5.5
Total units of risk: (8-(7/2)) = 4.5
总的风险单位：4.5
That was it. Boom. Two weeks of training, at the Union League Club, was done. With those rules in hand, they entered Dennis’s office space in the old Insurance Exchange building next to the Chicago Board of Trade. They took his money and started trading.
就这样，在联盟俱乐部为时2周的培训结束了。有了这些原则，他们走进了位于芝加哥交易所旁边的老保险交易大楼里丹尼斯的办公室。他们用他的钱开始交易。
However, the Turtles were given one more mandate that superseded all the philosophy and rules: Practice. Sure, it might sound clichéd, but it was reality. To put it in perspective, many people see winners like Tiger Woods and make innumerable excuses about why he is great and they are not: “He started learning golf as a toddler.” “He is a natural athlete.” “He earned his titles during a time when golf was lacking top-notch competition.”
然而，海龟被告知还不能交易，要先练习。这听起来就是陈词滥调，但也是事实。很多人看到了泰格·伍兹的成功，就找借口说：“他小时候就开始打高尔夫球了。”“他天生就厉害。”“他赢得头衔的时候竞争不激烈。”
The truth? Woods is great because he has the discipline of practice ingrained in him. Look at the tape of him on Johnny Carson when he was three or four years old. Practice, practice, practice - all the time. Woods is famous for saying, “No matter how good you get you can always get better and that’s the exciting part.” That mentality is mission critical for both golf and trading.
事实是什么？伍兹伟大是因为练习的纪律。你看看他在3，4岁时的录像，他一直在练习，练习，练习。伍兹的名言是：“无论你多么优秀，你还可以变得更好，这就是最激动人心的地方。”对高尔夫和交易来说，这个思想很关键。
Medicine is yet another field where skills develop as a result of repetitive training. Research shows time and time again that medical students are often clumsy at their first tries at performing even such basic procedures as finding a vein to tap for blood work. However, their process of focusing on repetition and discipline consistently produces many competent doctors with long and successful careers.
医学是另外一个领域，在这个领域，重复训练才能形成技术。研究多次表明：医学院学生第一次找静脉的时候都很笨拙。随着不断的重复，加上持续一致的纪律，就能造就优秀的医生。
For the Turtles there was going to be nothing glamorous - just as with doctors practicing to find a vein. At the end of the day, their training was surely not what they expected (of course how could they have really known what to expect?). But they never truly got a “secret” sauce. As one Turtle put it, “Richard didn’t quite give us the Holy Grail. There’s no single magic element.” Magic or not, once the Turtles finished class they immediately went to work. However, before they started making big money, there were rough patches.
海龟们也没有什么好炫耀的——和医生找静脉一样。到了最后，他们的训练和他们想象的也不一样（他们如何知道他们想要什么？）但是他们确实得到了秘方。就像一个海龟说的：“理查德没有给我们圣杯。根本没有任何神秘的东西。”不管有没有神秘的东西，一旦海龟们完成了课堂学习，他们就开始做事了。然而，在开始赚大钱之前，还要经历艰难时期。
章 在酝酿中
“It’s possible to train people to perform to a certain level in chess, but if this training does not promote self-education and a philosophical attitude, then the trainees will be little more than performing seals.”
“培训别人下棋是可以达到一定水平的，但是如果这个培训过程没有达到自我教育和哲学的高度，那么这个被培训的人就和动物园的海豹一样在表演。”
Nigel Davies,
Daily Speculations
奈杰尔·戴维斯
投机者
How many Turtles were there? The number of Turtles is in dispute. Dennis and Eckhardt not only included people selected from want ads in the training room, they also invited an assortment of colleagues who were already working for them. Other people in the office entourage, who were close enough to pick up the essential concepts of what they were teaching, ended up exposed to the Turtle rules.
当时有多少个海龟？数字不一。丹尼斯和埃克哈特不但包括了通过广告招来的人，还邀请了一些早就为他们做事的同事来参加培训。办公室的其他随从人员，他们也接触到了海龟原则的关键思想。
Take, for example, Mark Walsh. Walsh was not an official Turtle, but someone who has traded like a Turtle for twenty years. With a track record of better than 20 percent average annual performance, he is an equal to Turtles who managed money for clients since 1988. Sam DeNardo, a generally accepted Turtle, didn’t want his definition of the Turtle club violated: “I love Mark Walsh, I’ve known him for a long time but he wasn’t really a Turtle . . . And I think the Turtles, the real Turtles, feel strongly about keeping the group true to what the list was.”
以马克·沃尔什为例，他不是正式的海龟，但是他像海龟一样交易了20年。记录表明，他的平均年收益比平均值20%要好，从1988年开始，他为客户理财。山姆·迪拿杜也是一个海龟，希望自己的言论没有得罪别人：“我爱马克·沃尔什，我早就认识他了，但他不算是海龟……我认为真正的海龟只认同名单上的海龟。”
DeNardo also argued against Craig Soderquist as a Turtle even though the Wall Street Journal had referred to him as one: “Soderquist was somebody involved in Rich’s life at the time who maybe got a couple guys’ notes from the meetings.” However, Robert Moss, head of Richard Dennis’s trading-floor operations in New York from 1984 to 1988, stated without a moment’s hesitation that Soderquist was a Turtle. Moss’s job was to execute daily for C&D Commodities thousands of futures contracts across New York trading pits. He would know. Yet Jeff Gordon, a verified Turtle, disagreed with Moss, saying that the Turtles were only those who traded Dennis’s money.
迪拿杜也不承认克雷格·索德奎斯是海龟，虽然《华尔街日报》认为他是海龟：“索德奎斯当时从一些人那里得到了笔记，所以和理查德是有瓜葛的。”然而，罗伯特·莫斯，他在1984年——1988年在纽约帮丹尼斯做场内交易，他却毫不犹豫地说索德奎斯是海龟。莫斯当时每天在纽约的交易场内帮C&D商品公司处理几千份期货合约。他应该知道的。然而一个确切的海龟杰夫·戈登却不同意莫斯的说法，他说只有交易丹尼斯的钱的人才叫海龟。
Clearly, many people, official Turtles or not, learned the methods simply because they were close to the action in the C&D offices. It was easy to see that once Dennis and Eckhardt started the training phase of their experiment, it was similar to the informal seminars Dennis and Tom Willis had held in the 1970s. Training was open to a much wider circle than Turtles hired via the ad would have preferred.
很明显，有很多人，不管是不是正式的海龟，他们因为和C&D公司比较亲近，所以他们学到了海龟的方法。很明显，当丹尼斯和埃克哈特开始做实验时，情况就和70年代与汤姆·威利斯举办非正式的研讨会一样。培训的对象比通过广告招聘的人要多很多。
The refinements and distinctions as to who was and who was not a Turtle went right to the heart of what was to become a serious competition. They might have all been told they were equal, and perhaps they were initially, but this was no game. Millions of dollars were on the line.
谁是海龟，谁不是海龟，只有靠竞争来说明了。也许一开始他们是平等的，但这不是游戏。要交易的资金高达几百万。
The Office Environment
办公室环境
Within the offices of C&D Commodities, the Turtles were Dennis’s pet project. They were viewed as worker bees freeing him up for bigger-picture political initiatives. Robert Moss said that they were “essentially a stable of ‘little Richards,’ no pun intended.”
在C&D商品的办公室内，海龟们就是丹尼斯的宠物实验。他们像蜜蜂一样工作，丹尼斯则解脱出来，以准备自己的政治前程。罗伯特·莫斯说他们“就是理查德的牛马，没有讽刺的意思。”
That stable had very little in personal oversight once they were trained. Russell Sands, for one, was surprised at the complete lack of supervision. He noted, “We might have seen Rich, Bill, or Dale once a week on a Friday afternoon for two hours.” According to Sands, they would walk in and say, “How did you guys do this week? Anybody have any questions?” That was it.
他们被培训时，似乎不被重视。拉塞尔·桑兹很吃惊地发现没人监管他们。他说：“我们每周一次，也许会在周五下午的2个小时内看见理查德，比尔或代尔。” 桑兹说，他们会走过来说：“本周学的如何？有问题吗？”仅仅如此。
If one of the Turtles did not follow the rules, Dennis and Eckhardt, who reviewed their daily statements, would call up and ask for an explanation. Sands added, “But aside from that, there was no mentoring; there was no supervision, there was nothing. We were totally on our own.” It was, “Here’s the money, keep a journal, write down every trade you took and why you took it.” The Turtles would become more famous and successful over time, but in the beginning there was no fanfare.
如果哪个海龟没有遵守原则，丹尼斯和埃克哈特在看到交易报告后会找他，问他的原因是什么。桑兹补充说：“除此之外，就没有任何监督了，什么都没有。我们完全靠自己。”确实如此：“给你钱，自己做日记，记下每笔交易及原因。”海龟们后来出名了，成功了，但是在一开始，是没人理他们的。
The working conditions were Spartan. Dennis provided them with a large trading office sandwiched between two floors in the Insurance Exchange building. It was furnished with metal desks and chairs. The most basic amenities, such as a coffee machine or TV, were missing. There was a bookcase with trading books that hardly anyone ever read. Eventually a Ping-Pong table was brought in.
工作环境比较简单。丹尼斯在保险交易大楼为他们提供了2层的大交易室。里面是金属的桌子和椅子。最基本娱乐设施，像咖啡机和电视都没有。书架里面有交易书，几乎没人看。最终还是买了一台乒乓球桌。
The Turtle seating arrangements were reminiscent of grade school. They were seated two by two, with six-foot-tall dividers between the cubicles. The informal, no-frills environment was typical of the way Dennis ran his business and his life. Mr. Anti-Establishment was passing his attitude down to his students.
海龟们的座位安排和中学差不多。2个人坐一排，每个格子用6英尺高的办公墙分开。这种非正式的，低调的环境和丹尼斯的风格是相衬的。他把自己的风格传给了他的学生们。
This attitude left others in the building wondering what the Turtle office was up to. After all, they had all kinds of downtime trading as trend traders. They would go days without trading. On top of that, there was no dress code. They used to show up to work in the summer in cut-offs and T-shirts.
因为态度低调，这个大楼的很多人搞不清海龟们在干什么。毕竟趋势交易者很多时候无所事事。对着装也没有要求。他们在夏天总是穿着短裤和短袖汗衫。
A Harvard MBA worked side-by-side with a recent high school graduate. A Jehovah’s Witness played Ping-Pong with a blackjack player from Eastern Europe. Jewish and Christian students were mixed into one diverse office.
哈佛的工商管理硕士和刚毕业的高中生一起工作。耶和华的信徒和来自东欧的赌徒一起打乒乓球。犹太教徒和基督教徒在一起办公。
Consider Anthony Bruck, a wiry and fashionable Chicago socialite and artist. He reminded some of Andy Warhol. He’d come to work dressed in skin-tight black clothes. Bruck, like Jim Kenney, was a friend of Dennis before the experiment started.
想想安东尼·布鲁克，他是芝加哥的名流和艺术家，他很时髦，说话声音尖细。他像安迪·沃霍尔。他会穿着紧身黑衣去上班。布鲁克和吉姆·肯尼在实验前就是丹尼斯的朋友。
Erle Keefer loved the wild diversity of what was almost a mini United Nations: “You had people who didn’t have a college degree, then people who had doctorates. Anthony Bruck had a doctorate in linguistics. Actually, I think that probably helped him to be a good trader because you had to think about it analytically and conceptually.”
尔勒·科夫喜欢像一个小联合国一样的胡乱组合：“有些人没有大学学历，有些人有博士学位。安东尼·布鲁克就是语言学博士。实际上，我认为这能帮助他，因为交易需要你懂分析，懂概念。”
Mike Carr was a terrific demonstration of Dennis’s eclectic hiring policy. He couldn’t spell “future” (as in trading futures), so to speak, in the beginning. Carr, like other newbie Turtles, had to be shown a chart and how to read it. He was living proof that you did not need a Harvard MBA to excel.
迈克·卡尔是丹尼斯古怪聘用方式的完美解释。他一开始连期货这个单词都不会写。卡尔和新手海龟们一样，必须看着图表才知道是什么意思。他是活证据，说明你没有哈佛的工商管理硕士学历也能成功。
Even more unusual was the inclusion of Lucy Wyatt. For years, people who were aware of the Turtle story have assumed that there was only one female Turtle, Liz Cheval. But it turns out that there were two.
更不寻常的是露西·瓦特。多年来，人们只知道海龟的故事中只有一位女性海龟——莉斯·雪娃。但实际上有2位女性海龟。
Wyatt was a friend of William Eckhardt’s. Jim DiMaria noted: “While the rest of us were like Turtles and that’s what we were and that’s what we did, she would kind of come and go. She did actually have a desk . . . in the room. I guess maybe that’s the Turtle barometer . . . you have a desk in that room.”
瓦特是威廉·埃克哈特的朋友。吉姆·迪玛利亚说：“我们大部分人像海龟那样做事，她则是来来去去。她在办公司也有一张桌子。我想她也是海龟……因为她有一张桌子。”
Off the record, several Turtles who’d been hired through the screening process commented that having Dennis employees and friends in the room trading as Turtles caused strife. One said, “The regular Turtles, so to speak, wondered how in the hell were they ever picked for this program. The ones not picked via a screening process just didn’t have the mental horsepower for it.” All one Turtle could remember about Wyatt was that she was always doing her nails.
据传，一些正式海龟认为和丹尼斯的员工，朋友一起交易会有冲突。其中一个人说：“正式的海龟不明白其他人是怎么混进来的。不是通过正式招聘进来的海龟思想都不行。”有个海龟记得瓦特总是在摆弄自己的指甲。
Mike Cavallo said that Wyatt had been Eckhardt’s girlfriend. He noted, “She was in the room with us. So of the people, if you were going to say who was a Turtle and who wasn’t, she would have been considered to be the least likely to be called a Turtle.”
迈克·卡瓦洛说瓦特曾经是埃克哈特的女朋友。他说：“她当时和我们在一起。所以，如果你要问我谁是海龟，谁不是海龟，我想她最不像海龟。”
Did Wyatt trade? Apparently yes. Many people who hear the Turtle story make excuses for why they could never fit in. Wyatt made it clear that anyone could have fit in with the Turtles.
瓦特交易了吗？很明显，她交易了。很多人听说了海龟的故事，然后给自己找借口，说自己不适合。瓦特则说明了任何人都能像海龟一样交易。
Wildly differing political views did not keep Turtles from fitting in, either. Jerry Parker and Richard Dennis, for example, were political opposites. Mike Shannon painted Parker in extreme terms: “[He was] about as right-wing conservative as you can get and we had people in there who were more liberal than Rich by a long shot.” Shannon got a kick out of the political diversity crammed into the one-room office. He said, “Jerry was far right and at the time I was more far left. We would really lock horns once in a while on certain political and social issues. He is so far right. It’s just unbelievable. I just never really took him seriously in that regard.” However, Shannon did take Parker seriously as a trader, saying, “He’s very good. But the funny thing is with all of that, when it came to the actual trading and discussing the systems and methodologies, we were all on the same page. No matter what the political background or social background, we all tried to cooperate as much as possible.”
政治观点的不同并不影响海龟们的交易。比如说，杰瑞·帕克和丹尼斯就是政治对手。迈克·仙农是这样形容帕克的：“他是右翼分子，有些人则比理查德更加倾向于自由派。” 仙农因为政治观点不同，被排挤到另一间办公室里交易。他说：“当时杰瑞太右翼，我则太左翼。对于政治和社会问题，我们时不时有争论。我不相信他如此地倾向于右翼。我从没想到他很右翼。”然而，仙农确实认为帕克是一位交易者，他说：“他很优秀。有趣的是，一旦谈到了交易，系统和理念，我们的观点都是一致的。不管政治背景和社会背景的不同，我们总是尽量合作。”
These political differences were no small matter. Jeff Gordon learned this firsthand at a dinner before the 1984 presidential election. Everyone knew Mondale was Dennis’s guy. Dennis started going around the table asking everyone who they were voting for. One by one, they all said, “Mondale.” They were all his guests, and Dennis was one of the richest guys around. However, when it was Gordon’s turn he said, “Gary Hart.” Gordon knew he had just upset the trading king of Chicago.
这些政治分歧不是小问题。杰夫·戈登在1984年总统大选前一次晚餐上就明白了这个道理。每个人都知道丹尼斯支持蒙代尔。丹尼斯围着桌子一个一个地问他们要投票给谁。每个人都依次说：“蒙代尔。”他们都是客人，而丹尼斯是最富的人之一。然而当问到戈登时，戈登说：“加里·哈特。”话刚说完，戈登就知道自己让芝加哥交易之王伤心了。
However, far more important than any political differences were the commonalities. Mike Cavallo saw all the Turtles as extremely bright, but viewed the group as an interesting mix of competitive and easygoing people. He believed that the great majority of the Turtles could have a day filled with total disasters yet still be pleasant.
然而，比政治分歧更重要的是商品。迈克·卡瓦洛认为海龟们都很聪明，而整个团队则是有趣的组合，既竞争，又互相好说话。他相信大部分海龟在遇到灾难的时候也会感到高兴。
In hindsight, it’s hard to know for sure if the Turtles were like what Cavallo described or if they ultimately became like that as a result of their unique situation. No one was going to make waves when a rich guy was giving out millions to a group to trade with an incentive plan to make their own millions. That kind of opportunity kept mouths closed.
回头来看，很难肯定海龟们真的像卡瓦洛说的那样，或者是独特的环境真的让他们最终是那样的。富人给了大家几百万让大家交易，还有机会为自己赚几百万，在这种情况下，是没人愿意得罪富人的。这样的机会能让大家都闭嘴。
The Turtles, however, didn’t immediately realize that they had been given the “golden goose” for making millions. Since they had to hit the ground running, they did not have time to test the rules Dennis had given them. They had to trust Dennis and Eckhardt implicitly.
然而，海龟们一开始并没有意识到他们得到了一只能赚几百万的“金鹅”。因为他们根本没时间测试丹尼斯的原则，就要去交易。他们必须盲目地相信丹尼斯和埃克哈特才行。
Erle Keefer, hired in the second Turtle class, was in the minority with his desire for a “proof of concept.” Like his mentor, Keefer remained skeptical: “You said I learned about the golden goose, but I didn’t have a computer program, hadn’t seen printouts, hadn’t seen proof of concept. You know what I mean?”
尔勒·科夫是第二次实验招聘时被聘用的，他和大部分人一样，想要一个“证明”。他像他的导师一样，科夫表示怀疑：“你说我得到了金鹅，但是我没有软件。如果没有看见打印出的结果，我就不相信这个概念。你知道我的意思吗？”
As time went on, some Turtles did test the rules Dennis gave them. This effort changed the direction of the Turtle program. Still, initially, the Turtles executed their trades based on the rules they had been taught. They were making big money doing so. In fact, all were now making more money than they ever had in their lives. At that moment, everyone associated with C&D Commodities was certain that they had proven nurture trumps nature - even if no one outside of the firm knew this yet.
随着时间的推移，有些海龟确实测试了丹尼斯的原则。这样的努力改变了海龟计划的方向。最初，海龟们按照原则交易。他们赚了大钱。实际上，他们赚的钱比一辈子赚的钱还多。当时，和C&D商品公司有关系的人都肯定自己有赢家特质——即使外人还不知道。
A Boring Trading Strategy
无聊的交易策略
The Turtles experienced what the term “free time” really meant. There simply was no trading if a market didn’t move. Not trading when there was no market movement was, in fact, one of the most important rules of all. No trending market, no profit. No market moves, no calling Robert Moss to place trades.
海龟们体会到了什么叫真正的“自由时间”。如果市场没有波动，根本就没有交易。实际上，没有波动就不交易还是最重要的原则之一。没有趋势，就没有利润。没有市场波动，就不能打电话给罗伯特·莫斯下单。
These long periods of doing nothing would be considered useless by today’s hyperactive crowd, in love with checking stock quotes every minute. However, the Turtles would have had no need for hot tips from the likes of Jim Cramer of Mad Money or CNBC’s David Faber’s latest “breaking” news story.
对于现在的大众来说，他们喜欢每分钟都查看行情软件，整天无所事事太没意义了。海龟们没有必要看电视《疯狂金钱》中吉姆·克拉默报道的消息，也没有必要看美国全国广播公司财经频道中大卫·费伯的“插播”新闻。
Today, people gobble up dozens of trading infomercials and nightly advice from everyone under the sun on what to buy and sell. All of this was useless to the Turtles. Today’s get-rich-quick crowds have created a whole culture of traders afraid of missing something. They obsess about analysis about what the markets have done or are going to do - even if it has no direct connection to their trading decisions. The Turtles, on the other hand, were perfectly content to do nothing when the rules said to do nothing.
如今，人们每天都能得到大量的投资报告和建议，让你买这个，让你卖那个的。对海龟们来说，这些东西都没用。现在大众都想快速致富，都害怕失去什么。他们迷恋市场分析，那个市场有机会，或没有机会——即使这些分析和他们的交易决定没有任何关系。海龟们则不同，如果原则叫他们观望，他们就观望。
The Turtles would come in every day already armed with their war plans so that they didn’t make bad decisions in the heat of the battle. Stare at the screen and it’s going to say, “Do something, trade me.” All top traders today work like hell to develop a trading philosophy. They convert that philosophy to rules. After that, they stand back and see if their rules act as expected. If you build a system that gives you an entry and exit, tells you how much to bet along the way and adjusts to your current capital and current market volatility at all times, no more analysis is needed.
海龟们每天都有现成的计划，所以即使战争再激烈，他们也不会出错。如果整天盯着屏幕，就有交易的冲动。所有的优秀交易者都努力地开发自己的交易理念。他们把理念转换成原则。然后，他们测试原则，看看效果如何。如果你的系统能告诉你进场点，出场点，如何加仓，如何调整资金，那么分析就是没有必要的。
The Turtles did not fight this boring state of affairs. However, everyone handled downtime differently. Jerry Parker, for example, played electronic baseball until he had figured out all the tricks. Does that mean Parker was goofing off and not trading properly? No. Far from it. Parker was always prepared. Self-discipline meant doing nothing until the time came to do something. Parker knew what role they played in Dennis’s life when he said that Dennis ran the training “because he wanted to have a certain chunk of money traded using systematic rules” while he went on and tried out new techniques.
海龟们在无聊的时候没有胡乱交易。然而，每个人在无事可做的时候表现不同。比如，杰瑞·帕克在无聊的时候玩游戏。这是不是说帕克吊儿郎当，交易不行呢？不，不是这个意思。帕克一直在等待着。自律就是在时机到来之前什么都不要做。帕克明白丹尼斯搞培训时希望他们扮演什么角色：“因为他希望用系统原则交易大量的钱”，他自己则继续研究新的技术。
But for now, their trading was all about downtime. It was for the Turtles a deliberate process of following about thirty markets, waiting to do something. They didn’t trade foreign markets at the time; many of those were yet to be invented. Their basket of markets was not very active.
但是现在，他们所有的交易就是无所事事。海龟们要故意地等待30个市场出现机会。他们当时没有交易外国的市场，很多外国的品种当时还没发明呢。当时市场不活跃。
The Turtle think tank did have occasional undercurrents and personal biases, particularly when it came to Liz Cheval. This was Chicago trading in the early 1980s, and some Turtles thought sexism was an issue. The fact that some Turtles may not have taken Cheval seriously was not easy to deal with. Michael Shannon said, “Between guys hitting on her and guys shunning her and stuff, it kind of made her somewhat ambivalent to the whole Turtle process.”
有时候海龟们有自己的想法和偏见，尤其是莉斯·雪娃。当时是80年代初的芝加哥，一些海龟认为性别是个问题。事实上一些海龟认为雪娃不好对付。迈克尔·仙农说：“有些人打击她，有些人冷落她，所以整个海龟对她有矛盾的情感。”
Cheval appreciated the fact that she was getting a great education in the program, but she may have had some residual animosity toward other Turtles. Shannon added support: “A lot of people just underestimated her. You have to remember this was the ’80s. How many women commodity traders did you know at the time?” Even though they were the Turtles, it clearly did not mean they were all behaving with the decorum of choirboys.
雪娃很感激得到了这个培训的机会，但她有点憎恨海龟们。仙农补充说：“很多人低估了她。你要知道当时是80年代初。当时有几个女性在做商品交易？即使他们是海龟，他们也不会像唱诗班的男孩那样知书达理。”
Jiri Svoboda used his inordinate amount of downtime for other ventures beyond trading. He was always trying to figure out ways to beat the house. This, however, was not gambling in the way most people think of it. His view was all about understanding the odds and making money.
吉里·斯沃博达在无所事事的时候在想其它事。他总是在思考如何打败赌场。这个想法和别人不一样。他思考的是概率和赚钱。
Svoboda had no problem leaving the office for two or three months at a time. Other Turtles made sure his trades got placed properly once Svoboda had worked out all of his if/then contingencies. In turn, he then spent much of his time in Las Vegas developing systems that could read cards being dealt at blackjack tables.
斯沃博达有时会离开办公室2，3个月。只要斯沃博达知道如何解决意外问题，其他海龟就知道他的交易一定不错。他自己则把很多时间花在拉斯维加斯的赌桌上研究如何赢21点。
This behavior was fine within the parameters of the experiment, because Dennis himself had created the atmosphere of “get the job done and I don’t care where you are physically.” By giving Turtles his rules, his money, his brokers, and his ATRs (the computed daily volatility for each market, or what they called “N”), Dennis had taken away much of the day-to-day routine the Turtles would have been experiencing had they been trading entirely on their own.
他的行为并没有导致不好的影响，因为丹尼斯是这样说的：“只要你把事做好了，我不管你人在哪里。”丹尼斯给了海龟们原则，资金，经纪人和ATR（每个市场每天的波动性，或者叫N），这样丹尼斯就免了自己亲自动手了。
The trading day unfolded with the Turtles tracking their group of markets. If one or more of those markets generated an entry or exit signal, they picked up the phone, called to the trading floor, and made the trade. Then they would wait for the market to move one way or the other before picking up the phone and calling the floor again.
海龟们在交易日跟踪自己的市场。如果一个或多个市场发出了进场或出场信号，他们就拿起电话，打给交易所场内，开始交易。然后他们等待市场的变化，再次打电话。
The Turtles were on their own Survivor island. They marked all of their charts and made all their calculations on loose-leaf paper. If they wanted a Wall Street Journal, they had to buy it. Dennis of course would have paid, but he was a technical trader, not a fundamental guy. There was no reason to study the Journal every day.
海龟们要靠自己。他们自己在活页纸上画图，计算。如果他们想看《华尔街日报》，他们要自己掏钱买。当然了，丹尼斯会付钱的，但他是技术交易者，不是研究基本面的。实在没有每天研究《华尔街日报》的理由。
Think about how many people in 2007 read the Wall Street Journal daily from start to finish searching for fundamental insights. Consider how many people scan annual reports or crop reports online. Not the Turtles.
想想吧，在2007年有多少人每天通过《华尔街日报》寻找基本面的知识。有多少人通过上网研究年度报告或农业报告。海龟们不这么做。
Everything they did was basic. The Turtles would actually write down their orders for the next day and make a carbon copy. They would leave the carbon copy behind, in case they couldn’t make it in the next day. That way their orders would still be executed properly. Jim DiMaria laughed, “People don’t even know what carbon paper is anymore.”
他们做的都是基本工作。海龟们会提前写好第二天的订单并复写出来。他们会把复写件留下来，以防止第二天自己没来得及下单。这样，会有人帮他们下单。吉姆·迪玛利亚笑着说：“现在的人根本不知道什么是复写纸。”
Beyond the day-to-day office idiosyncrasies, the physical locations of the Turtles would soon change dramatically. For that first year they were all in the same office, but after that some left. Mike Cavallo was in the office for one year before he moved home to Boston to continue working for Dennis long distance. Russell Sands was gone after the first year, too - he left the program completely.
除了每天在办公室养成的习惯，海龟们就可以乱跑了。第一年他们都待在同一个办公室，之后就有人离开了。迈克·卡瓦洛第一年在办公室，然后就搬到波士顿去了，并继续为丹尼斯交易。拉塞尔·桑兹在第二年也离开了——不过他是永远离开。
Their office environment was slowly changing as time went by. Jim DiMaria said, “At some point, half the people, like Jerry Parker, moved back to Virginia (his home). So those of us Chicago people who wanted to stay, we moved to a smaller office. But the dynamic was gone at that point.”
随着时间的推移，他们办公室的环境也在慢慢变化。吉姆·迪玛利亚说：“有一段时间，有一半的人走了，比如杰瑞·帕克，就搬到弗吉尼亚去了（他家在那里）。所以像我们芝加哥人，只好搬到小点的办公室里面。但是活力却没有了。”
Early on, when everyone was together in Chicago, there were bonding moments as they labored in the trenches with little outside guidance. They were not expert traders out of the gate - far from it. To begin with, almost all the Turtles were in their twenties or late teens. It wasn’t long before the first-year class was down 50 percent each on average six months into the program. If you think some of them were panicking, you’re right.
之前，当他们都聚集在芝加哥的时候，他们能团结在一起，不太需要外人的指导。他们当时还远远不是专家。很多人都在20多岁，或10多岁。没多久，人数就少了一半。如果你认为有些人害怕了，那是对的。
Still, out of those early volatile performance swings came personal anecdotes that put their daily grind into perspective. September 1985, for example, was a difficult learning moment. The “Group of Seven” finance ministers made a concerted effort to weaken the U.S. dollar. Over the weekend they changed their policy on the dollar. All of the currencies quickly gapped a couple of hundred points higher. Some of the Turtles were short.
早期，市场波动很大，留下了一些逸闻趣事。比如1985年9月就很艰难。7个国家的财政部长聚在一起，想让美元贬值。结果在周末时他们又改变了主意。突然之间，所有的外汇都跳空高开了几百个基点。有些海龟当时在做空。
Jeff Gordon, who had exited his positions, remembered that Tom Shanks was still short. He said, “You have to imagine, here we are, managing millions of dollars, we come in [Monday], we have these positions and the market is so much against you. We have large positions, we’ve just lost a horrendous amount of money, through no fault of our own.” Gordon was pointing out that Shanks was following Dennis’s rules and that by following those rules exactly, he had incurred significant losses.
杰夫·戈登已经提前平仓了，他记得当时汤姆·桑克斯还是做空的。他说：“你想象一下吧，当时我们管理着几百万的资金，周一早上却发现所有的市场都对我们不利。我们的仓位很大，我们亏了很多钱，虽然我们自己没有犯错。” 戈登指出，桑克斯遵守了丹尼斯的原则，正是因为遵守了原则，结果他亏了很多。
Even though the Turtles were given precise rules. Dennis’s weakness for discretionary decisions rubbed off on his students. In theory they all had the same rules for selecting markets to trade, when to enter and exit, and how much to buy and sell. However, there were ongoing incidents of exceptions to the rules.
即使海龟们学到了精准的原则，丹尼斯的谨慎还是传染给了学生们。理论上，他们的原则一样，何时买，何时卖，买卖多少，然而，总是有一些例外情况发生。
One of those exceptions involved a cocoa trade. Erle Keefer vividly recalled it: “Cocoa is going out the roof. We generated the whole move because we were allowed to add on. We had the whole market. The guys on the floor knew it was Rich’s traders, but they just kept the market going. We push it up another ten points and they add on. We are shoving that through the roof and when our buying dried up, the market collapsed. We all got stung hard because honestly we were loaded. Phil Lu was the only one who didn’t have any cocoa positions.”
其中一个例外就发生在可可的交易中。尔勒·科夫生动地回忆说：“可可冲到天上去了。我们抓到了整个波动，因为我们可以加仓。场内的交易者知道是理查德的交易者干的，但市场还是在涨。只要我们把价格推高了10个基点，他们就加仓。当我们的买单结束时，市场就崩溃了。我们都很吃惊，因为我们是满仓的。只有飞利浦·卢一个人没有持有可可的仓位。”
During the Turtle program, Dennis had a policy that one day a year all Turtles would individually go to lunch with him. They got to trade with Dennis for the day, so to speak. When Phil Lu came back from his day with Dennis, he thought Dennis was unhappy with him. Dennis wanted to know what caused Lu not to take the cocoa trade. Lu’s decision to not take the trade clearly was against how they had been trained.
在海龟实验时，丹尼斯有个政策，每年中的某一天，所有的海龟单独陪他共进午餐。也就是说，当天要和丹尼斯一起交易。当飞利浦·卢从丹尼斯那里回来时，他觉得丹尼斯对他不满。丹尼斯想知道为何他没有进行可可的交易。卢没有交易可可，这明显违反了原则。
Lu had a reason. Each day the Turtles had to write down their contingencies for the day. Lu, who never really had the intense trader drive, simply had two pieces of paper listing his if/then contingencies, his buy and sell points, for each market each day, and his second sheet listed cocoa. It turns out that Lu had a rule that if he had two pages and if a trade wasn’t on page one, he wouldn’t trade it. Cocoa was on page two for him.
卢有自己的理由。每天，海龟们都要写下当天的意外情况。卢没有交易者的动力，只是简单地用2页纸来记录自己的意外情况，他每天写自己的买卖点，第二页纸上有可可。卢自己的原则是，如果在第1页纸上没有这个交易，那么他就不交易。可可正好在第2页纸上。
Dennis said, “Why didn’t you trade cocoa? What told you?” Lu said, “Oh, I only trade stuff that is on my first page and cocoa wasn’t on my first page.” Lu thought he saw Dennis’s face fall. After all, Dennis, ever the curious skeptic, had hoped he was about to learn something new from one of his students.
丹尼斯说：“你为什么不交易可可？谁叫你不交易的？” 卢说：“噢，我只交易第1页纸上的品种，而可可不在第1页上。” 卢发现丹尼斯的脸色都变了。丹尼斯最终希望卢找他最喜欢的一个学生重新学习。
Lu’s trading was a great example of the imprecision within the Turtle world that could and did lead to different levels of performance. It was the type of incident that showed even though the Turtles were doing exceedingly well trading, there were reasons for differing performance numbers.
卢的交易是一个很好的例子，说明了在海龟中间，如果操作不当，结果相差很大。这个事件说明，即使海龟们做的很好，还是有人会出现做不好的情况。
Dennis’s hiring process loaded the experiment up with real characters. Perhaps the most colorful background of any Turtle was that of Mike Shannon.
丹尼斯用真人做实验。也许是迈克·仙农的背景最具有色彩性。
At one point I asked Shannon if there was anything else to know about the whole Turtle process. He said bluntly and out of left field, “You know that I was a criminal, right?” Before explaining himself, he said his story deserved a disclaimer. First, his transgressions were twenty-five years ago, and second, he is very anti-drug today. He then explained, “Probably about two or three years before I joined Richard Dennis, I was a drug dealer. I used to control about maybe 80 percent of the drug traffic within the Rush Street nightclub scene in Chicago.”
我曾经问过仙农，对这个实验是否还有什么要补充的。他立刻牛头不对马嘴地说：“难道你知道我是罪犯？”他说他的经历就是免责声明。首先，他是在25年前犯罪的，第二，他目前坚定地抵制毒品。然后他又解释：“我大约在2，3年前加入丹尼斯的实验，当时我是贩毒的。过去在芝加哥的冲刺街夜总会，80%的毒品是我控制的。”
Other Turtles confirmed his account, but this unusual story kept unfolding long into the Turtle program. After he had been working for Dennis for fifteen months or so as a Turtle, Shannon was called to testify in a federal drug case for the government. Dennis found out and called him into the office. Shannon thought he was going to be let go when Dennis reached into his briefcase and pulled out a transcript of the trial. Dennis was stern: “Now look, I am not going to fire you if you tell me the truth. Just tell me the truth, what’s going on?” Shannon gave up the whole story about his drug-dealing past and his current side gig working for the FBI. Dennis was shaking his head. “Are you done with them?” Shannon had no clue whether they were done with him.
其他海龟证实了这个说法，但是他的离奇故事远不止这些。当他为丹尼斯工作了15个月左右，政府召见他去证实一个联邦贩毒案。丹尼斯知道了，喊他去办公室。当丹尼斯从公文包里面拿出审判的文件时，他以为丹尼斯要开除他。丹尼斯很严肃：“听着，如果你告诉我真相，我就不开除你。快告诉我，怎么回事？”仙农就说了他过去贩毒的事，并表示现在在协助联邦调查局。丹尼斯摇头说：“你和他们讲清楚了吗？”仙农自己也不知道是否和他们讲清楚了没有。
Shannon was convinced that Dennis was the reason his problems went away. He said, “I was well into the Turtle program and I was a little profitable as well. I think if I was a marginal trader he might have cut me loose.” Shannon said that Dennis’s political connections ended his nightmare, adding, “So, I have no criminal record.”
仙农很确信是丹尼斯消除了他的麻烦。他说：“我当时在做海龟，还赚到了利润。我想，如果我是无关紧要的交易者，他肯定会放弃我。”仙农说丹尼斯靠自己的政治关系结束了他的恶梦，他还补充说：“所以，我现在没有犯罪记录。”
Another Turtle said about Dennis’s handling of Shannon, “Rich grew up around a lot of pretty tough guys, being in the trading business and everything else. Rich knew that there was always another story. By his nature Rich is an amazingly forgiving person.”
另外一个海龟谈到了丹尼斯处理仙农的事：“理查德和一些高官交情深厚，场里场外都有。理查德知道总是有一些流言蜚语。但他本性很容易原谅别人。”
Throughout the Turtle blowouts, quirky trading decisions, and a federal narcotics investigation, Dennis treated his people right. On one occasion he flew the entire C&D entourage to Las Vegas to see the rock band Blood, Sweat and Tears (he was a 1970s music aficionado, after all). Even though he might have led an outwardly frugal life, Dennis was generous to everyone he came in contact with.
在海龟们资金增长的过程中，奇怪的交易决定中，联邦调查局对毒品的调查中，丹尼斯都举止得当。有一次，他带着整个公司的随从人员飞到拉斯维加斯去看摇滚乐队汗水和眼泪（毕竟在70年代他是音乐的狂热爱好者）的表演。即使丹尼斯看起来生活节俭，但是他对认识的人都很慷慨。
The Group Dynamic
团队的活力
The Turtles were exposed to ideas with tremendous power, but those ideas did not come without a price. Human nature was always at play. It was one thing to practice applying Dennis and Eckhardt’s rules on a blackboard, but learning how the rules performed in live action was critical for confidence.
海龟们学习的思想有巨大的力量，但是这些思想又没有标价。人性总是反复的。在黑板上学习丹尼斯和埃克哈特的原则是一回事，但是在实战中使用则需要信心。
In this sense, the Turtles’ training had unmistakable parallels with the U.S. Army Rangers’ training regime. The Rangers work under the assumption that extraordinary performance can’t come from rehearsing under ordinary conditions. Elite troops can be forged only from extraordinary challenges that force them to draw upon emotional and physical reserves they never knew they possessed. Trading for Dennis was the same. The Turtles had been taught how to handle their worst-case trading scenarios and to feel confident in any trading situation but it wasn’t easy.
如此说来，海龟们的培训和美国陆军突击队员的训练一样。突击队员认为在平常的环境下训练是无法达到极限的。精英部队只有经过超常的挑战才能逼他们发挥超常的能力。丹尼斯的培训也是一个道理。海龟们学习了如何处理最糟糕的情况，如何在交易中保持自信，但是这不容易做到。
Gaining confidence, whether Turtle or Ranger, involved a setting. The Turtles were in an empty office learning their way; the Rangers were in physical training pit learning theirs. Both groups always had the eerie feeling that someone was watching over them. In a way the Turtles and Rangers were both trapped, though voluntarily. They had signed over their lives to people they didn’t know with the expectation that those people would subject them to pain.
不管是海龟，还是突击队员，获得信心是需要方法的。海龟们在空荡的办公室学习，突击队员则通过训练学习。他们都知道有人在关注他们。从某种程度上说，海龟和突击队员都是主动接受挑战的。他们用生命下注，承受别人不理解的痛苦。
Of course, the Turtles did not endure the physical pain of Ranger School, but they certainly endured psychological pain while they gained confidence in their ability to trade. Whether intentional or not, the Turtle office environment fostered a tribelike atmosphere.
当然了，海龟们不必到军事学院去体验肉体痛苦，但是在获得信心的过程中他们也要经历心理上的痛苦。不管是有意的，还是无意的，海龟的办公室搞的像宗族一样。
And many Turtles saw their group, or tribe, dynamic as crucial while they were in the womb trading Dennis’s millions. Erle Keefer felt the psychological need: “The reason we all needed to stay together, especially in the beginning, was we literally made all our money in a normal year in about a three-week period. The rest of the year, most people were down minus 30 percent. And then the markets all clicked in and we had bullets to fire because of Rich’s money management scheme. You can go from minus 30 percent down to a plus 150 percent up in three weeks with no trouble at all.”
很多海龟认为自己的团队在一起交易丹尼斯的几百万资金时，其实是在酝酿中，酝酿关键的活力。尔勒·科夫能感觉到心理上的需求：“我们聚在一起的原因，尤其是一开始聚在一起，是因为我们在一起，一年中真正赚钱的时间才3周。其它时间内，大部分人都亏了30%。突然，市场成形了，因为丹尼斯的资金管理，我们都有足够的子弹。你可以很轻松地在3周内从-30%增值到150%。”
Slaving away together as comrades-in-arms was important because they were getting the crap kicked out of them on a day-to-day basis, with lots of small losses and very little positive reinforcement. When the big trend came it was great, but they still had to patiently wait for it to happen.
像同志一样地团结在一起很重要，因为大家每天在一起都要接受很多小亏损，但却进步很少，这样的困难是要一起克服的。如果有大趋势，那当然好，但他们仍然要耐心地等待趋势的到来。
Imagine sitting there day after day with a multimillion-dollar trading account funded by a guy who is Chicago’s trading royalty. And imagine that the account appears to be slowly dwindling away, little bit by little bit, even though you are doing what you are supposed to do. There was self-doubt. There was concern. The group dynamic helped the Turtles alleviate stress and reassure each other that they were all doing the right thing.
想象一下吧，拿着芝加哥交易之王的几百万美元的资金，却天天坐在那里。再想象一下吧，虽然你没有做错什么，但是这些资金还在一天天地慢慢减少。肯定会怀疑自己的。肯定会有担心的。而团队在一起就可以互相舒解压力，互相安慰，说自己并没有做错什么。
As time passed, though, the Turtles saw Dennis’s system making huge amounts of money from big trends. They finally had the psychological assurance of “I know this works in my gut, and you can’t take that away from me.”
随着时间的推移，海龟们发现丹尼斯的系统利用大趋势赚了很多钱。最终他们在心理上有了信心：“我内心知道这个方法有用，你是不能打击我的。”
However, even with the tribelike atmosphere, even with the Ranger parallels, even with learning in their guts what it really meant to trade like Dennis, as evidence accumulated, it showed that the group process had ultimately turned out not to be significant. That’s because the “Turtle trading tribe” was ultimately undermined by an unexpected threat: competition and jealousy. Liz Cheval addressed the rivalry head on when she declared, “At the end of the day, the numbers are there in black and white. Either you made money or you didn’t.”
然而，即使有团队的气氛，有突击队员的精神，即使有丹尼斯那样的自信，最后表明团队就不太重要了。因为最后会遇到意料之外的威胁：竞争和嫉妒。莉斯·雪娃说她遇到了竞争：“每天下班时，数字都是白纸黑字的，不管你有没有赚钱，都要写出来的。”
The Turtles would soon learn that trading for Dennis over the four-year life of the program was more complicated then the black-and-white world described by Cheval. The Turtle trading experiment was about to become an experiment inside an experiment, with newly confident Turtles just as quickly burdened with self-doubt.
海龟们很快发现，这4年的实验比雪娃说的复杂多了。海龟实验是试验中的实验，虽然刚获得信心，很快就迎来了自我怀疑。
章 资金分配问题
“It’s interesting where the truth ultimately ends up. What you read on the front of the newspaper and what really happens can often be the difference between black and white.”
Anonymous Turtle in interview
“真相很有趣。你在报纸头版读到的东西和事实常常是不同的。”
匿名海龟
When the Turtles first started working together the atmosphere was pretty carefree. After all, they had been selected and trained by the trading king of Chicago. But their complacency was short lived. In just a few months they became the equivalent of insecure earthlings being analyzed from afar - just like in an old Twilight Zone episode. The initial experiment of nature versus nurture was one thing, but now there was another experiment underway, intentional or not.
当海龟们一开始在一起工作的时候，气氛是很放松的。反正都被芝加哥交易之王选中了，并一起接受了培训。但是他们很快就不能自满了。几个月后，他们就变得和凡人一样——就像在贫民窟。一开始关于天生的还是后天的实验是一回事，但是，无论是有意的，还是无意的，现在另外一个实验又开始了，
Money was mother’s milk in a Turtle’s world. Since without Dennis’s money to trade, there would be no Turtle program. But soon the Turtles learned that there was little rhyme or reason when it came to how much money each of them got from Dennis to trade. This was no small matter; it made the difference between making millions or not. Again, the movie Trading Places comes to mind, with the scene in which Billy Ray exclaimed, “The whole thing was an experiment, fool! And you and me were the guinea pigs! They made a bet over what would happen to us!”
对海龟来说，钱就是母奶。如果没有丹尼斯的钱，就没有海龟实验。很快海龟们就明白了，他们拿到钱的数量多少是有原因的。这不是小事，这关系到是否能赚几百万。《颠倒乾坤》这部电影又回到了人们的脑海，比利·雷说：“整件事情就是一个实验，笨蛋！你和我都是试验品！他们拿我们做赌注，赌我们的未来！”
Sam DeNardo, a first-year-class Turtle, who received a $1 million allocation from Dennis but rationalized away the smaller amounts given to second-year-class Turtles. He thought Dennis figured he didn’t need to risk as much with the second-year class: “He started those guys up with different amounts. It would have been nice to know at the time how fast he wanted us to go, how aggressive, or how conservative. I think that was part of what he was trying to discover.”
山姆·迪拿杜是第一届海龟，得到了100万的资金，但是在第二年第二届时，他得到的资金只是小账户。他想丹尼斯不希望他像第二届的学生一样冒太多风险：“他给他们的资金数量不一样。他当时，他在看每个人的速度，是否进取，是否保守。我想他在观察这些东西。”
The outside world was hearing that the Turtles had it made in the shade, but behind the scenes Dennis was making unequal allocations to his students. His action created tension within the ranks, but no one was about to complain openly. After all, they, were making more money than they ever had before. Yet being a Turtle was clearly a double-edged sword.
外面人听说海龟们很厉害，但是丹尼斯给每个学生的资金数量却不一样。他的行为让学生们产生了紧张感，但是没有人敢公开抱怨。毕竟他们赚的钱比过去要多。作为一个海龟也是双刃剑。
Jeff Gordon, discerned overall friction before allocations even became an issue. He saw some people in the Turtle program as being there only because of a previous acquaintance with Dennis, while others were hired through the ad. Dennis referred to the people who had had a connection with him as a “control group.” Gordon said, “They were just chosen for other reasons.”
因为每个人得到的资金数量不同而引起了一些问题和摩擦，杰夫·戈登则很清醒。他知道有些人加入了海龟实验是因为他们和丹尼斯的关系，而其他人则是通过正式招聘被聘用的。丹尼斯说和他有关系的人是“控制团队。”戈登说：“他们的存在是有其它原因的。”
Gordon and several other traders thought the people like him (those who had been hired and screened from the want ads) were superior traders. Dennis thought there was no difference. This was small potatoes to the real office tension to come.
戈登和其他交易者认为像他们这样的人（也就是通过广告被正式聘用的）是超级交易者。丹尼斯认为没有什么区别。办公室还有其它更紧张的气氛。
With different amounts of money being allocated, the Turtles started to earn wildly different amounts. Mike Cavallo, for example, was one of the early leaders. He described everyone as doing well initially, but said that then in the spring of 1984 they all got crushed.
因为每个人分到的资金数量不同，所以每个人赚的钱也不同。迈克·卡瓦洛一开始是组长。他说一开始大家都做的很好，但是到了1984年春天大家都被套了。
At that point, midyear, when the Turtles in the first class were all in the red, Dennis came in and said that they were all trading well. He then increased their equity. This made no sense to the Turtles. They were shocked. They were down big, and Dennis was going to give them more money?
当时，第一届海龟们都亏了，丹尼斯进来表态，说他们都做的不错。然后还给大家增加了资金。海龟们感到不可思议，他们很吃惊。他们亏了很多，丹尼斯却给他们更多的资金？
Cavallo could not believe it: “I might have thought he’d say, ‘Well, I think the program has been a failure. I’m going to close you down.’ Instead, he increased equity especially for a few of us that he thought who were trading the best. I was one [along with] Curt [Faith] and Howard [Seidler]. I guess we were trading the best at that time.” The word “best” made little sense when comparing Turtle performance data (see Appendix). They were all going up and down as a group in general.
卡瓦洛也很吃惊：“我以为他会说‘这个实验失败了，我还是终止吧。’相反，他给几个交易成绩好的人增加了资金。我是其中一个，还有柯蒂斯·费思和霍华德·辛德勒。我想当时我们的交易成绩最好。”如果你对照海龟们的成绩表，就能明白“最好”这个单词的含义（请看附录）。他们的账户像一个团队一样，一起增值，一起回落。
Over time, however, the ones who perceived unfairness in the disparate allocations became frustrated. Erle Keefer said some Turtles spoke up vociferously about the allocation of money. He recalled, “You’ve got guys like Curt Faith and Mike Cavallo who go down to minus 50 percent, minus 70 percent and not only are they given a reload, but they’re given even more money.”
有些人因为分到的资金太少了而感到气馁。尔勒·科夫说有些海龟因为资金的分配问题而大吵大闹。他回忆说：“柯蒂斯·费思和迈克·卡瓦洛亏了50%和70%，他们不但得到了新的资金，而且得到的资金是最多的。”
They all sat in the classroom together. They all learned the same rules. They then went to the office together and initially all received the same amount of money to trade. Almost out of the gate everyone started to lose, but some of the biggest losers were given even more money to trade.
他们都在同一个教室学习。他们学的都是一样的原则。他们一起走进办公室，得到了同样多的资金。差不多大家是一起开始亏钱的，而亏钱最多的人却得到了最多的资金。
Many Turtles thought Dennis was subjectively guessing who was going to be a great trader, as opposed to letting the actual trading results dictate greatness. The rub for many was that Dennis and Eckhardt always argued that trading should be based on true logic. Now some saw Dennis allocating money in a “losing game” fashion, meaning they could not understand why he was not using the scientific method in his trading allocations just the way he had taught the Turtles to do in their trading.
很多海龟认为丹尼斯不是让数据说话，而是在主观判断谁会成为最伟大的交易者。更气人的是丹尼斯和埃克哈特还总是在争论应该根据真正的逻辑交易。现在有人看见丹尼斯给亏钱的人更多的资金，所以搞不懂为何他不用自己说的科学的方法分配资金。
More and more frustration boiled over at how herky-jerky the allocation process had become. In 1986, for example, the money management business as a whole had a very difficult year. Jeff Gordon was quick to point out his success: “I produced plus 65 percent that year without a double-digit drawdown.”
这种没有逻辑的分配资金的过程让很多人感到沮丧。在1986年，资金管理的结果都不好。杰夫·戈登很快指出自己成功的地方：“我当年赚了65%，而不是亏损2位数。”
How did Dennis reward Gordon in terms of an allocation for the next year? Dennis decreased his allocation and his incentive fee. It seemed to resemble a science experiment: “Add acid to base and note the reaction.” However, it was Dennis’s game, and he alone had the right to make the rules.
那么第二年丹尼斯将如何为戈登分配资金呢？丹尼斯减少了他的分配比率，还减少了他的奖金。这有点像科学实验：“加点酸，看看反应如何。”然而，这是丹尼斯的游戏，他想怎么修改规则就怎么修改规则。
Gordon was frank about his ultimate difference of opinion with Dennis and the eventual outcome: “He didn’t like my risk control. Well, he was the guy making the decisions. Did I appreciate that? No, because I knew how I had done. On a reward-to-risk basis I was wiping everybody else out.” Dennis’s act of lowering Gordon’s incentive fee, which no matter his allocation meant less profit, was not interpreted well: “After that I wasn’t terribly enthusiastic about remaining in the Turtle program. I wasn’t providing Rich what he wanted. I left the program in July of 1987.”
戈登后来和丹尼斯的观点不一致了，结果也不是想象的那样，这点他很坦然：“他不喜欢我的风险控制。不错，是他做主。我会感激他吗？不，因为我了解自己的方法。从风险回报比来看，我比别人都强很多。”丹尼斯减少了戈登的提成比率，意味着他的利润减少了：“从那以后，我就不太想待在海龟实验中了。我没有给他赚很多钱。我在1987年7月离开了这个实验。”
But Gordon had a problem, however. Like all Turtles, he had signed a contract to trade exclusively for Dennis for five years. If he quit the program, he could not trade for others. Gordon knew what he was up against. “You didn’t want to get into a lawsuit with somebody who has $200 million,” he said.
但是戈登也有问题。他和所有海龟一样，都签了合同，要替丹尼斯保密5年。如果他退出了实验，他不能为别人做交易。戈登知道自己的麻烦：“你不会跟一个身家2亿美元的人打官司。”
Dennis did not care whether Gordon had a “decent” risk-adjusted return. Dennis wanted big rewards - absolute returns. It is not surprising that Dennis cut Gordon prematurely. Given Dennis’s strong philosophical underpinnings (“follow my rules”), and given the fact that Dennis and Gordon had political differences (Gordon supported Hart in the 1984 presidential race, not Mondale), this appeared to be as much about butting heads as about making money.
丹尼斯并不在乎戈登的资金管理是不是很好。丹尼斯只想赚大钱——绝对的回报。丹尼斯过早地减少戈登的资金和提成，这就不显得奇怪了。考虑到丹尼斯的理念基础（遵守我的原则），考虑到丹尼斯和戈登不同的政见（戈登在1984年支持哈特竞选总统，没有支持蒙代尔），所以看起来这是关于思想的斗争，并不是钱的事。
But Gordon was not alone. Echoing similar concerns, Jim DiMaria addressed allocations as well: “I think the first year [Turtles] were all given the million-dollar trading limits to start. Then in the second year, there were eight of us. I think three were given a million, two were given $600,000, and three were given $300,000. I was one of the $300,000 ones, which is fine. It was still a job. I was a little surprised, but we did get a draw.”
但戈登不是唯一的一个。同理，吉姆·迪玛利亚对资金分配也有看法：“在第一年，海龟们都得到了100万美元的起始资金。然后在第二年，只有8个人了。我想有3个人得到了100万，2个人得到了60万，3个人得到了30万。我得到了30万，但没事的。我保住了这个工作。我们的资金确实减少了，有点奇怪。”
Dennis and Eckhardt matched DiMaria’s prior $18,000 salary, but the Turtle allocation process was a mystery. DiMaria said, “Everyone sort of believed in ‘the market is never wrong’ and ‘technical versus fundamental,’ but then when the money distribution went out, it was like there was no correlation between who got the money and what the performance was.”
丹尼斯和埃克哈特承诺给迪玛利亚18000美元的工资是兑现了，但是海龟的资金分配是个秘密。迪玛利亚说：“每个人基本上都相信‘市场永远不会错’，‘技术派和基本派的对立’，但是一旦提到资金的分配，似乎业绩和得到的资金数之间没有必然的关系。”
DiMaria was at the bottom in equity and near the top in performance. That type of discrepancy continued throughout the whole program. Adding fuel to that fire was the common knowledge that, one turtle was soon getting twenty times what others got.
迪玛利亚得到的资金最少，但他的业绩是很靠前的。这种不正常的事一直存在。火上加油是大家的共识，一个海龟可以很快比其他海龟多赚20倍。（张轶注：指资金多，所以赚的多）
It bears repeating: The Turtles all had the same rules and the same training. At the same time their earnings were based on an incentive structure tied to their total account value, and some Turtles were trading millions while some were trading thousands. That’s a formula for internal strife. Conversation after conversation regarding allocations peeled away the rivalries and ill will below the surface.
海龟们都学习了一样的原则，接受了一样的培训。同时，他们的收入和他们打理的资金数量及提成有关系，有些海龟交易几百万的资金，而有些海龟只交易几千元的资金。这是内部斗争的原因。明争暗斗的时候都是在吵资金分配的事。
As time marched on under Dennis’s roof, it became apparent that the one Turtle who got the largest allocation of all was purportedly not following Dennis’s rules as taught. Almost every Turtle brought all discussions back to Curtis Faith, who had perhaps half the money in the program at one point. DiMaria was blunt: “His trading was pretty erratic. He’d have great months, but he took enormous risks to get there.”
在丹尼斯的管理下，随着时间的推移，很明显，是最不听话的人得到了最多的资金。几乎每个人都谈到了柯蒂斯·费思，曾经一度他交易的资金是别人交易资金的总和。迪玛利亚很直接：“他的交易不稳定。有几个月他的表现很好，但是他的风险太大了。”
In 1989, the Wall Street Journal described Curtis Faith as “the most successful Turtle.” The article included a chart showing the performance numbers of fourteen Turtles, but conspicuously absent from the chart were Faith’s performance numbers. Only in the text of the article was there mention of “trading records” showing that Faith made about $31.5 million in profits during the Turtle program.
1989年，《华尔街日报》把柯蒂斯·费思描述成“最成功的海龟。”报纸用图表显示了14个海龟的业绩，但却故意没有印出柯蒂斯·费思的业绩。只是用文字说明费思在海龟试验中赚了3150万美元。
However, if you look at the big picture this headline was problematic. If Faith was trading the most money, and hence earning the most from incentive fees, then the Wall Street Journal was in severe error by saying he was the most “successful” Turtle. To appreciate the imbalance between Faith and the other Turtles, consider an example: Trader “John” is given $20 million to trade and trader “Mary” is given $20,000 to trade. They both get a 15 percent incentive fee and both produce plus 50 percent returns. It can’t be said with a straight face that John is unilaterally more successful.
如果你再想想，那么这个头条是有问题的。如果费思交易的资金最多，并由此提成最多，那么《华尔街日报》说他是最成功的海龟，这个说法就是错的。考虑一下费思和其他海龟之间的不平衡，比如“约翰”得到了2000万美元，“玛丽”得到了2万美元。他们的提成都是15%，都赚了50%。那就不能直接说约翰最成功。
During research, I found a chat forum posting with what appeared to be an inside view of the Turtles’ allocations. The post reiterated the $31.5 million that Faith purportedly made, but also said that the entire Turtle group “made around $100 million.” This chat forum posting emphasized that Faith had made 30 percent of the total. It concluded with faulty logic, “What Jerry Parker made 5 years later trading a much larger equity base is not relevant.”
在研究中，我在网上论坛发现了一个帖子，里面说明了海龟们的资金分配情况。这个帖子反复声明，虽然费思号称赚了3150万美元，但是整个海龟团队赚了1亿美元左右。这个帖子强调费思赚了总利润的30%。但逻辑不对，“和杰瑞·帕克在5年后交易了更多的资金不符。”
That posting conveniently left out the critical fact that Faith was trading upward of twenty times the equity base of other Turtles. In other words, Faith made more because he was trading more. But there are no performance numbers demonstrating that he was the best-performing Turtle.
这个帖子说明了一个事实，费思交易的资金是其他海龟的20倍。换句话说，费思的资金多，所以他赚的多。但是却没有数字证明他是最优秀的海龟。
However, as long as the risk Faith was taking was within the parameters, this was not considered a big deal. DiMaria was quick to correct that view: “No, not within the parameters. That was sort of the standing joke. There were parameters and then there were Curtis parameters. He just got to do whatever he wanted. It’s as if the whole thing was decided on ‘who knows what?’ criteria. Who were going to be the good traders and who weren’t? And returns be damned. It was totally fundamental. It was, ‘Mike Cavallo, he’s like the smartest guy in the program. We got to give him a lot of money.’ I was at the other end of the spectrum. Maybe because I was a control person and they thought I wasn’t going to be anything.”
即使费思在交易时承受的风险在标准范围之内，这也没有什么了不起。迪玛利亚快速指出问题所在：“不，他的风险超过了标准。有点搞笑。丹尼斯定了一个标准，费思却有自己的标准。他想怎么干就怎么干。似乎可以为所欲为。谁是优秀的交易者，谁不是优秀的交易者？回报额不算，这是当时的正常现象。迈克·卡瓦洛才是最聪明的人，我们应该给他很多资金。我自己可以少拿点。也许因为我是控制人员，他们以为我不算什么。”
Faith saw it differently, saying there was a certain amount of variability when they were taught the S1 and S2 trading systems. He saw his subjective choices as key to his success. Faith was also the most openly competitive in his public statements about his experience. It could be that when Faith said he wanted to beat everyone in the room, he was motivated by his lack of a college degree (Jehovah’s witnesses do not advocate college as part of their religions practice). Or he simply may have had a healthy “I will show them” chip on his shoulder.
费思的观点不同，他说系统1和系统2确实有点不同。他认为他的主观选择是他成功的关键。费思的言论有点竞争性。他说他想打败所有人，因为他没有大学学历，所以他需要一个动力（耶和华的信徒不应该因为大学学历而和别人争论）。或者他只是简单地想证明给大家看。
At first blush, DiMaria’s initial comments could have been “sour grapes.” However, they weren’t made purely out of self-interest; he saw other Turtles getting the short end of the allocation stick. He said, “George Svoboda was an absolute genius and probably had the potential to be the best trader of all and might be.” However, as the program went on, many Turtles saw that the correlation between trading success and the amount of money they were given by Dennis as not very good.
一开始，似乎迪玛利亚的言论是吃不到葡萄说葡萄酸。但是他也不是为了自己才这么说的，他看到有些海龟分到的资金不多，但坚持下来了。他说：“乔治·斯沃博达绝对是个天才，有希望成为最优秀的交易者。”然而，随着实验的进行，很多海龟发现交易的成功和得到的资金并不成正比。
Yet DiMaria added, “I think at the end of the first year I was one of the top performers, if not the top performer. My bonus was like $10,000 when other people were getting $600,000. I had a kid and all and it was tough. It was very, very difficult.”
迪玛利亚补充说：“我认为在第一年结束时，我的成绩即使不是最好，也是非常好的。我的奖金是10000美元，而别人得到了600000美元。我有一个小孩，当时很艰难，真的很艰难。”
Twenty years later, the regret of not being given the opportunity to trade a larger account for Dennis still comes across in DiMaria’s voice. There was a touch of Rodney Dangerfield’s “no respect.” However, it is worth noting that today DiMaria has a continuous month-by-month track record dating back to 1988. That’s a twenty year track record in stark contrast to Faith’s lack of performance numbers over the last 20 years.
20年后，迪玛利亚仍然为没有机会为丹尼斯交易大资金而让感到遗憾。现实很无情。然而，值得一提的是，迪玛利亚从1988年到现在都有交易记录。而费思这20多年来却没有交易业绩。
While many Turtles like DiMaria thought Dennis was playing favorites, Mike Cavallo bluntly disagreed. He thought allocations were all performance driven. In 1984, Dennis decided that trading grains wasn’t worth his time anymore. He gave those grain accounts to Howard Seidler, Faith, and Cavallo to trade.
虽然很多像迪玛利亚这样的交易者认为丹尼斯有偏爱的迹象，迈克·卡瓦洛却坚决不同意。他认为资金额是根据业绩分配的。1984年，丹尼斯认为谷物市场不会像当年那么有希望。他就把谷物的账户给了霍华德·辛德勒，费思和卡瓦洛，让他们交易（然后他们赚大钱了）。
Talk about even more tension. Everyone in the room knew about these grain accounts. They all knew they created the potential for trading much larger, with the chance to earn much more through incentive fees. Cavallo agreed: “I would say, sure there was some jealousy. I think it’s just human nature. People are in this great job that’s so much better than anything they’ve ever done, so much fun, and so lucrative, and who are now making six-figure incomes for the first time, get jealous of the people making seven-figure incomes.”
谈谈更紧张的事。每个人都知道谷物账户的事。他们都知道这样就有机会交易更大的资金，提成也更多。卡瓦洛同意这点：“我想说，当然有人会嫉妒。这是人性。没有人交易过这么大的账户，而且很有趣，利润也很大，收益是7位数，别人当然会嫉妒的。”
Although no one knew to the penny what other Turtles were making, it was obvious some were trading much more money than others. Everyone was worth basically the same when the Turtles started. Then, within eighteen months to two years, a few Turtles were millionaires and many were not, but all the while everyone was generating very similar returns. This was tension personified.
虽然没人知道对方交易的具体数字，但是很明显，有些人的账户的资金比别人多了很多。海龟起步的时候是平等的，18个月到2年后，虽然每个人的回报率差不多，但个别海龟成了百万富翁，而大部分人却不是。这样就有了紧张气氛。
Cavallo also saw more than just allocation issues at play. He witnessed some Turtles who were less confident in their trading. There were Turtles actually imitating other Turtles. He saw a few trying to piggyback others’ trading orders.
除了资金分配的问题，卡瓦洛还看到了其它问题。他发现有些海龟对交易没有信心。有些海龟在模仿别人。有少数海龟照别人的订单交易。
However, in the end, it all kept coming back to allocations. For instance Jerry Parker was not happy about being allocated such a small amount either. Parker thought he was trading just as well as the Turtles who were getting the big allocations. The performance numbers support that. At one point in 1986, Parker was trading $4.2 million for Dennis. Then, in 1987, he was trading $1.4 million. Parker made plus 124 percent for 1986 and plus 36 percent for 1987.
但是最终还是分配的问题。杰瑞·帕克对自己分到的小账户就不满。帕克认为他的成绩和分到大资金的人一样好。业绩报告能支持他的观点。在1986年，帕克为丹尼斯交易的资金是420万美元。到了1987年，他交易的资金是140万美元。帕克在1986年赚了124%，在1987年赚了36%。
Erle Keefer said that politics was the reason why Parker received smaller allocations from Dennis. Keefer said that Parker believed that, too. He said, “Jeff Gordon and Jerry are the political polar opposites of Rich. Jerry was about the biggest polar [opposite].”
尔勒·科夫说政治才是帕克分到小资金的原因。科夫说帕克也相信这点。他说：“杰夫·戈登和杰瑞2人与理查德的政治观点不同。杰瑞更反对丹尼斯的政治观点。”
Dennis was giving positive reinforcement in the form of larger allocations not only to Turtles who were willing to take bigger risks, but also apparently to those with whom he had become closer friends. Parker was a Republican. Obviously, he wasn’t Dennis’s favorite Turtle.
丹尼斯不但给愿意承担更大风险的人更多的资金，而且给好朋友更多的资金。帕克是共和党。很明显，他不是丹尼斯喜欢的海龟。
Parker may have been the first Turtle hired, but Dennis was still a human being. Keefer added, “He still had his favorites. Curt was a favorite. Mike Cavallo was a favorite. Then you look at some other people and you say, ‘Why did they get less money?’ Maybe they just didn’t want to pull the trigger on big numbers?”
也许丹尼斯最先聘用了帕克，但是丹尼斯也是人。科夫补充说：“他有自己的爱好。他喜欢柯蒂斯。他喜欢迈克·卡瓦洛。然后你看着其他人说‘为什么他们分到的资金很少？’也许是因为他们不敢冒大险？”
Parker was by no means the only Turtle whose allocation was cut back after big performance runs. Many other Turtles with seriously eye-popping performance had their money under management slashed. Liz Cheval, Paul Rabar, and Mike Carr all had their allocations cut.
帕克并非是唯一一个业绩好，而资金被减少的海龟。很多其他海龟都有惊人的业绩，但资金都被减少了。莉斯·雪娃，保罗·拉巴和迈克·卡尔的资金都被减少了。
The fear of not knowing what to expect next was a constant in the Turtles lives. Turtles would get calls without explanation to increase or decrease 20 percent of their account size. They scratched their heads, wondering what was going on. Some Turtles joked that perhaps they were in a cruel psychological experiment. Others seriously considered the possibility that they were being filmed like Jim Carrey in the Truman Show.
海龟们一直担心自己前途未卜。海龟们的账户总是不问理由地被增加或减少20%。他们抓着自己的脑袋，不知道为什么。有些海龟开玩笑地说，也许这是残忍的心理实验。其他人则很严肃的认为也许他们就是电影《楚门的世界》里面的金·凯瑞（被人监视，当试验品）。
Mike Cavallo, who viewed the allocation process as a meritocracy, did end up having some questions, too. He thought Dennis was partly awarding trading aggressiveness, placing bigger bets with Turtles he thought were trading better, but even Cavallo could not understand Dennis’s decision-making logic when it came to Faith. He said, “It seemed like Curt was trading too aggressively and too riskily and yet was getting rewarded for it. He was making the most, although probably not on a risk-adjusted basis. So at the time, it was just sort of puzzling. I’m not particularly a jealous person, so I wasn’t too worried about it.”
迈克·卡瓦洛看到资金的分配过程被能人统治着，他也有一些疑问。他想丹尼斯也许是为了鼓励积极进取的人，希望他们会交易的更好，但是卡瓦洛也不明白为何丹尼斯要鼓励费思。他说：“费思交易最积极，风险也是最大的，但是他却得到了奖赏。他的交易根本没有考虑到风险控制。所以在当时，我也迷惑不解。我这个人不喜欢特别嫉妒别人，所以我也不是太担心这个问题。”
Cavallo knew Dennis had become very successful as a very young man by taking big risks. The implication was that Faith was Dennis’s chosen one. Others said the C&D brain trust were enamored with the fact that Faith was so young.
卡瓦洛知道丹尼斯在年轻时因冒很大的风险而变得非常成功的。费思是丹尼斯选择的。其他人则说丹尼斯喜欢费思是因为他很年轻。
It become increasingly apparent that the whole subject of allocations issues was just an entry into the central sticky issue of the program: favoritism. The disparity began almost out of the gate. There was a heating oil trade only weeks after the Turtles’ initial training in 1984. The Turtles were supposed to be trading much smaller sizes. They were supposed to be trading “one lots” or just one futures contract.
事实越来越明显，分配到的资金大小和一件事有关系：他喜欢谁。不公平的事发生了。在1984年海龟们的培训刚开始时，有一笔关于取暖油的交易。本来海龟们交易的仓位很小。也就是只能交易1份合约。
Faith apparently traded much larger and made more money than all of the other Turtles. Cavallo thought Faith had exceeded what they were allowed to trade, but he also thought an arguably reckless or “go for the jugular” attitude may have elevated him in Dennis’s eyes.
很明显，费思交易的仓位很大，所以赚的钱比其他海龟都多。卡瓦洛认为费思交易的仓位超过了规定的仓位大小，但是对于丹尼斯来说，费思的行为既可以理解为鲁莽，也可以理解为“直取咽喉”的交易态度。
It kept coming across loud and clear from assorted Turtles: Faith’s trading didn’t reflect what they’d been taught. Cavallo, the Harvard MBA, was brutally honest: “It wasn’t at all what we were taught. In fact, you could say it was slightly counter to what we were taught.” Even though Cavallo was making millions and was easily considered a top-grossing Turtle at the time, the fact that Dennis gave more and more money to Faith perplexed him. Cavallo had no ax to grind in talking about Faith. In fact, years later he served on the board of directors of a firm Faith had started.
海龟们都一致认为：费思的交易行为和大家所学到的知识不一致。卡瓦洛是哈佛的工商管理硕士，他很诚实：“这和我们学的完全不同。事实上，可以说他完全违反了我们所学的东西。”虽然卡瓦洛也赚了几百万，而且当时他的收益最高，但是丹尼斯把越来越多的资金分配给费思，这事也让他迷惑不解。卡瓦洛不想过多地谈论费思。实际上，几年后他还在费思的公司做董事。
Why was Cavallo concerned about Faith’s style of trading? He worried that Faith was risking so much that he could ultimately be ruined (as in mathematical risk of ruin). From that first day of class Eckhardt had pressed home the point of managing risk, but many Turtles saw it almost immediately being ignored by one of their own.
为什么卡瓦洛担心费思的交易风格？因为他担心费思的风险太大，最终会毁了自己（指数学上的概念）。从第一天开始，埃克哈特就强调管理风险的重要性，而很多海龟却发现有人就是不听。
DiMaria, who was only eighteen months older than Faith, saw everyone playing by the rules during the program except Faith. He said, “That would go to position sizing, markets traded . . . he was the special boy wonder. So he could do things that the rest of us couldn’t. He probably doesn’t realize that. Did he have special rules ahead of the game, or did he change the game and then ask if those new rules were okay?”
迪玛利亚只比费思大18个月，发现除了费思，每个人都是按照原则交易的。他说：“在仓位大小方面，市场方面……他都很特殊，和别人不一样。所以他可以做别人不敢做的事。他自己可能都不知道这点。他是不是有特殊的原则，是不是他改变了原则？”
Jeff Gordon was the first to broach Faith’s religion. He said, “Curtis was a Jehovah’s Witness. A person of faith, a religious person, someone who you’d think would have morals. I am not saying that Curtis does not have morals or religious convictions. But when it came to handling Richard Dennis’s money, Curt could have cared less if he lost it all. That’s how he conducted himself. The fact of the matter is, in retrospect that appears to be what Rich wanted. Rich wanted people who would be really aggressive.”
杰夫·戈登第一个反对费思的做法。他说：“柯蒂斯是耶和华的信徒。一个有信念的人，一个教徒，有人会认为他是有道德的人。我并非就是说柯蒂斯没有道德，或没有宗教信用。但是在处理丹尼斯的金钱方面，柯蒂斯似乎不在乎把钱亏光。他就是那么做的。事实是，事后回想，似乎丹尼斯也希望大家这么做。丹尼斯希望大家积极进取。”
The most remembered and controversial trade in the program was that 1984 heating oil trade. All the Turtles were trading $100,000 in the first month, and Faith made much more money pyramiding than the others. Dennis loved it. Gordon was shocked: “It was actually kind of strange because Curtis started getting personal calls from Rich, and he would come in the morning and say, ‘Hello, well Rich and I were talking last night and he said, ‘da da da.’ Nobody else was getting these calls.”
大家记忆最深，也是最有争议的交易就是1984年的取暖油交易。所有的海龟都在第一个月交易100000美元，费思的加仓量比其他人都多。丹尼斯喜欢这样。戈登很吃惊：“柯蒂斯会得到丹尼斯的单独指导，他会在早上进来时说‘昨晚我和丹尼斯讨论了，他说‘这个事要这样办，那个事要那样办。’其他人从没有得到过丹尼斯的指导。这太奇怪了。”
Faith saw the 1984 heating oil trade differently, saying that he bought three futures contracts per the rules and quickly added the maximum twelve contracts he was allowed. Heating oil went straight up, and all of the Turtles had big profits.
费思对1984年的取暖油有不同的看法，他说建仓3份合约是符合原则的，然后快速加仓到12份合约也是合情合理的。然后取暖油直线上涨，所有的海龟都赚了不少利润。
But Faith, said he saw something odd in the other Turtles’ trading. He said he was the only Turtle to have “on” a full position. It was Faith’s view that every single other Turtle had decided for some reason to not trade the system as Dennis and Eckhardt had taught them. He wondered if they had even been in the same class with him.
但是费思说其他海龟的交易有点奇怪。他说他是唯一一个满仓的海龟。费思认为其他海龟都没有按照丹尼斯和埃克哈特教的原则去做。他甚至怀疑大家是不是一个老师教的。
Because this was a very volatile trade, the price of heating oil soon plummeted. The Turtles began to exit. Faith believed that the right thing to do was to hold on (and not exit) as heating oil dropped. Soon it began to rise again, surpassing the previous high. Faith was apparently the only Turtle with all twelve contracts “long.” He said, “We had all been taught exactly the same thing but my return for January was three times or more than the best of the other Turtles.”
因为取暖油的波动很大，价格很快下跌。海龟们开始平仓。费思认为正确的事就是在下跌时持有仓位（不平仓）。很快取暖油又涨了，创造了新高。很明显，费思是唯一一个满仓持有12份合约的海龟。他说：“我们学的东西都一样，但是我在1月份的回报是其他最好的海龟的3倍。”
Mike Cavallo and Russell Sands both reinforced the point that Faith had a helping hand that other Turtles did not have. They said Dennis guided Faith at the liquidation point on this trade. It appeared that Faith was in a special “no fail” setup to which the other Turtles were not privy.
迈克·卡瓦洛和拉塞尔·桑兹都认为有人在帮助费思，而其他海龟则没有这么好的运气。他们说丹尼斯在指导他。似乎丹尼斯要力保费思。
Was all of this tension designed by Dennis just to see how other Turtles would react? Or was Faith getting extra ongoing instruction because he and Dennis had become friends?
是不是丹尼斯故意制造紧张气氛，以测试其他海龟的表现呢？是不是因为费思和丹尼斯的友情深厚，所以得到了额外的指导呢？
Mike Shannon connected the dots in very human terms: “I think some of the Turtles had different motivations for doing what they did. I did it because I just found at the end of the day, I just truly enjoyed the experience. You take guys like Jim Kenney and Anthony Bruck, I think their view was a little bit more artistic. Curt Faith, on the other hand, was driven by his father. His father was a Jehovah’s Witness and he had to pay a tithing to the church. It was like his dad was a stage mom almost . . . [He] would come up and we’d look at this guy and some of their beliefs are just a little bit off the wall.”
迈克·仙农说的很人性：“我想有些海龟的动机不一样。我的动机是每天收盘后都感到很享受交易的体验。像吉姆·肯尼和安东尼·布鲁克，我想他们的思想还是有点追求艺术。柯蒂斯·费思则不同，他受到了他爸的影响。他爸是耶和华的信徒，他必须向教堂捐款。他爸对他很严格……他必须很进取，所以我们会发现每个人的信念都不太一样。”
Now, Mike Shannon was no angel, but his words revealed a real-world picture of the goings-on in the office. The bottom line: Given the millions Faith was trading, given the clear allocation discrepancies, given the clear discontent, this drama over allocations and extra assistance was just as much a part of being a Turtle as the rules they were taught.
迈克·仙农并非天使，但是他的发言揭露了海龟办公室的真相。简单说就是：考虑到费思交易的几百万，考虑到资金分配的不同，考虑到明显的不满，过多的资金分配和过多的指导都是做为海龟实验的一部分。
Shannon was sympathetic when he described the situation: “[Curtis] made no secret of it. Look, he wasn’t running around giving us copies of [Jehovah’s Witness brochures] or anything bizarre like that . . . He was pretty upfront about it. He would say, ‘The church I belong to and blah, blah, blah and all that.’ ”
仙农在描述的时候表示同情：“柯蒂斯没有什么秘密。他喜欢给我们分发关于耶和华的手册，或做一些相关的事……他是很坦率的。他会说‘我所在的教堂这样啦，那样啦。’”
Perhaps Richard Dennis had become a father figure for the young Faith. Shannon added, “Rich really likes Curt a lot.”
也许对于年轻的费思来说，理查德更像一个父亲。仙农补充说：“理查德非常喜欢柯蒂斯。”
The Performance
业绩
The personal and perhaps subjective descriptions of what was taking place are fascinating, but the bottom line is performance data. Sol Waksman of Barclays Performance Reporting was the only person I could find with copies of the Turtles’ month-by-month performance while they were under Dennis’s umbrella.
也许个人对交易的描述很有趣，但是关键是看业绩。巴克莱业绩报告公司的索尔·瓦克斯曼是我找到的唯一一个拥有当时每月业绩报告复印件的人。
Table 7.1: Annual Turtle Performance.
图7.1：海龟的年度业绩
1984
1985
1986
1987
Mike Cavallo
迈克·卡瓦洛
14%
100%
34%
111%
Jerry Parker
杰瑞·帕克
-10%
129%
124%
37%
Liz Cheval
莉斯·雪娃
-21%
52%
134%
178%
Stig Ostgaard
斯汀格·欧斯格
20%
297%
108%
87%
Jeff Gordon
杰夫·戈登
32%
82%
51%
11%
Mike Carr
迈克·卡尔
24%
46%
78%
49%
Jim Melnick
吉姆·梅尔尼克
102%
42%
160%
46%
Howard Seidler
霍华德·辛德勒
16%
100%
96%
80%
Phil Lui
飞利浦·卢
132%
129%
78%
Tom Shanks
汤姆·桑克斯
18%
170%
146%
Jim DiMaria
吉姆·迪玛利亚
71%
132%
97%
Brian Proctor
布莱恩·不劳特
55%
116%
185%
Paul Rabar
保罗·拉巴
92%
126%
78%
Mark Walsh and Mike O’Brien
马克·沃尔什和迈克·欧博仁
99%
135%
78%
Source: Barclays Performance Reporting (www.barclaygrp.com).
来源：巴克莱业绩报告公司。
Nothing illustrates the life of a Turtle while working for Richard Dennis better than the monthly ups and downs of the raw performance numbers. Consider the performance of three Turtles, Mike Cavallo, Jerry Parker, and Liz Cheval, during 1985 (more Turtle performance numbers are in the appendix.):
月度业绩报告更能说明海龟的情况。请看看3个海龟的业绩，他们分别是迈克·卡瓦洛，杰瑞·帕克和莉斯·雪娃。时间是1985年（更多的海龟业绩请看附录。）：
Table 7.2: 1985 Month-by-Month Performance for Mike Cavallo, Jerry Parker, and Liz Cheval.
图7.2：1985年迈克·卡瓦洛，杰瑞·帕克和莉斯·雪娃的月度业绩
Date
日期
Mike Cavallo ROR
迈克·卡瓦洛的回报率
Jerry Parker ROR
杰瑞·帕克的回报率
Liz Cheval ROR
莉斯·雪娃的回报率
Jan-85
85年01月
24.45%
2.51%
26.70%
Feb-85
85年02月
-12.49%
18.92%
23.07%
Mar-85
85年03月
55.73%
-8.77%
-20.29%
Apr-85
85年04月
-15.39%
-20.38%
-27.80%
May-85
85年05月
4.50%
17.52%
72.49%
Jun-85
85年06月
2.50%
-10.30%
-22.48%
Jul-85
85年07月
53.75%
61.05%
29.21%
Aug-85
85年08月
-20.62%
1.18%
-18.77%
Sep-85
85年09月
-34.21%
11.25%
-26.93%
Oct-85
85年10月
-5.09%
14.61%
-6.60%
Nov-85
85年11月
39.52%
20.99%
46.98%
Dec-85
85年12月
22.82%
-2.46%
20.04%
VAMI (Value Added Monthly Index): An index that tracks the monthly performance of a hypothetical $1,000 investment as it grows over time.
每月增值指数：一个指数，用来跟踪以1000美元投资为基准的业绩增值情况。
ROR: Rate of return.
ROR：回报率。
Source: Barclays Performance Reporting (www.barclaygrp.com).
来源：巴克莱业绩报告公司。
I found the omission odd that Sol Waksman did not have Curtis Faith’s numbers from inside the Turtle program. Faith said that his performance numbers were not available because he never constructed an approved track record for his years trading Dennis’s money, preventing him from giving his exact Turtle performance numbers.
我发现了一个奇怪的现象，索尔·瓦克斯曼遗漏了柯蒂斯·费思的业绩数据。费思说他没有业绩报告，因为他的业绩报告从没有被批准过，所以他没有准确的业绩报告。
However, how was it even possible that Faith could be trading so much more money than other Turtles? Dennis had a lot of money, but not an infinite amount. Other Turtles said money was being taken from their accounts and given to Faith’s account.
那么，为何费思可以交易比其他海龟更多的资金？丹尼斯有很多钱，但不是无限的。其他海龟则说他们账户的资金被取出来了，然后被转进了费思的账户。
Interestingly, once Faith’s account got really big, things apparently went south. One Turtle saw Faith losing much of his gains in a 1987 silver trade; it was his contention that all of the money Faith had ever made for Dennis may have been lost on that one trade.
有趣的是，一旦费思的账户变大了，事情明显就变坏了。有一个海龟看见费思在1987年交易白银时把大部分利润都亏掉了。他强调的是，费思也许把帮丹尼斯赚的所有利润在一笔交易中亏光了。
Other Turtles talked about this silver trade, too. One said that Faith didn’t exactly follow the system because he had “gotten a feel for it.” When silver finally spiked down from a big run-up, he saw Faith as the last trader actually trying to exit.
其他海龟也谈到了白银交易。有一个海龟说费思根本不遵守系统，因为费思是靠感觉做的。当白银在上涨之后最终下跌时，他发现费思是最后一个平仓的。
Faith admitted that he was in error. In the EliteTrader.com chat forum, he said it was his single worst mistake trading: “I was holding 1,200 contracts of Comex Silver, yep the 5,000 ouncers for 6,000,000 ounces for Richard Dennis’s account. This along with 500 contracts of Comex Gold. Rode it all the way up and almost all the way down accounting for a whopping - 65 percent drawdown in the account. The equity swing on the high-move day for the account from the high to the low was something ridiculous, like $14 million.”
费思承认他当时犯错了。在论坛elitetrader.com中，他说那是他唯一最糟糕的错误：“我持有1200份纽约商品交易所的白银，其中5000盎司是丹尼斯账户中6000000盎司的一部分。当时还同时持有500份纽约商品交易所的黄金合约。它们一起上涨，一起下跌——账户回吐了65%。当天的账户起落很大，从最高点到最低点的变化值很荒谬啊，高达1400万美元。”
At the end of the day there was no way to verify the exact amount Faith lost on that silver trade, and there was no way to verify Faith’s exact $31.5 million profit figure while working for Dennis either. In trying to do so, I talked with reporter Stanley Angrist who wrote that 1989 Wall Street Journal article nearly twenty years ago. He told me that he had no way to verify Faith’s earnings. He received that $31.5 million number from Faith himself.
当天以后，无法去确认费思交易白银到底亏了多少，也无法确认费思是不是真的帮丹尼斯赚了3150万美元。为了确认这些数字，我和记者斯坦利·安格瑞斯特有过交谈，他就是在20年前为《华尔街日报》写那篇报道的人。他告诉我他无法确认费思的收益。3150万美元这个数字是费思告诉他的。
While this silver trade may have been one of the final behind-the-scenes sagas within the Turtle experiment, it certainly wasn’t the last one. Once the idea of taking too much risk and not following rules was on the table, it was as though a dam broke. David Cheval, Liz Cheval’s former husband, saw more than one Turtle in the first year ignore the rules and take excessive risk. He said, “I also believe that Rich increased the stake of several traders because they blew out the initial stake - not necessarily because they were the top traders.”
白银交易只是海龟实验中的一个故事，肯定不是最后一个故事。一旦有人想承受太多的风险并不遵守原则时，就离溃堤不远了。大卫·雪娃是莉斯·雪娃的前夫，他当时看见不止一个海龟在第一年违反原则并承受过多的风险。他说：“我想丹尼斯给几个海龟更多的资金是因为他们一开始就把本金亏光了——并不是因为他们是最优秀的交易者。”
Curtis Faith disagreed saying that it wasn’t really possible to blow out the initial stake. He said that if the Turtles lost 50 percent on a closed trade basis they would not have money to trade. Fifty percent was not a cutoff point. Turtles clearly breached that, and the data proves it. However, when it comes to allocations there will always be a mystery, with assorted inconsistencies as everyone protects their real or perceived reputations twenty years later.
柯蒂斯·费思不承认他一开始就把本金亏光了的说法。他说如果海龟清仓后亏损了50%，他就不能再继续交易了。亏50%并非是被炒鱿鱼的限制。很明显，海龟们的亏损都超过了50%，数据也能证明这点。然而，一旦到了分配资金的时候，情况就变得很神秘，20年后每个人都想维护自己的名声。
That said, the allocation story had an ending. Sam DeNardo zeroed back in on allocations as he saw the second-year group of Turtles becoming destabilized. They were concentrating a lot on “How come you got $50,000 where I got $200,000?” or “Why did you get $600,000?” He saw them worried that they had done something wrong in Dennis’s eyes. DeNardo even tried to ease tensions by writing Dennis a letter to warn him that there was destabilization in the Turtle ranks. “They were fighting amongst each other,” he said.
资金分配的故事讲完了。山姆·迪拿杜说资金分配让第二届的海龟团队很不稳定。他们的注意力都集中在：“为什么你拿到了50000美元，而我拿到了200000美元”或“为什么你拿到了600000美元？”他们都担心是不是自己做错了什么，被丹尼斯发现了。迪拿杜甚至给丹尼斯写了一封信，告诉他海龟们的情绪不稳定。他说：“他们在搞内部斗争。”
Keefer also sent a brief letter to Dennis questioning his allocation formula. He believed that if Dennis had done nothing more than give an equal allocation to all Turtles, for example $5 million, he would have made much more money. He said, “I’m quite certain that it didn’t endear me to Rich a whole lot when I wrote the paper saying, ‘Here’s how the logic of asset allocation should be in this kind of a game.’ ”
科夫也给丹尼斯写了短信，询问自己的资金分配原因。他相信，如果丹尼斯能做到公平地分配资金，也给他500万资金，他也可以赚很多钱。他说：“当我写纸条说‘这个实验的资金分配必须按照这个逻辑分配’时，丹尼斯肯定不高兴。”
Keefer, who thought Dennis deserved a Nobel prize for his real-world work in harnessing volatility in his trading models, lamented the allocations aspect of the program: “You’ve got somebody that’s got an awesome trading system and he’s following really rigidly good protocols about trend trading and then he just literally blows it up on asset allocation.”
科夫认为丹尼斯做为交易模范，值得拿诺贝尔奖，但是在资金分配方面让人痛心：“有些人得到了很不错的交易系统，他严格地遵守原则交易，但是在资金分配方面他却大失所望。”
It was DeNardo, however, who got punished for questioning allocations - he got cut from the program. Dennis interpreted his letter as trying to make excuses for his losses. DeNardo said he followed the rules, but not always: “I remembered buying sugar when I should have been selling it. I just said, heck, ‘I’ll buy some.’ Well, I get called in for that. ‘You shouldn’t do that. It’s counter trend.’ Well, I never did it again. Let me tell you, they knew what you were doing.”
迪拿杜因为质问资金分配的事而受到了惩罚——他被开除了。丹尼斯看到了他的信，认为他在为自己的亏损找借口。迪拿杜说他虽然不是每次都遵守了原则，但基本上都遵守了原则：“我记得在应该卖出白糖的时候，我买入了。我说‘我要卖点。’然后丹尼斯打电话给我。‘你不应该这么做，这是逆势而为。’然后我再也没有犯错了。再说了，他们知道你的交易情况。”
The Memo
备忘录
While Dennis and Eckhardt always knew what the Turtles were doing, it turned out that the two mentors didn’t always know what they were doing. During all that downtime of waiting for the markets to trend, four Turtles from the second class (Tom Shanks, Paul Rabar, Erle Keefer, and Jiri “George” Svoboda) formed a small group to do trading research. They wanted to validate their rules instead of just playing by them.
虽然丹尼斯和埃克哈特始终都能知道海龟们在做什么，但是这2位导师似乎又总是不知道他们在做什么。当市场振荡时，大家就要等待，第二届有4个海龟（汤姆·桑克斯，保罗·拉巴，尔勒·科夫和吉里·“乔治”·斯沃博达）组建了一个小团队进行交易研究。他们想证实这些原则，而不是盲目地根据原则交易。
While the rest of the Turtles may have been reading the sports pages and playing Ping-Pong, this group spent their time building a systems testing platform. Doing that took them a year. The results of their research project shook the program. They determined that Dennis had everyone taking far too much risk.
其他海龟都在看报纸上的体育新闻或打乒乓球，这个小团队则花时间组建了一个系统测试平台，他们花了一年的时间才搞好。他们的研究结果对丹尼斯的系统表示担心，他们认为丹尼斯给每个人的风险太大了。
The Turtles had all been trading according to rules taught by Dennis and Eckhardt and were making millions, but the research team, using original Apple computers, blended the S1 and S2 trading systems (see chapters 4 and 5) together and found that instead of a worst-case-50 percent drawdown, they were consistently getting a worst-case-80 percent drawdown.
海龟们都按照丹尼斯和埃克哈特教的原则进行交易，并赚了几百万，但是这个研究团队用苹果电脑测试系统1和系统2（请看第04章和第05章），发现最大的缩水（回落）不是50%，而是80%。
Paul Rabar intuitively figured out the problem occurred when both systems (S1 and S2) got the entry breakout signal at the same time. At that moment they were putting on too much risk.
保罗·拉巴在直觉上找到了问题所在，也就是2个系统同时发出进场突破信号时有问题。如果那时进场，风险就非常大。
Dale Dellutri had somewhat arrogantly always said to the Turtles, “If you guys ever invent anything bring it to us.” Dellutri was clear that he never really expected that to happen, so turning over this new research was going to be a delicate matter. Dennis and Eckhardt’s attitude was, “We know this trading cave, and we know it better than anyone else.” And given the success they had had, why not think that way?
待尔·德鲁崔总是傲慢地对海龟们说：“如果你们有什么新发明，不要忘了告诉我。” 德鲁崔知道自己并不指望得到什么好东西，所以反对这个新研究时就比较微妙。丹尼斯和埃克哈特的态度是：“我们了解交易，我们比任何人都了解交易。”他们已经成功了，当然可以这么想。
However, the research team had determined the guys in the cave were off by a factor of 100 percent, and they told Dellutri. Soon afterward, Dellutri came out and ordered everyone to reduce their position sizes by 50 percent going forward.
然而，研究小团队发现交易之王的风险高达100%，他们告诉了德鲁崔。很快，德鲁崔出来命令所有人都把仓位减少50%。
On the heels of Dellutri’s order came the official memo from Dennis dated April 23, 1986. It said:
德鲁崔的命令是丹尼斯在1986年4月23日写的备忘录，上面说：
Real-world drawdowns far in excess of theoretically expected values have caused us to reassess the linkage between theory and fact regarding how big to trade. It seems that we have misconstrued the theoretical data so that you have been trading as much as twice as big as we thought. The good news is that this has been true throughout the whole trading program - your profits were doubled, but at the cost of a doubling of the risk. We must be living right.
现实的缩水要比理论值高，我们有必要重新评估我们该交易多大的仓位。似乎我们用理论数据误导了大家，所以你们交易的仓位比我们想象的大了一倍。好消息是在整个交易过程中理论是对的——你们的利润翻倍了，但是是建立在1倍的风险之上的。我们必须按照正确的方式生存。
Dennis went on to reiterate what Dellutri had already told them: They would soon have to cut back their trading by 50 percent. He wanted to turn the Turtles’ risk-taking back to what they expected it to be when they started the program. While this order did not change the rules for the Turtles, it meant they would be trading less money now. Instead of trading a $1 million account, they now traded that account as if it were a $500,000 account. Essentially, they were just massively de-leveraged.
丹尼斯又重申了德鲁崔告诉他们的命令：他们必须尽快把仓位减少50%。他希望海龟们把风险降低到实验刚开始时大家所期望的那个水平。这个命令并没有改变海龟们的原则，只是要求他们交易的资金要减少。如果以前是交易100万的账户，现在只能当50万交易。也就是说，他们之前的杠杆太高了。
Egos must have been bruised when those four Turtles beat Dennis and Eckhardt at their own game. They had been trading by these rules for years, teaching them to others, making millions, and then suddenly their trainees proved the rules were wrong. However, even after the cutback in their leverage, the Turtles kept performing. This was tension.
当这4个海龟打败了丹尼斯和埃克哈特的游戏规则时，有点伤他们自尊。他们按照这些原则交易了很多年，传授给海龟们，赚了几百万，然后突然告诉学生们这个原则是错的。然而，把杠杆降低之后，还是可以赚钱的。只是有点紧张而已。
Some Turtles thought there was a certain side of Dennis that felt as if he had created a bunch of Frankensteins (“My God, I’m competing against the people I trained!”). To top it off, during this period the Turtles were actually outperforming Dennis as a group.
有些海龟认为，丹尼斯的做法是创造了能毁灭自己的学生（上帝啊，我和自己的学生在竞争！）。总而言之，在这段时间内，海龟们整体的业绩确实比丹尼斯高。
Many Turtles thought they were doing better because they’d been taught good habits. Some thought Dennis had kept bad habits from the days when he was in the pit. Mike Shannon added, “He would not get angry, but he’d become hyper-critical about the certain execution of trades that would make sense if you’re standing in the pit, but really wasn’t as hyper-relevant if you were trading off the floor. He was always worried about ‘skid’ and we certainly were concerned about it as well.” But for some reason, not getting great fills on his trades (what the industry calls “skid”) was an ongoing (and perhaps irrational) bone of contention for Dennis.
很多海龟认为他们做的好是因为他们学到了好习惯。有些人认为丹尼斯在场内交易时就杜绝了坏习惯。迈克·仙农补充说：“他不会生气，但是如果他在场内交易，他会感到非常怀疑，但在场外交易就不会如此怀疑。他总是担心滑点亏损，我们当然也总是担心。”丹尼斯一直避免不要发生太多的滑点亏损。
For a man who taught logic and the scientific method to his students, it was amazing to hear that he worried too much about arguably inconsequential issues. He may have been feeling the tension when he once wondered outloud if he had a fatal pressure point: “I really am a contrarian at heart, and that’s really probably not good if you’re a mechanical trend follower.”
他教给学生们那么多逻辑和科学方法，却担心无足轻重的小事，这有点奇怪。也许有压力的时候他感到紧张：“我内心是个逆向交易者，但是对机械趋势跟踪者来说，这不太好。”
Bad omen.
这是糟糕的预言。
章 实验结束
“If Rich would not have traded against our positions, which I know he did at times, he’d have made even more money.”
Anonymous Turtle from interview
“如果理查德不和我们的仓位对赌，我知道他这么干过，也许他可以赚的更多。”
匿名海龟
In early 1988, the big political news was that the Soviet Red Army was withdrawing from Afghanistan. In the business arena, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. had just completed their then record leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco (surpassed only in February 2007 by Blackstone Group’s purchase of Equity Office). The Turtles had their own current event to deal with when Dennis suddenly pulled the plug.
1988年初，新闻说苏联红军从阿富汗撤军，这是很重大的新闻。商业方面，科尔伯格·克拉维斯·罗伯茨公司收购纳比斯科公司公司（2007年2月被黑石集团收购）。丹尼斯突然不干了，海龟们遇到了自己的麻烦。
It was over. Dennis sent a fax telling the Turtles that the program had been scuttled. Dennis, who was managing money for clients, too, had two public funds with Michael Milken’s Drexel Burnham Lambert. They closed down with big losses. The reason for the Turtle program shutdown has never been officially defined, but Dennis’s performance numbers painted a sobering picture:
结束了。丹尼斯给海龟们发了传真，告诉他们这个实验结束了。丹尼斯也打理客户的资金，他管理着迈克尔·米尔肯的德崇证券下的2个基金。它们因为重大亏损而被关闭。没有海龟实验中止的具体原因，但是丹尼斯的业绩说明了问题：
The game changed for Dennis when his losses were 55 percent in April 1988. Not only was his public fund performance beyond terrible; his father had recently died. One Turtle attributed the program’s closure to “family issues.” They were tough times for sure. However, April was not a terribly tough performance month for the Turtles. They typically lost 10 to 12 percent each for that month (see Appendix). Their losses were nowhere near the size of Dennis’s losses.
丹尼斯在1988年4月亏损了55%，这个游戏改变了。不但他的公共基金亏的厉害，他的父亲在不久前又去世了。有一个海龟说这个实验的终止是因为丹尼斯的家事。当时丹尼斯日子不好过。然而，4月并非是海龟们最糟糕的月份。当时他们只亏损了10——12%（请看附录）。他们的亏损离丹尼斯的亏损还远着呢。
That said, the shock of having the plug pulled threw the Turtles for a loop. Jim DiMaria was bewildered at the Turtle program’s abrupt ending: “All of a sudden it’s over. That’s how fast it was. They came in Monday morning and said, ‘Friday, we’re done.’ I was like, ‘Oh, better get a job.’ ” Some argued that his heavy losses forced Dennis out of the game, but DiMaria said personal trading losses didn’t force his hand.
丹尼斯突然终止了实验，让海龟们不知所措。吉姆·迪玛利亚当时感到很迷惑：“突然就没了。太快了。他们周一早上进来时说‘周五关门。’我当时想‘又要找工作了。’”其他人则说是过多的亏损让丹尼斯放弃了这个实验，但是迪玛利亚说个人的亏损没理由逼丹尼斯放弃啊。
Table 8.1: Richard Dennis Trading Performance: January 1986 - December 1988.
图8.1：理查德·丹尼斯从1986年1月到1988年12月的交易业绩。
Date
日期
VAMI
每月增值指数
ROR
回报率
Yearly ROR
年回报率
Amount Size
账户大小
Sep-87
87年09月
7343
-15.29%
$159.2M
Oct-87
87年10月
6330
-13.79%
Nov-87
87年11月
6474
2.28%
Dec-87
87年12月
6572
1.51%
16.12%
$135.9M
Jan-88
88年01月
6736
2.49%
Feb-88
88年02月
6635
-1.49%
Mar-88
88年03月
6623
-0.19%
$113.0M
Apr-88
88年04月
2948
-55.49%
May-88
88年05月
2977
0.98%
Jun-88
88年06月
3009
1.10%
$40.0M
VAMI (Value Added Monthly Index): An index that tracks the monthly performance of a hypothetical $1,000 investment as it grows over time.
每月增值指数：一个指数，用来跟踪以1000美元投资为基准的业绩增值情况。
ROR: Rate of return.
回报率。
Source: Barclays Performance Reporting (www.barclaygrp.com).
来源：巴克莱业绩报告公司。
DiMaria said that it was Dennis’s money, and he just didn’t want to do it anymore. Other Turtles said in no uncertain terms that the program was ended as a consequence of the Drexel meltdown.
迪玛利亚说那是丹尼斯的钱，他不想再做了。其他海龟则说随着德崇证券的倒闭，海龟实验就结束了。
Dennis himself simply declared that he was retiring. He announced that he would move full time into political causes. He wanted to take the wind out of what he thought were efforts to make “liberal” a dirty word. He quickly plunged headlong into libertarianism. To him, libertarian ideals, which stressed individual rights, were a tonic for society. However, others were not buying his political posturing. They felt the big trading losses had pushed him into politics.
丹尼斯则简单地宣布自己退休了。他说他会专心从事政治。他想为自由做点事。他很快进入了自由党。他认为自由的思想，也就是强调人权的思想才是社会的补药。然而其他人却不理会他的政治主张。他们认为是交易上的重大亏损逼他去从事政治的。
When it came to discussing his rocky trading for the Drexel funds, Dennis laid partial blame on his clients. They did not understand the nature of his trading style and when the drawdowns started, they lost faith in him. He could never understand why his clients (either now or back in the early 1980s) lacked his steely resolve. He also wondered why Drexel’s administrative people let him down. When they came to see him he said, “What the hell are you doing?” As a floor trader, Dennis had been down more than 50 percent a few times. He asked Drexel, “Didn’t anyone tell these people what they were getting into?”
关于德崇基金的糟糕交易，丹尼斯则部分归咎于客户。他们不了解他的交易风格，当发生资金缩水时，他们就对他失去了信心。他永远不明白为何他的客户（从80年初到现在）不喜欢他钢铁般的方法。他也不明白为何德崇证券的管理层会让他失望。他们见到他的时候说：“你到底在做什么？”做为场内交易者，丹尼斯经历了几次50%以上的缩水。他问德崇：“难道没人告诉他们现状吗？”
Clearly, the marketing people sold only the “good times” to the clients invested in the Dennis-managed Drexel funds. That said, Dennis was the trader; he was the one with whom the buck stopped, not the brokers selling him to the masses. However, the Drexel fund’s troubles did not immediately discourage the former “Prince of the Pit.” He was confident even at his worst moment: “What should give investors confidence is the overall record I’ve compiled in my 18-year career.” An eighteen-year track records mean little to clients when you lose 55 percent in one month.
很明显，德崇证券是在最好的时光向大众推销丹尼斯管理的基金。也就是说，丹尼斯是交易者，他能赚钱，没有哪个经纪公司敢和他对抗。然而，德崇基金的麻烦并没有让交易场内的王子立刻挫败。他在最糟糕的时候也很自信：“我18年的生涯能给投资者带来信心。”如果你在一个月亏损了55%，18年的交易记录也不能说服客户。
Drexel executives have proved perennially unwilling to comment on the chain of events that led to the unraveling of Dennis’s fund back in 1988. Former Drexel executive Richard Sandor had a good natured response to me when I asked if he would comment on what happened; he said “not in a million years.” Not a surprising reaction from one of the more prominent names in Chicago trading.
德崇的高管也不想解释是什么原因导致了丹尼斯在1988年的资金缩水。前德崇高管理查德·桑德尔对我的问题做出了自然回应，他说：“永远不说。”芝加哥的名人这么回答也不奇怪。
However, Dennis himself was not as reticent, and he addressed his hard times head on: “I wouldn’t trade a public fund now even if it were a cure for cancer.” He was angry. He felt the risks of trading with him were fully disclosed in printed materials, and said, “I found out the hard way, by going through the courts that disclosure documents tend not to mean anything. The way our court system is structured, you can make ignorance work to your advantage, by saying, ‘I didn’t understand the risks and this shouldn’t have happened.’ ”
然而，丹尼斯本人没有保持沉默，他这样评论自己的艰难时刻：“即使公共基金是为了治癌症，我也不会去管理公共基金了。”他很生气。他发现他的秘密都被报纸披露了，他说：“即使去打官司，也打不赢。因为司法体系就是这样。他们可以解释说投资前根本不知道有风险。”
For someone famous for being sanguine about losses, it was surprising to hear Dennis voice frustration. Many had no sympathy. He was once the boy wonder. He was the guy who’d made hundreds of millions. He was the guy giving money to politicians to spread his influence. His career competitors, those he won money from in the zero-sum game, were not feeling his pain.
即使是在面对亏损仍然微笑的人都听见了丹尼斯话音中的挫败感，他们感到吃惊。很多人没有同情心。他曾经是少年天才。他曾经赚了几个亿。他曾经给政治家很多钱，以扩大自己的影响。他的竞争对手，也就是在这个零和游戏中亏钱给他的人是感觉不到他的痛苦的。
Lawsuits soon followed as his former clients in the Drexel funds argued that Dennis had deviated from his own rules. Eventually, U.S. District Judge Milton Pollack agreed to a settlement in which nearly six thousand investors shared $2.5 million and got half of Dennis’s trading profits over the next three years. Under the settlement, Dennis and his firms did not admit any wrongdoing.
德崇基金的客户还是告了他，说丹尼斯偏离了自己的原则。最终美国联邦区法官米尔顿·波拉克做出了裁决，将近6000名投资者可以平分250万美元，且从未来3年丹尼斯的利润中平分一半的利润。丹尼斯和他的公司没有承认自己做错了什么。
Even in the midst of losing and being understandably angry about nonstop lawsuits, Chicago’s living legend still managed to wax philosophical about what he was going through: “The sad truth is the legal system is so porous that even reflections of things gone and settled have liability that they shouldn’t. If I say one day I had a headache and didn’t take an aspirin, I guess someone could call me into court for that.” Dennis believed that at any time, the vast majority of trading results were determined by uncontrollable factors. He felt that was the case in this period.
除了亏损，无休止的官司，恼怒，芝加哥的传奇人物还要关心政治事件：“司法系统太糟糕了，陈年旧事也要被翻出来讲。如果有一天，我说自己的头不痛了，我不再吃阿司匹林了，我估计也有人会传唤我到庭作证。”丹尼斯相信，在任何时候，大部分交易的结果都是受不可控因素决定的。他想他的交易在当时也是如此。
Uncontrollable? Dennis’s students did not lose 50 percent in April 1988; he did. While followers of Dennis routinely thought his Turtles were an overly risky group because of his trading record, the Turtles’ trading strategy was not the same strategy their teacher was using. His losses were not the result of pure trend-following trading, and there is no way to know exactly what he was doing differently.
不可控的？丹尼斯的学生没有在1988年亏损50%，他却亏损了这么多。丹尼斯的跟随者认为海龟们用的策略风险很大，但是他们老师用的系统应该不一样。他亏损的原因并非仅仅是趋势跟踪交易，但无法知道他当时在做什么。
Larry Hite, a founding father in the hedge fund industry and someone at the beginning of the now multibillion-dollar British-based Man hedge fund, wasn’t sure what Dennis was doing at the time. He said that Dennis’s trading did not make sense, since there was no one market move that should have caused his losses.
拉里·海特是对冲基金的创始人，当时管理着现在价值几十亿的英国对冲基金，他不明白当时丹尼斯在干什么。他说丹尼斯的交易没有逻辑，因为当时没有任何市场可以导致这么大的亏损。
Like Hite, David Cheval appreciated what Dennis had been through but questioned his decision-making at a time when his peers were doing quite well: “The fact that Richard Dennis made a fortune from a small opening stake is admirable. The issue is whether he followed his system when he took public money. I believe his drawdowns and volatility were far in excess of those experienced by the Turtles during the same period. Trust me, I admire what Richard Dennis achieved. However, I do believe he is human and open to criticism.”
大卫·雪娃像海特一样，他感激丹尼斯曾经做出的努力，但是他质疑当时丹尼斯的决策过程，因为当时其他基金经理都做的很好：“丹尼斯有本事从一笔小钱而赚到一大笔财富，这是值得敬佩的。现在的问题是，当他接手公共基金时，他是否遵守了自己的系统。我认为他的缩水情况比同期的海龟们严重。相信我，我敬佩丹尼斯的成就。然而，我也相信他是人，也会犯错，人们有权利批评他。”
Mike Shannon, who was there to witness the chaos, was alarmed along with other Turtles at Dennis’s risk-taking. Shannon said that the Turtles always knew what Dennis’s positions were because of position limits. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) had limits designed to keep any one trader from trading too much of any one market.
迈克·仙农目睹了整个闹剧，和其他海龟一样，知道了风险控制的重要性。仙农说海龟们都知道丹尼斯的仓位情况。商品期货交易委员会对交易者的仓位有明确的限制，交易者不可以在任何市场过量交易。
However, there was another reason for the Turtles’ knowledge of Dennis’s trading positions: He was an open book. When Dennis was trading the Drexel funds, Shannon said the Turtles were allowed to trade one, possibly two, units of the S&P 500 stock index. Shannon said Dennis was trading ten or fifteen units of S&Ps. He said the Turtles couldn’t figure out why Dennis was overtrading when he had stressed time and time again that overtrading would kill you: “We calculated one day that his risk was probably one hundred times greater than the risk we were taking.”
海龟们知道丹尼斯的仓位，还有一个原因：他很开放。当丹尼斯管理德崇基金的时候，仙农说海龟们也可以交易1，2个单位的标注普尔500股指期货。仙农说丹尼斯交易了10或15个单位的标注普尔。他说海龟们也不明白为何丹尼斯过量交易，而他自己却一而再再而三地强调过量交易会杀了你：“有一天，我们计算了一下，他的风险是我们的风险的100倍。”
That Dennis was possibly taking risks over and above his Turtles by a factor of 100 simply made no sense. He knew enough to make his students do the right thing, but had a difficult time disciplining himself. Both his achievements and shortcomings were in plain sight.
丹尼斯承担的风险比海龟们承担的风险大100倍，这不合理。他知道如何让学生们做正确的事，但是却不能规范自己。他的成就和他的缺点并存。
Amazingly, even though Dennis was losing money on his own trading decisions, his Turtle trading hedge, in the form of his students’ great performance, was keeping him in the black. How much money did he make off of the Turtles’ trading over those four years? He did not blink, in answering, “Tons. I think they grossed $150 million and we made $110 million. We started out paying them ten percent. Why not? Why give them a lot - it was our money, we took all the risk.”
奇怪的是，虽然丹尼斯自己的交易亏钱了，海龟们的交易却还在赚钱。他在4年间赚了多少？他毫不犹豫地说：“几吨。我想毛利润是1.5亿，净利润是1.1亿。我们一开始给他们的提成是10%。为什么？为什么不多给点——那是我们的钱，我们在承担所有的风险。”
However, while Dennis was bowing out of the game, his Wall Street fame was about to skyrocket thanks to a new book that featured top traders ranging from Bruce Kovner to Ed Seykota to Larry Hite to Paul Tudor Jones.
但丹尼斯在做实验的时候，有一本新书介绍了他，让他的名声在华尔街一飞冲天。这本列出了顶尖的交易者，包括布鲁斯·科夫勒，艾德?塞柯塔，拉里·海特和保罗·都铎·琼斯。
In the book Market Wizards, author Jack Schwager softened the blow to Dennis’s tough times by entitling his chapter “A Legend Retires.” Schwager’s Dennis chapter became a cult classic. He may already have been an underground legend, but this chapter minted the Dennis legend to a whole new audience right at the rockiest time of his career.
在《市场奇才》中，作者杰克·施瓦格弱化了丹尼斯的艰难时刻，把章节标题写成“一个退休的传奇人物。” 施瓦格关于丹尼斯的章节变成了经典文字。他本来就是地下传奇人物，但是这个章节把丹尼斯展现在众人面前。
With his fame greater than ever, Dennis hit the speaking circuit. He was invited to make appearances at assorted investment conferences. Not since the 1970s had so many people wanted a piece of him. Now that everyone had read Market Wizards, they had visions of being selected for the next Turtle class - even if none were scheduled.
随着他名声的提高，丹尼斯开始到处演讲。很多投资报告会邀请他去演讲。不但在70年代有很多人想见他，就是在现在，很多人看了《市场奇才》以后，都希望能被他下次聘用——其实根本就没有海龟实验了。
Charles Faulkner met Dennis around this time at a Chicago Board of Trade conference in Chicago. He said, “When I read Dennis was appearing on a panel moderated by Jack Schwager, I immediately bought tickets. I had been thinking a lot about what made it hard for traders to follow their system.”
查尔斯·福克纳就是在芝加哥交易者会议上遇到丹尼斯的。他说：“当我知道丹尼斯要出席时，我就立刻买了票。我一直在思考，为何交易者使用他的系统是那么难。”
Faulkner saw Dennis being treated like a rockstar. Would-be Turtles mobbed him as he left the stage. Faulkner observed that Dennis was wary with so many people wanting something from him.
福克纳看见人们像欢迎摇滚歌星一样欢迎丹尼斯。当他下台的时候，很多人跟着他。福克纳发现，因为有很多人围着他取经，丹尼斯很谨慎。
Later that evening Faulkner was introduced briefly to Dennis. Faulkner, a close observer of human nature, who would himself be profiled in the second Market Wizards book, was struck by Dennis’s appearance: “I was close enough to notice that his face had the look of someone who was having a tough time of it and generally not taking care of himself. This got me to wondering about what the non-academic, not ‘hard work,’ requirements might be for successful trading. For here was someone whose success was costing him dearly.”
当天晚上，有人简单地把福克纳介绍给丹尼斯。在第二本《市场奇才》中，福克纳说丹尼斯让他吃惊：“我离他很近，我发现他经历了太多艰难，所以有点不修边幅。这让我怀疑成功的交易不需要知识和努力这句话。我发现他的成功已经让他消耗了太多。”
Whether or not Dennis needed a break from the most tumultuous time of his life, his Turtles had graduated. It was time to see if they could continue to win at the game without their teacher. This would be the real life experiment and with no Richard Dennis safety net.
不管丹尼斯是否需要从混乱中休息一下，他的海龟们都毕业了。现在看看在没有老师的监督下，他们是否能继续成为赢家。现在才是真正的实战，没有丹尼斯做保护网了。
章 他们只有靠自己了
“The biggest conspiracy has always been the fact that there is no conspiracy. Nobody’s out to get you. Nobody gives a shit whether you live or die. There, you feel better now?”
Dennis Miller, comedian
“最大的秘密就是没有秘密。没人会帮你。没人在乎你的生死。现在，你感觉好点了吗？”
丹尼斯·米勒，喜剧演员
Fame is a drug. It distorts perspective. The movie Trading Places, a fire-starter for the Turtle experiment, addresses fame when Eddie Murphy’s character, Billy Ray Valentine, makes the transition from street hustler to successful speculator.
名声就是毒品。他扭曲了你的未来。电影《颠倒乾坤》就是海龟实验的导火索，艾迪·墨菲扮演的比利·雷·瓦伦丁从一个街头流浪汉变成了成功的投机者。
Jettisoned into the lap of luxury, he is enjoying the good life, reflecting on his fortune while smoking a cigar and reading a Wall Street Journal article about himself. Coleman, his butler, peers at him admiringly and remarks how well he has done in only three weeks. Billy Ray thinks about it: “Three weeks? Is that all? You know, I can’t even remember what I used to do before all this happened to me.” His butler smiles back and says, “All you needed was a chance.
他开始过奢侈的生活，享受着，他在抽雪茄的时候还在看《华尔街日报》关于自己的报道。科尔曼是他的管家，羡慕地问他为何在3周内做的这么好。比利·雷思考了一下：“3周？仅仅是3周吗？你知道我在以前有多么辛苦嘛。”他的管家笑着说：“只要有机会就行。”
The Turtles were also given a chance, but in a heartbeat the security of trading Dennis’s millions was gone. One minute they were trading for a moneymaking god and the next minute they were literally on the Street. As it turns out, some of the Turtles foresaw job insecurity with Dennis and were preparing their own version of C&D Commodities. Others were on cruise control, unaware that life under Dennis’s cushy umbrella was about to end.
海龟们也得到了一次机会，但是为丹尼斯交易几百万的激情已经没有了。之前，他们还在为交易之王交易，现在他们就流落街头了。事实上，一些海龟知道跟丹尼斯干没有工作保障，他们也开了自己的商品公司。其他人则随波逐流，并不知道丹尼斯的如意保护伞不能一直撑下去了。
Jim DiMaria regretted the ending, saying that he thought all of the Turtles would have stayed if Dennis had kept the program going. He said, “I would never have left. Unless they made it that I couldn’t make money somehow.” Mike Cavallo agreed that it had been one great gig, but also said that Dennis shut the program down ultimately due to problems he had incurred from the 1987 stock crash. (Dennis’s April 1988 performance was a big reason, too.)
吉姆·迪玛利亚为海龟实验的关门而感到难过，他说如果丹尼斯不关门，所有的海龟就能待在一起。他说：“我永远不想离开。除非我不能赚钱了。”迈克·卡瓦洛同意这事影响很大，但也说丹尼斯关闭海龟实验和1987年的股市崩盘有关系。（丹尼斯在1988年的业绩是主要原因。）
However, just because Dennis pulled the plug on the Turtle program didn’t mean his students were headed back to obscurity. Instead, they became Wall Street’s newest rockstars. The phenomenon of students surpassing their teacher may not have been envisioned when Dennis created the Turtles, but it is not uncommon in other areas of life. The ascension of assistant coaches from winning sports teams to head coach happens all the time. Winning rubs off, and people want a piece of winners who have associated with even bigger winners.
然而，丹尼斯关闭了海龟实验，并不意味着他的学生们就默默无闻了。相反，他们都成为了华尔街的新兴摇滚明星。丹尼斯创造海龟的时候并没有想到学生会超过老师，在生活中的其它方面，这样的事经常发生。在体育界，助理教练经常会升为总教练。长江后浪推前浪。
Clearly, if Dennis had anticipated the Turtles (as a group) would make hundreds of millions of dollars trading for clients after working for him, he never would have shut down the program. Yet how could he have known that once his students were out of school, Turtle-mania would hit? Maybe he should have known. Other trend-following traders were doing well at the time. They were raising millions to trade, without the snap, crackle, pop of the Turtle story.
很明显，如果丹尼斯知道海龟们后来为客户赚了几亿美元，他肯定不会关闭这个实验。但是，他怎么知道他的学生们毕业后，海龟热就兴起了呢？也许他应该知道。当时，其他趋势跟踪交易者都做的很好。他们交易的资金高达几百万，让海龟更加出名。
In fact the Turtles as a group, along with Michael O’Brien, who had long raised client money for Dennis to trade, saw an opportunity in the whole being greater than the sum of its parts. The Turtles were going to use O’Brien as a broker to set up a Turtle fund. They met to discuss trading as a group, but could not agree on the split. Egos were on full display.
实际上，海龟们计划和迈克尔·欧博仁一起干，他之前给丹尼斯交易的资金很多，他看到了总体作战的好处。海龟们把欧博仁当作经纪公司，以成立一个海龟基金。他们在一起讨论整体作战，但是对分成无法形成统一的意见。都很自负。
Mike Shannon said that since they were probably “the best traders on the planet at the time,” it all went to the heads of some Turtles. Some thought they were better than others. However, the Turtles’ performance numbers while working for Dennis did not show great performance differences on average.
迈克·仙农说，因为当时大家都是地球上最优秀的交易者，每个人都这么想。有些人就认为自己比别人强。然而，在丹尼斯手下的业绩报告并不能说明谁最强。
That said, while most of the Turtles were confused about what to do next, one of them clearly saw the writing on the wall. Jerry Parker went back to Virginia to start figuring out a trading business on his own. One Turtle thought Parker was a “traitor” for going solo so fast when a Turtle fund idea was on the table. But the name of the game was survival.
大部分海龟都不知道下一步怎么办，有一个人目标很清晰。杰瑞·帕克回到了弗吉尼亚自己创业。有一个海龟认为帕克是叛徒，因为他跑的太快了，当时大家还在谈海龟基金的事。但是这个游戏的名字就是生存。
Parker’s desire to go at it alone was the final demise of any effort to create a single Turtle fund. The collective disappointment could be heard in one Turtle’s resigned tone: “It never worked out. It should have; it would have been one of the greatest superfunds in history.”
帕克决定独自创业让海龟基金搁浅了。一个离开的海龟失望地说：“海龟基金不会成功的，它本应该成功，也许会成为历史上最出名的基金。”
Quickly, most of the Turtles filed with the government to trade for clients. Anthony Bruck, Michael Carr, Michael Cavallo, Elizabeth Cheval, Sam DeNardo, Jim DiMaria, Jeff Gordon, Erle Keefer, Philip Lu, Stig Ostgaard, Jerry Parker, Brian Proctor, Paul Rabar, Russell Sands, Howard Seidler, Tom Shanks, Michael Shannon, and Craig Soderquist all had dreams of running the next C&D Commodities. Curtis Faith did not continue trading, saying that he was now retired at twenty-three.
很快，大部分海龟和政府签了协议，代客理财。安东尼·布鲁克，迈克尔·卡尔，迈克尔·卡瓦洛，伊丽莎白·雪娃，山姆·迪拿杜，吉姆·迪玛利亚，杰夫·戈登，尔勒·科夫，飞利浦·卢，斯汀格·欧斯格，杰瑞·帕克，布莱恩·不劳特，保罗·拉巴，拉塞尔·桑兹，霍华德·辛德勒，汤姆·桑克斯，迈克尔·仙农和克雷格·索德奎斯都梦想拥有C&D一样的公司。柯蒂斯·费思不再从事交易，他说他正好在23岁退休。
Turtles in The Market Wizards
《市场奇才》中的海龟
While the idea of a group Turtle fund died a quick death, Turtle fame on Wall Street began rolling. When Jack Schwager wrote The Market Wizards (1989) and its follow-up, The New Market Wizards (1992), his chapters on Richard Dennis and the Turtles made the Turtle experiment accessible to many for the first time.
当成立海龟基金的想法破灭时，海龟的名声在华尔街已经起来了。当时杰克·施瓦格写了《市场奇才》（1989）和续集《新市场奇才》（1992），他对丹尼斯和海龟的描写让很多人第一次了解了他们。
However, Schwager’s Turtle chapter ended up being about the fact that the Turtles kept saying, “No comment.” He even titled it “Silence of the Turtles” because they all refused to talk substance with him.
然而，施瓦格关于海龟们的章节总是以“无可奉告”结束。他甚至用了“沉默的海龟们”这个标题，因为所有的海龟都不愿意深入交谈。
Nondisclosure agreements were one reason why the Turtles wouldn’t talk, but another just as significant reason was that they were afraid too much publicity about their techniques would hurt their returns. Just the opposite happened. Their protective stance of “no comment” created an aura of mystery, even if this was unintended. It seemed that everyone who had heard of the Turtles wanted some of their money managed by them. The time was right to capitalize on their good fortune.
海龟们不愿意谈论的一个原因是合同规定了不能泄漏，另外一个明显的原因是他们担心大众知道了他们的技术，就会让他们的收益减少。结果事与愿违。他们越是“无可奉告”，大众越是感到神秘。任何一个人，只要听说了海龟，就希望他们能帮忙理财。当时是致富的好时机。
They all pursued that good fortune in different ways. Paul Rabar said the key was to get to Wall Street as soon as possible so they knew the Turtles after Dennis were alive, so to speak. Jerry Parker, however, stayed far away from Wall Street, heading to Richmond, Virginia, to explore ventures with Russell Sands. Sands had been trading in Kidder Peabody’s Richmond office. It was a good place to be, as Kidder had access to clients interested in traders like Sands and Parker. One Turtle remarked about Kidder Peabody’s operations there, “It was two guys sitting down there traveling around the world trying to raise Middle East money to trade. They had office space down there that they had given to Sands and he had been trading their money.”
他们都用不同的方式致富了。保罗·拉巴说关键就是尽快赶到华尔街，让大家知道海龟们还活着。杰瑞·帕克则远离了华尔街，回到了弗吉尼亚的里士满，和拉塞尔·桑兹一起创业。桑兹过去在基德公司里士满分公司交易。那是一个好地方，因为基德对桑兹和帕克感兴趣。一个海龟说了基德的操作方式：“2个人坐在那里，用中东的资金满世界地交易。他们在那里有分公司，正好让桑兹去帮他们交易。”
Most Turtles, however, were essentially one-man road shows. For example, when Paul Rabar first started out, people who wanted to invest with him would ask how he traded. Rabar said that if they wanted to invest, they could give him their money. Period. No questions asked. Potential investors would have to meet him at the airport. Some investors probably walked away from what could be perceived as his arrogance, but without a doubt, many were smitten by Rabar’s “take it or leave it” attitude. There is a fine line between confidence and arrogance, and Rabar walked it with great success.
大部分海龟都是独自交易。当保罗·拉巴开始交易时，投资给他的人喜欢问他是如何交易的。拉巴说，如果他们想学投资，就要给钱。很快，就没人问了。潜在的客户和他在机场见面。有些投资者则觉得他很自大，没有投资给他。没错，拉巴的态度就是要么接受，要么滚蛋。自信和自大之间有一条线，拉巴做的很成功。
Russell Sands and Jerry Parker initially walked that fine line together. Sands, in a classic small-world story, knew Kidder Peabody broker Kevin Brandt from college at NYU. Parker called Sands to ask if he would introduce him to some Wall Street people (read: brokers to help raise money to trade). Since the two guys at Kidder Peabody in Richmond were Sands’s friends, he quickly introduced Parker. Sands added, “The guys at Kidder Peabody basically looked at Jerry when they met him and they looked at me and said, ‘You guys will make a pretty good team together. If you [set up a firm], we’ll give you some seed money to get started.’ That’s how Chesapeake Capital got started.”
拉塞尔·桑兹和杰瑞·帕克一开始合作的很好。桑兹在纽约大学就认识基德的经纪人凯文·勃兰特。帕克打电话给桑兹，询问是否能介绍一些华尔街的客户（找经纪人筹集更多的资金）。因为2人都是桑兹的好朋友，所以他很快把帕克介绍给了他们。桑兹说：“基德的人看着杰瑞，然后看着我说‘你们两个可以做一个组合，如果你们有公司，我们会给自己启动资金的。’切萨皮克资金就这样诞生了。”
Making Dennis’s Rules Less “Risky”
减少丹尼斯原则中的风险
With the skids greased by Jack Schwager and the Wall Street Journal, all the Turtles should have been able to land on their feet. Yet one of the decisions each Turtle had to make was whether to trade at the level of risk they had been taught by Dennis or dial it back to make it more palatable for clients (go look at the volatility of the Turtle month-by-month numbers again in the Appendix). They had all just witnessed Dennis’s Drexel blowup, so theirs was rightful concern.
在杰克·施瓦格和《华尔街日报》的宣传下，每个海龟都找到了事做。每个海龟都面临一个问题，是用丹尼斯教的风险水平，还是为客户合理地减少风险（请看附录中海龟每月的业绩数字）。他们都目睹了德崇的破产，所以他们很担心这个问题。
Jerry Parker, it turns out, was the first Turtle who figured out the importance of using less leverage to appeal to investors, saying, “The bigger the trade the greater the returns and the greater the drawdowns. It’s a double-edged sword.” At the same time, the Turtle adventure was the learning experience that pushed Parker to reassess leverage choices:
杰瑞·帕克是第一个明白地向客户宣传低杠杆的好处的人，他说：“交易额越大，回报越大，缩水也越大。这是双刃剑。”同时，做为海龟的经历也让帕克减少了杠杆：
I lost 60% in one day, although we were still up 140% at the end of the day. I was probably managing $2 million when the program ended in 1988. When I started Chesapeake, I was sure it was not a good idea to lose 60% in one day. So I compromised on my risk, traded smaller, and tried for 20% a year.
我在一天之内缩水了60%，虽然当天收盘时还是赚了140%。在1988年海龟实验结束时，我管理的资金是200万。当我启动切萨皮克资金时，我想一天之内缩水60%绝不是好主意。所以我减小了风险，交易额很小，准备一年赚20%。
Using a ton of leverage (even if it was well thought out) was the reason for huge swings in the Turtles’ performance. Parker said, “We were nuts. And then later in the mid 1980s and 1990s, we said, ‘okay, let’s make +15%, +20%’ and we raised a billion dollars.’ If you’re going to raise a lot of money, people will be very happy with +15% or + 20%.”
使用高杠杆是海龟业绩波动的原因。帕克说：“我们很疯狂。后来在80年代中期和90年代，我们说‘还是以15%，20%为目标吧，我们可以把资金提高到10亿美元。’如果你的资金很高，人们对15%或20%的收益是非常满意的。”
Others in the hedge fund industry were on the same page with Parker’s view on leverage. Paul Tudor Jones (not a Turtle), for example, does not think he is a different trader today - except for reducing leverage. His returns have dropped since the 1980s, but his risk-adjusted returns are the same as in his early days. He said, “What’s different has been my own personal appetite for risk and volatility. I think that probably happens with a lot of people, as they get older. Everything is a function of leverage, how much of a drawdown are you willing to tolerate, how much leverage do you want to put on. When I was younger, I had much greater drawdowns, much greater drawdown frequency, much greater leverage.” (Side note: Jones got into trading after reading an article on Richard Dennis in college; he recalled, “I thought that Dennis had the greatest job in the world.”)
关于杠杆，对冲基金的其他人和帕克观点一致。保罗·都铎·琼斯（不是海龟）认为自己和别人一样——但他知道要减少杠杆。他的回报率从80年代开始减少，但是他的回报额还是和过去一样多。他说：“我个人对风险和波动性有什么看法。我想随着很多人年龄的增长，他们的看法和我一样。什么事都和杠杆有关系，你能承受多大的缩水，你就用多大的杠杆。当我年轻的时候，我的缩水很大，频率也很高，杠杆也很高。”（顺便说一下：琼斯是在大学时看了一篇关于丹尼斯的报道才开始交易的，他回忆说：“我认为丹尼斯找到了这个世界上最好的工作。”）
Parker simply used Dennis’s trading system in a way that was more appropriate for nervous clients. Not all clients always want the early Turtle-trading absolute returns, the big home runs. In general, high returns do not attract as much money from investors as lower-volatility trading (which means less return).
帕克还是用丹尼斯的交易系统，只是让客户不再紧张。并非所有的客户都要求高回报。通常高回报吸引的资金少，因为投资者喜欢波动小的交易（虽然回报低些）。
Not surprisingly, Parker’s efforts to change how he traded had an impact on other Turtles. Once big institutional investors looking to invest with a former Turtle had Parker, they didn’t really need more Turtles - that is, unless they offered something different than Parker.
帕克想改变自己的交易方式，也影响了其他海龟，也并不奇怪。大机构投资者在选择前海龟时，他们并不需要太多的海龟——他们需要不同的东西。
With Parker covering that piece of many investors’ portfolios, the other Turtles had to try and push their individual differences. The problem was that their performance numbers under Dennis showed a near identical group of traders. Many investors thought the Turtles all sat in a room and when a green light went off, they all bought Swiss francs. For Turtles looking to stand out on their own, this was not a good characterization to be making the rounds.
帕克管理很多投资者的资金，其他海龟则要努力使用不同的方法。问题是，他们在丹尼斯手下时的业绩都差不多。很多投资者认为所有的海龟都坐在一个房间里，当绿灯灭时，他们都买入瑞士法郎。因为海龟们都要独立，就没有必要一致了。
That did not stop the Turtles from trying to distinguish their trading. Michael Carr said that he was now prone to lighten up or take a portion of the profits. But it was more than just their style that the Turtles wanted to differentiate. Stig Ostgaard, in an effort to gain some distance from Dennis, said he traded on behalf of a well-known Chicago commodity trader in the Turtle program. In a stark demonstration of the Turtles’ ambivalence Ostgaard wanted to have Dennis on his résumé without having to name him.
海龟们都在改变自己的交易特点。迈克尔·卡尔说他现在更喜欢轻装上阵或兑现部分利润。但是除了交易风格，他们还要改变很多东西。斯汀格·欧斯格想和丹尼斯保持距离，他说他在海龟实验中为一个芝加哥出名的商品交易者交易。欧斯格不希望自己的简历上出现丹尼斯的名字，这是一种矛盾心理。
DiMaria also distanced himself from Dennis, saying that clients did not want 150 percent returns and double-digit negative months. The challenges for all of the Turtles, in starting their own version of C&D Commodities, were tough. The industry simply did not want Richard Dennis–type volatility.
迪玛利亚也在远离丹尼斯，说客户不希望先赚150%，然后又亏损2位数。海龟们在创业时，都很艰难。整个行业都不希望像丹尼斯那样大起大落。
This is not suprising. The industry is made up of institutional bean counters managing billions upon billions in pension plans. They don’t want higher-volatility or higher-return trading. There is no immediate benefit for them even, if it might be the optimal strategy for their pensioners in the long run. Why? Pension fund managers judge themselves by targeting benchmarks. They only worry about aggregate measures of what their peers are doing, which is by and large trading “long” only. With that mandate, Turtle returns are useless.
这不奇怪。这个行业机构的钱都是几十亿的退休金。他们不想要高波动或高回报。他们不需要立刻盈利，他们只想要长期赚钱。为什么？退休金基金经理说自己是按照标准办事。他们只关心同行做的如何，也就是长期做多。考虑到这个要求，海龟的回报就没用。
Even if it was arguably a bad long-term move to cater to clients’ desires for less leverage, there was only so much Turtles could do. If a client says, “I want this” and Turtles say, “I won’t trade that way, it hurts compounding,” they will not have that client. It was a classic Catch-22.
为了迎合客户的需求，所以要降低杠杆并长期慢慢地交易，这就是海龟唯一能做的事。如果客户说：“我要这样”，海龟说：“我不会那样交易的，那样复利太少了。”他们就不能要这样的客户。这真是左右为难。
Parker got it. He was quite willing to compromise the original rules, which was after all was making him super-rich in the early 1990s. But while, the idea of lowering returns by reducing leverage in the hope of reducing drawdown may have been a winning move for Parker, it wasn’t for all the Turtles.
帕克做到了。他总是屈从于客户的要求，以修改原则，结果在90年代初让他变得超级富有。为了降低回报而降低杠杆的做法给帕克带来了赢利，但其他海龟就不是这样。
In fact, it may have contributed to their downfall. The very nature of what the Turtles had been taught revolved around taking large calculated risks. Reducing the risk level quickly reduced the size of potential returns. In the trading business, big returns are critical. The basics of compounding are always at play. If Turtles were cutting their appetite for risk in year one, they left little or no cushion if their next year’s performance bombed.
实际上，这个方法可能导致失败。海龟们被教导要承受大风险。减小风险水平就很快减少了潜在的回报水平。在交易界，大回报是很关键的。复利的作用总是很重要的。如果海龟们在第一年减少了风险，如果第二年的业绩又不好，那么他们就没有缓冲机会了。
However, many of Parker’s Turtle compatriots were not ready to give up the original high-risk style they were taught. Those Turtles never stopped seeing the benefits to the home-run approach Dennis had taught them.
其他海龟并没有决定放弃原来的高风险风格。这些海龟用这个方法取得了很多本垒打。
Sticking to Their Knitting
坚持他们的原则
Unlike Parker and Rabar, Tom Shanks did not pull back from the original aggressive Turtle rules. From his then home office overlooking the Sonoma Valley in California, he was blunt: “There are individual investors who seek high returns and are willing to accept the risk entailed in achieving them.”
和帕克，拉比不同，汤姆·桑克斯没有改变本来就很进取的海龟原则。他在加州家中看着索诺玛山谷快速地说：“有些投资者想追求高回报，所以也愿意接受随之而来的高风险。”
However, most investors did not want Shanks’s Turtles style even though he would eventually knock the cover off the ball. Other Turtles saw Shanks as Mickey Mantle. “He will hit the ball out of the park. It’s just you have to stay with him. Unfortunately, money is being controlled by people who don’t know the business. They couldn’t trade their way out of a paper bag if their life depended on it.”
大部分投资者知道自己最终会大获全胜，但他们不想使用桑克斯的海龟风格。其他海龟把桑克斯看作是米奇·曼特勒。“他会把球打出界。你又要跟着他。不幸的是，不懂生意的人控制着钱。他们不知道如何交易。”
This criticism of people ignoring high-return traders was spot on, but being right does not mean Shanks was on the way to being Parker wealthy. One Turtle could not figure out how an investment with Shanks could not be a small percentage of everyone’s portfolio, saying, “If you . . . saw gold go from $350 an ounce to $600 an ounce, you want to be with Tom, because . . . you’re going to make a lot more money with someone like him.”
一些人不喜欢高回报的交易者，但是做对了并不表示桑克斯像帕克一样致富。有个海龟不明白为何有人不喜欢让桑克斯理财，他说：“如果你看见黄金的价格从1盎司350美元涨到了1盎司600美元，你应该去找汤姆，因为你只有找他这样的人才能赚钱。”
This was the original Turtle trading mentality, but it goes straight against people’s natural inclinations. Of course, Dennis had taught the Turtles that natural inclinations are almost always wrong when it comes to making the right market decisions.
这就是海龟的本来思想，但是又和很多人的自然倾向不同。当然了，丹尼斯已经告诉了海龟们自然倾向总是错的，所以要做正确的市场决定。
Shanks did his best to differentiate himself from other Turtles by declaring at one point that his trading had shifted to 75 percent systematic and 25 percent discretionary. For some investors, the idea that a mechanical “black box” trading system, with trades placed from code executed inside a computer, is foreign. Shanks used the word “discretion” to allay those fears. He wanted to show that he added value to his trading system beyond the hard and fast rules. However, Shanks’s use of discretion almost sank his firm in the mid-1990s before he recovered, acknowledging the mistake.
桑克斯为了把自己和其他海龟区分开，他尽力宣称自己的交易75%是机械的，25%是主观的。对有些交易者来说，这个思想是一个机械的“黑盒子”交易系统，用电脑交易是陌生的。桑克斯用“灵活”这个词来排除别人的恐惧。他想让别人知道，他在刻板的原则上面加入了自己的价值体系。然而，桑克斯的灵活让他在90年代中期差点破产，然后他明白了自己的错误。
He was not the only Turtle to stick with Dennis’s high-risk, high-return style. Liz Cheval was clear: “I felt that people who invested based on my track record deserved the same trading program that produced those results.” She added, “Volatility is what creates the high returns investors want from the market in the first place. As always, when assuming risk, investors should look for commensurate rewards. And high rewards don’t come without high volatility.” Cheval openly admitted that she adjusted the size of her trading positions using Dennis’s model for volatility.
他并非是唯一一个坚守丹尼斯的高风险，高回报的海龟。莉斯·雪娃很明显：“我觉得根据我的交易决定而投资的人应该使用同样的交易系统。”他补充说：“波动性才能产生投资者需要的高回报。在看到风险的同时，还要看到同等的回报。没有高波动性，就没有高回报。”雪娃公开承认他在使用丹尼斯的仓位原则。
With the passing of years, and with the time to reflect on the wisdom of Parker’s less leveraged approach versus Shanks and Cheval’s high-octane approach, the market of nervous institutional investors made a choice. It liked Parker’s choice and frowned on any allegiance to the original Turtle style.
随着时间的推移，在帕克的低杠杆和桑克斯，雪娃的高杠杆之间，紧张严肃的机构投资者做出了选择。他们喜欢帕克的风格，而对原始的海龟风格感到担心。
Highly Correlated Traders
高度相关的交易者们
However they positioned themselves, whether as less or more risky than their mentor, the Turtles as individuals were the same traders in the eyes of Wall Street insiders. Their trading performance was highly correlated, which meant there was a historical tendency for their performance to move in tandem. Numerous correlation comparisons showed the Turtles trading the same way.
无论他们如何宣传自己的形象，不管是不是比他们的导师更爱冒风险，在华尔街交易界的眼里，海龟都是一样的。他们的交易业绩高度相关，这意味着历史表明他们的业绩都差不多。无数的相关对比表明海龟们的交易都是一样的。
However, it was Tom Shanks’s opinion that the Turtles had evolved and developed systems very different from those taught under Dennis. He said, “Independent evolution suggests that the dissimilarities in trading between Turtles are always increasing.” Shanks’s opinion seemed designed to camouflage the fact that the Turtles were all really competitors.
汤姆·桑克斯认为每个海龟都修改了自己的系统，应该和丹尼斯教的不同了。他说：“独立开发意味着海龟之间的相似性越来越小。”桑克斯的话其实是想掩盖海归之间的竞争关系。
This spin did not convince old pros on Wall Street. Virginia Parker (unrelated to Jerry Parker), a fund management consultant, saw no mystery in the Turtles, as well she knew that they are all driven by systematic, momentum-based, trend-following models.
这个说法并不能说服华尔街的老油条。弗吉尼亚·帕克（和杰瑞·帕克没关系）是一个基金顾问，发现海龟们没有什么秘密，她知道他们的共同点是系统交易，动力交易，趋势跟踪的模型。
Mark Goodman, president of Kenmar Asset Allocation, a firm that invested with the likes of the Turtles, said what none of them wanted to hear: “If you were to put all trend-following models side by side, you would probably find that most made their profits and incurred losses in the same markets. You are not going to find that EMC [Liz Cheval] made it in one market, while Rabar made it in another. They were all looking at the same charts and obtaining the same perception of opportunity.”
马克·古德曼是肯玛资产管理公司的总裁，他的公司投资像海龟这样的人，他说没有人想听别人说：“如果你使用所有的趋势跟踪模型，你会发现它们在同一个市场既能赚钱，也能亏钱。你不能指望EMC公司（莉斯·雪娃的）在一个市场赚钱，而同时拉巴的公司在另一个市场也能赚钱。他们看的是同样的图表，抓住的是同样的机会。”
Whether dealing with initial fame, trading as a less or more risky Turtle, or battling correlation perceptions or negative associations with Dennis, the pressure was on. If there were potentially jealousies inside the program, imagine the feelings of rivalry building up now with the Jerry Parkers of the world fast approaching a net worth of over $100 million in the early to mid-1990s.
无论是使用最初的名声，承担低风险或高风险，或互相竞争，或否认和丹尼斯的关系，压力都是存在的。如果说海龟实验有什么值得人嫉妒的，想想吧，杰瑞·帕克从创业到90年代中期，他的资产规模净值有1个亿了，竞争可想而知。
Perhaps the Turtle story would have ended right there. They had all been part of a grand experiment. They all learned to trade well while under Dennis. It had been a good ride. But here is where Turtles separated. Beyond the rules, they still needed something else for long-term trading success.
也许海龟的故事可以结束了。他们都是伟大实验的一部分。他们都学习了正确交易的方式。这是一个不错的旅程。但是海龟们分家了。除了交易原则，要想长期成功，他们还需要学习其它东西。
章 丹尼斯又回到了交易界
“He was the toughest son of a bitch I ever knew. He taught me that trading is very competitive and you have to be able to handle getting your butt kicked. No matter how you cut it, there are enormous emotional ups and downs involved.”
“他是我认识的人中最坚强的一个家伙。他教导我，交易是最有竞争性的行业，你必须随时做好被打击的准备。无论你怎么努力，情绪上的无数起落是无法避免的。”
Paul Tudor Jones, hedge fund manager, on his mentor Eli Tullis
保罗·都铎·琼斯，对冲基金经理，关于他的导师艾礼·杜利斯
Whether the Turtles became big winners or losers, the excitement of their fame and money had their former teacher wanting a piece of the early 1990s money pouring into hedge funds. The Turtles’ success was 100 percent because of him, but now his students were ahead. To trade or not to trade was Dennis’s internal debate as he pondered reentry into a now more crowded field to compete against his apprentices.
无论海龟们是大赚或是亏损，他们的名声和资金让他们的老师很想在90年代初期去管理对冲基金。因为他，海龟的成功是100%的，现在他的学生们超过他了。去交易，还是不去交易，对丹尼斯来说，这是一个内心的挣扎，现在竞争更激烈了，要想交易，就必须和自己的学生们竞争，这必须深思熟虑。
However, the early to mid-1990s was a tough time for Dennis. He was still unhappy about a class action suit brought against him after the Drexel fund debacle. Plaintiffs chasing him through the courts concluded he was “financially strapped” and “debt-ridden.” Dennis poverty-stricken? Doubtful. Was Dennis envious of his students’ success? He essentially said so.
然而，90年代初期是丹尼斯的艰难时期。德崇基金倒闭后，他吃了很多官司，这让他不开心。律师在法庭上说他“财务艰难”“负债累累”。是不是丹尼斯穷困潦倒？这表示怀疑。是不是丹尼斯嫉妒自己的学生们？他基本上说是的。
Jeff Gordon attempted to get into Dennis’s head: “Rich thought he could out-trade his own methodology. How in the world could a methodology that you created with your own knowledge out-trade you?”
杰夫·戈登想描述丹尼斯的内心：“理查德认为自己可以做的比自己的理念还要好。你自己创造的理念如何能打败你自己呢？”
Yet Gordon, like so many others who were acquainted with Dennis’s 1988 “retirement” and shutdown of the Turtle program, was not sympathetic. He was perplexed. He kept wondering about what could have been: “Let’s just say, you taught a bunch of beginners to play chess, then you start playing them and they all start [beating] you. How would you feel? If Richard Dennis had hung up his cleats and just allowed the Turtle program to manage all that money he got from Drexel, they might have $10 billion now. He could be sitting on easy street. We will never know how many hundreds of millions and perhaps how many billions of dollars he might have left on the table because he disbanded the Turtle group.”
戈登和很多人都知道丹尼斯在1988年宣布退休并关闭海龟实验的事，戈登认为不应该这么做。他当时很困惑。他一直在思考未来会怎么样：“这么说吧，你教一帮新人如何下棋，然后你开始和他们下棋，结果他们都赢了你。你有什么感受？如果丹尼斯当初不关闭海龟实验，并让海龟们管理德崇基金，那么他现在会有100亿。他就可以轻轻松松了。就是因为他解散了海龟们，几个亿，甚至几十个亿的利润让他错过了。”
Dennis must have felt that he had left money on the table, too, because in 1994, along with his brother Tom, he launched a new firm called Dennis Trading Group. No fanfare; just an unlisted phone number and suite number on the door to protect anonymity.
丹尼斯也觉得自己错过了很多利润，因为在1994年，他和他的兄弟汤姆一起做事，汤姆开了一个公司叫丹尼斯交易集团。没有搞什么豪言壮语，门上只有几个电话号码。
This was not the mammoth operation of C&D in the 1980s (one hundred employees, fifty to one hundred customers, and $8 million in fixed costs), but Dennis still had loyal supporters. “He is a lifelong student of the markets and a brilliant individual. Anything he does is worth paying close attention to,” said Sol Waksman of Barclay Trading Group, a consulting firm that tracks fund performance.
这和80年代的C&D公司不同了（当时有100个员工，几十个客户，成本都有800万），但丹尼斯还是有忠实的支持者。“他是市场中的长期学徒，他很优秀。值得关注他的一举一动”这是巴克利交易集团的索尔·瓦克斯曼说的，他的公司是咨询公司，专门跟踪基金的业绩。
While he had taken to calling himself a “researcher” now instead of a “trader,” one of the questions Dennis was asked most frequently was, “Why are you doing this? Why step back into the fire again?” Dennis gave all kinds of answers from philanthropy to politics, but when pressed, he came back to his famous students: “I kept picking up the trade journals and seeing how much money they were managing. I thought, ‘I know I’m at least as good as some of these people.’ So I decided to give it another try.”
丹尼斯自称是研究者，不是交易者，人们问他最多的一个问题是：“你为什么要这么做？为什么要重入险境？”丹尼斯做了很多回答，包括慈善和政治，但如果被逼着问，他会谈到他著名的学生们：“我看报纸的时候总是能看见他们在管理着很多资金，我想‘我至少应该和他们差不多厉害。’所以我决定再尝试一次。”
Still, there were reservations about this comeback. Vic Lespinasse, a floor analyst at the Chicago Board of Trade, saw the pros and cons: “He still has a very good reputation, although it has been tarnished somewhat by the Drexel episode. He’s going to have to establish a track record again, but I don’t see why he shouldn’t do that. I think he’s a superstar.”
对他重返交易界，还是有所保留的。维克·莱斯碧那斯是芝加哥交易所的场内分析师，他看出了赞成和反对的理由：“他的名声仍然很好，只是德崇事件让他有点挫败。他想再次建立自己的业绩，但我不明白他为何不这么做。我认为他本来就是超级明星。”
When Dennis was asked to compare his new firm’s trading strategy to the Turtles, he sounded less confident than in years past: “The people I trained [Turtles] are succeeding on the ideas they learned from me. People might be interested in getting some updated ideas. If yesterday’s motto was that the trend is our friend, today it might be that the trend is a harsh mistress.”
有人问丹尼斯，新公司的交易策略和海龟和什么不同，他说起来似乎没有过去那么自信：“我训练的海龟在理念上非常成功。也许人们想要更好的理念。如果在过去说趋势是你的朋友，那么现在趋势是一个严厉的情人。”
Just as the Turtles were trying to overcome identity issues on Wall Street and Dennis was staging his comeback, Turtle Russell Sands threw everyone a curve ball.
当海龟们正在华尔街为自己树立名声的时候，丹尼斯却想回到交易界，拉塞尔·桑兹向大家扔出了一个曲线球。
Russell Sands
拉塞尔·桑兹
Russell Sands lasted one year as a Turtle before leaving for reasons that aren’t completely clear. While he said that he resigned, other Turtles said he was “let go.” However, that detail was minor in view of Sands’s true Turtle legacy: selling Dennis’s famous rules.
拉塞尔·桑兹只做了一年海龟就离开了，具体原因不清。他说他是辞职的，其他海龟说他是被开除的。然而，桑兹真正在做的事是：销售丹尼斯著名的海龟交易原则。
The selling of Dennis’s rules followed shortly after Sands’s departure from Chesapeake Capital (the firm he’d created with Jerry Parker). Sands was always honest about why Parker carried more weight in their former firm (“he had the longer and more valid track record”), but at the same time tension was brewing.
桑兹离开切萨皮克资金公司（他和杰瑞·帕克一起创造的公司）之后不久，他就开始销售海龟交易原则。桑兹很诚实地解释了为何在之前的公司里帕克的地位比他重要（他的交易业绩比较好），但同时，他们关系紧张。
For a while they had a close relationship. Every day they were at each other’s house. However, Parker soon bought Sands out. What was Sands’s version of the buyout? “Jerry got greedy.” In all fairness, many hard-working people who make millions are called greedy. Sands could have just as easily been called jealous.
他们有一段时间关系很好。每天都去对方的家里。但很快帕克就把桑兹的股份收购了。桑兹是如何解释收购事件的？“杰瑞太贪婪了。”公平地说，凡是努力赚钱并赚了几百万的人都是贪婪的。也许桑兹是有点嫉妒。
Sands had an explanation for why trading had not gone his way after parting with Parker: “Paul Saunders and Kevin Brandt [Kidder Peabody/James River Capital Principles] came to me and said, ‘Russell, why don’t you start your own company? We’ll give you some money and let Jerry have Chesapeake.’ I said fine. This was right after the first Gulf War, when there had been some huge moves in the oil markets.”
桑兹解释了为何和帕克不和：“保罗·桑德斯和凯文·勃兰特（基德/詹姆士·瑞瓦资金）过来告诉我说‘拉塞尔，为何你不自己创业？我们会给你资金，让杰瑞打理切萨皮克。’我说好啊。当时海湾战争刚结束，原油波动很大。”
Kidder Peabody gave Sands money to trade, but the markets did not produce good trends over the next six to nine months. Sands said his trading performance went down to around 25 percent. His clients all ran for the doors. He sounded boxed in explaining his predicament: “Now, I’m basically out of business and don’t know what to do next.”
基德给了桑兹一些资金，让他去交易，但是在之后的6——9个月内，市场并没有形成大趋势。桑兹说他的业绩跌到了25%。他的客户都找上门来了。为了解释情况，他处境困难，精疲力竭：“我基本上破产了，我不知道下一步怎么办。”
In August 1992, a few days after Hurricane Andrew had rocked south Florida, Sands rocked the Turtles’ carefully crafted secrecy. The Chicago Tribune blasted the story:
1992年8月，在飓风安德鲁袭击了佛罗里达南部以后的几天，桑兹开始揭露海龟们用心保护的秘密。《芝加哥论坛》是这样造势的：
A disciple of Richard J. Dennis, the world-famous Chicago futures trader, is offering to reveal the master’s trading secrets to the public for the first time . . . promising to tell all at seminars across the country, including one this weekend in Chicago, for an admission fee of $2,500 a person.
芝加哥著名交易者理查德·J·丹尼斯的一个学生将首次向大众公开大师的交易秘密……保证披露所有的内容，包括在芝加哥本周末每个人收费2500美元时所讲的内容。
Maybe Sands selling Dennis’s rules would have been no big deal in a normal situation, but the secrecy in the Turtles’ world was intense. Mike Shannon laughed at the situation in hindsight: “If we were having this interview and it was 1986 or 1987, we wouldn’t be talking. We were very guarded about the whole thing and we were intensely proud of what we were back in the day. We felt that there was something really incredibly special going on, that we were part of a special and experimental project. The secrecy alone was just off the charts. We weren’t allowed to discuss it according to Richard or anybody that worked for him.”
也许桑兹透露丹尼斯的原则本不是什么大事，但是海龟们都很紧张。迈克·仙农事后回忆时为此大笑：“如果你在1986年或1987年采访我们，我们是不会说的。我们对整个事件都抱有戒心，而且我们为自己感到骄傲。我们觉得这事非常了不起，我们是这个特殊的实验的一部分。这个秘密是不能说的。根据理查德的要求，任何人都不可以谈论此事。”
However, Jim DiMaria downplayed the need for even signing an agreement: “It was pretty obvious to me that this stuff should be kept secret . . . the stuff we were taught was their stuff. I was lucky enough that they shared it with me. I didn’t feel like sharing it with anyone else.”
然而，吉姆·迪玛利亚说签合同的作用是：“对我来说，很明显这个是要保密的……我们学的东西是他们的。我很幸运他们愿意传授给我。我不想和别人分享这个。”
DiMaria’s response was typical of how most Turtles felt toward Dennis. After all, the Turtle experiment was all about making big-time money, and sharing rules for making millions made no sense. So not knowing what the impact of Sands’s actions would be, the other Turtles attempted to minimize the importance of Dennis’s rules. They wanted the world to know that the rules alone weren’t the secret to riches (true point).
迪玛利亚的反应和其他海龟的反应一致。毕竟，海龟实验讲的就是如何赚大钱，和别人分享赚几百万的方法是不符合逻辑的。海龟们都不知道桑兹的影响有多大，所以其他海龟就尽量说丹尼斯的原则其实没那么重要。他们想让全世界知道仅仅靠原则并不能致富（也没说错）。
As a counterstrike, Sands argued that it was a good business opportunity: “I didn’t do anything illegal. I didn’t even do anything immoral. I tell people, ‘Whatever I say is what Richard Dennis said twenty years ago.’ I give him all the credit in the world for it. I didn’t come up with these ideas. I’m just passing it on. That’s the way it is.”
为了反击，桑兹说这是一个绝好的生意机会：“我没有做违法的事。我们没有做违背道德的事。我告诉人们‘我说的所有内容都是丹尼斯20年前说的东西。’我让全世界都相信他。我没有其它想法。我就是这么做的。”
Fifteen years before he was the arguable billionaire he is today, Jerry Parker reacted with outrage against his former partner: “I don’t think Russell has anything to say that’s worth $2,500.” Given that Sands and Parker had been co-workers and friends at one time, his comment was a ninety-five-mile-per-hour fastball at Sands’s head.
15年前，杰瑞·帕克是比较有争议的亿万富翁，他对老搭档的做法非常气愤：“我认为拉塞尔讲的东西连2500美元都不值。”考虑到桑兹和帕克过去曾经是朋友，还是生意伙伴，他的评论对桑兹来说是当头一击。
Liz Cheval then played the “Sands only learned so much” card, saying that it took her about two years to fully grasp and then use Dennis’s rules. Other Turtles said that since Sands was terminated from the program after one year, he did not get the “real” system.
莉斯·雪娃的说法不同：“桑兹学到的东西不多。”她说自己学了2年才完全掌握丹尼斯的原则。其他海龟则说桑兹第一年之后就被开除了，他没有学到“真正”的系统。
Right. Parker and Sands had worked in the same house every day. At that time, Sands knew what Parker knew about the Turtle trading rules. Both shared the same basic knowledge back then. The “doing” part, the reason Parker is huge today, is a whole other story.
没错。帕克和桑兹过去每天在一起工作。同时，桑兹知道帕克了解海龟交易法则。2人都分享了一些基本知识。帕克今天成功的原因是他做的比较好。
Sam DeNardo pulled back the curtain on Sands: “I think he [Sands] was talking to people outside the room about what he was doing. That got him in a lot of trouble. I heard it with my own ears. There was some talk that he was talking to either his mother or somebody about different trades. The word got back to Rich. And I don’t know if it was that or his performance that got him cut from the program. He ultimately got cut.” Multiple Turtles gave the same basic story.
山姆·迪拿杜是这样评价当时的桑兹的：“我想他确实告诉了别人他是怎么做的。他自己也引起了不少麻烦。我亲耳听见别人说的。有人说他告诉他母亲的方法和告诉别人的方法不同。理查德也听到了。我不知道是这个原因，还是因为他的业绩不好，他最终被开除了。”大多数海龟都是这么说的。
Sands said he was not fired, but chose to resign. He said, “I’m sure some of them say I quit. I’m sure some of them say I was fired. I’m sure some of them say I had a big mouth and said things I shouldn’t have said.”
桑兹说他不是被开除的，而是他主动辞职的。他说：“我知道有人说我是辞职的。也有人说我是被开除的。我还知道有人说我喜欢乱说话，说了不该说的东西。”
On the other hand the leaflet for Sands’s 1992 seminars said he’d co-managed funds with Parker. Parker, said in most cases that Sands merely placed orders at his direction. He thought Sands’s prime motivation for selling the rules was to raise money and get back into trading.
桑兹1992年在散发的传单上面说他和帕克共同管理过基金。帕克说大部分情况下都是帕克下指令，桑兹执行并下单。他认为桑兹销售海龟交易原则的主要原因是为了筹集资金东山再起。
Parker thought Sands’s actions violated Dennis’s training not in a legal way, but in a moral and ethical one. He said of Dennis, “How could we repay him for giving us all this knowledge?” Parker added, “Rich always said that you can’t pay attention to books, articles or papers. If it was worth knowing, the people would keep it for themselves and trade.”
帕克认为桑兹的行为没有犯法，但在道德上讲不过去。他提到了丹尼斯：“丹尼斯给了我们这么多，我们如何回报他？”帕克补充说：“理查德总是说，你不能关心书，文章或报纸的内容。如果它们有价值，人们宁愿不透露这些知识，他们可以自己用来交易。”
In the end, maybe Sands had simply embarrassed his Turtle peers so much that they felt they had to respond. The promotional language Sands and his marketing people used to sell the Turtle rules promised: “The Most Powerful, Valuable and Profitable Trading Method Ever . . . Now Revealed in a New Trading Course for Just a Small, No-Risk Investment!” Sands’s ads screamed about “A Very Affordable Low, Low Price! 15 straight years of Profitable Trading!”
最终，桑兹的行为让其他海龟们感到尴尬，他们做出了反应。之前，桑兹和他的销售人员最喜欢宣传的是：“有史以来最强力，最有价值，最赚钱的方法……只要花很少的钱，这是没有风险的投资，就可以学到！”桑兹的广告狂喊：“非常非常低的价格！15年持续赢利的交易！”
Playing right into the attacks against him, Sands’s marketing pitched, “Listen, there are a lot of people very upset that Russell is sharing these secrets, especially at such a low price. The other original Turtles and their phenomenally successful mentor do not want these priceless secrets revealed. At any price!” It was like a 2007 late-night infomercial from Wizetrade, 4x Made Easy, or INVESTools.
为了反击反对他的人，桑兹的市场销售更加高调：“听着，有些人觉得拉塞尔用这么低的价格销售这些秘密让他们感到非常难过。最初的海龟们和他们的成功导师不希望揭露这个秘密。他们希望任何价格都不能卖！”这和2007年其他销售交易软件的人的做法差不多。
Eventually, DeNardo offered a more sympathetic interpretation of Sands’s teaching: “Everybody else is sort of mad at him for letting the system out of the bag. What else was he supposed to do? Drive a cab?” Erle Keefer gave another reason for the secrecy at any cost: “Honestly, I don’t think we were that sophisticated. I just think there was . . . allegiance to Rich.”
最终，迪拿杜对桑兹的教学行为有了更加同情的解释：“他透露这个系统让所有人都对他非常生气。他能怎么办？开出租车？” 尔勒·科夫也解释了：“老实说，我想我们都不够专业。我想……我们都很忠诚于理查德。”
Dennis’s own take on the selling of rules was tight-lipped. He made it clear, however, that a few Turtles had failed: “There were one or two [Turtles] who will remain nameless. The majority was exemplary.”
丹尼斯则对此事闭口不谈。他很明确地说有少数海龟失败了：“有1，2个海龟一直不出名。大部分都很优秀。”
He may have been diplomatic, but his longtime friend and fellow trader Tom Willis, who was and is no fan of Sands, was not: “I’ve always thought that Rich exemplifies the Christian attitude and behavior more than most Christians I know. He probably doesn’t hold a grudge against Russell.”
也许丹尼斯这么说很得体，但是他的老朋友和追随者汤姆·威利斯不喜欢桑兹，他说法不一样：“我一直认为理查德比大部分基督徒还要好心。他甚至没有憎恨过拉塞尔。”
Dennis Retires Again
丹尼斯又退休了
Soon after the Sands dustup, Dennis staged another remarkable comeback. It would take him through most of the 1990s. While Dennis did not reveal his exact trading systems to the public, his performance data had earmarks of trend-following trading. After returning in 1994, his compounded annual rate of return was approximately plus 63 percent through September 1998. For two years in a row, 1995 (108.9%) and 1996 (112.7%), Dennis had triple-digit returns.
桑兹兴风作浪之后不久，丹尼斯又回到了交易界。这段时间占据了90年代大部分的时间。但是丹尼斯没有公开自己的交易系统，他的业绩数据表明他还是趋势跟踪交易。1994年回来后，到1998年，他的年收益是63%。曾经有连续2年，1995年（108.9%）和1996年（112.7%），丹尼斯的回报是3位数。
He was still the same high-risk, high-reward trader he had always been. It was his ticket to the Hall of Fame and his Achilles’ heel rolled into one. However, this was now the time of Bill Clinton and the dotcom bubble. It was hard to get noticed even with his great performance.
他和过去一样，还是高风险，高收益。这既是他出名的优点，也是致命的缺点。然而，当时比尔·克林顿是总统，又赶上了互联网泡沫。即使他的业绩很好，人们也没有特别关注。
On top of that, many investors were gun-shy about another Dennis comeback. In an effort to allay client fears, he assured everyone that his infamous discretion, his inability to not personally interfere with his own rules, had been eliminated. He said the computer was his new friend: “Given what the computer can do today - compared with what it could do only a few years ago, I just can’t see how any human could possibly compete on a level field with a well-designed computerized set of systems.”
丹尼斯再次回到交易界，这让很多投资者风声鹤唳。为了减轻客户的恐惧，他安慰他们说他很谨慎，自控能力提高了。他说电脑是他的新朋友：“考虑到现在电脑能做的事——再对照几年前电脑能做的事，我不明白有什么人能够打败用电脑系统武装的专业人士。”
The term “computer” as a marketing hook was old news. In some ways, Dennis was a technophobe in the middle of the Internet revolution (he always said he could not program). Maybe the over-sixty crowd bought in, but no one else on Wall Street breathed a huge sigh of relief just because he’d used the word “computer.”
宣传电脑的优势已经是旧新闻了。从某种角度来说，在互联网革命中，丹尼斯是一个害怕新科技的人（他总是说他不会编程）。他用上了电脑，也许60岁以上的投资者会买账，但是华尔街的其他人则放心了。
Worse yet, Dennis’s critics thought that his strict mechanical trading formula was just a marketing ploy. Dennis rebutted them by saying he had put in checks and balances. He struck a confident tone: “At the end of the day, a trader has to go with what works. I know that mechanical systems work best, and therefore I am quite comfortable that our strategies will continue to be successful.”
更糟糕的是，有些人批评丹尼斯，说他严格的机械交易系统只是一个市场策略。丹尼斯反驳说他会检查和平衡的。他用自信的口吻说：“交易者必须坚持使用有效的东西。我知道机械系统才是最好的，因此我很轻松地说，我们的策略将会继续成功。”
There was a difference in Dennis’s trading strategy this time around: He was religiously applying that same discipline he had taught his students. For example, he was right there in August of 1998 making big money during one of the most historic months on Wall Street. He, like all trend followers, made a fortune in August. “Between the ruble, Yeltsin, and the deep blue sea, it’s been pretty crazy,” said Dennis with a hint of glee. He was up 13.5 percent in August 1998, giving him a year-to-date return of about 45 percent.
这次丹尼斯的交易策略有点不同了：他虔诚地使用他曾经教给学生们的原则。比如，在1998年8月，在华尔街最具有历史意义的月份，他赚了很多钱。他和很多趋势跟踪者一样，在8月赚了很多钱。丹尼斯高兴地说：“在卢布，叶利钦和深蓝的大海之间，还有疯狂。”他在1998年8月赚了13.5%，从那时到年底的回报是45%。
Other traders were sinking like stones in the zero-sum market game at the same moment Dennis was flying high. Wall Street’s darling, Long Term Capital Management’s (LTCM), for example, imploded at the same time. LTCM lost billions. Chief Executive John W. Meriwether, the legendary former Salomon Brothers bond trader, said in a letter to investors at the time, “August (1998) was very painful for all of us.” LTCM and its two Nobel laureates, Robert H. Merton and Myron S. Scholes, padded the pockets of Dennis and other trend- following traders, including the Turtles.
在丹尼斯高飞的时候，其他交易者在这个零和游戏中石沉大海。华尔街的最爱，长期资金管理公司在当时倒闭了。长期资金管理公司亏了几十个亿。他的首席执行官约翰·W·默里维萨尔过去是所罗门兄弟公司的债券交易者，他当时给投资者写了一封信：“对我们来说，1998年8月是永远的痛。” 长期资金管理公司和他的2个诺贝尔奖获得者罗伯特·H·默顿及麦伦·S·斯科尔斯把他们的钱亏给了丹尼斯，其他趋势跟踪者，还包括海龟们。
It was a high point for Dennis’s trading return, because within a few years of that historic zero-sum win, he was out of the game again. On September 29, 2000, Dennis Trading Group ceased trading and liquidated customer accounts. Burt Kozloff, an investor in Dennis’s current fund, laid out the painful truth: “Dennis Trading Group was -50% down in June but then made a slight recovery in July. But we finally broke through the -50% mark to -52%. You still can trade and try to recover when you’re down 50%, but you run the risk of falling to -60% or -70%, and there’s no turning back from there.”
当时是丹尼斯最辉煌的时候，因为在随后的几年，丹尼斯又不行了。在2000年9月29日，丹尼斯交易集团停止交易，并清算了客户的账户。柏特·科兹洛夫是一个投资者，他投资了丹尼斯的基金，看到了痛苦的现实：“丹尼斯交易集团在6月亏了50%，但在7月有所回升。但最终以亏损50%——52%而破产。你在亏损50%的时候仍然可以再继续交易以谋取回升，但是当风险变成是-60%或-70%时，你就不能回本了。”
While it was no solace for Richard Dennis, the moment when clients pulled funds from him in the fall of 2000 was a bottom for trend-following traders. In the following twelve months, returns for many of his trading peers zoomed up 100 percent or more in performance. Dennis’s clients had panicked at the bottom and paid dearly.
客户在2000年秋天撤资时，那正是趋势跟踪者的底部，这可不是安慰丹尼斯。在随后的1年中，很多交易者取得了100%的回报，甚至更多。丹尼斯的客户在底部时太恐慌了，付出了太多。
Dennis was once again out of public money management. Meanwhile, his conservative Republican student Jerry Parker was rising even farther to the top in both the trading and political worlds. His story would take the Turtles and their philosophy to a whole new level.
丹尼斯再次离开了基金管理。同时，他那保守的共和党学生杰瑞·帕克在交易和政治上都取得了高升。他的经历把海龟和他们的理念提高到一个新的高度。
章 抓住机会
“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.”
General George S. Patton
“立刻执行好的计划比下周再执行完美的计划要好。”
乔治·S·巴顿将军
Imagine driving to Manakin-Sabot, outside of Richmond, Virginia, to see Jerry Parker’s office in 1994. The last thing you would have anticipated was an unassuming colonial-style brick and wood building that looked as though it might house a local insurance company or real-estate office. It was situated in a field along a country road. Describing my feeling, upon seeing it, as thunderstruck would be an understatement.
想象一下，在1994年开车到弗吉尼亚里士满杰瑞·帕克的办公室看看。你能记得的就是殖民时代的砖和木屋建筑，看起来像当地的保险公司或房地产经纪公司。它的位置在离公路很远的田地里。如果要说我当时的感受，说是被雷击了都不过分。
Actually entering Parker’s office was like walking into the old, musty office of your neighborhood attorney who at seventy was about to retire. The front-office staff was friendly, unpretentious, and informal.
走进帕克的办公室就像是走进了一个70多岁即将退休的老律师的古老的，发霉的办公室。前台人员很友好，不招摇，很随便。
In contrast to that original office, Parker’s new office (opened in 1995, approximately ten miles away) has a far more gracious feeling of Southern gentility and success. From the entrance, two staircases spiral up each side of the room to a top landing area. However, today visitors can no longer stroll in unannounced. Smoked-glass windows, video cameras, and a request for identification are not surprising precautions in today’s security-conscious society.
和之前的办公室相比，帕克的新办公室（1995年开张，大约10英里之外）更有南方的高贵和成功的感觉。在入口处，2个楼梯螺旋到上面的房间。现在，客人是不能随便闯入了。黑色的窗子，监视器和查看证件都是现代社会的安全措施。
What remains true to Parker’s down-to-earth character is that his current office is located across from a 1960s-style strip mall that includes a salon, Mary Lou and Co: Hair, Nails & Wigs. Soccer moms park in the Chesapeake Capital parking lot to pick up their children at the church-run preschool next door. A Turtle is making a fortune in suburban Richmond, and no one is paying attention.
帕克现在办公室所在之处是60年代风格的商业街，有沙龙，有娱乐，有卖生活必需品的商店。母亲可以把车停在切萨皮克资金公司的停车场，然后去附近的学校接孩子。有一个海龟在里士满郊区致富了，但似乎没人在意这点。
Moreover, one would never guess the financial disparity between Parker and other Turtles from the furnishings of his private office. It is nondescript, almost utilitarian except for a small turtle on his desk. Yet the gap between him and his former partner Sands is arguably now a billion dollars in net worth. The reasons for that are arguably more important to understand than the rules originally taught the Turtles.
另外，别人无法从办公室来区分帕克和其他海龟的财务差别。那不是区分财富的特征。但帕克和前合作伙伴桑兹的差距有10亿美元了。具体原因是他们对海龟交易系统的理解不同，而这点很重要。
The bottom line is that Jerry Parker, Liz Cheval, Tom Shanks, Howard Seidler, Jim DiMaria, Paul Rabar, and their teacher Bill Eckhardt had entrepreneurial skills beyond trading Dennis’s rules. They had something extra. The people who excel in any field are people who realize that the moment is to be seized, that there are opportunities at every turn. They’re more alive to the moment.
总而言之，杰瑞·帕克，莉斯·雪娃，汤姆·桑克斯，霍华德·辛德勒，吉姆·迪玛利亚，保罗·拉巴和他们的老师比尔·埃克哈特都有能力用丹尼斯的原则交易。他们有一些独特的东西。在任何行业成功的人都是因为他知道他抓住了机会，而机会总是存在的。他们对机会很敏感。
Did Dennis think that in the long run all of his students would be alive to the moment? Back in 1986, long before the Turtles were out on their own, he was asked how he would have reacted to his ad. He responded, “I guess I would’ve applied. I have no doubt that for the people who got the job it was the best job that has ever come along for them. Obviously, not all 14 are going to be the greatest traders who ever lived, but I think there are two or three who could be really excellent.”
丹尼斯是否想到了所有学生都会长期生存？在1986年，海龟们独立之前，有人问他对广告有什么看法。他回答说：“我想我也会去应聘的。毫无疑问，这是最好的工作。很明显，不可能这14个人都会成为伟大的交易者，但我想其中2，3个人会变得非常优秀。”
R. Jerry Parker, Jr., became excellent. A graduate of Ferrum College and the University of Virginia, he is a devoted Christian and family man, who along with his wife home-schooled their three children.
杰瑞·帕克也变得优秀。他在费罗姆学院和弗吉尼亚大学毕业，他是虔诚的基督教徒，他和妻子在家教育3个孩子。
Even though he is comparatively straight-laced, Parker still makes time to kick back and enjoy life, especially sports. He made sure he got good seats at Chicago Bulls games when they were winning championships with Michael Jordan. Today, he still cheers on his University of Virginia Cavaliers basketball team at the new John Paul Jones arena in Charlottesville.
虽然帕克很严厉，但他喜欢找时间回家享受生活，他特别喜欢体育。当芝加哥公牛队和迈克尔·乔丹比赛时，他一定要买好座位。现在，他正在新的约翰·保罗·琼斯球场为弗吉尼亚大学骑士队欢呼。
Parker was certainly not considered the success he is today while working for Dennis. He ended his first year trading as a Turtle down 10 percent before regrouping to have three stellar years. But keep in mind that he did not make the most money while working for Dennis, in large part due to Dennis’s allotment of allocations, not his performance. Parker may have had some regrets about the way his mentor parceled out money, but those years under Dennis were central to his development.
帕克在为丹尼斯工作时没有想到会有今天的成功。他第一年作为海龟亏了10%，然后要重新学习3年。他知道，为丹尼斯做事时，他并非赚了最多，主要原因是丹尼斯的资金分配有问题，而不是他的业绩不好。帕克对他的导师分配资金的事有点不高兴，但当时是丹尼斯说了算的。
The confidence he gained while trading for Dennis was his biggest lesson: “The most important experience that led me to utilize a technical approach was the amount of success that I experienced trading Rich’s system.” What was the critical experience he gained under Dennis? “It’s important to live with someone who says, ‘It’s okay to lose money.’ ”
他为丹尼斯交易时得到的信心是他最大的收获：“我用理查德的系统取得了巨大的成功，这个最重要的经历让我可以使用好技术方法。”他在丹尼斯手下的关键经历是什么？“能和说‘亏钱是正常的’人一起工作是重要的。”
Tom Shanks agreed wholeheartedly with Parker about the need for a mentor: “By far, the structure of what I do is based on Richard’s systems, and certainly, philosophically, everything I do in terms of trading is based on what I learned from Richard.”
汤姆·桑克斯完全同意帕克的说法，那就是找一个导师是必须的：“我现在的系统都是根据理查德的系统来的，当然了，还包括他的理念，其实，几乎所有的关于交易的东西都是从理查德那里学到的。”
Parker and Dennis are still political opposites. Today, Parker is one of the most influential backers of Republican candidates in the state of Virginia. He has contributed over $500,000 to mostly conservative candidates since 1995. While he has ruled out a run for political office so far, his wealth and political power put him on the short list of potential Virginia governors.
帕克和丹尼斯仍然是政治对手。如今，在弗吉尼亚，帕克是共和党的最有影响力的支持者。他从1995年开始向最保守的候选人捐献了500000美元。他也想参与政治，他的财富和政治力量让他有可能成为弗吉尼亚的管理者。
Aspects of Parker’s politics have universal appeal. He has said, “When there is a tax increase and the result is a surplus, the taxpayers should receive their money back. Just as when you pay too much for something in a store, you get your change back.”
帕克的政治观点有吸引力。他说：“如果税收增加的同时财政有盈余，纳税者应该把钱拿回去。就像你在商店多付了钱，你应该把找零的钱拿回去。”
Bottom line, Parker’s earnings from 1988 through 2006 are the clearest demonstration yet that the story of the Turtles is relevant today. Using his publicly available disclosures and the size of his fund, and assuming a standard fee structure, the best educated guess of Parker’s net worth is approximately $770 million.
总之，帕克从1988年到2006年赚的钱说明了海龟的故事还没有结束。综合他的基金规模，标准的费用比例，我们估计帕克的净值是7.7亿。
Table 11.1: Annual Returns, 1998–2006, for Jerry Parker’s Chesapeake Capital.
图11.1 杰瑞·帕克的切萨皮克资金从1998年——2006年的年度回报。
Year
Total
Year
Total
1988
48.91
1998
16.31
1989
28.30
1999
3.30
1990
43.12
2000
5.23
1991
12.51
2001
-7.98
1992
1.81
2002
11.01
1993
61.82
2003
23.08
1994
15.87
2004
4.84
1995
14.09
2005
1.15
1996
15.05
2006
10.90
1997
9.94
Source: Disclosure Documents Filed with United States CFTC.
来源：美国商品期货交易委员会公开的文件。
That number assumes no reinvesting for twenty years. If 10 percent growth is assumed and compounded annually, Parker’s net worth could be as high as $1.75 billion.
如果20年来不再追加资金，如果每年的复利是10%，那么帕克的净值是17.5亿。
What Separated Parker from Other Turtles?
是什么让帕克和其他海龟差距这么大？
“You had to be really smart to be hired by Dennis.” It might be comforting to think that intelligence alone accounted for the Turtles’ trading success, but that would be an excuse. That said, many of the Turtles were brilliant. So there is no intention here to slight their individual brainpower.
“你只有非常聪明才能被丹尼斯聘用。”智慧是海龟成功的原因，这么想比较轻松，但那是借口。也就是说，很多海龟都很优秀。他们的智力都差不多。
However, a high IQ is hardly the key to success in life, or Enron’s hundreds of MBAs from the top schools in the country might have prevented its demise. Intelligence ensures absolutely nothing in the long run; success requires something more.
然而，高智商不是成功的关键，否则安然公司几百个工商管理硕士就可以阻止安然的倒闭了。长期而言，智力不能保证什么，成功需要更多的因素。
As it turns out, most CEOs at the biggest corporations didn’t attend Ivy League schools. They went to state universities, big and small, or to lesser-known private colleges. Most people, would guess that the percentage of CEOs bearing Ivy League undergraduate degrees is far higher than the actual figure of only 10 percent. So what, beyond pure intelligence, enabled Parker’s twenty years of great performance?
事实说明，很多大公司的首席执行官并没有上过名牌大学。他们上的是州立大学，规模有大有小，或在不出名的私立大学读书。很多人认为大部分首席执行官都是名牌大学的，而实际上只有10%的首席执行官上过名牌大学。那么，除了智力，还有什么让帕克取得了20年的优秀业绩？
The Maginot line, between those Turtles who achieved huge trading success after working for Dennis and those who failed at trading, came down to an understanding and application of entrepreneurial skills. The Turtles had to have trading rules, but without entrepreneurial savvy they were doomed. Nancy Upton and Don Sexton, professors at Baylor University who have long studied entrepreneurs, pinpointed traits possessed by Parker and other entrepreneurs:
马奇诺防线，也就是取得巨大交易成功的海龟和失败的交易者之间的区别，是理解和使用企业家技术。海龟们必须拥有交易原则，但是如果没有企业家的精神，他们也不行。南希·厄普顿和敦·塞克斯顿是贝勒大学的教授，他们长期研究企业家，他们指出了帕克和其他企业家的特质：
1.        Nonconformists - lower need to conform indicating self-reliance.
不墨守成规——很少遵守规则意味着能自我发展。
2.        Emotionally aloof - not necessarily cold to others, but can be oblivious.
情绪上的冷淡——并非指对人冷淡，而是指不在意。
3.        Sky divers - lower concern for physical harm, but does change with age.
喜欢跳伞的人——年轻时不怕身体受伤，但随着年龄增长会改变的。
4.        Risk takers - more comfortable taking it.
敢冒险的人——很轻松地接受风险。
5.        Socially adroit - more persuasive.
社交能力强——很容易说服别人。
6.        Autonomous - higher need for independence.
自主——喜欢独立。
7.        Change seekers - like novel approaches. This is different than 99% of all other people.
寻求变化——喜欢新方法。这个99%的人不同。
8.        Energetic - higher need and / or ability to work longer.
充满活力——更希望，或有能力长期工作。
9.        Self-sufficient - don’t need as much sympathy or reassurance, but they still need to form networks so self-sufficiency need not be taken to extremes.
自给自足——不需要同情和安慰，但他们仍然需要一些关系网，能自给自足就行了，不过分索取。
We shouldn’t underestimate those nine factors. Dennis turned on the lights and supplied the brokers, the money, and the system. With Dennis out of the picture, the Turtles had to answer for themselves as to whether or not they had the ability and the desire to succeed on their own. Their dilemma, whether they knew it or not at the time, could be solved by how well they applied only those nine traits.
我们不要低估这9个因素。丹尼斯给了他们机会，给了他们经纪人，资金和系统。如果没有丹尼斯，海龟们就要自己去搞清楚他们是不是有能力靠自己成功。他们当时的两难是，无论他们当时是否知道，只要很好地运用了这9个特质，他们就能解决自己的问题。
Jerry Parker applied the nine traits out of the gate, which some Turtles proved unable or unwilling to do. Parker always had the self-confidence to believe that one day his earnings could rival those of Dennis. Other Turtles, when seeing firsthand Dennis earn $80 million in 1986, may have thought, “That could never be me.” A few confessed that they just felt lucky to be a Turtle, and when describing their peers some used words like “timid” or “gun shy.”
杰瑞·帕克很好地运用了这9个特质，有些海龟则证明做不到，或不愿意这么做。帕克一直有信心迟早有一天会超过丹尼斯。当其他海龟在1986年看到丹尼斯赚了8000万时，也许会想：“我永远也赚不到这么多。”有少数海龟承认他们确实运气好，而提到他们的同伴时则使用“胆小的”或“风声鹤唳的。”
No one ever described Parker like that. Although he didn’t say so directly, he was referencing those nine characteristics of an entrepreneur when he spoke about what it really takes to be a success. He said, “We’re not really interested in people who are experts at the French stock markets or German bond markets. It doesn’t take a huge monster infrastructure - not Harvard MBAs and people from Goldman Sachs.”
没有人这样说帕克。他也没有直说，他只是说要想成功，必须具有那9个企业家的特质。他说：“我们对法国股市或德国债市的专家没兴趣。背景强大也没用——哈佛的工商管理硕士不行，高盛的人也不行。”
Loren Pope, author of Colleges that Change Lives, a book extolling the virtues of small liberal-arts colleges, appreciated the deeper meaning in Parker’s wisdom: “The Ivies and other A-league schools have a lot of prestige because they’re supposed to open doors and lead to successful careers. But parents who expect the Ivies to ensure their kids’ success are going to be disappointed. The old-boy network isn’t much good in an economy like this. It’s competence that counts.”
劳伦·波普是《改变人生的大学》的作者，这本书颂扬了大学文科的优点，并更深入地解释了帕克的智慧：“名牌大学名声好，是因为人们以为他们打开了通向成功的道路。但是希望自己的孩子上名牌大学的父母一般会失望。名牌大学不适合我们的经济情况。能力才是最关键的。”
Competence is not easy to acquire. Parker saw life as a Turtle as pretty easy by comparison to his solo operation. He recalled, “Trading for Rich, you got in at 7 A.M. and at 2 P.M. you watched the Cubs game.” But once he became a money manager for clients he had to raise money, hire people, do research, track his performance, and trade. “The degree to which you are successful will be partly because of your buys and sells. But you’re also running a business: hiring, making sure you have good accounting and legal and marketing systems in place.”
获得能力并不容易。帕克觉得做海龟和自己单干一样简单。他回忆说：“为丹尼斯交易时，你要早上7点和下午2点赶到办公室。”但是作为基金经理，他要自己筹集资金，招聘员工，研究，跟踪业绩，进行交易。“你成功的程度取决于你的买卖情况。但是你还要打理公司：招聘，找到好的财务，采用合法有效的销售策略。”
Parker’s business acumen came from many sources beyond Dennis. His favorite book, for example, is Selling the Invisible, a modern-day marketing bible. But Parker always brought it back to his training under Dennis: “An honest, humble mentor is the best thing going. Learn from other people. Do the right thing every day, focus on what you’re doing, and let the cards fall where they may.”
帕克的生意才能很多方面来自丹尼斯。他最喜欢的书是《销售无形的商品》，这书是现代营销的圣经。但帕克总是谈到在丹尼斯手下接受的培训：“一个诚实的，谦虚的导师才是最好的。向其他人学习。每天做正确的事，聚焦于自己的事，不要管自己是否拿到好牌或坏牌。”
After the Turtle program ended, Jim DiMaria had no doubts about the cards falling right for Parker: “Jerry wanted to raise a lot of money. He said it from day one.”
海龟实验结束后，吉姆·迪玛利亚一点也不怀疑帕克的牌：“杰瑞想自己筹集资金。他在第一天就这么说。”
Decide What You Really Want
决定什么是你真正想要的
Following the Market Wizards books, many Turtles were content to bask in their fame without making the true effort needed to build a solid business. Parker’s goal was not to be on the front cover of magazines (although he did once appear on the cover of Financial Trader in 1994, leaning against the white picket fence surrounding his suburban Richmond estate). No, what he wanted was “Master of the Universe” profits.
《市场奇才》出版后，很多海龟不用做宣传就得到了很好的名声。帕克的目标不是为了上杂志封面（不过他1994年确实出现在《金融交易者》的封面上，斜靠在办公室外面的栅栏上）。不，他想要的是天文数字一样的利润。
Jonathan Craven was the second person hired at Chesapeake Capital. Today, Craven runs his own trading firm with $20 million under management. He never forgot Parker’s core principles. Parker said, “You have to have faith in two things.” When Craven asked, “What’s that?” Parker said, “God and your system.” Craven added, “You have to have faith that your system works. Otherwise, you would get one hour of sleep a night.”
乔纳森·卡文是切萨皮克资金第二个聘用的员工。现在，卡文有自己的交易公司，他管理着2000万美元。他永远不会忘记帕克的核心原则。帕克说：“你必须对2件事有信心。”卡文问：“是哪2件事？”帕克说：“相信上帝，相信你的系统。”卡文补充说：“你必须相信你的系统有作用。否则，你在晚上都睡不好。”
What was Craven getting at? Many people think the Jerry Parkers of the world have systems or rules that limit them to certain markets. Upon learning of a trader like Parker, they naively assume he trades only commodities. The reality is that Parker applies Dennis’s philosophy to all markets. He seeks to apply Dennis’s original principles globally in markets all around the world. He doesn’t care what market: Chinese porcelain, gold, silver, markets that exist, markets that don’t exist today, and markets that others are making lots of money in that he is not trading.
卡文学到了什么？很多人以为帕克只交易特定的市场。他们天真地以为帕克只交易商品期货。其实帕克学到了丹尼斯的理念，那就是在所有的市场交易。他把丹尼斯的原则用到了全球的市场。他不在乎是什么市场：瓷器，黄金，白银，只要是存在的市场，他就去交易。很多市场现在已经不存在了，他都交易过。
Craven learned that philosophy of diversity while under Parker’s tutelage. The number of markets they traded was always in flux: “We could have sixty-five markets or we could have thirty.” Craven was once asked, “Are you always in the market? What’s the maximum number of positions you could have on at any one time?” Craven responded. “It all depends. If the markets are going sideways, theoretically zero. The markets are trending up or down? I could have sixty-five positions.”
卡文在帕克的指导下知道了分散的意义。他们交易的市场总是在改变：“有时交易65个市场，有时交易30个市场。”有一次有人问卡文：“你永远在市场中吗？你在同一时间持有多少个仓位？”卡文回答：“要看具体情况。如果市场是振荡的，那么我理论上就不持有任何仓位。如果市场的趋势是上涨或下跌的，我则持有65个仓位。”
Unfortunately, what Parker does to make money in all those markets is often confused with jargon terms like “managed futures” and “commodity trading advisor.” Both are government terms for hedge funds. In many cases traders have been guilty of compounding the confusion, as Parker was quick to admit:
可惜，因为帕克有时说自己管理期货，有时说自己是商品交易顾问，这种混乱的说法让人混淆，其实他交易了所有的市场。官方的说法就是对冲基金。帕克很快承认说很多时候交易者让投资者迷惑是有罪的：
I think another mistake we made was defining ourselves as “managed futures,” where we immediately limit our universe. Is our expertise in that, or is our expertise in systematic trend following, or model development? Maybe we trend follow with Chinese porcelain. Maybe we trend follow with gold and silver, or stock futures, or whatever the client needs . . . We need to look at the investment world globally and communicate our expertise of systematic trading.
我认为我们还犯了一个错误，那就是把我们自己定义为管理期货，我们立刻限制了自己的业务范围。是不是可以这样说，我们的专业是系统化的趋势跟踪，或模型开发？也许我们在趋势跟踪瓷器。也许我们在趋势跟踪黄金和白银，或股指期货，或任何客户要求的商品……我们应该用全球的眼光看待我们的投资，并系统化交易来沟通技能。
Communicating his expertise has always been a challenge. People with trading philosophies that run counter to Parker’s have actively spun the word “commodity” as something negative. It can’t be said enough, Turtle trend-following is a strategy. These traders trade financial instruments across the globe, ranging from stocks to currencies to energies to wheat to gold to bonds to commodities.
和别人沟通他的技能总是遇到挑战。很多人认为商品交易是负面的东西。也不能说太多，海龟的趋势跟踪是一个策略。他们全球交易，他们交易股票，外汇，能源，小麦，黄金，债券。
Even though Parker has had a great run, he is still fighting the kind of uphill battle that sunk many of his Turtle peers. He knows that people look at systematic and computerized trading with too much skepticism. He said, “I think we’ve mis-communicated to our clients what our expertise really is. Our methods will work on lots of different markets. The ones that are hot today and the ones that are not hot today.” He could have been William Eckhardt in the Turtles’ classroom in 1984: There was no change in the message.
虽然帕克做的很好，他还是要努力战斗，他的很多海龟战友都多次失败。他知道很多人怀疑系统化电脑化的交易。他说：“我想我们和客户的沟通不好，客户也不懂我们的技能是什么。我们需要在不同的市场交易。有些立刻就能赚钱，有些并非立刻就能赚钱。”他在模仿1984年海龟教室里面的威廉·埃克哈特：我传递的信息表达的意思并没有改变。
The Problem with Fundamentals
基本面的问题
Like many top hedge-fund players today, Parker gives back to his community. He donated $500,000 to the University of Virginia for the “Chesapeake Capital Trading Room.” It was designed as “a real-world, highly sophisticated trading atmosphere.” Bob Webb, who is the Director of The McIntire Center for Financial Innovation at UVA, graciously gave a tour of the facility. With numerous trading desks and large quote screens on the walls, you appreciate where every dollar of Parker’s donation went.
像很多顶尖的对冲基金经理一样，帕克也回报社区。他代表切萨皮克资金交易室向弗吉尼亚大学捐款500000美元。那是“真实复杂的交易氛围。” 鲍勃·韦勃是弗吉尼亚大学金融革新迈克英塔尔中心的主任，兴致勃勃地参观了帕克的交易室。里面有很多交易用的桌子，墙上有很大的显示器在显示行情，这样就明白了帕克捐献的钱来自何处了。
Webb, who is a finance professor at UVA, sees the Chesapeake Capital Trading Room as “the ideal environment to illustrate real-time events in financial markets. Students are able to examine the financial markets’ reaction to news events. Working there allows them to look at recent changes and explore what factors promoted the changes.” Webb says that “students get their feet wet right away. They’re able to make predictions, based on real events, from the first day of class. They can then look at factors that later cause prices to change, and that helps them to make better decisions.”
韦勃还是弗吉尼亚大学的金融教授，他认为切萨皮克资金交易室是“实时地现实了金融市场的变化。学生们可以根据金融市场的变化来对照新闻事件。在那里上班可以知道最近的变化及导致变化的因素是什么。” 韦勃说“学生们可以立刻学到东西。他们在第一天学习后就知道如何根据真实时间做出预测。他们能提前看到导致价格变化的因素，这样就能帮助他们做出更好的决定。”（张轶注：韦勃根本不懂机械交易的本质，这段话应该是套话，真正的海龟不是价值投资者。）
One business student unaware of Parker and the original Turtle training environment, that office with cube dividers and no TVs, excitedly described the new Chesapeake Capital trading room: “It’s fantastic to be able to use the software to look up information about any company. You can get balance sheets, income statements, ratios, Seizing Opportunity growth patterns - just about anything.” The irony, of course, is that Parker would never use “just about anything” to make his trading decisions.
有一个商业系的学生不了解帕克，也不了解原版海龟的交易环境，当时的环境是小格子办公室，没有电视，这个学生激动地描述切萨皮克资金交易室：“用软件可以查看任何公司的信息，太神奇了。你能看到资产负债表，损益表，利润率，成长模式——要什么有什么。”当然了，讽刺的是，帕卡从来不用这些东西做交易决定。
The contradictions between Parker and these statements by a UVA professor and student are not intentional. Webb, an accomplished professor simply teaches a philosophy that sharply contrasts with Parker’s. For example, consider Webb’s view that individuals at the Federal Reserve beyond the chairman can impact financial market prices through their comments. He said, “One consequence is that traders must monitor the comments of a number of individuals at the Federal Reserve System.” Webb’s advice is plausible to many on Wall Street and Main Street who follow fundamental analysis, but his observations do not line up with the trading approach of the Chesapeake Capital Trading Room’s benefactor.
帕克和弗吉尼亚大学师生们的矛盾之处不是故意的。韦勃是著名的大学教授，但他教的理念和帕卡正好相反。比如，韦勃认为美联储除了主席之外，其他人的发言也可以影响金融市场的价格。他说：“交易者必须注意美联储内部有些人的发言。” 对于华尔街的很多价值分析者来说，似乎韦勃讲的没错。但是对于切萨皮克资金的管理者来说，他的观点不足以采信。
Like his mentor Richard Dennis, Parker wouldn’t consider monitoring multiple voices at the Fed to make a trading decision for a nanosecond. Consider, for example, Parker’s standard disclosure, “Chesapeake believes that future price movements in all markets may be more accurately anticipated by historical price movements within a quantitative or technical analysis than by fundamental economic analysis.” With that kind of clear statement of intent, how did students enjoying the Chesapeake Room at UVA miss understanding Parker’s trading style?
就像他的导师丹尼斯，帕克绝不会依靠美联储的发言做交易决定。帕克是这样公开宣称的：“切萨皮克认为，可以通过历史的价格波动或技术分析来判断期货的价格，而不是使用基本的经济分析。”既然帕克都这么明显地说了，为何到切萨皮克交易室参观的弗吉尼亚学生还会误解帕克的交易风格呢？
Bob Spear runs a systems-testing software firm with a program called “Mechanica.” He has arguably the most powerful software programs for testing trading systems available to the public.
鲍勃·斯皮亚开了一个公司，并做了一个项目，项目叫“机械分析”，以测试系统软件。他宣称拥有最强有力的测试系统的软件。
Two Turtles became his clients over the years: Jerry Parker and Erle Keefer. It was one of Spear’s software ads that caught Parker’s attention. The ad blared: “Trading Recipes pinpoints winning systems, then supercharges their performance!” The 1994 ad spoke of “money management” (what William Eckhardt called risk management), a rarity then.
过去几年，有2个海龟成为了他的客户：杰瑞·帕克和尔勒·科夫。是斯皮亚的一个广告引起了帕克的注意。广告宣称：“精确地找到最赚钱的系统，然后能大幅提高交易业绩！”这份1994年的广告还提到了“资金管理”（威廉·埃克哈特称之为风险管理），这在当时是很罕见的。
Parker didn’t know at the time that there was software available to test the Turtle trading systems and money management (see chapters 4 and 5). When Parker first called about Spear’s software, Spear knew immediately who he was. He said, “He didn’t have to explain to me Chesapeake Capital.”
帕克在当时还不知道有软件可以测试海龟交易系统和资金管理（参看第04章和第05章）。当帕克第一次打电话询问斯皮亚的软件时，斯皮亚立刻就听出了他是谁。他说：“你不用解释了，我知道切萨皮克资金是谁管理的。”
Over his career, Parker has repeatedly gone out of his way to educate everyone that technical traders need no particular expertise in the markets they trade, saying, “They do not need to be an authority on meteorological phenomena, geopolitical occurrences or the economic impact of specific worldwide events on a particular market.” Parker often borders on exasperation as he fights to get that message across: “If the alternative is massive diversification stocks only, buy and hold, or listen to some analyst with a fundamental point of view. Well, you see what that’s got us.” That logic can be hard for people to accept. Investors want big money potential along with a sophisticated story that makes sense fundamentally.
这么多年来，帕克一直在教育别人，技术交易者是需要实战的，他说：“交易者不必成为著名的气象学家，不必成为地理政治家，不必成为经济学家，就能做好交易。”帕克经常为此和别人吵架：“如果投资的方法就是买入并持有，或听从基本面的分析，那么你会知道结果是什么的。”一般人很难接受这个逻辑。投资者希望利用合理的复杂的基本面赚到大钱。
And even if investors understand Parker’s Turtle style enough to invest, they don’t want to watch their account equity going up and down. Even Parker’s clients focus constantly on monthly rates of return. They hold him to a high standard, with admonitions like “Don’t give back my monthly profit,” “I am concerned with all of this monthly data,” and “You’re behind this month versus last month.” Parker said flatly, “It is crazy.”
即使投资者理解帕克的海龟交易风格，他们也不希望眼睁睁地看着自己的账户起起落落。即使帕克的客户关注每个月的回报率，他们的标准也是很高的，比如说：“不要返还我的月度利润。”“我关心每个月的数据。”“你这个月的业绩不如上个月。”帕克说：“真是疯狂。”
He added, “I think that risk from initial capital, losing 10%, that’s a serious thing. If I’m up 50%, now I’m up 40%, that’s a whole different thing. But not to clients! Not to the ratios. So we’re screwing around with our profitability when we’re playing with the market’s money, and trying to fine tune the performance table so we don’t have what looks like a risky investment, even though it’s risky. But a much different risk than the risk on initial capital. So I think it’s ridiculous.”
他补充说：“对于起始资金来说，如果亏了10%，那很严重。如果我之前赚了50%，现在赚了40%，那是不同的性质。但是客户却不这么看！他们要绝对的增长。所以，为了做出好看的业绩报告，我们要修改我们的利润报表。故，即使我们有风险，客户也看不出来。但是起始资金的风险是不同的。总之，我觉得很荒谬。”
Dressing up his performance to make it more palatable to nervous clients is not something Parker likes:
修改业绩报告，让紧张的客户看起来很舒服，这样的事并不是帕克想做的事：
No matter how well we do, I’m always being met with people who are telling me, “doesn’t matter how much money you make or how well you do, I just don’t like your style. I don’t like the style that relies upon price only. I don’t like commodities. And it’s hocus-pocus.” When we’re down 20%, my gracious, [they think] we’re on our way out of business. I’ve actually had people calling me on the telephone, [when] maybe we’re down -12% and they’d say, “You’re never going to come back. You’re never going to make money. Forget it.” But if NASDAQ’s down -40%, that’s a pretty good buying opportunity.
不管我们做的多么好，总是有人对我说：“不管你赚了多少钱，不管你做的多么好，我就是不喜欢你的交易风格。我不喜欢仅仅依靠价格做决策的风格。我不喜欢商品期货。那是鬼把戏。”如果我们亏了20%，那么我们就快破产了。确实有人在我们亏损了12%的时候打电话质问我，他们说：“你再也不会扳本了，你再也不能赚钱了。算了吧。”但是如果纳斯达克跌了40%，他们就认为是极好的买入机会。
The odd truth about fundamental traders is that behind closed doors, they often trade very similarly to Parker. In public they might talk about the NASDAQ down 40 percent as a good buying opportunity, a value play, but for their actual trading they look for trends.
奇怪的是，基本面交易者的交易方法和帕克很相似。也许在公开场合，他们说如果纳斯达克跌了40%，那就是好的买入机会，是价值投资，但是在实际交易中，他们又在寻找趋势。
Parker saw this contradiction firsthand when he was purchasing quantitative information from Ned Davis (a well-known analyst on Wall Street). Parker was getting faxes every day, and he would compare Davis’s analysis to his own positions. Parker, the trained skeptic, said to the staff at Davis’s office, “It looks like a lot of times, almost all the time, my positions are same as yours.” They told Parker, “That’s true because even with all of our good analysis, if we don’t put a trend following component in it, it doesn’t do very well.”
帕克自从向奈德·戴维斯（华尔街著名的分析师）购买信息以来，他第一时间发现了这些矛盾的现象。帕克每天都能收到传真，他会对比戴维斯的分析和自己的仓位。帕克也是一个怀疑论者，他对戴维斯的员工说：“很多时候，几乎是任何时候，我的仓位和你的是一样的。”他们告诉帕克：“这没错，因为即使拥有所有的优秀分析师，我们也要使用趋势跟踪，否则就做不好。”
That said, the most successful Turtle doesn’t sugar-coat his style of trading. He addresses the drawbacks head on. When he compares his philosophy to a form of government, he sounds like a down-to-earth Sunday school preacher:
他们说，最成功的海龟不包装自己，直面问题。当他把自己的理念和官方形式相比时，他就像一个务实的牧师。
Trend following is like a democracy. Sometimes it doesn’t look so good, but it’s better than anything else out there. Are we going to rely on buy and hold? Buy and hope, that’s what I call it. Are we going to double up when we lose money? The world is too big to analyze. The fundamentals are too large. We need to aggressively, unrepentantly sell trend following and describe it as it is: a system of risk controls that gets in the right markets at the right times and limits the disaster scenarios.
趋势跟踪就像是民主。有时候看起来不太好，但是它比其它的东西都好。我们真的能坚持使用买入并持有的方法吗？还不如说是买入并期待着。我们真的要在亏损的时候加倍买入吗？这个世界太大了，无法去分析。基本面也太大了。我们应该积极地，无悔地使用趋势跟踪：控制风险的系统就是在正确的时间进入正确的市场，并阻止灾难的发生。
Hedge Fund Blowups
对冲基金的破产
In Jerry Parker’s world, the unexpected eventually happens. If you think the world is tidy, get ready for the hurricane to blow you away. For example, if there’s a good side to the 2006 implosion of the Amaranth hedge fund (to the tune of $6 billion), it’s the embarrassment suffered by the state and city pension funds that invested in it. And in Amaranth’s case, its name (a mythical flower that never fades) may have held a hidden meaning. The secondary meaning: a pigweed.
在杰瑞·帕克的世界里，无法预料的事最终会发生。如果你认为这个世界是整齐有序的，要做好心理准备，飓风随时会摧毁你。比如，2006年红苋菜对冲基金（60亿规模）倒闭了，这让很多投资它的退休金基金感到难堪。红苋菜（是一种从不褪色的奇怪的花）这个名字本身就代表了这个基金深藏的含义。它另外的一个含义：普通的野草。
And “pigweed” all started with “mean reversion.” This term, with its academic overtone, may make some people cringe, but understanding its ramifications lies at the heart of why hedge funds Amaranth and Long Term Capital Management went belly-up.
野草意味着均值回归。红苋菜对冲基金和长期资金管理公司的倒闭让有些人不开心，但它们确实说明了交易的另外一个方面。
What is mean reversion? Over the long haul, market prices have a tendency to “revert to the mean.” That is, studies have conclusively shown that when stock prices (or any price, for that matter) get overextended to the upside (or to the downside), they eventually fall back in line with averages. However, stock prices do not exactly snap back into place overnight. They can remain overvalued or undervalued for extended periods of time.
什么是均值回归？长期而言，市场价格有回归均值的趋向。研究表明，如果股票的价格（任何价格）过分上涨，它们最终要下跌到均值附近（过分下跌也是同理）。然而，股票的价格不会在一夜之间下跌到位的。它们在很长一段时间内，要么是被过分高估了，要么是被过分低估了。
That extended period of time is the sandbar that sinks ships. People who bet on markets’ behaving in an orderly fashion (arbitrage) are panning for fool’s gold. Parker and the other Turtles learned a long time ago from Dennis that the hard thing to do is the right thing to do:
这种过分估值的时期就是让船沉没的沙洲。用比较老的方式（套利）赌市场波动的人其实是在赚傻瓜的钱。帕克和海龟们在很早以前就从丹尼斯那里明白了：最难做的事就是做正确的事：
Mean reversion works almost all of the time. Then it stops and you’re kind of out of business. The market is always reverting to the mean except when it doesn’t. Who wants a system like we have, “40% winners, losing money almost all the time, always in a draw down, making money on about 10% of your trades, the rest of them are sort of break even to losers, infrequent profits”? I much prefer the mean reversion where I have 55% winners, 1% or 2% returns per month. “I’m always right!” I’m always getting positive feedback. Then, maybe in 8 years, you’re kind of out of business, because when it doesn’t revert to the mean, your philosophy loses.
大部分时间都有均值回归的现象发生。如果市场突然不再均值回归，你可能就要破产了。市场总是在均值回归，但它也有不均值回归的时候。谁想要我们这样的系统“成功率是40%，几乎大部分时间都在亏钱，资金总是在缩水，赚钱的交易能赚10%左右，其它时间要么打平，要么是亏的，利润不确定”？一般人更喜欢均值回归的系统，成功率是55%，每个月的回报是1%或2%，这样会觉得好些。“我总是对的！”我总是得到正回报。然后，也许是8年后，你最终破产了，因为当市场不再均值回归时，你的理念就输了。
Hearing Parker’s Southern cadence as he preaches about mean reversion hits home. Consider an example that makes his point: Let’s say an investor gives a trader money because his two-year track record shows he made 2 percent every month with no down months. Six years later, that same fund blows up and that investor’s retirement is gone because the strategy was predicated on mean reversion. It is human nature to believe in mean reversion, but as Parker says, “it just is a fatal strategy of trading the markets.”
帕克用南方口音告诉你均值回归是如何害人的。他举了一个例子：如果一个交易者的交易记录显示，他在过去2年里每个月赚了2%且没有亏损的月份，然后有一个投资者给钱给这个交易者进行交易。6年后，这个基金突然倒闭了，那么投资者的退休计划就泡汤了，因为这个交易者的策略是建立在均值回归的基础上的。人性就愿意去相信均值回归，但是帕克说：“这是致命的交易策略。”
“Fatal” is the kind of word that grabs you by the throat. “Most of the time” is not a good enough bet. The bottom line: Those hundred-year floods that give mean-reversion traders solace really occur every two or three years - and they can and do wipe out fortunes.
“致命的”，这个单词让你紧张。“大部分时间”不是你下注的理由。简单说：百年一遇的洪水只是给均值回归交易者的安慰而已，实际上洪水每2，3年就会发生一次——一旦洪水来了，你的财富就没了。
James River Capital
詹姆士·瑞瓦资金
Back in the summer of 1994, the sign outside Parker’s offices in Manakin-Sabot, Virginia, listed two firm names: Chesapeake Capital and James River Capital. Since James River Capital smacked of State of Virginia geography, it could have been anything. It turns out that it was actually the new name for the firm that had risen from the ashes of Kidder Peabody’s managed futures division.
在1994年的时候，在帕克弗吉尼亚办公室的外面有2个牌子：一个是切萨皮克资金，另一个是詹姆士·瑞瓦资金。詹姆士·瑞瓦资金其实是基德公司期货部门的新名字。
Jonathan Craven saw how critical James River Capital was to Chesapeake Capital’s start. He said, “I met Jerry through somebody I knew at James River Capital. Those guys introduced me to Jerry and I got hired in March of 1990. We were renting space from James River for a long time.” Investor Bradley Rotter added, “Jerry Parker did a very wise thing early on in his career. He associated himself with Paul Saunders and Kevin Brandt.” What Parker did was wise for good reason. Brokerage firms were the perfect partners to sell the Turtles to the public as something sexy.
乔纳森·卡文见证了詹姆士·瑞瓦资金成为切萨皮克资金一部分的过程。他说：“我通过詹姆士·瑞瓦资金的熟人介绍见到了杰瑞。他们把我介绍给杰瑞，然后我在1990年3月被聘用了。我们长期租用詹姆士·瑞瓦资金的办公室。”投资者布拉德利·罗特补充说：“杰瑞·帕克在他职业生涯的早期做了一件明智的事。他和保罗·桑德斯及凯文·勃兰特建立了关系。”帕克的明智做法是有原因的。经纪公司可以帮忙把海龟推销给投资大众。（张轶注：手续费也便宜。）
On the other hand, Erle Keefer thought Parker’s success had an element of rolling the dice: “You would have never picked who, when they left the Turtle program, would be phenomenal or not phenomenal I think it was a crapshoot.”
另一方面，尔勒·科夫认为帕克的成功也有运气的成分：“在海龟实验结束的时候，你根本不知道谁会出名，谁不会出名，交易是个有风险的事业。”
“Crapshoot” is not quite accurate, but Keefer saw an element of randomness in Parker’s stratospheric rise: “What if it was another time in history that was for the so-to-speak ‘gambler,’ then it would be Tom Shanks who would be trading a billion dollars and Jerry Parker would be trading $250 million. I know a couple of other Turtles who didn’t want to trade public money. They wanted to drive a race car rather than an aircraft carrier.” Keefer saw other Turtles who could have had Parker’s level of success. He said, “If Paul Rabar would have got with those guys at Kidder Peabody rather than Jerry, Paul Rabar would be the one that you’re writing about as trading a billion or two billion dollars.”
“有风险的事业”这个说法还不精准，科夫认为成功也有随机的因素：“一般人都认为这是赌博，如果时间变换一下，也许是汤姆·桑克斯在交易几十亿美元，而杰瑞·帕克才交易2500万美元。我知道有几个海龟不想管理大众的资金（张轶注：不想当基金经理）。他们宁愿开跑车，也不愿意开航空母舰。”科夫的意思是说其他海龟也可以取得帕克的成功。他说：“如果保罗·拉巴也和基德公司有关系，而不是帕克和他们有关系，那么你现在写书时就要说是保罗·拉巴在管理10亿，20亿的资金。”
However, Keefer was not slighting Parker: “Jerry was at the right place at the right time and what he did is he did not impede himself. I say that in the most positive of ways. Too many of us are presented with an opportunity in life and we hesitate.” Exactly. At the end of the day, Parker had to swing and hit the ball hard to win the game. He had to make it happen. Parker whipped the bat through the strike zone with ferocity.
科夫并非是在贬低帕克：“杰瑞在正确的时间，正确的地点做了正确的事。我是在夸奖他。我们很多人都得到了机会，但是我们因为忧郁而错过了机会。”没错，帕卡努力地赢得了这个游戏。他成功了。帕克在棒球场内欢呼。
However, don’t expect to see Parker on CNBC explaining how to make money on unpredictable disasters. Don’t expect to see him on Fox News debating politics with Hannity and Colmes. You have a much better chance of meeting Parker at the local Richmond, Virginia, area Starbucks. The lesson: Be alert when buying your next morning coffee. You just might meet a good trader to handle your retirement money or the needed benefactor for your political run.
另外，你不要指望帕克会在美国全国广播公司财经频道向你解释如何在不可预测的灾难中赚钱。也不要指望他在福克斯电视新闻频道和汉尼迪及考姆斯争论政治。你只有在里士满地区才有可能遇到帕克。记住：以后在早上买咖啡的时候要醒目点。也许你会遇到一个可以帮你打理退休金的优秀交易者，或者是资助你参加政治竞选的人。
章 失败是一个选择
“I ran out of gas. I had a flat tire. I didn’t have enough money for cab fare. My tux didn’t come back from the cleaners. An old friend came in from out of town. Someone stole my car. There was an earthquake! A terrible flood! Locusts! It wasn’t my fault, I swear to god!”
Jake Blues, The Blues Brothers Movie
“我没汽油了，车子爆胎了。我没有足够的钱打的。我的礼服还在洗衣店。有个老朋友来了。我的车被偷了。地震了！可怕的洪水来了！蝗虫来了！我向上帝发誓，这不是我的错！”
杰克·布鲁斯，布鲁斯兄弟电影
Understanding why some Turtles were swallowed up in the pressure cooker of ego and expectations while others went on to great success reveals what is necessary to achieve long-term success. Liz Cheval was blunt: “The most interesting thing about the Turtle program was observing who succeeded and who did not.” Cheval never expanded publicly about which Turtles fell into which category, but the evidence about which Turtles she was referring to was becoming clear.
搞清楚为什么有些海龟受制于自我和期望的压力，而其他海龟则取得了巨大的成功，这之间的区别是通向长期成功的必要因素。莉斯·雪娃说话很直率：“海龟实验最有趣的事就是观察谁会成功，谁会失败。”雪娃没有公开说谁会成功，谁会失败，但是很明显知道她在说谁。
Dennis himself acknowledged in a 2005 interview, “You could make the case on reflection that it didn’t make much difference who we picked. The people who could sustain trading after the Turtle program did so pretty much according to their abilities. While they were sort of under our control, it didn’t make much difference how intrinsically smart they were.”
丹尼斯在2005年的采访中说：“我挑选谁并没有多大区别。完整地参与海龟实验的人之后都做的很好。虽然他们受我的控制，但他们本质上很聪明。”
In fact, when referring to intrinsic intelligence, Dennis makes the point that executing a well-designed trading system does not require, intellect as a key factor: “Good traders apply every ounce of intelligence they have into the creation of their systems, but then they’re dumbbells in following them. You’ve got to have a schizoid approach. Work like hell to make it good, and then ignore it like you’re a brick wall. President Bush would be a great trader if he had a system.”
当谈到天生就聪明时，丹尼斯指出，如果是使用已经设计好的交易系统，并不要很聪明的人，智商不是关键因素：“优秀的交易者绞尽脑汁地开发他们的系统，但是在执行系统时要傻乎乎地执行。你要使用不同的精神状态。拼命地把系统做好，然后麻木地执行系统。如果布什总统有一个好系统，他就能成为伟大的交易者。”
Others offered a far different view. David Cheval, a peripheral player in the Turtle story, and Curtis Faith didn’t buy the “anyone can do it” premise from the man who actually proved it. Faith said: “You can certainly teach trading and trading concepts. You can teach someone to be a successful trader. There were marked differences in the performance of the group. So some people couldn’t apply or learn trading. Some took several years to catch on. I do believe that legends are born not made. Decent traders can be made however. So I’m in the nature and the nurture camp.”
其他人有不同的观点。大卫·雪娃不是主要的海龟，虽然她证明了“任何人都可以成功”，但柯蒂斯·费思不认同这个说法。费思说：“你当然可以教别人交易，教别人理念。你可以教别人成为成功的交易者。但是每个人的业绩是不同的，相差很大。所以说有些人是不适合做交易的。有些人需要学习几年才真正掌握交易。我相信高手是天生的，不是后天打造的。当然，优秀的交易者也可以被打造出来。所以，我属于天生的。”
The Turtle story does not straddle the debate. Dennis proved conclusively that nurture trumped nature. However once the Turtles were out of his program and out into the real world, many tried to capitalize on their fame in an assortment of different ways. Their behavior provided fascinating insights about what not to do if making big money making is your goal.
海龟的经历并没有终结这个争论。丹尼斯已经证明了后天的培养也能战胜天生的高手。一旦当海龟们自己创业时，很多海龟都或多或少地利用了他们的名声。他们的行为说明了，如果赚大钱是你的目标，就要避免一些事情。
It turns out that Russell Sands was not the only Turtle to dispense Dennis’s rules. Curtis Faith, referring to himself as an “original Turtle,” started a website in April 2003 that at first promised to give the Turtles’ rules away free, provided those who found them useful sent a donation to charity “in honor of Richard Dennis, Bill Eckhardt and the original Turtles.”
事实说明，拉塞尔·桑兹并非是唯一一个透露丹尼斯的原则的海龟。柯蒂斯·费思号称自己是原版的海龟，他在2003年开了一个网站，承诺说，如果你为了“理查德·丹尼斯，比尔·埃克哈特和原版海龟们”而向他慈善捐款，他就免费告诉你海龟交易原则。
Faith, without naming him directly, criticized Sands for profiting off the Turtle system: “. . . it always bothered me that some were making money off the work of Richard Dennis and Bill Eckhardt without their consent.”
费思没有直接点名，但他批评了桑兹利用海龟系统谋取利润：“……有人没有征得理查德·丹尼斯和比尔·埃克哈特的同意就靠卖系统赚钱，此事一直让我不安。”
That said there is no evidence that Dennis had anything to do with giving away his rules for charity. When asked about the rules being offered free online, he sounded resigned: “Once I was walking down Michigan Avenue and I heard somebody talking about it. It was pretty clear that they were looking at the stuff and that they thought it somehow had my blessing. What can I do?”
也没有证据表明丹尼斯同意了用交易原则换取别人的慈善捐款。有人问他关于网上免费版本的事，他似乎认同了：“有一次我走在密歇根大街上，我听到别人在讨论这个。很明显，他们在看这个系统，而且他们认为那是我的祝福。我能怎么办？”
But Faith’s charity soon turned capitalistic. In 2006, the website he created switched gears, no longer asking for a charitable donation. The website now charged $29.95 for Dennis’s rules. Faith and his firm were doing what he had criticized Sands for. Additionally, while he had criticized Sands for not trading profitably, there was absolutely no evidence Faith was trading successfully either.
但是费思的慈善捐款很快变成了资本运作。2006年，网站变了，不再要求慈善捐款。现在是，如果你要买丹尼斯的原则，必须付费29.95美元。费思以前批评桑兹靠系统牟利，现在他自己也在做同样的事。另外，他批评桑兹根本没赚到钱，但也绝对没有证据证明费思就赚钱了。
When explaining his career ups and downs, Faith referred back to the money he made sixteen years before as a Turtle: “You’re probably thinking, ‘What happened to those millions?’ More than half went to taxes, about a quarter went to charity and helping my father out, and the rest went to start various businesses.” He said the biggest chunk, $2 million, was invested into a software company.
关于自己事业的起起落落，费思是这样解释的，他提到了17年前他赚到的钱：“也许你会想‘那几百万去哪里了？’有一大半缴税了，四分之一做了慈善捐款并帮助我爸，其它的则用来创业。”他说有200万美元投资到了软件公司。
Faith explained in online chat rooms how this software firm (which later became the focus of an SEC investigation) went bankrupt. He blamed the firm’s implosion on a newly hired CEO. At the time there were personal issues at play, too: “I went through a divorce and gave pretty much all of the non-risk assets to my ex. I still loved her, and we parted on good terms so I gave her the house, porshe [sic], etc. Long and short of it is that I don’t have as much as I once did. I’m not complaining as I’m still better off than most.”
费思在网上论坛解释了他的软件公司（后来成为证券交易委员会调查的重点）是如何破产的。他说是新招聘的首席执行官导致了公司的倒闭。当时他还有一些个人问题：“当时我离婚了，把几乎所有的非风险性资产都给了我的前妻。我仍然爱她。我们友好分手，所以我把房子和保时捷等等都给了她。因为这些原因，所以我的钱不多了。我并非是说自己现在很好。”
But different characterizations regarding Faith’s purported 2003 stock-trading losses, a disgruntled employee, and his personal solvency were making the rounds in cyberspace. Faith commented on rumors of his money woes in 2004: “I am not broke. I have had several periods in the last several years where I was very, very low on cash, but that’s not the same thing as being broke. Even if I had been broke, I’m not sure it matters as I’m selling software, not advice on how not to ever go broke.”
关于费思2003年交易股票的亏损，有不同的说法。网上在流传不满的雇员和他的偿还能力。有流言说他在2004年资金困难，他是这样回应的：“我没有破产。有时候我确实很缺钱，但我并没有破产。即使我破产了，这和我卖软件没有关系，我卖的又不是如何防止破产的建议。”
Shortly thereafter, Faith launched his first trading effort since leaving Dennis in 1988. Hedge World Daily ran with a headline describing Faith’s and broker Yuri Plyam’s new Acceleration Mercury 4X LP hedge fund. The new fund’s strategy was going to rely on three time frames: a one- to two-day holding period, another holding period of ten to fifty days, and a third for months to years.
之后不久，费思开始了自从1988年离开丹尼斯之后的第一次交易。《对冲世界日报》用头条报道了费思和经纪人尤利·普莱姆合伙的新的四倍加速水星对冲基金。新的基金策略是依靠3个时间框架：一个是持有1，2天，另一个是持有10——50天，第三个是持有几个月到几年。
The pitch? Faith had taken a fifteen-year break from the trading business and decided to get back into trading in order to take advantage of breakthroughs in trading technology. He explained why clients should be excited at the prospects of him managing their money: “Traders used to have to sit in front of the screen all day, but that’s no longer necessary to trade successfully.” (It’s worth noting that Turtles trading for Dennis never sat in front of a screen.)
这是广告词吗？费思离开了交易界15年，现在想回来继续做突破。他解释到，客户对他管理资金感到非常激动，认为有前途：“交易者都喜欢整天坐在屏幕前面，但是成功的交易没有必要这么做。”（请注意，海龟们为丹尼斯交易的时候是每天坐在屏幕前面的。）
Faith struck a confident tone in a chat room about coming out of retirement to form new trading pools. Clearly, raising money for Acceleration Capital without Faith’s name and his Turtle association would have been difficult. Dennis and the word “Turtle” were lead résumé points in the firm’s disclosure documents (and in assorted news accounts).
费思在论坛很自信地说他开始使用新的交易工具。很明显，如果没有依靠费思的名声和海龟的名声，为“加速资金”筹集资本是困难的。丹尼斯和海龟就是他的简历，就是他公司文件的宣传点。
While the ambitious Faith spoke of quickly raising a $100 million fund, Acceleration Capital was started with less than $1 million of client money - an extremely small amount for a hedge fund. The fund traded for a short period, accrued significant losses, and was shut down.
费思野心勃勃地说他能很快筹集到1个亿，但实际上“加速资金”启动时，客户投资的资金不到100万——对对冲基金来说，这个数字太少了。这个基金交易了一小段时间，亏损严重，然后就被关闭了。
Unfortunately, the shutdown was not only due to bad performance. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, a government regulatory arm similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission, started investigating the fund.
不幸的是，基金的关闭不仅仅是因为业绩差。类似证券交易管理委员会的商品期货交易委员会开始调查这个基金。
An employee of Castle Trading (Castle and Acceleration were in the same office) named Toby Wayne Denniston was embezzling customer monies from Acceleration Capital. From November 2004 through August 2005, this employee misappropriated $190,883 from the Acceleration’s customer account. He was forging checks and concealing his theft by altering the firm’s bank and trading account statements. Denniston bought a new BMW and took several trips with his stolen loot. He was ultimately fined $250,000 in an August 2006 order.
城堡交易公司（城堡交易和加速其实在同一个办公室里）的一个职员叫托比·韦恩·丹尼斯顿，他盗用了加速资金的公款。从2004年11月到2005年8月，这个职员从加速的客户账户动用了190883美元。他伪造支票，修改公司的银行和账户信息。丹尼斯顿买了新的宝马，用偷来的钱出去旅游了几次。在2006年8月的庭审中，他被罚款250000美元。
Then a January 16, 2007 government order from a related investigation found Acceleration Capital responsible for Denniston’s actions. The firm was barred from managing money for clients permanently and fined $218,000. Yuri Plyam was also fined and prohibited from acting as a commodity pool operator (hedge fund term) for three years. The CFTC’s investigation (as of June 2007) is still ongoing, consisting of an unreleased collection of 869 depositions, 694 pages of financial records, and 200 pages of trading records.
2007年1月16日，政府的调查认为加速资金应该对丹尼斯顿的行为负责。公司被永远禁止代客理财并罚款218000美元。尤利·普莱姆也被罚款了，并禁止在3年内从事商品工具操作员（对冲基金的名词）的工作。（截至到2007年6月）美国商品期货交易委员会的调查工作还在继续，涉及到未公开的869份证词，694页金融记录和200页交易记录。
Faith should have been one of the biggest traders of the last twenty years, but he was clearly missing that something Jerry Parker had. Author Jack Schwager, seeing the struggles of some Turtles, reeled in the legend his Market Wizards books had created. He told me, “I don’t think it was as much of a miracle as it has been popularized. My feeling is that there is no magic here and perhaps no really great talents other than the original founders.”
费思本可以成为20年来的最伟大的交易者之一，但是很明显他错过了类似杰瑞·帕克这样的机会。作者杰克·施瓦格见证了一些海龟的挣扎过程，揭露了海龟的真相。他告诉我：“他们没有传说中的那么神奇。我的感觉就是没有神奇的东西，也许是因为他们都不如丹尼斯。”
Schwager may have a point with Turtles such as Faith and others who never traded to great success after the Turtle program ended. However, twenty-year performance track records established by at least six other Turtles and William Eckhardt are without a doubt impressive.
也许施瓦格说的是像费思这样的人，他们在海龟实验后从来没有成功过。但是，其他6个海龟和威廉·埃克哈特这20年来的交易记录无疑是值得重视的。
At the end of the day, the Turtles could have all the trading rules in the world, but if some were lazy or poor businessmen, if they lacked motivation or the ability to follow through, their failure at trading - or indeed at any entrepreneurial endeavor - was not a surprise.
在海龟实验结束时，可以说所有的海龟都掌握了交易原则，但是，如果有人很懒，或者是没有做生意的能力，或者是没有动力，或者是没有能力去执行，那么，他的交易就是失败的——其实做任何生意都是这样——这就不感到奇怪了。
But the success or failure of some of the original Turtles does not tell us conclusively whether Dennis’s trading wisdom is truly transferable. The Turtle story arguably remains little more than a fascinating corner of investing history, but one without larger implications for the rest of us. The key test is whether the Turtles themselves were capable of passing on the investing knowledge they’d learned, that they’d applied so successfully while working for Dennis.
但是，不管是成功的原版海龟，还是失败的原版海龟，他们都不能证明是否丹尼斯的交易智慧就可以被传授。海龟的故事不但是投资的历史，而且对我们有更深的含义。关键是，海龟们是否吸收了所学到的知识，是否成功地运用了这些知识。
Fortunately, there is at least one person who provides inspirational evidence of the true transferability of Dennis’s trading wisdom. He is rock-solid proof that a hard-working guy with no direct connection to Dennis and Eckhardt could learn to make big money trading - all out of a sleepy small town in the Texas panhandle. If the applicability of Dennis’s original experiment to wider society has ever been doubted, skeptics will need another excuse to explain away this second-generation Turtle’s success. His name is Salem Abraham.
幸运的是，至少有一个人证明了丹尼斯的交易智慧是可以传授的。他坚定地证明了，即使没有丹尼斯和埃克哈特的帮助，只要你努力，你就能通过交易赚大钱——不必在德克萨斯的小镇乞讨。如果有人怀疑丹尼斯的实验不能扩展到社会上，那么就要解释第二代海龟是如何成功的。他的名字叫塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕。
章 第二代海龟
“I have been broke three or four times. But fortunately for me I’m not an MBA, so I didn’t know I was broke.”
T. Boone Pickens
“我破产了3，4次。但幸运的是，我不是工商管理硕士，所以我不知道我破产了。”
T·布恩·皮肯斯
That second-generation Turtles exist is arguably the most important part of the Turtle story. Ultimately, these “Turtles” present an even more convincing argument supporting nurture over nature than does the success of the original Turtles. They prove that (possibly) anyone can be a Turtle today.
第二代海龟的存在也备受争议。最终，这些“海龟”更加证明了交易是可以后天培养的。他们证明了如今（也许）任何人都能成为海龟。
Second-generation Turtles include Mark J. Walsh, Jonathan Craven, John D. Fornengo (originally taught by Eckhardt in 1989), and Salem Abraham, four traders among hundreds of trend followers who all learned Turtle-style trend following secondhand. In turn, they built trading businesses that in many instances far exceeded those of the original Turtle traders.
第二代海龟包括马克·J·沃尔什，乔纳森·卡文，约翰·D·福南格（最初由埃克哈特在1989年传授）和塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕，在几百个趋势跟踪者中，这4个交易者学到了二手的海龟风格的趋势跟踪。他们交易的规模比原版海龟交易的规模要大很多。
When Walsh talks about his trading, it’s like hearing Dennis and Eckhardt all over again, discussing strength and weakness: “If beans are up 10 cents and corn is down five cents, we buy beans. Some people think to buy corn because it’s going to catch up with beans. We take the opposite. We’d rather buy the commodity that’s strongest and sell the one that’s weakest.” Walsh saw Dennis as “generous with his knowledge of the markets. He gave us a solid foundation on which to build a program.”
当沃尔什谈论他的交易时，简直就是再次聆听丹尼斯和埃克哈特的教导，他在谈论强的品种和弱的品种：“如果大豆涨了10美分，玉米跌了5美分，我们买大豆。有些人认为要买玉米，因为玉米会追上大豆的。我们则相反。我们会买最强的品种并卖出最弱的品种。” 沃尔什认为丹尼斯“对市场有很深的认知。他告诉我们如何建立系统，这是坚实的基础。”
Two other second-generation Turtles are Robert Marcellus and Scot Henry, who run the Richmond Group Fund. Little is publicly known of their organization except that Henry once worked for Jerry Parker and Kidder Peabody (James River Capital). Coincidentally, their home base is in Manakin Sabot, Virginia, near Jerry Parker’s.
还有2个第二代海龟，他们是罗伯特·马塞勒斯和斯考特·亨利，他们管理着里士满集团基金。很少有人知道他们的基金，只知道亨利曾经为杰瑞·帕克和基德（詹姆士·瑞瓦资金）做过事。碰巧的是，他们的公司离杰瑞·帕克的公司很近。 There are many ways to analyze successful entrepreneurial traders, but “winning” is the starting point. Behind all the talk about teamwork and balance, people still judge trading success by an individual’s ability to win big money. True competitors have a remarkable immunity to failure. It’s simply not a factor that takes them out of the game even when it happens. They have a single-mindedness and zealous disregard for obstacles. They have indefatigable optimism. Winners pursue the prize because they are sure they can get it. They’re less afraid of striking out than of not taking every possible turn at bat that comes their way.
分析成功交易者的方法很多，但是“赢”是起点。除了常说的团队精神和协调能力，人们一般通过个人赚大钱的能力判断交易是否成功。真正的竞争者天生对失败免疫。一个不利因素是不能打败他们的。他们专注一心，不怕困难。他们具有不屈不挠的乐观精神。赢家追求荣誉是因为他们知道他们能成功。他们不怕三振出局，也不怕任何困难。
Many of the original Turtles simply did not think that way. Dennis taught his original Turtles only part of what made him successful. There was no way he could teach them the inner drive that had propelled him from the South Side of Chicago to becoming “Prince of the Pit.” Dennis was forced by necessity to learn the hard way, just like so many second-generation Turtles.
很多原版海龟也不这么想。丹尼斯只是把他自己成功的东西教给了海龟们。但是没有办法把内在动力教给他们，让他们成为交易场内的王子。丹尼斯的知识是在实战中努力学到的，很多第二代海龟也是如此。
Of all of the second- generation Turtles, one stands out. When Salem Abraham started trading he had no prior experience with Dennis and Eckhardt, no group of like-minded Turtle traders with whom to share experiences. He hadn’t worked for Goldman Sachs or for any other hedge fund. Yet it didn’t matter one iota.
在所有的第二代海龟中，有一个最突出。当塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕开始学习交易的时候，他没有跟丹尼斯和埃克哈特学过，也无法从其他海龟那里学习经验。他没有为高盛或任何对冲基金工作过。但这一点都不重要。
With his pleasant demeanor, thick brown hair, and compact physique, Salem Abraham looks younger than his forty years. He could be mistaken for one of his ranch hands, but his Texas drawl and friendly manner mask a steely entrepreneurial drive that goes back generations.
塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕很高兴的样子，头发是棕黄的，很密，体格紧凑，看起来不到40岁，其实他40岁。你会把他当作农夫，但是他德克萨斯慢吞吞的语速和行为掩饰了他的企业家精神，而这种精神可以追溯到几代前。
How far away was Abraham from a Wall Street pedigree? He comes from a family of Christian Lebanese immigrants who settled in rural Canadian, Texas, in 1913. His grandfather, Malouf “Oofie” Abraham, sold ready-to-wear clothing out of a suitcase along the railroad before opening a retail store.
亚伯拉罕和华尔街的名门差距有多大？他的祖辈在1913年从黎巴嫩移民到德克萨斯的加那丁郊区，他们是基督徒。他的爷爷马洛夫·欧非·亚伯拉罕在车站附近把一箱子要穿的衣服都卖了，然后开了一个小店。
Before Abraham was headed down the path to becoming a trader, he attended Notre Dame and planned to marry his childhood sweetheart, Ruth Ann. He was going to start a mail-order business. While he did marry Ruth Ann and while he still lives in Canadian, Texas, it is not the story of his mail-order career that makes people take notice. It is his twenty-year trading performance:
在亚伯拉罕成为交易者之前，他在圣母大学读书，并准备和青梅竹马的露丝·安结婚。他准备做邮递商品的生意。如果他确实娶了露丝·安并住在德克萨斯的加那丁，那么现在就要讲邮递商品的故事了。以下是他20年来的交易业绩：
Table 13.1: Abraham Trading Company - Diversified Program (Salem Abraham).
图3.1 亚伯拉罕交易公司——不同的软件系统（塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕）。
Year
年
Annual Return
年回报
Year
年
Annual Return
年回报
1988
142.04%
1998
4.39
1989
17.81
1999
4.76
1990
89.95
2000
13.54
1991
24.39
2001
19.16
1992
-10.50
2002
21.51
1993
34.29
2003
74.66
1994
24.22
2004
15.38
1995
6.12
2005
-10.95
1996
-0.42
2006
8.88
1997
10.88
Source: Disclosure Documents Filed with United States CFTC.
来源：美国商品期货交易委员会公开的文件。
I first interviewed Salem Abraham face-to-face in his office in 2005. His world offers instant culture shock. Canadian, Texas, is the epitome of small-town America, but with a big twist. Abraham’s success has allowed him to endow his tiny town with amenities unusual in communities several times its size.
我于2005年在塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕的办公室第一次访问他。他展现了不同的文化。德克萨斯的加那丁是美国的一个小镇，也是美国的缩影，但变化很大。亚伯拉罕的成功让他有能力给小镇捐款修建娱乐设施，但是他的捐款数字显然太大了。
Canadian’s Main Street (with one stoplight) now has the Cattle Exchange steakhouse and a restored movie theater with a digital sound system. Abraham has spent millions to create this oasis. How was he able to do it?
现在加那丁的大街上有了活牛交易所，还有牛排餐厅，电影院使用数字音响系统。亚伯拉罕为此付出了几百万。他是如何做到的？
Meeting a Turtle
会见一个海龟
Salem Abraham would never have pursued trading if not for a chance meeting with Jerry Parker. It was the spring of 1987. He was at Notre Dame with one semester left, determined to graduate in three and a half years in order to start his mail-order business. Then he attended a family wedding where he met Parker, and his life changed.
如果不是遇见了杰瑞·帕克，塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕是永远不会从事交易的。当时是1987年春天，他在圣母大学读书，还有一个学期就要毕业了，他准备毕业后的3年半以后开始做邮递商品生意。然后他参加了一个家庭婚礼，他在那里遇到了帕克，他的人生就发生了变化。
Abraham was making casual conversation with Parker (whose wife and Abraham shared mutual first cousins), with no expectation of a life-changing moment at hand. He asked Parker what he did for a living. Parker said, “We figure out the odds and there’s certain patterns that we look for. Then we manage our risk and when these patterns happen, you put on certain trades.” Abraham incredulously followed up, “The odds are in your favor? You’re sure of that?”
亚伯拉罕就和帕克随便交谈（帕克的老婆和亚伯拉罕是堂兄妹），当时还没想到会有改变一生的事情会发生。他问帕克以什么为生？帕克说：“我们寻找概率和特定的模式。如果这些模式出现了，我们就管理风险，开始交易。” 亚伯拉罕就怀疑地问：“你能保证这些概率就对你有利吗？”
When Abraham heard the Turtle story for the first time, he was floored. He recalled, “Jerry told me about Richard Dennis and told me about these guys that he hired to train to trade. He told me that everybody’s making money and how much money they’ve made each year.” Abraham, who’d already decided he wanted “to make a living in a little town in Texas,” quickly said to himself, “This can work from Canadian. It’s right up my alley.”
当帕克第一次告诉亚伯拉罕海龟的故事时，他陶醉了。他回忆说：“杰瑞告诉我丹尼斯的事，还有海龟们的事。他说每个人都赚钱了，并告诉我他们每年赚了多少钱。” 亚伯拉罕本来是计划在德克萨斯的小镇做生意，他立刻对自己说：“我可以在加那丁工作。正好就在家门口做事。”
At that moment he saw an opportunity, just as his grandfather had decades before when the railroad was being built. He had never before heard of the Turtles or Richard Dennis, yet he took stock of Parker’s career, and without knowing the specifics, immediately shifted his goals in life to pursue trading. No more mail-order business.
当时他看到了机会，就像他的爷爷几十年前在铁路边看到的机会一样。他从没听说过海龟，也没听说过丹尼斯，虽然他知道帕克的事业，但那只是皮毛，他立刻改变了主意，不搞邮递商品了，他要去做交易。
Luckily for Abraham, Parker said that if he ever wanted to visit Richmond he would show him some things to point him in the right direction. Abraham called the next week. It never occurred to Abraham that Parker might have been making polite social conversation, never dreaming that Abraham would take him up on the offer.
亚伯拉罕是幸运的，帕克说如果他没有去里士满，他就不会告诉他这些东西。第二周亚伯拉罕就打电话过来了。亚伯拉罕没想到帕克在电话里很客气，也没想到自己接受了这个建议。
The thought that he might have been imposing on Parker simply did not occur to Abraham, who later described his mindset at the time: “I think you’re kind of young and dumb and you just say, ‘He made the offer and that means he really means it.’ ” When Abraham called, all he could hear was, “Well, ah.” At that moment Abraham knew Parker was just trying to be nice to the new relative. But Parker finally said, “Sure, come on out.”
帕克担心的事，似乎亚伯拉罕没担心过，帕克后来说：“我觉得你有点年轻，有点傻，你仅仅说‘你给了一个建议，那么你就是认真的。’”当亚伯拉罕打电话时，他听见的是：“啊。”当时，亚伯拉罕知道帕克只是为了对新亲戚表示客气而已。但是帕克最后说：“行，你来吧。”
Abraham knew the immediate import of Parker living in Richmond and trading out of his home office for his own plans to build a career in tiny Canadian. That bit of knowledge told him that all he needed was a telephone line to potentially be the next Jerry Parker. The self-confidence to instantly switch gears from mail-order business ideas to a trading career was the first sign of a true entrepreneur in action. Abraham was also very fortunate to have grown up in a family of entrepreneurs who would take a chance on his seemingly crazy trading idea.
亚伯拉罕很快就明白了，帕克在里士满生活和交易就是为了建立自己的事业。于是他决定打电话给杰瑞·帕克，争取机会。他的信心快速地从邮递商品转到了交易，这是真正的企业家精神的表现。亚伯拉罕很幸运地生活在一个具有企业家精神的家庭，他们愿意抓住看起来疯狂的机会。
Those who immediately interpret this to mean Abraham got a free family gift may want to reconsider. It was his responsibility to use his very limited capital wisely. So not surprisingly, he saw “risk management” as the big lesson during their first meeting at Parker’s office. Abraham recalled, “Jerry was clearly aware that there were things that were proprietary he couldn’t tell me.” But he said to Abraham, “Look, this trend-following works, and here’s some ideas you ought to think about,” and then gave him some risk management concepts to think about. Reflecting on Parker’s generosity Abraham, said, “I certainly would never be in the position I’m in without his early help. I would never be where I am now.”
如果有人看到这里，认为亚伯拉罕的天赋是祖传的，那么就请你再思考一下。他有责任聪明地支配自己有限的资金。当他第一次到帕克的办公室时，他发现风险管理是最重要的，这不奇怪。亚伯拉罕回忆说：“杰瑞很清楚，有些事只可意会，无法言传。”但是他告诉亚伯拉罕：“趋势跟踪是有用的，你应该多想想。”然后就告诉了他一些风险管理的概念。回想起帕克的慷慨，亚伯拉罕说：“没有他，就没有我的今天。”
At the time Abraham knew nothing about trading. He had no experience, but he started researching after meeting Parker at his office. Back at Notre Dame, he then read everything he could about Richard Dennis and trend followers. He said, “If you want to be successful at something, well, you want to identify who’s been successful and what are they doing.”
当时亚伯拉罕还不懂交易。他没有经验，但是他立刻在帕克的办公室开始研究。到了圣母大学以后，他开始阅读所有关于丹尼斯和趋势跟踪的资料。他说：“如果你想成功，你就要搞清楚谁成功了，他当时在做什么。”
During his last semester at Notre Dame, Abraham touted the success of Dennis to deaf ears. His professors weren’t interested. They said Richard Dennis was “lucky.” It’s not surprising that professors were skeptical, since Abraham was preaching a gospel that went squarely against the notion of efficient markets - the backbone of generally accepted financial truth.
他在圣母大学最后一个学期的时候，亚伯拉罕到处宣扬丹尼斯的成功。他的教授们根本没兴趣。他们说丹尼斯是运气好。教授们表示怀疑，这是不奇怪的，因为亚伯拉罕宣扬的东西是违背有效市场理论的——大部分人只相信有效市场理论。
Nor was Abraham the only convert to new success following a conversation with Jerry Parker. Off the record, another trader also spoke to me about Parker’s generosity with trading advice. Parker had helped him navigate the waters of setting up his trading firm many years ago. That trader is worth close to $100 million today.
不仅仅是亚伯拉罕一个人因为和杰瑞·帕克谈话之后就转向新的成功。另外，还有一个交易者告诉我，帕克也友好地和他谈过，并建议他从事交易。在多年前，帕克帮助他建立交易公司。如今，那个交易者的价值接近1个亿。
Taking the Plunge
接受亏损
Once Abraham had Parker’s initial mentoring, he started researching trend-following trading rules by hand. It was messy. He was marking charts, noting his risk rules and then just keeping tabs every day. “If I would have bought here, sold here, bought here, sold here.”
亚伯拉罕接受了帕克的教导以后，他开始亲自研究趋势跟踪。当时很混乱。他每天画图，记录风险原则，记账。“如果我在这里买入，就在这里卖出，等等。”
He went to his grandfather with a portfolio of twenty-one markets that he had tested over an eight-month period, and said, “Look, if I had started with a million dollars, it’d be worth $1.6 million at the end of eight months.” He was excited to show all the stuff he had been working on. Abraham’s grandfather, who at that time was seventy-two, had seen lots of Texas deals. He was skeptical of his grandson’s new venture.
他测试了21个市场在8个月内的组合结果，然后找他爷爷说：“如果我用100万开始交易，那么8个月后就能增值到160万。”他急着展现自己的研究成果。亚伯拉罕的爷爷当时72岁了，见证了德克萨斯很多生意情况。他对孙子的新冒险感到怀疑。
His grandfather’s skepticism would be hard to overcome and Abraham had to have been pretty tough to take the withering sarcasm that followed. His grandfather said, “What are we going to do? I guess we just package this up and send it to Chicago. They cut us some check, right, dumb-ass? You may think you’re a smart kid coming out of Notre Dame, but these guys in Chicago, they’re going to chew you up and spit you out. Of all the ways to lose money, why in the hell did you have to pick the very fastest way?”
亚伯拉罕无法让爷爷相信，同时还要面对很多讽刺。他爷爷说：“不如这样吧？我们把这个东西打个包，然后寄到芝加哥。然后让他们寄张支票给我们，好不好，笨蛋？你以为你在圣母大学很聪明，但是芝加哥的这帮家伙会吃了你。输钱的方法太多了，你为什么要选择最快的输钱的方法？”
Not about to be dismissed, Abraham explained the wisdom behind his trading philosophy. He said he was going to use good risk management, explaining, “Just because you have a Lamborghini, you don’t have to go 160 miles an hour. I’m never going past 30 and I’m going to control risk.”
亚伯拉罕没有气馁，他向爷爷解释交易理念后面的智慧。他说他有优秀的风险管理，他解释说：“因为你有兰博基尼车，你不必开160码。我则不会超过30码，我能控制好风险。”
It was obvious where Abraham had inherited his confidence and entrepreneurial zeal. More than just hard business truths had been passed down from generation to generation. Abraham had also been given a moral business compass. His grandfather used to say that if you screw one person, you’re done and you are out of business. He wanted his grandsons to always keep their word, number one. But he also wanted them to go above and beyond what’s fair, saying, “Make sure, even though that’s not the deal.” The legendary investor Boone Pickens, a longtime family friend, saw heredity playing a role in Abraham’s drive. He had known the family for fifty years and saw them make a great contribution to the Texas panhandle.
很明显，亚伯拉罕继承了他爷爷的自信和企业家精神。他爷爷的特点传给了他。亚伯拉罕也是很好的生意标杆。他的爷爷过去常说，如果你害了一个人，你就没戏了。他希望他的孙子首先记住他的话。但是他又希望他的孙子更加成功，他说：“记住，那不算什么生意。”传奇交易者布恩·皮肯斯是他们家的朋友，他认为遗传是亚伯拉罕的内在动力。他和这家人认识了50多年了，这家人为德克萨斯的这片土地做了很多贡献。
Luckily for Abraham, he had grown up around entrepreneurial risk-taking and even participated in some family business deals. He learned the most from the potential deals that went awry. On one oil and gas deal that he learned about from his grandfather, he decided that he would talk to the representative at Shell Oil. Abraham thought they would sell a piece of land to him.
亚伯拉罕很幸运，他成长的环境就有企业家的冒险精神，而且他参与了一些家族生意。他在生意中学到了一些东西，知道什么是对的，什么是错的。他爷爷做过关于原油和汽油的生意，他学到了东西，就决定去代理壳牌石油。亚伯拉罕觉得可以赚很多钱。
His grandfather knew it was going nowhere, saying, “No way. They’ve had this for thirty years, forty years we’ve all talked to them. They won’t do anything with anybody.” Abraham was not deterred, and said, “This guy at Shell Oil, he’s new there. I think he’ll do something.”
他爷爷知道结果没那么好，他说：“不行。他们在这一行已经做了30年了，其实是40年。他们不会和任何人合作的。” 亚伯拉罕没有后退，他说：“壳牌有个人是新来的，我想他会帮忙的。”
His grandfather responded with some attitude: “Tell you what, if you get that deal done, I will kiss your butt out there in the middle of the intersection under that stoplight right there.” Abraham replied to his grandfather, “Pucker up, old man, because it’s going happen.” The deal never happened.
他爷爷的态度不太好：“我告诉你，如果你能做成这笔生意，我会在十字路口红绿灯下亲你的屁股。” 亚伯拉罕回答：“老头，你等着瞧。我会成功的。”结果他没成功。
However, it was that same entrepreneurial fearlessness that Abraham used to launch his trading career that last semester at Notre Dame. It demanded burning the candle at both ends. He was trading twenty-one markets and taking a grueling twenty-one semester hours. He was cramming, and all of his classes had to be scheduled in the afternoon. He would wake up at 7 A.M. and trade from 7 A.M. to 10 A.M. Then he would put his stops in and go to class. After class he would check to see if his stops had been hit.
正是这种企业家的无畏精神让亚伯拉罕在圣母大学最后一个学期开始了交易生涯。这要求铤而走险的精神，他同时研究21个市场，并占用了大量学习时间。时间太紧了，他必须在下午上课。他在早上7点起来，一直到上午10点都在交易。然后他下好止损单，再去上课。下课后再来检查是否被止损了。
The fall of 1987 was no ordinary time, especially for a brand-new trader experiencing historic market volatility. During the last part of September and the first part of October, the interest rates started going straight down. Abraham had come home for fall break on October 19, 1987. He recalled, “The Friday before fall break I made a lot of money. My $50,000 was $66,000 as of Friday. I’m going home and I’m feeling great.” Then, Monday morning, the stock market tanked.
1987年的秋天不寻常，对于新手交易者来说更难，市场发生了剧烈的波动。在9月下旬和10月上旬，利率直线下跌。亚伯拉罕在1987年10月19日回家过秋天的假期。他回忆说：“我放假前的周五我赚了很多钱。5万增值到了6.6万。我回家时感觉很好。”然后周一的上午，股市跌了。
These were big events. Things were going haywire. Abraham worried about his positions in Eurodollars. He called up his broker and said, “So where are Eurodollars?” His broker replied, “They’re up 250.’ ” Abraham shot back, “Two fifty, what do you mean, 25?” His broker said, “No, 250. ” Abraham wanted to know if it was as bad as what he was thinking. He immediately knew that that move was in the neighborhood of 10+ standard deviations away from where Eurodollars normally traded.
这些都是大事。都很乱。亚伯拉罕担心欧洲美元的仓位。他打电话给经纪人说：“欧洲美元如何了？”经纪人回答：“涨了250。” 亚伯拉罕回问：“250，你什么意思，是25吧？”他的经纪人回答：“不，是250。” 亚伯拉罕想知道是不是有他想象的那么糟糕。他立刻明白了这次波动离正常的标准背离太远了，多了10个单位。
His $66,000 had dropped to $33,000. But by the end of the day, he considered it all a great lesson. He had learned the significance of hanging in there to play another day. He felt that to survive at this point in his trading career, with his own money on the line, and not blow out, was “okay.” He recalled, “The one lesson I was clear on: always know the thing that they say can never happen, can happen.”
他的6.6万变成了3.3万。但是在当天，他认为这是一个很大的教训。他明白了坚持并继续交易的重要性。他想用自己的钱坚持下来，而不是爆仓，他明白了生存的含义。他回忆说：“我得到了一个教训：永远要知道不可能发生的事其实会发生的。”
Abraham took a short break after the 1987 October crash. He was out of the markets for a week or so and then got back in. He traded during November and a little bit of December and then shut down for the year. His account had bounced back to $45,000 from that $33,000 low. He took $1,600 out of his account and went to Jim’s Guns, Gold, and Diamonds to buy an engagement ring to propose to his now wife.
1987年股市崩盘后，亚伯拉罕短暂地休息了一下。他休息了一周，然后又进场了。他在11月交易了，在12月也交易了一点，然后当年就结束了。他的账户从3.3万回到了4.5万。他取出1600美元，到吉姆黄金珠宝店买了一个订婚戒指向她老婆求婚。
Commodities Corporation
商品公司
Starting in 1988 Abraham wanted to trade full time, but he still had to prove himself to his grandfather. He told his grandfather, “I want to do this on the side. I know we’re not that busy. Will you let me do this on the side?” He had $45,000, and his older brother Eddie agreed to put up $15,000. His younger brother Jason put in $10,000 to get the “Abraham brother fund” up to $70,000. He wanted his grandfather to put in $30,000 so he would have an even $100,000 trading account.
亚伯拉罕想从1988年开始全职交易，但是还是要征得爷爷的同意。他告诉爷爷：“我想兼职做。我知道我们没那么忙。你同意我兼职做吗？”他有4.5万，他哥哥埃迪同意给1.5万，他弟弟杰森给了1万，这样“亚伯拉罕兄弟基金”一共有7万。他想让他的爷爷投资3万，这样他就有10万了。
His grandfather was willing to play ball, but true to Abraham family ethos there would be a deal. He announced, “Okay, here’s the deal. I’ll put up $30,000. But if we get down to $50,000, we throw that quote machine out the window and we stop all this trading nonsense.”
他的爷爷还是同意了，亚伯拉罕家的人还是有生意头脑的。他宣布：“好的，你就可以做。我给你3万。但是，如果跌到了5万，我就把你的报价器丢出去，我们就全部停止这种无谓的交易。”
For a man in his early twenties, Salem Abraham was taking on some serious risk and pressure. And as is often the case, just when he was out of the gate with his $100,000 account for his new trading firm, the bottom dropped out.
亚伯拉罕当时20出头，承受了很大的风险和压力。事情总是这样，当你拿着10万美元去交易时，很快就没钱了。
The first two weeks of May 1988 were horrible markets. Abraham was downstairs in his office when his grandfather stuck his head in one morning and said, “Where are we today?” Abraham replied, “Sixty-eight thousand dollars.” In sarcastic glee, his grandfather said, “Just a matter of time,” and he walked out the door.
1988年的头2周，市场很糟糕。亚伯拉罕在楼下的办公室，他的爷爷抓着他的脑袋问：“我们今天如何了？” 亚伯拉罕回答：“6.8万美元。”爷爷讽刺地笑着说：“就快了”，然后出门了。
Time never happened. The grain market drought of 1988 hit and Abraham was long soybeans, corn, and wheat. The markets just exploded the second half of May and into June. He was very well positioned and rocked along to serious profit.
还好没有。1988年谷物干旱，而亚伯拉罕做多了大豆，玉米和小麦。市场在5月中下旬爆发了，并持续到6月。他的仓位很好，一路上涨，获利很多。
How could Abraham have been certain that bigger things were around the corner with the kind of volatility he had seen in his first eight months of trading? Plenty of people would have quit, chalking it up to a failed business venture. In spite of the ups and downs, once he’d shown his grandfather that he was on to a profitable angle, the senior Abraham came on board in a big way. His grandfather walked in the door one day with a “Dean Witter Principal Guarantee Fund 2” brochure and threw it on his grandson’s desk, declaring, “Hey, you did better than these guys did.”
亚伯拉罕是如何才交易了8个月就能提前知道振荡的市场中有大事要发生？很多人都退出了，进入了另一个亏损的生意。无论是涨跌，只要向爷爷证明他要赚钱，亚伯拉罕就要大干一场。有一天他的爷爷进来时手上还拿着《狄恩维特尔2号保障性基金》的册子，他把册子扔到了孙子的桌子上，说：“嗨，你比这些家伙做的好。”
Commodities Corporation was the manager of the Dean Witter fund, and they were in the process of raising $100 million and allocating it among eight to ten traders. Commodities Corporation had quite a history. They were a prominent Princeton, New Jersey–based trading incubator (now part of Goldman Sachs following a late-1990s buyout). They were responsible for the early funding (and in some instances training) of hedge fund greats such as Paul Tudor Jones, Louis Bacon, Ed Seykota, Bruce Kovner, and Michael Marcus.
商品公司负责管理狄恩维特尔基金，他们当时正在筹集1亿资金，准备分给8到10个交易者。商品公司过去做的不错。他们是著名的，位于新泽西普林斯顿孵化基地（90年代末被高盛收购了）。他们负责为大的对冲基金筹集资金（培训），这些基金包括保罗·都铎·琼斯，路易斯•培根，艾德?塞柯塔，布鲁斯·科夫勒和迈克尔·马库斯。
Abraham did not know all that history at the time. He just picked up the phone and called Commodities Corporation. He got Elaine Crocker on the phone late in the day. Crocker, who now runs Louis Bacon’s Moore Capital and today may be the most powerful woman in the hedge fund industry, said she would send some information. Abraham doubted Crocker was taking him seriously, because he had only a one-year track record.
亚伯拉罕不知道这些历史。他拿起电话就打给了商品公司。后来，他和伊莱恩·克罗克通了电话。克罗克现在在管理路易斯•培根摩尔资金，如今也许她是对冲基金业的最有能力的女性，她说她要送点信息过来。亚伯拉罕不太相信克罗克是认真的，毕竟他的交易记录只有1年。
But eventually Commodities Corporation got back in touch with him, announcing that they were going to be in Houston and inviting him to meet with them. He jumped at the opportunity and flew to the Houston airport to meet Crocker and Michael Garfinkel.
但最终商品公司和他联系了，宣布他们会到休斯敦，并要求他去会面。他抓住了这个机会，飞到休斯敦和克罗克及迈克尔·加芬克尔会面。
Abraham had just celebrated his twenty-third birthday before the meeting. Garfinkel did most of the talking. Crocker sat back and watched the discussion. Garfinkel said, “Wow, last month was a tough month. What happened?” Abraham pointed out that during the current month he was up 40 percent.
亚伯拉罕在会面前刚过完23岁生日。大部分时间是加芬克尔在说话。克罗克则坐在那里观看他们的讨论。加芬克尔说：“哇，最后一个月太糟糕了。发生了什么事？” 亚伯拉罕指出，自己当月赚了40%。
Crocker started laughing. Not seeing the humor in his response, Abraham asked. “What’s so funny about up 40 percent?” Garfinkel, sensing a disconnect, wanted to know what kind of returns Abraham was shooting for. Abraham gave the Turtle-like answer of 100 percent a year. And just like many of the original Turtles were told after leaving Dennis, Crocker wanted Abraham to back off his riskier “shoot for the moon” approach. She and Garfinkel made the same observation Jerry Parker and others had heard: “If you make 30 percent a year, people will beat a path to your door. You need to back off on the leverage.”
克罗克开始笑。亚伯拉罕不知道有什么好笑的，就问：“我赚了40%，有什么好笑的？”加芬克尔说他想知道亚伯拉罕的期望回报是多少。亚伯拉罕的回答和海龟相似，说要1年赚1倍。因为很多海龟离开了丹尼斯，克罗克希望亚伯拉罕降低自己的风险，不要把目标设定在每月赚多少上。她和加芬克尔，杰瑞·帕克，还有其他人说的一样：“如果你能一年赚30%，人们会上门来求你的。你必须降低你的杠杆。”
Commodities Corporation still wanted to see a ten-year simulation of Abraham’s system - something he did not have. Their request forced Abraham to learn programming to quickly test his trading system. The pressure was on. It started Abraham down the path of developing a whole new research and programming skill set. It was just one of the many ways he was setting himself apart from the original Turtles.
商品公司还想看看亚伯拉罕的系统的10年模拟结果——可惜他没有。他们逼亚伯拉罕赶快学编程，这样可以测试他的交易系统。他有压力。亚伯拉罕又要被逼开发新技术，学编程。这是他和原版海龟唯一不同地方。
There was one more consideration in the deal. Commodities Corporation wanted to invest Abraham’s minimum account size. Since he had no minimum, he settled on $200,000, rightfully surmising that Commodities Corporation would pony up to a reasonable number. He was right, and they became his first big client.
还有一件事要考虑。商品公司想投资给亚伯拉罕，但亚伯拉罕必须存入一定的金额。但是他没多少资金，他就准备了20万，他猜想商品公司可能会投资不少钱。他没猜错，他们成为了他最大的客户。
For a young man with no trading pedigree and no hedge fund experience, this investment was admission to the major leagues. Commodities Corporation invested the next $7 to $8 million in his firm as well. That initial $30,000 investment from his grandfather? It’s worth $1.3 million today.
作为一个年轻人，他并非出自名门，也没有对冲基金的经验，这样的投资是很大的。商品公司又追加投资了7，800万。他爷爷最初投资的3万如何了？现在价值130万。
However, even with all that moneymaking success, Abraham was still just a young guy, and his experiences with the establishment questioning his credibility were similar to those of the young Richard Dennis. Reminiscent of Dennis’s trip to the bank to cash the $250,000 check was Abraham trying to rent a car at age twenty-five, with no luck since they had recently raised the minimum age requirement. He was managing $15 million, but the Hertz counter was not budging on renting to him. Salem, after attempting to negotiate, tried some attitude: “Do you know that I have people who entrust $15 million with me, and I can buy and sell whatever I want to with this $15 million? You won’t loan me a car? A $15,000, $20,000 car for the day?” The lady at the counter was looking him up and down thinking, “Yeah, right, I’m not believing you, punk.” Salem added, “I had to call Joe’s Rent-a-Wreck.”
虽然亚伯拉罕取得了成功，但他还是太年轻了，很多人怀疑他的能力和经历，就像当年怀疑丹尼斯一样。丹尼斯去银行兑现25万的支票，亚伯拉罕则在25岁时自己租车。他管理1500万的资金，但是赫兹公司的前台不愿意把车租给他。塞勒姆在争吵后生气了：“别人给我1500万，我想买什么就买什么，你知道吗？你不租车给我？每天要1.5万，还是2万？”前台的女士上下打量他，想了一下：“可惜我不相信你，小子。” 塞勒姆说：“那我换一家公司去租车。”
Dennis and Eckhardt Training
丹尼斯和埃克哈特的培训
Even people who are knowledgeable about the Turtles do not know about an obscure third Turtle class after the 1983 and 1984 original ones on which the Turtle legend was built. Abraham actually received personal instruction from Dennis and Eckhardt several years after his trading firm was launched. In the early 1990s, Commodities Corporation asked Dennis and Eckhardt to hold a third Turtle class for their stable of traders. Commodities Corporation was giving them money to trade, and part of the deal was that they had to hold a seminar. The seminar was supposed to simulate the Turtle trader experience, except instead of two weeks, it was held over four days.
在海龟传奇发生以后，人们只知道1983年和1984年的原版海龟，却不知道还有第三届海龟班。亚伯拉罕在成立公司的几年后，确实得到了丹尼斯和埃克哈特的个人指导。在90年代初，商品公司请丹尼斯和埃克哈特为他们的交易者开办第三届海龟班。商品公司愿意出资金，但丹尼斯和埃克哈特要举办研讨会。研讨会的目的就是模仿海龟交易者的经历，但不是2周，而是4，5天。
While Abraham was already trading by Turtle-style trend-following trading rules, and while he found much of the training to reinforce what he already knew (“What I got out of it was a lot of risk management ideas, position sizing ideas, and system analysis ideas.”), the classroom experience with thirty students from Commodities Corporation was a memorable part of his education.
亚伯拉罕早就开始用海龟风格的趋势跟踪交易原则做交易，他发现培训的大部分内容增强了他已经知道的东西（我学到了很多风险管理，仓位思想和系统分析思想），他和商品公司的30个学生们一起学到的知识是值得怀念的。
However, Abraham saw his learning process as a step-by-step journey, not just a lucky leap: “It’s like climbing a mountain. Which step was the most important? Every step is needed to get to the top of the mountain. Each individual step is not that much.” This makes him far more the “average guy” than Parker, Rabar, or any of the other original Turtles, who had four years of Dennis covering the overhead costs.
亚伯拉罕认为他的学习过程是循序渐进的，不是靠运气：“就像登山，哪一步最重要？只有走好每一步才能到达山顶。每一步都重要，也不是很重要。”这说明他和帕克，拉巴或任何海龟一样，都是普通人，海龟们则得到了丹尼斯的4年的帮助。
The seminar opened Abraham’s eyes though. He was very impressed by William Eckhardt. All of the students had also been given an advance copy of Eckhardt’s interview in the New Market Wizards. Abraham added, “I went into that meeting thinking, ‘Oh yeah, Richard Dennis, he’s the guy and Eckhardt is the sidekick’ kind of deal.’” Just as the original Turtles had learned during their training, Abraham discovered that he was wrong: “However when I got through, I really appreciated the math and the objective data. The statistics of this works, this doesn’t work. It’s all odds. I actually got more useful information from Eckhardt. But of course Richard Dennis is clearly a brilliant trader.”
这个研讨会打开了亚伯拉罕的眼界。他对威廉·埃克哈特印象深刻。每个学生都提前拿到了《新市场奇才》中对埃克哈特的采访部分的复印件。亚伯拉罕补充说：“我当时在想‘噢，丹尼斯，他就是那个传奇人物，而埃克哈特就是他的伙伴。’”在培训时，他和原版海龟一样，亚伯拉罕发现自己错了：“当我学懂了以后，我真的很感激这些数序和客观的数据。他的统计数据表明都是概率。我从埃克哈特那里学到了更多的东西。当然了，丹尼斯是出色的交易者。”
Dennis would basically tell the class, “The system is a nice thing to guide you, but it’s okay to set the system aside.” Eckhardt was saying something a little different: “These are the odds; it’s all a math game.” Nothing had changed about the two teachers since the original Turtle experiment.
丹尼斯一般会说：“这个系统是指导你们的好东西，不过，把系统放在一边也没关系。” 埃克哈特讲的东西就有点不一样：“这些就是概率，就是数学游戏。”从原版的海龟实验到现在，这2个老师的风格都没改变。
Eckhardt challenged the Commodities Corporation traders with a series of questions. There were ten questions the traders had to answer within a range. The goal was to get nine of the ten correct. Eckhardt asked, “What does a 747 plane weigh?” The answer could be as big a range as the traders wanted it to be, but the goal was to be 90 percent certain that they were right. It tested their confidence and their ability to estimate. Everyone missed four or five questions. Eckhardt said that the majority of people missed about 45 percent of the questions because they were overconfident in their ability to estimate reality.
埃克哈特用很多问题挑战商品公司的交易者们。其中有10个问题，这些交易者的回答必须接近于真实答案。目的是希望大家90%的正确。埃克哈特问：“747飞机的重量是多少？”大家的答案相差很大，但是希望他们的回答90%的准确。这是为了测试他们的信心和估值的能力。每个人都答错了4，5题。埃克哈特说大部分人答错了45%的问题，因为他们过分自信了。
Trend trading thrives on that overconfidence. Abraham made this point using the recent surge in the price of oil over the last few years: “What you see in trend following is people’s mistaken mindset of what’s a high price and what’s a low price. It all has to do with a very limited set of experiences. People make assumptions for a small sample size. To think that crude oil could go from $20 to $70, you say, ‘that’s nuts.’ To buy crude oil at $55? That’s a hard bet to do when it’s never been to $56. Never in the history of the world has it been to $56 and you say, ‘It hit $55 today, I’m buying it.’ ”
趋势交易因为过分自信而繁荣。亚伯拉罕用最近几年原油的价格说明了这个观点：“趋势跟踪就是利用人们思想中高价和低价的错误认识。这和有限的经历有关系。人们对小账户产生了设想。以为原油会从20美元涨到70美元，你说‘那是疯子。’在55美元买入原油？这太难赌了，因为它永远不会到56美元。他在历史上都没到过56美元，你说‘它今天就到了55美元，我在买入。’”
Can you imagine buying a market that is making an all-time high, without any knowledge that it will keep going up or come crashing back down? Abraham put the focus where it really counts: “I care about the statistics.” He gave me an example. Pretend a physicist walks in with a coin and says, “This coin will always come up 50-50 heads or tails.” A statistician, however, walks in and says, “Yes, but I flipped it one million times and 65 percent of the time it came up heads.” The Harvard-trained physicist says, “That is impossible; it’s a 50-50 coin.”
在不断上涨的市场买入，也不知道它以后是涨还是跌，你能想象吗？亚伯拉罕谈到了要点：“我关心的是统计结果。”他讲了一个例子。假如一个物理学家拿着一个硬币进来，他会说：“这个硬币出现正面或反面的概率总是50%。”然而当一个统计学家进来时，他会说：“没错，但是我用这个硬币扔了100万次，我发现65%的时间它出现的是正面。”哈佛毕业的物理学家则说：“那不可能。硬币的概率是50%。”
Abraham asked, “Who do you believe?” He had many college professors with plenty of good reasons why that coin should not be coming up heads 65 percent of the time, but at some point you have to say, “I don’t know why this coin is coming up 65 percent heads, but I’m willing to bet after a million flips that the 65 percent rate will hold true even when on the face of it, it shouldn’t.” Abraham added, “Just because I don’t understand it doesn’t mean I’m not going to bet on it.”
亚伯拉罕问：“你相信谁？”你可以找很多大学教授来证明这个硬币出现正面的概率不会达到65%，但是有时候你会说：“我不明白为什么这个硬币有65%的时间出现了正面，但是既然测试了100万次，那我就愿意赌正面，虽然理论上不应该如此。” 亚伯拉罕补充说：“我不懂，不代表我不会去赌。”
Ultimately, Abraham was saying the same thing that Tom Willis had said years before, which was to just trade the “numbers.” The empiricist in Abraham was driving at the concept of the unexpected big event; the nexus of his trading profits derived from trading “price.” Is the world due for another large unexpected event that will give him a chance to profit? He did not blink: “Yes, but it will be one that we’ve never seen before. It’s always a different one.”
最后，亚伯拉罕又说了汤姆·威利斯几年前的原话，也就是要去交易“数字”。亚伯拉罕的经验就是指等待无法预料的大事件，利润来自交易“价格”。是不是另外一个无法预料的大事件会给他带来利润？他没有忧郁：“是的，但必须是从没见过的大事件才行。事件总是不同的。”
Boil the Ocean
把海水煮沸
Abraham might not be in Wall Street’s top ten in terms of earnings yet. He might not be managing a billion-dollar fund at this moment in his life, but he has done exceedingly well. Sitting in his office, filled with evidence of his eclectic interests ranging from oil and gas leasing projects to the restoration of antique books and papers, he has made a life for himself that includes family, friends, and a company of like-minded people drawn from his local community.
从收益的角度来看，也许亚伯拉罕称不上华尔街的前10名。也许他永远不会管理几十亿的基金，但是他做的非常好。在他的办公室坐着，听他自信地谈论，从原油到石油，到古书的修复，他的生活影响了整个社区的家人和朋友们。
His hiring practices come very close to mimicking Dennis’s original Turtle hiring process. No one at Abraham’s firm has an Ivy League degree. Most employees have backgrounds working at the area’s feed-lots or natural gas-drilling companies. For example, Abraham hired Geoff Dockray as a clerk from one of those very feedlots. Dockray appreciated the opportunity to work in Abraham’s office. He said, “This beats shoveling manure at 6 A.M. in the morning. The financial markets are complicated but they’re not as relentless as dealing with livestock all the time.”
他招聘员工的方式和丹尼斯招聘海龟的方式很相似，估计是模仿的。亚伯拉罕不招名牌大学的学生。大部分员工都有农场或石油公司的工作背景。比如，亚伯拉罕从农场聘用杰夫·道克雷来做文员。道克雷很珍惜这次机会。他说：“这比早上6点起来清理粪便好多了。金融市场很复杂，但是牲畜更难处理。”
Maybe it is that down-to-earth perspective gleaned from living in handshake country that gives Abraham a clear perspective. Sitting in the Cattle Exchange steakhouse located in the historic Moody Building, which he owns and where he has his office, he had no doubts that it is his entrepreneurial tenacity: “I think they [the winning Turtles] have a self-confidence or charisma to run a business. There’s a drive to go out and do it. Then there is a drive to want to do it. Some people [the losing Turtles] will just say, ‘Oh, hey, I made some money. That’s all I need.’ ”
也许在这个友好的国度让亚伯拉罕的观点更务实，更清晰。他拥有历史性建筑穆迪大楼，里面还有他的办公室，他坐在里面的牛排餐厅里感受着自己的企业家韧性：“我想他们（赚钱的海龟）要么是自信，要么是有能力，所以他们能开公司。有些人（失败的海龟）只会说‘嘿，我赚了一点钱。那就行了。’”
However, if you are going to boil the ocean (in other words, if you are going to use all means and options available to get something done), especially if it is a very competitive and lucrative endeavor, there will be ups and downs. Salem Abraham’s experience has been no different. Twice during his trading career, clients left after down or flat performance periods. He regrouped and made new equity highs each time. During trying times, he handled curve balls in his career by working on other ideas to make money. He always focused on his trading, but he also cast a wider net and caught other kinds of fish.
如果你想把海水煮沸（换句话说，如果你想千方百计地完成某件事），尤其是非常具有竞争性和非常赚钱的行业，起起落落是难免的。塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕的经历也是如此。在他的交易生涯中，有2次因为亏损或平平的业绩导致客户离开了。每次他都重新开始并赚了更多的钱。在努力的时候，他要处理好曲线球，把自己的思想变成钱。他总是关注自己的交易，但有时会去撒网捕鱼。
As with trading, not everything works out. One project was a water deal that he almost cut with billionaire T. Boone Pickens (“Couldn’t agree on the price”). Pickens and Abraham’s ranches are right next to each other in the Texas panhandle (even though they are separated by forty miles, their ranches touch) and they have become friends over the years; Pickens was not shy about praising Abraham’s entrepreneurial guts when I talked to him in his Dallas office.
交易不代表一切。他和亿万富翁T·布恩·皮肯斯差点做成一笔水生意（价格没谈拢）。皮肯斯和亚伯拉罕的农场是相连的（虽然他们2个相隔40英里，但是他们的农场相连），多年来，他们成为了朋友。当我在皮肯斯位于达拉斯的办公室和他交谈时，他很自然地赞扬了亚伯拉罕的企业家勇气。
There were other deals that turned out to be big winners. Abraham was humble about them: “I sold water rights to the city of Amarillo. I invested $1.5 million and I got $9 million out. I said to myself, ‘That’s a cool idea.’ Then I did the Chicago Mercantile Exchange deal [CME Initial Public Offering]. I put $1.5 million in, and got about $13 million out. You recognize opportunities where you see them.”
有些交易是很赚钱的。亚伯拉罕则比较谦虚：“我把灌溉权卖给了阿马里洛市。我投资了150万，但我卖了900万。我对自己说‘这个想法不错。’然后我到芝加哥交易所交易，我投入150万，平仓时是1300万。只要是你的机会，你就能抓住。”
This kind of thinking and risk-taking is how to make your first million by age twenty-five - which Abraham did. Still, it’s not enough to simply spot opportunities. The confidence to act on them is mandatory. You need a killer instinct. When faced with real life and death, even with chickens and pigs, it is never easy to pull the trigger or snap a chicken’s neck, even for dinner. You have to be able to pull the trigger when there is blood on Wall Street, especially if the blood is yours.
这种想法和冒险的方法就是他在25岁赚到第一个100万的原因——亚伯拉罕做到了。仅仅发现机会也不够。行动的信心是必须的。你需要敏锐的直觉。面对现实时，那怕是为了做晚餐去杀鸡杀猪，你也会发现自己不敢轻易下手。
Jerry Parker could not have known Salem Abraham would have the prerequisite killer instinct when they first met. Parker was probably thinking, “Okay, this young guy has got a rough idea of what I do. I’ve given him some pointers. If he’s serious, he’s going to figure it all out and ‘just do it,’ but I will be surprised if he hangs around.”
杰瑞·帕克和塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕刚见面时，也不知道他具备敏锐的直觉这个先决条件。帕克也许在想：“这个年轻人对我做的事只是大概的了解而已。我应该给他一些指点。如果他很认真，你就会明白并去做的。但是我没想到他坚持下来了。”
Unlike the original Turtles who won the job lottery - who were given the exact winning rules and allowed to practice on Richard Dennis’s dime, all in the womblike atmosphere of C&D Commodities - Abraham was on his own from the get- go. He is tougher for it. There is far more to learn from the attitude and actions of this second-generation Turtle than from any one original Turtle.
原版海龟相当于是赢了一次工作彩票——他们得到了赚钱的原则并用丹尼斯的资金进行交易，就像是在C&D商品公司上班一样——亚伯拉罕不同，一切靠自己。这样更难。和原版海龟相比，第二代海龟学习交易的态度和行为都比较困难。
章 榜样的伟大
“Are Turtles grown, or can be they taught? Do they have a magic sixth sense or something? The jury is in, isn’t it? They’d be better off having the knowledge implanted than relying on a sixth sense. I think I could take a kid who wasn’t my son and say, ‘Do this, I’ll pay you $50,000 a year, or you’re fired if you don’t exactly follow it.’ He’d beat me every day, every week, every month and every year.”
Tom Willis
“海龟们会成长吗？他们会传授知识吗？他们是否有神奇的第六感，或其它东西？有人在做评判吗？最好还是拥有必要的只是，不要去依靠第六感。我想我可以对一个别人家的小孩说‘照我的做，我每年给了5万元，否则我就开除你。’这样一来，他每天，每周，每月，每年都可能比我强。”
汤姆·威利斯
The Turtle story breaks down into two parts. Part one takes place during the experiment, when the Turtles are on the relatively level playing field designed by Richard Dennis. His experiment proves nurture trumps nature. Part two takes place after the experiment, when the Turtles have to face the real world as individuals and human nature reenters the picture.
海龟的故事分成2部分。第一部分是实验时的，海龟们在丹尼斯创造的相对一致的起跑线上工作。他的实验证明了优秀的交易者是可以后天培养的。第二部分发生在实验以后，海龟做为个人，要独自面对现实，人性开始起作用。
While the experiment itself is what made headlines, some people familiar with the Turtle story recognized the greater significance of part two, the experiment’s aftermath as Turtles attempt to carry on solo. Larry Hite called me late on a Friday afternoon after we’d had lunch near his Park Avenue office. Hite, who founded Mint Capital and was instrumental in the early successes of the multibillion-dollar Man Financial hedge fund, had more feedback for me about my Turtle book (i.e., the one you’re reading now).
虽然媒体关注的是海龟实验，但是了解海龟故事的人认为第二部分更有价值，这个实验的结果就是看海龟如何独自生存。有一个周五，我和拉里·海特在他办公室附近的公园大街吃过中饭，下午他又打电话给我。海特创办了薄荷资金，并帮助规模达几十亿的曼对冲基金取得了早期的成功，他为海龟书提供了很多回馈（也就是你正在看的书）。
“I have been thinking about this new book. . . .” He laid it out: “The people who are very good and long-lasting are tough. If life goes against them, they stick to their game. There is a certain amount of mental toughness to have clarity. Toughness is just the ability to roll with the punches. They don’t get disappointed by losses. Some people when they lose, they don’t get back up. Think about the Turtles who failed at trading. What did the failures have in common? Maybe the ones who failed just gave up. They were not tough.”
“我在思考这本新书……”他说：“优秀的，且长期生存的人才是厉害的人。如果现实对他们不利，他们还是坚持自己的事业。这是一种思想上的坚强。坚强就是能承受一连串的打击。亏损不会让他们泄气。有些人在亏损之后就一蹶不振。想想亏损后的海龟吧。他们失败的共同点是什么？也许就是失败的人放弃了，他们不够坚强。”
Dennis demanded that the Turtles be mentally tough as long as they worked for him, but once he pulled the plug they had to face head on what Dennis was not providing them. Hite saw it. He brought up the memo (see chapter 7) sent out by Dennis telling the Turtles to cut back their leverage by 50 percent. He observed that Dennis had made an error, ignored any knock against his ego, acknowledged the mistake, and fixed it. That was “an act of mental toughness” in Hite’s book.
丹尼斯说海龟们必须像他一样坚强，但是一旦他终止了实验，他们都要看着丹尼斯并思考是不是还有什么东西没学到。海特明白这点。他拿出了丹尼斯给海龟们的备忘录（请看第07章），备忘录要求海龟们把杠杆降低50%。他发现丹尼斯犯了一个错误，但是丹尼斯不在乎自尊，他承认错误，并修改错误。海特在书中说这就是“坚强的精神态度。”
But Dennis did not select his students for strength of character and drive to win, nor did he train them on the fine art of mental toughness. On that level playing field where he covered the overhead, everyone appeared mentally tough. However, it turned out that only Turtles like Jerry Parker, Paul Rabar, and a few others, and later, Salem Abraham, actually shared the same drive and entrepreneurial spirit that Dennis had.
但是丹尼斯并没有挑选出性格坚强的学生，也没有教学生们如何做到思想坚强。他没有做这些培训工作，似乎每个人看起来都是思想坚强的。然而，事实表明只有杰瑞·帕克，保罗·拉巴，其他几个人，之后是塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕，他们都有和丹尼斯一样的动力和企业家精神。
Think about the annual drafts of professional sports teams. They demonstrate this same inability to screen candidates for mental toughness. For example, every year college stars get drafted with much fanfare. Every year at least one significant stud, one “can’t miss” prospect, fails. Look how many thousands of great college players never make it to the NFL, NBA, or Major League Baseball. Something separates pretenders from contenders. Innate talent alone is never enough.
想想体育队的招聘吧。他们也体现了候选人的精神坚强程度。比如，每年的大学明显要准备加入体育队。每年至少有一个优秀的人，“肯定不会输”的人失败了。想想有几千个大学体育生永远错失美国国家足球联盟，美国职业篮球联赛或美国职业棒球大联盟。这个过程就把意志不坚强的人和意志坚强的人分开了。天生的才智永远不够。
The same is true when it comes to making money. Take, for example, the top ten earners in the hedge fund industry for 2005:
赚钱也是同理。比如，2005年对冲基金的前10名是：
1.        James Simons, Renaissance Technologies Corp.: $1.5 billion
詹姆士·西蒙斯，复活技术集团：15亿
2.        T. Boone Pickens, Jr., BP Capital Management: $1.4 billion
T·布恩·皮肯斯，BP资金管理：14亿
3.        George Soros, Soros Fund Management: $840 million
乔治·索罗斯，索罗斯基金管理：8.4亿
4.        Steven Cohen, SAC Capital Advisors: $550 million
史蒂文·科恩，SAC资金顾问：5.5亿
5.        Paul Tudor Jones II, Tudor Investment Corp.: $500 million
保罗·都铎·琼斯，都铎投资公司：5亿
6.        Edward Lampert, ESL Investments: $425 million
爱德华·兰伯特，ESL投资：4.25亿
7.        Bruce Kovner, Caxton Associates: $400 million
布鲁斯·科夫勒，卡克斯顿企业：4亿
8.        David Tepper, Appaloosa Management: $400 million
大卫·泰珀，阿帕卢萨马管理：4亿
9.        David Shaw, DE Shaw & Co.: $340 million
大卫·肖，肖公司：3.4亿
10.   Stephen Mandel, Jr., Lone Pine Capital: $275 million
斯蒂芬·曼德尔，一只松树资金：2.75亿
Those men got to the top ten by more than rules alone. While not everyone can make Wall Street’s top ten (and many of those top ten are trend-type traders), the story of the Turtles is compelling proof that it is possible to learn the steps top earners took and replicate their process.
这些人进入前10名，所依靠的不仅仅是原则。也不是所有人都能成为华尔街前10名（前10名的人大多是趋势交易者），海龟的故事证明了，向高手学习并复制他们的方法是可能的。
The greater challenge, the real “secret,” comes in following the footsteps of those trading entrepreneurs in part two of the story. All of the winners role-model that extra drive - call it self-confidence, toughness, or entrepreneurial passion - that proves it is possible to surmount those biases inherent in human nature that hold the majority of people back.
最大的挑战，真正的秘密，就是追寻第二部分那些有企业家精神的交易者。这些赢家才是标杆，他们具有独特的动力——自信，坚强，企业家的激情——证明了可以战胜人类天生的偏见，这些偏见导致大部分人无所作为。
To cultivate that extra drive, however, requires deliberate practice. Berkshire Hathaway’s Charlie Munger (Warren Buffet’s number two man) has lived it; he has said, “In my whole life, I have known no wise people over a broad subject matter area who didn’t read all the time - none, zero.” Most people do not want the real work that comes with real success.
要想培养独特的动力，需要认真的练习。伯克希尔·哈撒韦的查理•芒格（沃伦·巴菲特的2号人物）有这样的经历。他说：“据我所知，在我整个生命中，没有一个人不是通过大量的阅读而变成聪明人的——没有一个。”大部分人想成功，却不努力。
Look at Eddie Lampert, too (number six on the top ten). His nurture process had him reverse-engineering Warren Buffett’s thought process. He said, “Putting myself in his shoes at that time, could I understand why he made the investments? That was part of my learning process.” Second-generation Turtles did the same thing when it came to Dennis.
再看看埃迪·兰伯特（前10名的第6名）。他的经历让他敢于采用和沃伦·巴菲特相反的思路。他说：“如果当时我是他，我能明白他投资的原因吗？这就是我学习的过程。”第二代海龟在遇到丹尼斯时，也做了同样的事。
Further, consider the similarities between the skills of a surgeon and those of a trader. Great surgeons are the ones who are conscientious, industrious, and boneheaded enough to keep practicing day and night for years on end. Once again, nurture over nature.
另外，考虑一下外科医生和交易者的技术之间的相似性。伟大的外科医生是认真的，勤奋的，没有失误的，所以他们会每天坚持实践，从来不间断。再次说明后天培养的能超过天生的。
The bottom line is that the market doesn’t care about you personally. It doesn’t care about your gender, culture, religion, or race. It’s one of the last frontiers where low barriers to entry allow anyone to bet his cash and take a whack at making big money. In the end, traders like Jerry Parker, Salem Abraham, and Richard Dennis are playing a legitimate game that anyone can play.
简而言之就是，市场不在乎你是谁。它不在乎你的性别，文化，宗教信仰或宗族。它只是让任何人拿钱投资并赚钱的场所。最终，像杰瑞·帕克，塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕和理查德·丹尼斯成功地玩好了别人都在玩的合法游戏。
And you don’t have to have been lucky enough to answer a Richard Dennis want ad in 1983 to be a successful trader. Salem Abraham only needed to know that Dennis and his philosophy existed; from that point on, he would figure it out. That is the reason why Abraham is so important to the story. He embodies the stubborn determination and entrepreneurial guts played out over the four decades since Dennis first entered the Chicago pits.
你没有那么幸运，能在1983年看见丹尼斯的招聘广告。塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕只需知道丹尼斯和他的理念就行了，也就是说，他能自己搞明白的。这就是为什么说亚伯拉罕在这个故事中非常重要的原因。自从丹尼斯进入芝加哥交易所场内之后的40年，亚伯拉罕依靠自己的坚强的决心和企业家的勇气搞懂了丹尼斯的原则。
However, the best affirmation of this story’s enduring legacy came from Richard Sandor (a legendary figure in his own right, often viewed as a founding father of the financial futures markets) when we shared a few moments at Chicago O’Hare baggage claim in fall 2006. Sandor spoke directly to practicing, winning, and never giving up. Smiling broadly, he said with a glow of admiration and respect as we parted ways, “You do know that Richard Dennis is trading again?”
然而，理查德·桑德尔（他本身也是传奇人物，他是期货市场的注资者）对这个传奇故事做了更好的注解。我是在2006年秋天在芝加哥的奥海尔和他短暂见面的。桑德尔直接谈到了实战，赚钱，永远不放弃。在离别时，他笑着说话，谈到了对丹尼斯的钦佩和尊敬：“你知道丹尼斯又开始交易了吧？”
That simple comment said it all. It solidified my belief that we all have the opportunity to build upon our inborn gifts. Ultimately, the path that led a regular Chicago guy to the top, that led him to teach a handful of beginners to win big and make millions like him and in many ways inspired a generation of Wall Street titans from up close and afar, is a path we can all take.
这个简单的评论说明了一切。这个坚定的信念说明了我们都有机会发挥自己天生的才能。一个芝加哥的普通人走向顶峰，教导一帮新人像他一样赚大钱，赚几百万，他的道路影响了华尔街的一代人，这正是我们要走的路。
他们现在在哪里？
“It’s not the uniqueness of the idea that’s the key. It’s the uniqueness of your ability to implement it.”
Anonymous
“思想的独特性不是关键所在。关键是你运用它的能力。”
无名氏
Salem Abraham, Second-generation Turtle
塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕，第二代海龟
In 2006, Shaun Jordan (with Abraham Trading) organized a two-day visit for me to Canadian, Texas - Salem Abraham’s home and office location. During the visit, Abraham put William Eckhardt’s utility theory of risk in perspective with an example.
2006年，肖恩·乔丹（亚伯拉罕交易公司的）帮我安排了为期2天的参观——到塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕位于加那丁的家中和办公室参观。在这个过程中，亚伯拉罕用例子向我说明了威廉·埃克哈特的风险管理理论。
Assume a coin-flipping game. You have $10 million to your name. For the game, you get to bet $10 million per flip. With this coin you have a 90 percent chance of winning another $10 million, but you have a 10 percent chance of losing $10 million - all of your money. Can you really afford to bet it all, even if the odds are in your favor? No. Abraham clarified: “As an odds guy I go ‘That’s a great bet.’ I will take the bet. But, wait a minute. If the upside is $10 million, the downside is $10 million . . . I’ve seen guys around here in Texas oil and gas businesses and they go broke. They’re great oil and gas guys, but they bet the ranch too many times and lost it.”
假如是掷硬币。你有1000万。每次掷硬币的时候你要下注1000万。你有90%的机会再赚1000万，有10%的机会输掉1000万——也就是你所有的钱。虽然概率对你有利，你真的敢下注吗？不敢，亚伯拉罕明确地说：“我靠概率交易，如果是好的下注机会，我会下注。但是，请等等，如果正面是1000万，反面也是1000万……我知道德克萨斯州很多搞原油和天然气的人都破产了。他们在原油和天然气方面很会赚钱，但是他们总是用自己的农场下注，结果都输掉了。”
Anthony Bruck, Turtle Class of 1983
安东尼·布鲁克，83届海龟
There is no public information about Anthony Bruck except that he is a board member of the AIDS Foundation of Chicago. He is apparently still associated with C&D Commodities. However, it is not clear if C&D Commodities is still an active business or if it just a collegial association between Dennis and Bruck.
没有关于安东尼·布鲁克的公开信息，只知道他是芝加哥艾滋病防治协会的会员。很明显，他和C&D公司还有联系。但是，也不清楚是否C&D公司还在运作，或者说只是丹尼斯和布鲁克之间的联系桥梁。
Michael Carr, Turtle Class of 1983
迈克尔·卡尔，83届海龟
Mike Carr today is a professional writer whose favorite topic is snowmobiling and winter recreation. He writes snowmobile travel articles for five different magazines as well as a monthly column called “Making Tracks.” He has been a dedicated sledder for over twenty-five years and has ridden more than 40,000 miles.
迈克尔·卡尔现在是专业作家，他最喜欢写的话题是滑雪和冬天娱乐。他为5家不同的杂志和一份叫《创造轨迹》的月度专栏写关于雪上摩托的文章。他有25年的滑雪经验，他滑雪的距离超过了4万英里。
Michael Cavallo, Turtle Class of 1983
迈克尔·卡瓦洛，83届海龟
Michael Cavallo continued to answer want ads after his work with Dennis ended. By answering one such ad, Cavallo eventually became the United States Chess Federation executive director. He is also a former New York City Junior Chess champion, with a then ranking of 2,142. He at one time reached the level of “master.”
迈克尔·卡瓦洛在和丹尼斯的关系结束后，他又为其它公司打工。后来他成为美国下棋协会的执行主任。他以前是纽约青年组下棋冠军，级别是2142。有一段时间他达到了大师的级别。
Cavallo has also established and funded The Cavallo Foundation, Inc., to assist people who demonstrate moral courage in the workplace, principally whistle-blowers. Recipients have included environmentalists, scientists, and those fighting racism and sexual harassment. Cavallo is also the father of triplets.
卡瓦洛还成立了卡瓦洛公司，以帮助困难群体，尤其是检举人。受帮助的人包括环境保护分子，科学家，对抗法西斯和性虐待的人。卡瓦洛还是三连团体的创始人。
Liz Cheval, Turtle Class of 1983
莉斯·雪娃，83届海龟
Liz Cheval declined to be interviewed for this book. Today, Cheval still runs her trading firm EMC Capital.
莉斯·雪娃谢绝为本书接受采访。如今，雪娃还在管理她的交易公司：EMC资金。
Jim DiMaria, Turtle Class of 1984
吉姆·迪玛利亚，84届海龟
Jim DiMaria likes the way things have worked out over the last twenty-five years. Would he have liked to make more money? Sure. However, there are always trade-offs. He clearly sees those: “Because of the flexibility of trading, if you use technology right, we picked up and moved to France for three years with the kids. So it was great for the family. The kids are native French speakers. We traveled all over the place. We loved it. I think I traded from twenty- three different countries.”
吉姆·迪玛利亚和25年前一样。他是否赚钱了？是的，肯定。然而，他有一些权衡。他说：“因为交易是很灵活的，如果技术是对的，就能赚钱。我们赚钱后就带着小孩去法国待3年。这样家人在一起很快乐。小孩都会说法语了。我们到处旅游。我们喜欢旅游。我想我在23个不同的国家都交易了。”
Of all the Turtles, DiMaria did the best job of explaining why blowups happen in the hedge fund world. He saw the root of the problem with “allocators,” the investors with the money who allocate it across a wide grouping of traders: “The biggest single problem with these allocators is they completely confuse volatility and standard deviation with ‘risk.’ The two are completely noncorrelated. They want Amaranth, Long Term Capital Management, and III [name of a hedge fund that blew up] and that’s going to work 95 percent of the time, but when it doesn’t, they’re broke.”
在所有海龟中，迪玛利亚很好地解释了为何对冲基金总是倒闭。他认为最根本的原因是投资者的问题，投资者把钱投资到不同的交易者：“这些人的最大问题是，他们混淆了波动性和风险的标准背离，这2者之间根本没有关系。他们想要红苋菜，长期资本管理和3（也就是倒闭的那个对冲基金）等公司在95%的时间里都能为他们赚钱，但事实不是这样的，它们破产了。”
William Eckhardt, Turtle Teacher and Partner of Richard Dennis
威廉·埃克哈特，丹尼斯的伙伴，海龟的老师
The teacher of the Turtles today manages roughly $1 billion for clients. Beyond his trading, he has remained engaged in his own philosophical pursuits. In 1993, Eckhardt’s article “Probability Theory and the Doomsday Argument” was published in the philosophical journal Mind. His follow-up article, “A Shooting-Room View of Doomsday,” was published in the Journal of Philosophy. Both articles made arguments skeptical of the Doomsday Argument as formulated by John Leslie. The Doomsday Argument (DA) is a probabilistic argument that claims to predict the future lifetime of the human race given only an estimate of the total number of humans born so far.
海龟的老师如今为客户打理大约10亿的资金。除了交易，他还喜欢研究哲学理论。1993年，埃克哈特在哲学性的杂志《思想》上发表了《概率论和世界末日论》。后来一篇文章《世界末日一瞥》发表在《哲学》杂志。这2篇文章都提到了约翰·莱斯利提出的世界末日论，引起了很多争论和质疑。世界末日论是根据现有人口来估算预测人类的某日，是一种概率论。
Interestingly, in January 2001, Eckhardt Trading Company took over the employment of a number of people previously employed by C&D Commodities. The world of those associated with the Turtles remains small and close-knit.
有趣的是，在2001年1月，埃克哈特交易公司接收了以前C&D商品公司的一些员工。之前和海龟有关系的人还是很少，且组织严密。
Curtis Faith, Turtle Class of 1983
柯蒂斯·费思，83届海龟
Today, Curtis Faith spends a great deal of time participating in online chat forums. He has also been a vocal critic of my telling of the Turtle story. Faith currently lives in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
如今，柯蒂斯·费思把大量时间花在网上论坛。有人质疑他的故事。费思目前居住在阿根廷的布宜诺斯艾利斯。
Jeff Gordon, Turtle Class of 1983
杰夫·戈登，83届海龟
Gordon, now a private investor, gets his greatest thrill from teaching. He and his wife have been teaching chess to children in Marin County, California, for ten years. His Marin Country Day School Chess Team placed first at the Northern California Regional Chess Championship in 2005.
戈登现在是个人投资者，并从教学中得到了很多乐趣。他和他老婆在加州马林县教小孩下棋，已经教了10年了。他的马林县学校队在2005年北加州地区冠军赛上取得了第一名。
Gordon provides some food for thought about the dreaded “risk” that everyone must cope with at one time or another: “People’s attitude about risk was a very important aspect of being a trader. Can that be taught? Well, it can be taught intellectually. Can it be taught so that it is in the gut? I am not so sure about that. I am not saying no, but I am saying that it is hard. If you ever try to change some of your basic attitude towards basic things like risk, there are people who are more comfortable with risk than others. It comes from upbringing. It comes from attitude, life experiences, and being rewarded or being burned from taking risk in the past.”
戈登对每个人都要遇到的风险做出了新的解释：“做为交易者，如何看待风险是很重要的。这个可以被传授吗？是可以被传授的。能被传授成像天生有胆量那样吗？我无法肯定。我不是否定，我只是说这很难。如果你能对风险的态度有所改变，那么你就能像其他交易者一样，面对风险时不再害怕。这是一种培养。它来自态度，经历，回报或伤害。”
Erle Keefer, Turtle Class of 1984
尔勒·科夫，84届海龟
Erle Keefer was the oldest Turtle hired. He was about the same age as Dennis, thirty-seven years old, when he started out as a Turtle. Describing himself physically he chuckled, “I’m a miniature Rich.”
尔勒·科夫是年龄最大的海龟。他差不多和丹尼斯一样大，他做海龟时都70岁了。他笑着描述自己的体形：“我是迷你版的理查德。”
He also may have had the most diverse work experience prior to his Turtle time. He was a founding member of the London International Financial Futures Exchange, serving on the original membership and rules board. He received his undergraduate degree from the U.S. Air Force Academy and flew Air Rescue “Jolly Greens” in Vietnam.
在做海龟之前，他的工作经历也是最丰富多彩的。他曾经是伦敦国际金融期货交易所的会员，为会员和管理委员会服务。他是美国空军学院的肄业生，在越南开飞机拯救伤员。
Military service was instrumental in his development. He said, “Combat forces you to be 100 percent ‘in the now.’ It changes your DNA forever.”
军事生涯对他的发展有帮助作用。他说：“战争逼你每次都要做到100%的正确，它改变了你的基因。”
Philip Lu, Turtle Class of 1984
飞利浦·卢，84届海龟
In 2006, an interview was attempted with Philip Lu, now working as a college teacher at Edgewood College in Wisconsin. He threw a curve ball. Lu declined to be interviewed because he believed his confidentiality agreement with Richard Dennis (which expired in the early 1990s) was still in force.
2006年我想采访他，他当时在威斯康星州艾格伍学院工作。他扔了一个曲线球。卢拒绝接受采访，因为他认为他和丹尼斯的保密协议还是有效的（其实在90年代初就失效了）。
Jerry Parker, Turtle Class of 1983
杰瑞·帕克，83届海龟
Years ago, at my first meeting with Jerry Parker, before the allotted time was up, I was quick enough (or dumb enough) to capitalize on the opportunity by asking him to confirm who won the Barings Bank sweepstakes when it imploded. He confirmed the winner. That was the type of confirmation that allowed me to write my first book, Trend Following. Today, Parker continues on as hands-down the most successful Turtle. He still works out of his suburban Richmond, Virginia, office.
几年前，当我第一次和杰瑞·帕克见面时，当时时间不够用了，我就急促地问他，当巴林银行倒闭时，到底是谁赢了。他确认了自己是赢家。就是这个确认让我决定了去写我的第一本书《趋势跟踪》。如今，帕克还是在轻松地做着最成功的海龟。他还在里士满郊区的办公室工作。
Paul Rabar, Turtle Class of 1984
保罗·拉巴，84届海龟
Paul Rabar, the second most successful Turtle managing money for clients, theorized as to why some Turtles were more successful than others: “Perhaps some of the others have preferred to focus less on business management.”
在代客理财方面，保罗·拉巴是第二成功的海龟。他分析了为什么有些海龟比其他海龟要成功很多：“可能是因为有些人不太关心创业的事。”
Rabar actually ran his own version of the Richard Dennis’s original 1983 want ad in the New York Times for new hires. And a recent online search produced not the old ad, but a 2006 one from the Times. Whiners making excuses that they were never afforded a foot in the door in their lifetime, should look harder.
其实拉巴也在《纽约时报》模仿丹尼斯发招聘广告。有人在网上搜到了他在2006年在《纽约时报》发的广告。有些人发牢骚说自己这辈子再也找不到这样的好机会了，他们真应该再努力去找找。
Tom Shanks, Turtle Class of 1984
汤姆·桑克斯，84届海龟
Tom Shanks appears to have had the most fun as a Turtle. One of his Turtle peers recalled a Las Vegas Turtle reunion years back when Shanks showed up with a well-known sitcom actress on his arm.
汤姆·桑克斯似乎是最有趣的海龟。一个海龟同事说看见他和一个著名的情景喜剧女演员手挽手出现时，那简直就是拉斯维加斯海龟的重逢。
Bradley Rotter saw up close the adventurous side of Shanks: “I remember he bought a jet helicopter, and was learning to fly it and wanted to take me out on one of his maiden missions. He said we were going to fly underneath the Golden Gate Bridge. I said as a matter of principle, I try not to fly with traders at the wheel.” Rotter turned serious in the next breath. “He is one of the finest individuals that I have ever met. He has unquestionable discipline.”
布拉德利·罗特见证了冒险中的桑克斯：“我记得他买了一架飞机，他当时还在学开飞机，就叫我和他一起进行第一次飞行。他说他要飞到金门大桥下面，我说我有一个原则，我不和开飞机的交易者一起飞行。” 然后罗特的语气变得认真了：“他是我见过的最优秀的人之一。他的纪律性非常好。”
Shanks is proudest of his first client. That investor put in $300,000 in 1988. Despite redemptions of more than $1 million, the client’s account has grown, without further additions, to over $18 million.
桑克斯为他的第一个客户感到最骄傲。那个投资者在1988年投资了30万。这个客户曾经赎回了100万，然后再也不追加资金，目前他的资金已经超过了1800万。
Michael Shannon, Turtle Class of 1984
迈克尔·仙农，84届海龟
Michael Shannon’s career after the Turtles brought him into contact with some of Wall Street’s biggest names. He worked on a fund with legendary T-bond trader Thomas Baldwin (profiled in Market Wizards) and later worked with Dr. Kaveh Alamouti (who would later run money for Louis Bacon). Today, he enjoys a quiet life outside the United States.
迈克尔·仙农在海龟后的事业让他和华尔街的名人有联系。他为一个基金工作，和传奇的债券交易者汤玛斯·鲍德温（《市场奇才》写到了他）一起交易，后来又和卡文·阿腊莫提（他又来又为路易斯培根管理资金）一起工作。如今，他在国外享受安静的生活。
Jiri “George” Svoboda, Turtle Class of 1984
吉里·“乔治”·斯沃博达，84届海龟
Jiri “George” Svoboda is a Turtle mystery. While he did initially register with the National Futures Association (a government-sanctioned regulatory body) to trade money for clients in 1988, the association never actually granted him final registration, presumably because of his 1988 felony convictions for producing false identification documents and making a false statement in an application for a passport, as well as his failure to disclose such felony convictions to the NFA.
吉里·“乔治”·斯沃博达是神秘的海龟。虽然他1988年到美国国家期货协会（政府批准的监管机构）申请注册代客理财生意，但是期货协会从没有批准他的注册申请。可能的原因是他在1988年做假文件，在申请护照时也做假，而在向期货协会申请时又没有及时澄清这些犯罪指控。
Why a fake passport? As an accomplished card counter, Svoboda was presumably searching for a way to play blackjack abroad and get his winnings back into the States anonymously. This circumspect history aside, several of his peers had great praise for Svoboda; one even said, “He’s a very practical person. He’s an extremely ethical and honest person who lives in a very black and shades-of-gray world.” And one Turtle, who declined to be interviewed on the record, was a big fan of Svoboda’s: “His performance is probably the best of all of the Turtles since 1988.”
为什么要做假护照？斯沃博达是扑克牌老玩家，他想玩21点赚钱，还不想让政府知道，以隐瞒收入。除了这些事，他的同事还是很欣赏他的，其中一个甚至说：“他很实际。他对生活在黑暗社会的人很讲道德，也很真诚。”还有一个海龟，他拒绝透露真名，他说他很欣赏斯沃博达：“从1988年到现在，也许他的业绩是所有海龟中最好的。”
The Turtle grapevine did say that Svoboda has, over the years, provided advice to major Las Vegas casino owners on how to stop cheaters. Beyond that, Svoboda remains an enigma - which is probably just how he likes it.
有小道消息说斯沃博达过去几年给拉斯维加斯的赌场老板提供了很多建议，帮助他们杜绝出老千的人。除此之外，斯沃博达一直保持神秘色彩——恐怕他就是这个样子。
相关的网址
More information on the Turtles and their teachers Richard Dennis and William Eckhardt can be found at:
要想了解海龟们，他们的老师丹尼斯和埃克哈特，你可以访问这些网址：
www.abrahamtrading.com (Salem Abraham’s website) 塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕的网站
www.daledellutri.com (Dale Dellutri’s website) 待尔·德鲁崔的网站
www.eckhardttrading.com (William Eckhardt’s website) 威廉·埃克哈特的网站
www.emccta.com (Liz Cheval’s website) 莉斯·雪娃的网站
www.hawksbillcapital.com (Tom Shanks’s website) 汤姆·桑克斯的网站
www.jpdent.com (Jim DiMaria’s website) 吉姆·迪玛利亚的网站
www.markjwalsh.com (Mark Walsh’s website) 马克·沃尔什的网站
www.michaelcovel.com (Michael Covel’s website) 迈克尔·卡沃尔的网站
www.saxoninvestment.com (Howard Seidler’s website) 霍华德·辛德勒的网站www.trendfollowing.com (Michael Covel’s website) 迈克尔·卡沃尔的网站
www.turtletrader.com (Michael Covel’s website) 迈克尔·卡沃尔的网站
海龟的业绩数据
“In a world of constant change, risk is actually a form of safety, because it accepts that world for what it is. Conventional safety is where the danger really lies, because it denies and resists that world.”
Charles S. Sanford, Jr.
“在这个不断变化的世界里，风险实际上是一种安全，因为它接受了这个世界就是变化的，有风险的。传统的安全指危险在哪里，因为它否认并拒绝这个世界。”
查尔斯·S·桑福德
Jerry Parker was not the only Turtle to assemble a continuous track record since the Turtle program ended in 1988. Several other Turtles have gone on to have professional trading careers. Their careers are concrete proof of what sticking with a system over the long haul can do for a trading account. Table Appendices 3.1 and 3.2 graphically illustrate the month-by-month processes and performances of Jerry Parker and Salem Abraham. Table Appendix 3.3 illustrates the yearly performance history of Dennis’s former partner William Eckhardt and the performance histories of the other Turtles continuously trading since 1988.
自从1988年以来，除了杰瑞·帕克，还有其他人在继续做交易记录。有几个海龟在专职做交易。他们的事业说明了长期坚持一个系统是有价值的。附录表3.1，3.2说明了杰瑞·帕克和塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕月度业绩。附录表3.3说明了埃克哈特20多年来的年度业绩。
Table Appendix 3.1: Annual and Monthly Returns, 1988-2006, for Jerry Parker’s Chesapeake Capital.
Month-by-Month Returns with Annual Total Return
附录表3.1：杰瑞·帕克的切萨皮克资金1988年——2006年的年度和月度回报
阅读回报和年度回报
Source: Disclosure Documents Filed with United States CFTC.
来源：美国商品期货交易委员会公开的文件。
Table Appendix 3.2: Annual and Monthly Returns, 1988-2006, for Salem Abraham’s Abraham Trading.
Month-by-Month Returns with Annual Total Return
附录表3.2：塞勒姆·亚伯拉罕的亚伯拉罕交易公司1988年——2006年的月度和年度回报
月度回报和年度回报
Source: Disclosure Documents Filed with United States CFTC.
Table Appendix 3.3
附录表3.3
Source: Disclosure Documents Filed with United States CFTC.
海龟们帮丹尼斯交易时的业绩
The following performance data have never been published. They are the actual Turtle performance trading results while the Turtles traded for Richard Dennis, along with the amount of money they traded each month.
以下业绩数据从来没有出版过。它们实际上就是海龟们为丹尼斯交易时的业绩，也就是他们每个月的账户资金。
Table Appendix 4.1: Mike Carr Turtle Performance, January 1984-April 1988.
附录表4.1：迈克·卡尔的海龟业绩，1984年1月——1988年4月
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-84
986
-1.40%
Feb-84
1032
4.70%
Mar- 84
1107
7.20%
$1.0M
Apr-84
869
-21.50%
May-84
971
11.80%
Jun-84
679
-30.10%
$0.7M
Jul-84
1031
51.90%
Aug-84
861
-16.50%
Sep-84
892
3.60%
$1.6M
Oct-84
966
8.30%
Nov-84
1000
3.50%
Dec-84
1241
24.10%
$2.3M
1984 Final
24.09%
Jan-85
1247
-0.50%
Feb-85
1301
4.30%
Mar- 85
1210
-7.00%
$3.3M
Apr- 85
892
-26.30%
May-85
1030
15.50%
Jun-85
765
-25.70%
$1.6M
Jul-85
1251
63.50%
Aug-85
1132
-9.50%
Sep-85
1087
-4.00%
$2.4M
Oct-85
1266
16.50%
Nov-85
1637
29.30%
Dec-85
1809
10.50%
$2.8M
1985 Final
45.78%
Jan-86
1968
8.80%
Feb-86
3675
86.70%
Mar- 86
3917
6.60%
$6.0M
Apr- 86
3659
-6.60%
May-86
3081
-15.80%
Jun-86
3087
0.20%
$5.1M
Jul-86
3432
11.20%
Aug-86
3786
10.30%
Sep-86
3487
-7.90%
$5.6M
Oct-86
3480
-0.20%
Nov-86
3296
-5.30%
Dec-86
3220
-2.30%
$3.5M
1986 Final
77.98%
Jan-87
3513
9.10%
Feb-87
3228
-8.10%
Mar- 87
3422
6.00%
$3.3M
Apr- 87
6043
76.60%
May-87
6520
7.90%
Jun-87
5855
-10.20%
$5.4M
Jul-87
6148
5.00%
Aug-87
5669
-7.80%
Sep-87
5839
3.00%
$4.7M
Oct-87
4799
-17.80%
Nov-87
4799
0.00%
Dec-87
4799
0.00%
$1.3M
1987 Final
49.06%
Jan-88
5207
8.50%
Feb-88
5145
-1.20%
Mar-88
4471
-13.10%
$0.1M
Apr-88
3849
-13.90%
Table Appendix 4.2: Mike Cavallo Turtle Performance, January 1984–April 1988.
附录表4.2：迈克·卡瓦洛的业绩
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-84
969
-3.10%
Feb-84
1070
10.42%
Mar-84
1097
2.52%
$1.1M
Apr-84
829
-24.43%
May-84
760
-8.32%
Jun-84
324
-57.36%
$2.0M
Jul-84
605
86.72%
Aug-84
575
-4.95%
Sep-84
608
5.73%
$3.9M
Oct-84
791
30.09%
Nov-84
874
10.49%
Dec-84
1145
31.00%
$3.5M
1984 Final
-14.50%
Jan-85
1425
-24.45%
Feb-85
1247
-12.49%
Mar-85
1942
55.73%
$9.0M
Apr-85
1643
-15.39%
May-85
1717
4.50%
Jun-85
1760
2.50%
$8.6M
Jul-85
2706
53.75%
Aug-85
2148
-20.62%
Sep-85
1413
-34.21%
$7.8M
Oct-85
1341
-5.09%
Nov-85
1871
39.52%
Dec-85
2298
22.82%
$8.5M
1985 Final
100.72%
Jan-86
3172
38.03%
Feb-86
4726
48.99%
Mar-86
3299
-30.19%
$8.0M
Apr-86
2439
-26.09%
May-86
2390
-2.00%
Jun-86
1495
-37.46%
$4.8M
Jul-86
2719
81.92%
Aug-86
3595
32.22%
Sep-86
4092
13.82%
$8.1M
Oct-86
3792
-7.33%
Nov-86
2891
-23.76%
Dec-86
3071
6.22%
$8.7M
1986 Final
33.62%
Jan-87
3458
12.60%
Feb-87
2941
-14.95%
Mar-87
2603
-11.49%
$6.9M
Apr-87
5181
99.03%
May-87
6995
35.02%
Jun-87
6995
0.01%
$14.3M
Jul-87
8162
16.67%
Aug-87
7447
-8.76%
Sep-87
7961
6.91%
$12.3M
Oct-87
6668
-16.24%
Nov-87
7023
5.32%
Dec-87
6487
-7.63%
$3.6M
1987 Final
111.25%
Jan-88
6597
1.70%
Feb-88
6769
2.60%
Mar-88
6315
-6.70%
$0.4M
Apr-88
6006
-4.90%
Table Appendix 4.3: Liz Cheval Turtle Performance, January 1984-April 1988.
附录表4.3：莉斯·雪娃的业绩
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-84
1004
0.40%
Feb-84
984
-1.99%
Mar-84
1019
3.55%
$1.0M
Apr-84
878
-13.83%
May-84
800
-8.88%
Jun-84
683
-14.62%
$1.1M
Jul-84
1302
90.62%
Aug-84
979
-24.80%
Sep-84
740
-24.41%
$1.2M
Oct-84
656
-11.35%
Nov-84
579
-11.73%
Dec-84
790
36.44%
$1.0M
1984 Final
-20.98%
Jan-85
1001
26.70%
Feb-85
1232
23.07%
Mar-85
982
-20.29%
$1.0M
Apr-85
709
-27.80%
May-85
1223
72.49%
Jun-85
948
-22.48%
$1.0M
Jul-85
1225
29.21%
Aug-85
995
-18.77%
Sep-85
727
-26.93%
$1.1M
Oct-85
679
-6.60%
Nov-85
998
46.98%
Dec-85
1198
20.04%
$1.3M
1985 Final
51.65%
Jan-86
1600
33.55%
Feb-86
2948
84.18%
Mar-86
3635
23.31%
$3.8M
Apr-86
3279
-9.79%
May-86
3108
-5.21%
Jun-86
2652
-14.67%
$2.8M
Jul-86
2826
6.56%
Aug-86
3030
7.22%
Sep-86
3021
-0.29%
$3.2M
Oct-86
2812
-6.92%
Nov-86
2812
0.00%
Dec-86
2812
0.00%
$2.9M
1986 Final
134.68%
Jan-87
3584
27.42%
Feb-87
3251
-9.29%
Mar-87
3757
15.57%
$3.2M
Apr-87
7826
108.33%
May-87
7748
-1.00%
Jun-87
7461
-3.70%
$6.4M
Jul-87
8201
9.91%
Aug-87
7127
-13.10%
Sep-87
7603
6.69%
$5.9M
Oct-87
7140
-6.09%
Nov-87
7254
1.59%
Dec-87
7819
7.79%
$1.8M
1987 Final
178.02%
Jan-88
8077
3.30%
Feb-88
8836
9.40%
Mar-88
8325
-5.79%
$0.2M
Apr-88
6801
-18.30%
Table Appendix 4.4: Jim DiMaria Turtle Performance, January 1985-April 1988.
附录表4.4：吉姆·迪玛利亚的业绩
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-85
979
-2.10%
Feb-85
1229
25.50%
Mar-85
1093
-11.00%
$0.2M
Apr-85
791
-27.70%
May-85
1034
30.80%
Jun-85
809
-21.80%
$0.2M
Jul-85
1348
66.70%
Aug-85
1300
-3.60%
Sep-85
1194
-8.10%
$0.3M
Oct-85
1394
16.70%
Nov-85
1720
23.40%
Dec-85
1711
-0.50%
$1.2M
1985 Final
71.12%
Jan-86
2129
24.40%
Feb-86
4451
109.10%
Mar-86
4919
10.50%
$3.4M
Apr-86
4491
-8.70%
May-86
4060
-9.60%
Jun-86
3853
-5.10%
$2.7M
Jul-86
4307
11.80%
Aug-86
4837
12.30%
Sep-86
4556
-5.80%
$3.2M
Oct-86
4283
-6.00%
Nov-86
4005
-6.50%
Dec-86
3965
-1.00%
$1.9M
1986 Final
131.68%
Jan-87
4524
14.10%
Feb-87
3669
-18.90%
Mar-87
4113
12.10%
$1.5M
Apr-87
8677
111.00%
May-87
8782
1.20%
Jun-87
8536
-2.80%
$3.1M
Jul-87
9125
6.90%
Aug-87
8057
-11.70%
Sep-87
8597
6.70%
$2.8M
Oct-87
7832
-8.90%
Nov-87
7746
-1.10%
Dec-87
7800
0.70%
$1.4M
1987 Final
96.74%
Jan-88
7769
-0.40%
Feb-88
8173
5.20%
Mar-88
7045
-13.80%
$0.1M
Apr-88
6192
-12.10%
Table Appendix 4.5: Jeff Gordon Turtle Performance, January 1984-April 1988.
附录表4.5：杰夫·戈登的业绩
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-84
996
-0.40%
Feb-84
1028
3.21%
Mar-84
1021
-0.68%
$0.2M
Apr-84
972
-4.79%
May-84
920
-5.34%
Jun-84
847
-7.93%
$0.2M
Jul-84
1118
31.99%
Aug-84
763
-31.75%
Sep-84
830
8.78%
$0.3M
Oct-84
783
-5.66%
Nov-84
764
-2.42%
Dec-84
1317
72.38%
$1.2M
1984 Final
31.74%
Jan-85
1405
6.63%
Feb-85
1561
11.14%
Mar-85
1522
-2.54%
$2.0M
Apr-85
1399
-8.07%
May-85
1654
18.28%
Jun-85
1465
-11.48%
$1.9M
Jul-85
1867
27.45%
Aug-85
1834
-1.76%
Sep-85
1839
0.29%
$1.8M
Oct-85
2032
10.50%
Nov-85
2357
16.00%
Dec-85
2398
1.74%
$1.0M
1985 Final
82.05%
Jan-86
2814
17.33%
Feb-86
3958
40.65%
Mar-86
3917
-1.04%
$0.9M
Apr-86
3834
-2.12%
May-86
3821
-0.34%
Jun-86
3775
-1.18%
$0.9M
Jul-86
3758
-0.46%
Aug-86
3815
1.52%
Sep-86
3610
-5.37%
$0.7M
Oct-86
3601
-0.27%
Nov-86
3601
0.00%
Dec-86
3618
0.48%
$0.8M
1986 Final
50.85%
Jan-87
3907
8.00%
Feb-87
3911
0.09%
Mar-87
3918
0.18%
$0.4M
Apr-87
3961
1.10%
May-87
3813
-3.74%
Jun-87
3740
-1.91%
$0.6M
Jul-87
3960
5.89%
Aug-87
3960
0.00%
Sep-87
3887
-1.86%
$0.4M
Oct-87
3986
2.56%
Nov-87
4000
0.36%
Dec-87
4034
0.83%
$0.3M
1987 Final
11.49%
Jan-88
4061
0.67%
Feb-88
4140
1.94%
Mar-88
4181
1.01%
$0.4M
Apr-88
4173
-0.21%
Table Appendix 4.6: Philip Lu Turtle Performance, January 1985-April 1988.
附录表4.6：飞利浦·卢的业绩
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-85
951
-4.90%
Feb-85
1272
33.75%
Mar-85
1276
0.31%
$0.8M
Apr-85
1088
-14.73%
May-85
1462
34.37%
Jun-85
1244
-14.91%
$0.6M
Jul-85
1811
45.57%
Aug-85
1840
1.60%
Sep-85
1546
-15.97%
$1.6M
Oct-85
1881
21.66%
Nov-85
2045
8.71%
Dec-85
2322
13.59%
$2.0M
1985 Final
132.25%
Jan-86
2645
13.90%
Feb-86
5212
97.01%
Mar-86
5764
10.60%
$5.0M
Apr-86
5603
-2.79%
May-86
5340
-4.69%
Jun-86
5234
-2.00%
$4.5M
Jul-86
5364
2.50%
Aug-86
5831
8.70%
Sep-86
5324
-8.69%
$4.6M
Oct-86
5304
-0.39%
Nov-86
5267
-0.69%
Dec-86
5314
0.89%
$2.0M
1986 Final
128.80%
Jan-87
5653
6.39%
Feb-87
5371
-5.00%
Mar-87
6122
13.99%
$1.9M
Apr-87
9802
60.10%
May-87
9802
0.00%
Jun-87
9567
-2.39%
$2.9M
Jul-87
10017
4.70%
Aug-87
9377
-6.39%
Sep-87
9649
2.90%
$2.5M
Oct-87
8579
-11.09%
Nov-87
8579
0.00%
Dec-87
9437
10.00%
$1.2M
1987 Final
77.58%
Jan-88
9842
4.30%
Feb-88
10156
3.19%
Mar-88
10156
0.00%
$1.3M
Apr-88
10156
0.00%
Table Appendix 4.7: Jim Melnick Turtle Performance, January 1984–January 1988.
附录表4.7：吉姆·马尼克的业绩
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-84
721
-27.90%
Feb-84
916
27.04%
Mar-84
591
-35.48%
$1.0M
Apr-84
527
-10.82%
May-84
967
83.49%
Jun-84
768
-20.57%
$1.0M
Jul-84
1680
118.75%
Aug-84
1183
-29.58%
Sep-84
1398
18.17%
$1.0M
Oct-84
1356
-3.00%
Nov-84
1370
1.03%
Dec-84
2023
47.66%
$1.0M
1984 Final
102.33%
Jan-85
2124
4.99%
Feb-85
2606
22.69%
Mar-85
2030
-22.10%
$1.0M
Apr-85
1602
-21.08%
May-85
2115
32.02%
Jun-85
1330
-37.11%
$1.0M
Jul-85
1938
45.71%
Aug-85
1596
-17.69%
Sep-85
1535
-3.82%
$1.0M
Oct-85
2032
32.39%
Nov-85
2769
36.28%
Dec-85
2877
3.90%
$1.0M
1985 Final
42.18%
Jan-86
4117
43.11%
Feb-86
7205
75.00%
Mar-86
7888
9.49%
$1.0M
Apr-86
7943
0.69%
May-86
7609
-4.20%
Jun-86
7677
0.89%
$1.0M
Jul-86
8190
6.69%
Aug-86
8035
-1.90%
Sep-86
7538
-6.19%
$1.0M
Oct-86
7493
-0.59%
Nov-86
7493
0.00%
Dec-86
7493
0.00%
$1.0M
1986 Final
160.47%
Jan-87
8085
7.90%
Feb-87
7876
-2.59%
Mar-87
7829
-0.59%
$1.0M
Apr-87
10248
30.89%
May-87
10074
-1.69%
Jun-87
9612
-4.59%
$1.0M
Jul-87
10150
5.60%
Aug-87
10039
-1.10%
Sep-87
11373
13.29%
$1.0M
Oct-87
10908
-4.09%
Nov-87
10951
0.40%
Dec-87
10918
-0.30%
$1.0M
1987 Final
45.71%
Jan-88
11376
4.19%
Table Appendix 4.8: Mike O’Brien and Mark Walsh Turtle Performance, January 1985-April 1988.
附录表4.8：迈克·欧博仁和马克·沃尔什的业绩。
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-85
1008
0.80%
Feb-85
1271
26.09%
Mar-85
1091
-14.16%
$1.1M
Apr-85
1006
-7.79%
May-85
1201
19.38%
Jun-85
1175
-2.16%
$0.9M
Jul-85
1679
42.89%
Aug-85
1460
-13.04%
Sep-85
1527
4.58%
$1.6M
Oct-85
1798
17.74%
Nov-85
1890
5.11%
Dec-85
1995
5.55%
$1.6M
1985 Final
99.46%
Jan-86
2247
12.63%
Feb-86
4417
96.61%
Mar-86
4632
4.86%
$3.8M
Apr-86
4767
2.93%
May-86
4802
0.73%
Jun-86
4761
-0.85%
$3.9M
Jul-86
4955
4.07%
Aug-86
5117
3.26%
Sep-86
4767
-6.83%
$3.9M
Oct-86
4657
-2.30%
Nov-86
4649
-0.19%
Dec-86
4704
1.20%
$1.9M
1986 Final
135.86%
Jan-87
5046
7.26%
Feb-87
4854
-3.80%
Mar-87
5324
9.67%
$1.9M
Apr-87
7162
34.54%
May-87
7129
-0.47%
Jun-87
7120
-0.12%
$2.5M
Jul-87
7410
4.07%
Aug-87
7291
-1.60%
Sep-87
7417
1.72%
$2.9M
Oct-87
6892
-7.08%
Nov-87
7366
6.89%
Dec-87
8390
13.90%
$1.4M
1987 Final
78.35%
Jan-88
7778
-7.30%
Feb-88
7265
-6.60%
Mar-88
6749
-7.10%
$0.4M
Apr-88
5804
-14.00%
Table Appendix 4.9: Stig Ostgaard Turtle Performance, January 1984-April 1988.
附录表4.9：斯汀格·欧斯格的业绩。
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-84
990
-1.00%
Feb-84
1060
7.07%
Mar-84
980
-7.54%
$1.0M
Apr-84
820
-16.32%
May-84
740
-9.75%
Jun-84
580
-21.62%
$0.6M
Jul-84
1060
82.75%
Aug-84
750
-29.24%
Sep-84
770
2.66%
$0.8M
Oct-84
740
-3.89%
Nov-84
710
-4.05%
Dec-84
1200
69.01%
$0.8M
1984 Final
20.03%
Jan-85
1310
9.16%
Feb-85
1390
6.10%
Mar-85
1570
12.94%
$1.1M
Apr-85
1130
-28.02%
May-85
1190
5.30%
Jun-85
800
-32.77%
$0.6M
Jul-85
2350
193.75%
Aug-85
2000
-14.89%
Sep-85
3340
67.00%
$0.7M
Oct-85
3940
17.96%
Nov-85
4110
4.31%
Dec-85
4760
15.81%
$1.3M
1985 Final
296.56%
Jan-86
4250
-10.71%
Feb-86
10780
153.64%
Mar-86
10741
-0.37%
$2.9M
Apr-86
10611
-1.21%
May-86
9342
-11.96%
Jun-86
9082
-2.78%
$2.6M
Jul-86
8732
-3.85%
Aug-86
9692
10.99%
Sep-86
9991
3.09%
$2.9M
Oct-86
9622
-3.70%
Nov-86
9691
0.72%
Dec-86
9911
2.27%
$1.6M
1986 Final
108.21%
Jan-87
10460
5.54%
Feb-87
10021
-4.20%
Mar-87
11670
16.46%
$1.6M
Apr-87
19230
64.78%
May-87
19499
1.40%
Jun-87
16631
-14.71%
$1.8M
Jul-87
18849
13.34%
Aug-87
18131
-3.81%
Sep-87
19400
7.00%
$1.9M
Oct-87
16351
-15.72%
Nov-87
19660
20.24%
Dec-87
18610
-5.34%
$0.7M
1987 Final
87.77%
Jan-88
19040
2.31%
Feb-88
17330
-8.98%
Mar-88
16460
-5.02%
$0.5M
Apr-88
14171
-13.91%
Table Appendix 4.10: Jerry Parker Turtle Performance, January 1984–April 1988.
附录表4.10：杰瑞·帕克的业绩。
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-84
988
-1.20%
Feb-84
900
-8.87%
Mar-84
969
7.57%
$1.0M
Apr-84
804
-16.98%
May-84
753
-6.30%
Jun-84
619
-17.89%
$0.7M
Jul-84
969
56.56%
Aug -84
699
-27.85%
Sep-84
698
-0.15%
$0.8M
Oct-84
654
-6.22%
Nov-84
582
-11.01%
Dec-84
900
54.49%
$1.0M
1984 Final
-10.04%
Jan-85
922
2.51%
Feb-85
1097
18.92%
Mar-85
1000
-8.77%
$0.9M
Apr-85
797
-20.38%
May-85
936
17.52%
Jun-85
840
-10.30%
$0.8M
Jul-85
1352
61.05%
Aug-85
1368
1.18%
Sep-85
1522
11.25%
$1.4M
Oct-85
1745
14.61%
Nov-85
2111
20.99%
Dec-85
2059
-2.46%
$1.6M
1985 Final
128.87%
Jan-86
2706
31.43%
Feb-86
5446
101.26%
Mar-86
5472
0.47%
$4.2M
Apr-86
5265
-3.78%
May-86
5054
-4.00%
Jun-86
4921
-2.63%
$4.2M
Jul-86
4898
-0.47%
Aug-86
5139
4.91%
Sep-86
4685
-8.84%
$3.7M
Oct-86
4668
-0.35%
Nov-86
4652
-0.34%
Dec-86
4627
-0.54%
$1.6M
1986 Final
124.74%
Jan-87
5355
15.72%
Feb-87
4742
-11.44%
Mar-87
4815
1.53%
$1.4M
Apr-87
7669
59.28%
May-87
7529
-1.82%
Jun-87
6988
-7.18%
$2.0M
Jul-87
7826
11.98%
Aug-87
6582
-15.89%
Sep-87
6800
3.31%
$1.6M
Oct-87
6350
-6.62%
Nov-87
6339
-0.17%
Dec-87
6328
-0.17%
$1.5M
1987 Final
36.76%
Jan-88
6190
-2.19%
Feb-88
6027
-2.63%
Mar-88
5612
-6.89%
$2.1M
Apr-88
5011
-10.71%
Table Appendix 4.11: Brian Proctor Turtle Performance, January 1985-April 1988.
附录表4.11：布莱恩·不劳特的业绩。
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-85
985
-1.50%
Feb-85
1190
20.80%
Mar-85
994
-16.50%
$0.2M
Apr-85
699
-29.60%
May-85
930
32.90%
Jun-85
624
-32.90%
$0.2M
Jul-85
1113
78.50%
Aug-85
1109
-0.40%
Sep-85
1096
-1.20%
$0.3M
Oct-85
1149
4.90%
Nov-85
1431
24.50%
Dec-85
1548
8.20%
$1.2M
1985 Final
54.82%
Jan-86
1819
17.50%
Feb-86
3706
103. 70%
Mar-86
3746
1.10%
$3.7M
Apr-86
3821
2.00%
May-86
3504
-8.30%
Jun-86
3508
0.10%
$3.6M
Jul-86
3767
7.40%
Aug-86
4069
8.00%
Sep-86
3902
-4.10%
$4.1M
Oct-86
3480
-10.80%
Nov-86
3320
-4.60%
Dec-86
3347
0.80%
$2.1M
1986 Final
116.17%
Jan-87
3658
9.30%
Feb-87
3205
-12.40%
Mar-87
3817
19.10%
$1.9M
Apr-87
7133
86.90%
May-87
8410
17.90%
Jun-87
8646
2.80%
$5.0M
Jul-87
9329
7.90%
Aug-87
9273
-0.60%
Sep-87
9486
2.30%
$5.2M
Oct-87
9609
1.30%
Nov-87
9609
0.00%
Dec-87
9542
-0.70%
$1.2M
1987 Final
185.10%
Jan-88
9895
3.70%
Feb-88
9657
-2.40%
Mar-88
9764
1.10%
$0.1M
Apr-88
10291
5.40%
Table Appendix 4.12: Paul Rabar Turtle Performance, January 1985-April 1988.
附录表4.12：保罗·拉巴的业绩。
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-85
993
-0.70%
Feb-85
1100
10.80%
Mar-85
1001
-9.00%
$0.8M
Apr-85
790
-21.10%
May-85
992
25.60%
Jun-85
839
-15.40%
$0.7M
Jul-85
1505
79.30%
Aug-85
1495
-0.70%
Sep-85
1433
-4.10%
$1.8M
Oct-85
1594
11.20%
Nov-85
1849
16.00%
Dec-85
1917
3.70%
$2.0M
1985 Final
91.72%
Jan-86
2172
13.30%
Feb-86
4520
108.10%
Mar-86
5550
22.79%
$5.9M
Apr-86
4801
-13.50%
May-86
4590
-4.39%
Jun-86
4177
-9.00%
$4.4M
Jul-86
4745
13.60%
Aug-86
5234
10.30%
Sep-86
4753
-9.20%
$5.0M
Oct-86
4273
-10.10%
Nov-86
4200
-1.70%
Dec-86
4330
3.10%
$2.0M
1986 Final
125.86%
Jan-87
4906
13.30%
Feb-87
4121
-16.00%
Mar-87
4657
13.00%
$1.8M
Apr-87
9612
106.40%
May-87
9055
-5.79%
Jun-87
8566
-5.40%
$3.3M
Jul-87
9516
11.09%
Aug-87
8688
-8.70%
Sep-87
9139
5.19%
$3.1M
Oct-87
7220
-21.00%
Nov-87
7306
1.20%
Dec-87
7716
5.60%
$1.2M
1987 Final
78.19%
Jan-88
7792
0.99%
Feb-88
8563
9.90%
Mar-88
7818
-8.70%
$0.1M
Apr-88
7037
-9.99%
Table Appendix 4.13: Howard Seidler Turtle Performance, January 1984-April 1988.
附录表4.13：霍华德·辛德勒的业绩。
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-84
973
-2.70%
Feb-84
1097
12.70%
Mar-84
1090
-0.60%
$1.1M
Apr-84
989
-9.30%
May-84
1049
6.10%
Jun-84
881
-16.00%
$0.8M
Jul-84
1322
50.00%
Aug-84
924
-30.10%
Sep-84
970
5.00%
$2.0M
Oct-84
990
2.10%
Nov-84
883
-10.80%
Dec-84
1159
31.20%
$2.0M
1984 Final
15.91%
Jan-85
1214
4.70%
Feb-85
1580
30.20%
Mar-85
1401
-11.30%
$3.4M
Apr-85
1266
-9.70%
May-85
1490
17.70%
Jun-85
1284
-13.80%
$3.0M
Jul-85
1690
31.60%
Aug-85
1632
-3.40%
Sep-85
1658
1.60%
$6.1M
Oct-85
1905
14.90%
Nov-85
2130
11.80%
Dec-85
2320
8.90%
$6.3M
1985 Final
100.16%
Jan-86
2343
1.00%
Feb-86
4368
86.40%
Mar-86
5420
24.10%
$14.4M
Apr-86
4754
-12.30%
May-86
4459
-6.20%
Jun-86
4231
-5.10%
$12.1M
Jul-86
4401
4.00%
Aug-86
4982
13.20%
Sep-86
4872
-2.20%
$13.5M
Oct-86
4804
-1.40%
Nov-86
4597
-4.30%
Dec-86
4547
-1.10%
$7.0M
1986 Final
95.98%
Jan-87
4801
5.60%
Feb-87
4379
-8.80%
Mar-87
4668
6.60%
$5.8M
Apr-87
9181
96.70%
May-87
8961
-2.40%
Jun-87
8719
-2.70%
$10.4M
Jul-87
9565
9.70%
Aug-87
9115
-4.70%
Sep-87
9425
3.40%
$9.9M
Oct-87
6475
-31.30%
Nov-87
7116
9.90%
Dec-87
8162
14.70%
$5.0M
1987 Final
79.52%
Jan-88
8236
0.90%
Feb-88
8219
-0.20%
Mar-88
7685
-6.50%
$3.7M
Apr-88
7685
0.00%
Table Appendix 4.14: Tom Shanks Turtle Performance, January 1985-April 1988.
附录表4.14：汤姆·桑克斯的业绩。
Date
日期
VAMI
月度增值指数
ROR
回报率
Account Size
账户规模
Jan-85
941
-5.90%
Feb-85
1155
22.70%
Mar-85
935
-19.00%
$0.8M
Apr-85
683
-27.00%
May-85
765
12.00%
Jun-85
561
-26.60%
$0.5M
Jul-85
1065
89.70%
Aug-85
1034
-2.90%
Sep-85
850
-17.80%
$1.3M
Oct-85
1031
21.30%
Nov-85
1198
16.20%
Dec-85
1181
-1.40%
$1.7M
1985 Final
18.10%
Jan-86
1629
37.90%
Feb-86
3052
87.40%
Mar-86
3125
2.40%
$4.8M
Apr-86
3266
4.50%
May-86
3063
-6.20%
Jun-86
3109
1.50%
$4.8M
Jul-86
3330
7.10%
Aug-86
3470
4.20%
Sep-86
3345
-3.60%
$5.1M
Oct-86
3238
-3.20%
Nov-86
3109
-4.00%
Dec-86
3183
2.40%
$4.2M
1986 Final
169.53%
Jan-87
3813
19.80%
Feb-87
3813
0.00%
Mar-87
4771
25.10%
$5.1M
Apr-87
8740
83.20%
May-87
9212
5.40%
Jun-87
9083
-1.40%
$9.6M
Jul-87
9846
8.40%
Aug-87
9284
-5.70%
Sep-87
9303
0.20%
$9.5M
Oct-87
7554
-18.80%
Nov-87
7902
4.60%
Dec-87
7846
-0.70%
$2.4M
1987 Final
146.49%
Jan-88
7289
-7.10%
Feb-88
6932
-4.90%
Mar-88
5740
-17.20%
$0.2M
Apr-88
4976
-13.30%
（张轶注：因为不重要，尾注不翻译。）
Preface
1.   David Greising, “Adlai Bankroller Dennis Eschews ‘Millionaire’ Tag,” Chicago Sun-Times, August 3, 1986, A3.
2.    Andy Serwer, “The Greatest Money Manager of Our Time,” Fortune, November 15, 2006 (4:07 P.M. EST).
3.    Jeffrey Kluger, “Why We Worry About the Things We Shouldn’t and Ignore the Things We Should,” Time, November 26, 2006.
4.    Adam Levy, “Brain Scans Show Link Between Lust for Sex and Money,” February 1, 2006. See www.bloomberg.com.
Chapter 1
1.    Jack D. Schwager, Market Wizards: Interviews with Top Traders (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).
2.    Jack D. Schwager, The New Market Wizards: Conversations with America’s Top Traders (New York: HarperBusiness, 1992).
3.    Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W. Norton & Company, 1996).
4.    Ibid.
5.    Marc E. Pratarelli and Krystal D. Mize, Biological Determinism/ Fatalism: Are They Extreme Cases of Inference in Evolutionary Psychol-ogy, 2002.
6.    Jeffrey Pfeffer, “Only the Bulldogs Survive,” Business 2.0, September 2006, p. 62.
7.    Thomas Petzinger, Jr., “Speculator Richard Dennis Moves Markets and Makes Millions in Commodity Trades,” Wall Street Journal, November 8, 1983.
8.    Jenny Anderson, “Hedge Funds Are Back (Were They Ever Gone?),” New York Times, August 4, 2006.
9. Andrew Barber and Rich Blake, Trader Magazine, August/September 2006, p.76.
Chapter 2
1.    Making Oodles of Boodle, Time, June 22, 1987, p. 49.
2.    Julia M. Flynn, “Market Turmoil; Trader’s Survival Lessons,” New York Times, October 28, 1987.
3.    Manager Profiles, Dennis Trading Group, Inc., BMFR, 4th Quarter (1998). See www.barclaygrp.com.
4.    Flynn, “Market Turmoil.”
5.    David Greising, “Richard Dennis: The Man Behind All That Money,” Chicago Sun-Times, February 1, 1987, p. A1.
6.    See www.philosophypages.com.
7.    Kevin Koy, T he Big Hitters (Chicago: Intermarket Publishing Corp., 1986).
8.    Richard J. Dennis, Cato’s Letter #6 , “Toward a Moral Drug Policy,” The Cato Institute, 1991.
9.    Douglas Bauer, “Prince of the Pit,” New York Times, April 25, 1976.
10.  Geoffrey Keating, “How Richard Dennis Became a Commodity Trader and Made $102,000 One Year While Remaining Skeptical of Fat Cats,” Chicago Tribune, November 4, 1973, p. H24.
11.  Bauer, “Prince of the Pit.”
12.  Keating, “How Richard Dennis Became a Commodity Trader.”
13.  Bauer, “Prince of the Pit.”
14.  Ibid.
15.  Dennis, Cato’s Letter #6 .
16.  Ibid.
17.  Holcomb B. Noble and David C. Anderson, Endpaper, New York Times, December 26, 1976.
18.  Art Collins audiotape interview with Richard Dennis, 2005.
19.  Bauer, “Prince of the Pit.”
20.  Ibid.
21.  Thomas Petzinger, Jr., “Speculator Richard Dennis Moves Markets and Makes Millions in Commodity Trades,” Wall Street Journal, November 8, 1983.
22.  Ibid.
23. David Greising, “Adlai Bankroller Dennis Eschews ‘Millionaire’ Tag,” Chicago Sun-Times, August 3, 1986, p. A3.
24.  Ibid.
25.  Donald R. Katz, “Richard Dennis: The Once and Futures King,” Es?quire, December 1986.
26.  Jonathan R. Laing, “$200 Million Swinger: Meet Richard Dennis, Com-modities Speculator,” Barron’s National Business and Financial Weekly, vol. 66, no. 7 (February 17, 1986), 8.
27.  Laurie Cohen, “Farmers Fume Over Prices,” Chicago Tribune, January 15, 1984.
28.  Ibid.
29.  Michael Ervin, “Trader Richard Dennis Gets Back Into the Game . . . Again,” Central Penn Business Journal, vol. 7, no. 2, sec. 1 (September 1992), 12.
30.  Ibid.
31.  Peter Newcomb, “Would You Play Poker With This Man? Do You Think You’d Win?”  Forbes (October 27, 1986), p. 324.
32.  Kevin Koy, The Big Hitters (Chicago: Intermarket Publishing Corp., 1986).
33.  Laurie Cohen, “A Rare Trip: Trading Pit to Think Tank,” Chicago Tri?bune, July 31, 1983.
34.  Dennis, Cato’s Letter #6 .
35.  Laing, “$200 Million Swinger.”
36.  Ibid.
37.  Collins Audiotape interview with Richard Dennis.
38.  Ginger Szala, “Once a Trader . . . Profile of Richard J. Dennis, Futures Funds Trader,” Futures, August 1991, p. 46.
Chapter 3
1.    Trading Places, directed by John Landis and written by Timothy Harris and Herschel Weingrod. Don Ameche, Dan Aykroyd, Ralph Bellamy and Eddie Murphy, performers. Distributed by Paramount, 1983.
2.    Collins audiotape interview with Richard Dennis.
3.    Koy, The Big Hitters.
4.    Keith Button, “A T urtle’s Take.” Managed Account Reports, February 2004, p. 8.
5.    “The Billion Dollar Club,” Financial Trader Magazine, vol. 1, no. 7 (September/October 1994).
6.    Stanley W. Angrist, “Winning Commodity Traders May Be Made, Not Born,” Wall Street Journal, September 5, 1989.
7.    Greg Burns, “Financial on the Move:Former ‘Turtle’ Turns Caution into an Asset,” Chicago Sun- Times, 1989.
8.    Koy, The Big Hitters.
9.    “The Life Blood of Chicago,” Managed Account Reports, September 2004, pp. 11–12.
10.  Ibid.
11.  Button, “A Turtle’s Take.”
12.  Schwager, The New Market Wizards.
13.  Ibid.
14.  Ibid.
15.  Laing, “$200 Million Swinger.”
16.  Ibid.
17.  Katz, “Richard Dennis: The Once and Futures King.”
18.  Adam Hamilton, “Surviving Speculation,” December 31, 2004. See www.ZealLLC.com.
19.  “Turtles Outperform Industry in a Challenging Year,” The Barclay Group (1995), 1st quarter.
20.  Ibid.
21.  Button, “A Turtle’s Take.”
Chapter 4
1.    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientifi c_method.
2.    Ibid.
3.    Collins audiotape interview with Richard Dennis.
4.    Van Tharp. See www.iitm.com.
5.    Collins audio tape interview with Richard Dennis.
6.    Ibid.
7.   Barbara Saslaw Dixon, “Confessions of a Trend Follower,” Commodities Magazine, December 1974, pp. 19–21.
8.    Ibid.
9.    Darrell Jobman, “Richard Donchian: Pioneer of Trend- Trading,” Com-modities Magazine, September 1980, pp. 40–42.
10.  Koy, The Big Hitters.
11.  Katz, “Richard Dennis: The Once and Futures King.”
12.  Laing, “$200 Million Swinger.”
13.  “The Whiz Kid of Futures Trading,” Business Week, 1982, p. 102.
14.  Susan Abbott, “Richard Dennis: Turning a Summer Job into a Legend,” Futures Magazine, September 1983.
15.  Collins audiotape interview with Richard Dennis.
16.  Abbott, “Richard Dennis.”
17.  “William Eckhardt: Top Systems Traders,” Futures Industry Association. Speech on audiotape, 1992.
18.  Ibid.
19.  Abbott, “Richard Dennis.”
20.  “William Eckhardt: Top Systems Traders.”
21.  Ibid.
22.  Ibid.
23.  Ibid.
24.  Ibid.
25.  Ibid.
26.  Keating, “How Richard Dennis Became a Commodity Trader.”
27.  “William Eckhardt: Top Systems Traders.”
28.  “The Whiz Kid of Futures Trading.”
29.  Abbott, “Richard Dennis.”
30.  Kevin, The Big Hitters.
31.  Laing, “$200 Million Swinger.”
32.  “William Eckhardt: Top Systems Traders.”
33.  Koy, The Big Hitters.
34.  Abbott, “Richard Dennis.”
35.  “William Eckhardt: Top Systems Traders.”
36.  Ibid.
37.  Bradley Rotter interview.
Chapter 5
1.    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TypeI__andt_ype_IIe_rrors.
2.    TASS, “Twenty Traders Talk,” William Eckhardt. June 29, 1996.
3.    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam’s_Razor.
4.    Collins audiotape interview.
5.    TASS, “Twenty Traders Talk.”
6.    Ibid.
7.    Trading Systems Review, FIA Futures and Options Expo Audio, Novem-ber 8, 2002.
8.    Stanley W. Angrist, “Traders in the Slippery Oil Market Bet That Slide Won’t Last,” Wall Street Journal, October 25, 1990.
9.    Ibid.
10.  Trading Systems Review, FIA Futures and Options Expo Audio.
11.  TASS, “Twenty Traders Talk.”
12.  Ben Warwick, “Turtle Wisdom.” Managed Account Reports, Inc., 2001.
13.  “William Eckhardt: Top Systems Traders.”
14.  David Cheval and Patricia N. Gillman. How to Become a CTA: Based on CME Seminars, 1992-1994, edited by Susan Abbott Gidel (Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 1994).
15.  FIA Futures and Options Expo Audio.
16.  Ibid.
17.  McRae, “Top Traders.” Managed Derivatives, May 1996.
18.  Ibid.
19.  Ibid.
20.  Ibid.
21.  Cheval and Gillman, How to Become a CTA.
22.  McRae, “Top Traders.”
23.  Boris Schlossberg, “Trading House,” Stocks, Futures & Options Magazine, vol. 5, no. 2 (February 2006).
24.  Ibid.
Chapter 6
1.    RAM Management Group, Ltd., Barclays Managed Futures Report, 2nd Quarter (1998).
2.    Ervin, “Trader Richard Dennis Gets Back Into the Game . . . Again.”
3.    Ginger Szala, “Even Without Dennis, ‘Turtles’ Still Keeping Apace in Trading Race: Traders Following Methods of Retired Trader Richard J. Dennis,” Futures, vol. 18, no. 5 (May 1989), 72.
4.    Greg Burns, “Rich Dennis: A Gunslinger No More,” Business Week, April 7, 1997.
5.    Brett N. Steenbarger, “Trading the Ranger Way: Training the Elite Trader.” See www.BrettSteenbarger.com
6.    Brace E. Barber, Ranger School: No Excuse Leadership (Brace E. Barber, 2000).
7.    Button, “A Turtle’s Take.”
Chapter 7
1.    Trading Places.
2.    Stanley W. Angrist, “Winning Commodity Traders May Be Made, Not Born,” Wall Street Journal, September 5, 1989.
3.    See www.turtletradingsoftware.com, April 16, 2003.
4.    Ibid.
5.    Ibid.
6.    See www.turtletradingsoftware.com, July 25, 2003.
7.    See www.turtletradingsoftware.com, November 14, 2005.
8.    See www.turtletradingsoftware.com, February 08, 2006.
9.    Richard Dennis memo, April 23, 1986. 10. Collins audiotape interview with Richard Dennis.
Chapter 8
1.    Burns, “Financial on the Move.”
2.    “Dennis Trading Group, Inc: At a Glance,” The Barclay Group, 4th Quarter (1998).
3.    Julia Flynn Siler, “A Commodity Trader Fares Poorly in Funds,” New York Times, April 26, 1988.
4.    Scott McMurray, “Personal Finance (A Special Report): No Future - Safety in Numbers?”  Wall Street Journal, October 19, 1990.
5.    Michael Abramowitz, “Dennis Faces Doubts After Drexel Debacle,” Washington Post, September 1, 1991, p. H1.
6.    “Judge Approves Dennis Pact,” New York Times, November 11, 1990.
7.    Szala, “Once a Trader.”
8.    See www.turtletradingsoftware.com, March 14, 2005.
9.    Collins audiotape interview with Richard Dennis.
Chapter 9
1.    Trading Places.
2.    McRae, “Top Traders.”
3.    McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia. McIntire now, Spring 2002.
4.    Trading Systems Review, FIA Futures and Options Expo Audio.
5.    Szala, “Even Without Dennis, ‘Turtles’ Still Keeping Apace.”
6.   Carla Cavaletti, “Turtles on the Move; Former Students of Rich Dennis; Managed Money,” Futures, vol. 27, no. 6 (June 1998), 76.
7.    See lacm-usvi.com.
8.    Cavaletti, “Turtles on the Move.”
9.    Burns, “Financial on the Move.”
10. Jack Reerink, “Turtle Bisque; Money Management Experts Educated by Richard Dennis.” Futures, vol. 24, no. 5 (May 1995), 60.
11.  “Dealing with the Challenge of Unfavorable Markets Strategies and Methods CTAs Apply in Difficult Trading Environments,” The Barclay Group, 4th quarter (1993).
12.  Ginger Szala, “Trader Profile: Tom Shanks: Former ‘Turtle’ Winning Race the Hard Way,” Futures, vol. 20, no. 2 (1991), 78.
13.  Reerink, “Turtle Bisque.”
14.  Elizabeth Anne Cheval, “MFA Journal Encore: Why Choose High Vola-tility Trading?”  EMC Capital Management, vol. 9, issue 1 (1994).
15.  Cheval, “MFA Journal Encore.”
16.  “What’s in Store for 1991?” The Barclay Group, 1st Quarter (1991).
17.  See www.jwh.com.
18.  Michael W. Covel, Trend Following: How Great Traders Make Millions in Up or Down Markets (New York: Prentice Hall, 2004).
19.  Cavaletti, “Turtles on the Move.”
20.  Reerink, “Turtle Bisque.”
21.  McRae, “Top Traders.”
22.  Ibid.
Chapter 10
1.    Szala, “Once a Trader.”
2.    Burns, “Rich Dennis: A Gunslinger No More.”
3.    Michael Fritz, “Richard Dennis: He’s Baaaaaack - A Quiet Return for Futures Exile,” Crain’s Chicago Business, vol. 18, no. 50, sec. 1 (Decem-ber 11, 1995), 1.
4.    “Dennis Trading Group, Inc: At a Glance.”
5.    Michael Abramowitz, “Dennis Faces Doubts After Drexel Debacle,” Washington Post, September 1, 1991, p. H1.
6.    Fritz, “Richard Dennis: He’s Baaaaaack.”
7.    Laurie Cohen, “Promotion for Seminar on Futures Trading Secrets Not Telling All,” Chicago Tribune, August 30, 1992, Bus 1.
8.    Ibid.
9.    Ibid.
10.  Ibid.
11.  Ibid.
12.  Ibid.
13.  Ibid.
14.  Collins audiotape interview with Richard Dennis.
15.  Dennis Trading Group, Inc: At a Glance.”
16.  Ibid.
17.  Burns, “Rich Dennis: A Gunslinger No More.”
18.  Daniel A. Strachman, “Trader Profile: Back from the Bottom of the Pit,” Financial Trader.
19.  Andrew Osterland, “For Commodity Funds, It Was as Good as It Gets,” Business Week, September 14, 1998.
20.  Peter Coy and Suzanne Woolley, “Failed Wizards of Wall Street,” Business Week, September 21, 1998.
21.  Diane  Kruegar,  “Managed Money Review: Richard  Dennis  Closes Shop - Again,”     Futures (November 2000).
Chapter 11
1.    David Nusbaum, “Charles Faulkner: Mind Reader,” Futures, vol. 22, no. 12 (November 1993), 98.
2.    Koy, The Big Hitters.
3.    “Technical vs. Fundamental: How Do Traders Differ?” The Barclay Group, 3rd Quarter (1991).
4.    Ginger Szala, “Trader Profile: Tom Shanks: Former ‘Turtle’ Winning Race the Hard Way,” Futures, vol. 20, no. 2 (1991), 78.
5.    Jerry Parker, Chairman of VCAP. April 18, 2005, www.vcap.org.
6.    Malcolm Gladwell, “The Talent Myth,” The New Yorker, July 22, 2002.
7.    Carol Hymowitz, “Nation’s Top Chief Executives Find Path to the Corner Office Usually Starts at State University,” Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2006, p. B1.
8.    “What Does It Take to Be an Entrepreneur?” Under 25, Summer 1993.
9.    Greg Farell, “Does Harvard B‘ rand’ Matter Anymore? 1980 Grads Refl ect on What They Learned,” USA Today, June 7, 2005.
10.  McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia. McIntire now, Spring 2002.
11.  McIntire School of Commerce, McIntire now.
12.  “Roundtable: The State of the Industry II,” Managed Account Reports, Inc., no. 257 (July 2000), 8.
13.  “Roundtable: The State of the Industry,” Managed Account Reports, Inc., No. 256 (June 2000).
14.  Ibid.
15.  McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia, McIntire now. Spring 2001, 17.
16.  Ibid.
17.  Disclosure Document of Chesapeake Capital Corporation, March 29, 1999.
18.  “Technical vs. Fundamental: How Do Traders Differ?” The Barclay Group, 3rd Quarter (1991).
19.  FIA Futures and Options Expo Audio, Trading Systems Review, Friday, November 8, 2002.
20.  Ibid.
21.  Ibid.
22.  Ibid.
23.  “Roundtable: The St ate of the Industry II,” Managed Account Reports, Inc.
24.  Allan Sloan, “Amaranth’s Wilting Is a Lesson on Hedges,” Washington Post, September 26, 2006, p. D2.
25.  Nathan Slaughter and Paul Tracy, “Profiting from Mean Reversion.” See www.streetauthority.com, February 21, 2006.
26.  FIA Futures and Options Expo Audio.
27.  FIA Futures and Options Expo Audio.
Chapter 12
1.    Button, “A Turtle’s Take.”
2.    Collins audioTape interview with Richard Dennis.
3.    Ibid.
4.    See www.turtletradingsoftware.com, April 12, 2005.
5.    Ibid.
6.    See www.originalturtles.org, 2003.
7.    Collins Audiotape Interview with Richard Dennis.
8.    See www.turtletradingsoftware.com, February 13, 2004.
9.    Ibid.
10.  See www.turtletradingsoftware.com, August 19, 2004.
11.  Paul Barr, “New Futures Fund Rolls at Acceleration Capital,” Hedge-World Daily News. May 20, 2004.
12.  Ibid.
13.  See www.turtletradingsoftware.com, July 24, 2003.
14.  Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See www.cftc.gov/opa/enf06/ opa5211-06.htm, August 8, 2006.
Chapter 13
1.    Ginger Szala, “Top Traders Who Tamed the Rough and Tumble Markets of 1993,” Futures, vol. 23, no. 3 (March 1994), 60.
2.    Mark Aronson, “Trading Advisor Review: Learning from a Legend,” Managed Account Reports, June 1997.
3.    Diane Brady, “Yes, Winning Is Still The Only Thing,” Business Week, August 21, 2006.
4.    Bill Deener, “Who Is This Man? And Why Is He Trading So Many Futures Contracts Out of Canadian, Texas?”   Dallas Morning News, September 7, 2003.
5.    Simon Romero, “A Homespun Hedge Fund, Tucked Away in Texas,” New York Times, December 24, 2003.
6.    Jim Sogi, “The Killer Instinct.” See www.dailyspeculations.com, March 15, 2005.
Chapter 14
1.    Art Collins, Market Beaters (South Carolina: Traders Press, Inc., 2004), pp. 190–91.
2.    Michael J. Mauboussin, “Mauboussin on Strategy: Are You an Expert?” Legg Mason Capital Management, October 28, 2005.
3.    Ibid.
4.    Atul Gawande, The New Yorker, January 28, 2002.
Appendix I: Where Are They Now?
1.    Don Schultz, United States Chess Federation President’s Letter, January 17, 1997.
2.    See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Eckhardt_(trader).
3.    See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_argument.
4.    Reerink, “Turtle Bisque.”
5.    Elise Coroneos, “Trading Advisor Review: Steadying the Ship,” Managed Account Reports, Inc., January 2004, p. 15.
About the Author
关于作者
1. Michael Lewis, Liar’s Poker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, October 1989).
Index
索引
（张轶注：没价值，已经删除了。）
MICHAEL W. COVEL is the author of the bestselling book Trend Following, now in its seventh printing and translated into six languages. Covel speaks regularly on the subject of trading and is managing editor of TurtleTrader.com, the leading news and commentary resource on insights into the Turtles. He lives in Virginia.
迈克尔·W·卡沃尔是畅销书《趋势跟踪》的作者，此书已经被印刷了17次，被翻译成成了6种语言。卡沃尔在turtletrader.com网站做编辑，并发表关于交易的文章，这个网站有关于海龟的新闻和资料。他住在弗吉尼亚。
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迈克尔·W·卡沃尔的其它书
Trend Following:How Great Traders Make Millions in Up or Down Markets
《趋势跟踪》
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