铁狮门中国项目:航天飞机，一个犯了30年的错误终于结束了！

That's a little glib, of course. Bad wars, crooked pols and red-baiting were all around before the 37th president. And give the man his props too — for the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the EPA, the opening to China, all of which were genuine Nixonian gems.

当然，随便说说并无伤大雅。但无论是那愚蠢的战争、没有骨气的政客还是针对共产主义者的迫害行动都只是尼克松的一方面，他在任上同样做出了很多贡献。其中包括推动空气清洁法、水凈化法的出台，创立美国环境保护局以及同中华人民共和国建交等等。这些都是值得称颂的地方。

Then there was the space shuttle, which bears Nixon's stamp as indelibly as all the rest. It was on Jan. 5, 1972, that Nixon brought the shuttle program into being with a presidential order and an appearance alongside NASA administrator James Fletcher. And this Friday, the 135th and last shuttle mission is scheduled to be launched, ending a program in which five ships carried 777 passengers into space, traveling a collective half a billion miles — or out past the orbit of Jupiter. These shuttles built the International Space Station, carried the Magellan, Ulysses and Galileo probes aloft and sent them on their ways to Venus, the sun and Jupiter respectively. They lofted the Hubble Space telescope too — easily the most productive scientific instrument ever built — and made occasional servicing runs to it, with astronauts conducting surgically precise repair work on the $1.5 billion instrument in the impossibly challenging environment of space.

尼克松另外一个影响深远的举动就是直接推动了航天飞机的诞生。而航天飞机也像尼克松任内其他大事一样，被深深的盖上了尼克松的烙印。只要一提到它，人们便会立即联想起尼克松。1972年1月5日，在美国航空航天局局长詹姆斯?弗莱彻的陪伴下，尼克松签署了总统令，宣布了航天飞机项目的诞生。而这个星期五（7月8号）的最后一次发射则宣布了航天飞机项目走到了它的终点。在这辉煌的历程当中，5架航天飞机一共带着777名宇航员飞向太空，它们的总航程数加起来共有5亿英里之远，相当于我们到木星的距离。我们利用这些航天飞机作为运载工具，建造了国际太空站，将麦哲伦金星探测器、尤利西斯太阳探测器、伽利略木星探测器带上了太空。人类还利用航天飞机将迄今为止效率最高的科学试验仪器----哈勃太空望远镜带上了太空，并以令人不可思议的方式在几近不可能的情况下在太空中对其进行升级与维修。

But there's the other side of the shuttle too. The $500 million price tag every time one took off, the months of maintenance and prep work needed between flights, the temperamental electronic and hydraulic systems that scrubbed launches time and time again, the thermal tiles the ships would shed like dry leaves. And, finally, there are the 14 astronauts who lost their lives when first Challenger and later Columbia soared aloft but never returned home.

虽然自从航天飞机诞生伊始，令人眩目的辉煌成绩就伴随着航天飞机的每次升空而不停的出现在人们面前，但这并不表示航天飞机是完美无缺的。平均每次5亿美金的发射费用令人咂舌。而且尽管每次升空前都要在检查与维修上面花费数月的时间，机上的电子与液压系统还是故障频繁，并屡次导致发射被延误。同时铺设在航天飞机表面的隔热层仍然不时的像干树叶一样从飞机表面脱落下来。最终，这些缺陷导致了2起灾难性事故的发生，一共14名宇航员在 挑战者号 和 哥伦比亚号 的事故中失去了自己的生命。他们永远都没能再回到自己的家。

It's easy both to hate and love a ship like that. Conservative pundit Charles Krauthammer, who yields to no man when it comes to finely crafted crankiness, distilled that kind of cognitive dissonance splendidly once when he wrote that the space shuttle belongs in "the Museum of Things Too Beautiful and Complicated to Surviv

The fact is, the shuttles almost didn't exist at all. A reusable, low-orbit space truck was hardly the initial direction NASA was planning to go in the triumphant afterglow of the Apollo program. It wasn't even the initial direction the Nixon administration advocated. Not long after taking office, Nixon appointed a space task force to determine the future of cosmic exploration, chaired by Vice President Spiro Agnew. The group came back with an ambitious long-term plan that included the establishment of a near-Earth space station, further explorations of the lunar surface and a manned landing on Mars by 1986.

　　事实上，要不是当年NASA与尼克松改变主意，航天飞机恐怕根本就不会出现。一心想要将阿波罗项目的辉煌成就延续下去的NASA从一开始就没将这种 可重复使用的低轨道航天器 的研制项目放在第一位（译者注:按照NASA的计划，整个项目项目的最后一艘飞船是阿波罗20号，但是尼克松上台后不久，项目便被提前终止，最后升空的阿波罗17号也就成了整个项目的绝唱）。甚至就连尼克松政府也不是从一开始就积极提倡研制航天飞机。但尼克松上台后不久，便任命了以副总统 斯皮罗·阿格纽 为首的专家团来确定未来的太空探索方向。这个专家团给出了一份雄心勃勃的长期太空探索计划。近期目标包括建立近期空间站，而远期目标则包括探索月球表面，甚至定于1986年登陆火星。

"If there is any doubt that a manned landing on Mars has become the next grand objective of the U.S. space program, a reading of the Space Task Group report should dispel it," wrote one commentator in the January 1970 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. "The report ... not only designates Mars as the next port of call for astronauts, but also shapes most of the total space program in the next 16 years."

　　如果有人对美国已将登陆火星当做自己下一个宏伟目标一事心存疑虑，那么太空探索专家团的报告应该可以令他们释怀。在1970年出版的《原子科学家公报》上，一位评论员如是说道。”这份报告不但指出火星将作为宇航员的下一个太空基地，而且还对今后16年内的绝大部分太空探索计划做了描述”

But Nixon wanted none of it — nor of much of the remainder of the existing lunar program either, which was supposed to continue through Apollo 20 but was canceled before its final three missions could be flown. There has always been speculation in space circles that Nixon's antipathy for the lunar program was based on the fact that it was an idea initiated by President John F. Kennedy — whom Nixon never quite quit resenting. Maybe that's true; the man who gave us a White House enemies list was clearly not above pettiness. But it's also true that it was Nixon who was in office when Apollo 11 landed, and thus Nixon who got to perform the presidential touchdown dance — phoning the astronauts on the lunar surface, appearing on the deck of the aircraft carrier Hornet to welcome them home. Apollo had effectively become Nixon's program and any future Mars initiative would have been his baby as surely as the early space push was Kennedy's.

然而，提前终止阿波罗项目并重新制定太空探索计划 并不是尼克松的真实意愿。众所周知，阿波罗项目的最后一艘飞船是阿波罗20号。然而，在发射完阿波罗17号之后整个项目便被提前终止，剩下的阿波罗18、19、20号没能飞向月球。人们纷纷猜测尼克松为何要提前终止阿波罗计划，其中一个引人入胜的解释就是尼克松极度讨厌自己的对手：约翰·肯尼迪，而阿波罗计划就恰好成了政治斗争的牺牲品。也许这就是尼克松的真实想法，至少尼克松本身就是一位为了政治利益而不择手段的人。但另外一个事实是，当身处办公室的尼克松看到阿波罗11号成功着陆的时候兴奋的手舞足蹈。他还给正在月球表面的宇航员打电话，并登上大黄蜂号航母的甲板亲自迎接宇航员的归来。从这个角度来看，尼克松实际上已经坐收由约翰·肯尼迪推动的阿波罗计划所带来的丰硕成果，甚至连早期由约翰·肯尼迪推动的火星探索方案也被其统统收入囊中。

The more prosaic explanation for Nixon's wariness was money. The Vietnam War was still consuming an outsize portion of the federal budget and inflation was roaring — at 6% in 1970 — prompting Nixon to take the now unthinkable measure of imposing wage and price controls in the summer of 1971. Throwing money at Mars at a time like that might simply not have seemed tenable. Instead, we'd go the practical route, and a space shuttle would provide the way.

　　对于尼克松为何要提前终止阿波罗项目的另外一个解释就是：缺钱。这个解释听起来相当没劲。越南战争这个无底洞给联邦财政带来了沉重负担，而通货膨胀更使局面雪上加霜。在1970年的时候，这个美国国内通货膨胀率飙到了6%。所有这一切迫使尼克松不得不在1971年夏天推出包括 控制工资和物价 等一系列强力手段在内的新经济政策，以求在刺激经济的同时抑制国内通货膨胀。在这样一个大环境下，向火星砸钱肯定是说不过去的。而恰好在这个时候，航天飞机项目为困境中的尼克松和NASA提供了一条可选之路。

A reusable orbital vehicle, Nixon promised in his 1972 statement, "will revolutionize transportation into near space, by routinizing it. [The vehicle will] be recovered and used again and again — up to 100 times. The resulting economies may bring operating costs down to as low as one-tenth those of present launch vehicles. [The trip to and from space will be] safer and less demanding for the passengers, so that men and women with work to do in space can 'commute' aloft."

　　“这是一个可重复使用的载人航天工具”尼克松在1972年公开说道，“这将完全改变我们进入近地空间的方式。因为航天飞机的重复使用次数可达100次之多，所以每次的发射费用可以降低到目前费用的十分之一。而且，无论是进入太空，还是返回地球，这一过程都将变得更安全更可靠，同时还减少了对乘客自身的要求，这样一来无论是男宇航员还是女宇航员都能方便搭乘航天飞机往返太空与地面”

So how'd all that work out? The answer to that question, which was impossible to know at the time, was probably already baked into the overall plan — and the recipe was never very good. The grand — and so far unattained — dream of all orbital engineers is to design a craft that can take off either from a rolling start like an airplane or an upright posture like a rocket, fly to orbit and come back down without shedding any hardware along the way.

　　那么，应该通过何种方式来实现这个目标呢？这个在当初还无法回答的问题，在提出之时已经逐渐成形，虽然这样一个配置方法并不合适。在设计目标当中，设计师计划让航天飞机像普通飞机那样水平起飞，或者像普通火箭那样垂直升空，并且在进入轨道以及返回地球的整个过程当中不抛弃任何部件。这个设计目标在当时的技术水平下几近无法实现。

What makes this so-called single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) concept so elusive is the stubborn, circular nature of the thrust and weight problem. Getting to orbit without shedding parts requires a very powerful engine and a lot of fuel. But a very powerful engine and a lot of fuel add extra weight that must be lifted — which requires an even more powerful engine and even more fuel and on and on. Light, composite materials, very efficient engines and highly energetic fuel bring the goal closer — indeed, they're part of the design of any good booster — but never quite within reach. In this case, the problem very much is rocket science — and it ain't easy to do.

一味的坚持使用单级入轨方式（译者注：区别于多级火箭的多级入轨方式，多级入轨需要在发射过程中抛弃部分部件。单级入轨则不抛弃任何部件，在将其回收之后，经过简单的维修与重新添加燃料，便能重复使用。）和 推力与重量之间的矛盾 使得整个项目充满挑战。要想在升空过程当中不抛弃任何部件，便需要强大的发动机和携带更多燃料。但更强大的发动机与更多的燃料又意味着重量的增加。重量的增加又意味着需要使用更为强大的发动机和携带额外的燃料。如此循环，便成为一个难以解决的问题。轻巧的复合材料、高效的发动机，以及能量更高的火箭燃料可以在一定程度上缓解这个矛盾。事实上，设计一款优秀的助推火箭的时候，这些问题都是必然要考虑进去的，然而这件问题解决起来绝非易事。而在航天飞机的设计当中所碰到的麻烦，很大一部分都是火箭上的问题，而且这些问题都不是那么容易解决的。

The solution for the shuttle was to bolt the orange whale of the external tank onto the belly of the orbiter and tack two solid rockets onto the tank. That might have been the only way to get the 89-ton ship moving fast enough to achieve orbit, but it did present the inconvenient problem of positioning the crew directly next to three massive loads of compressed explosives instead of atop it as you would on a traditional rocket. If, say, an O-ring begins leaking superheated gas or a chunk of killer foam falls from the external tank, the astronauts and their spacecraft are directly in harm's way. That those two things both happened — with the most disastrous consequences possible — is a matter of historical record. That they were both precisely foreseeable is much less certain, but there's no doubt that smart people knew the ship presented a new portfolio of risks.

　　航天飞机设计方案当中所采取的办法便是在轨道器的腹部挂上一只橙色的外挂燃料箱，然后在外挂燃料箱上再捆绑两只固体助推火箭（译者注：航天飞机由轨道器、外挂燃料箱、固体燃料助推火箭组成，我们通常所看到的只是其轨道器）。或许这是给重达89吨的轨道器提供足够的速度，以使它能够进入轨道的唯一办法。然而，这样做却带来了另外一个危险。因为装满燃料的外挂燃料箱 和 固体燃料助推火箭 都是放置在轨道器的腹部，相较于将轨道器放置于火箭顶端的做法，任何一个小故障都可能造成灾难性的后果（译者注：请比较一下阿波罗项目当中 土星五号 的结构）。挑战者号事故中用来隔绝高热气体的O形密封圈，以及哥伦比亚号事故当中从外挂燃料箱上掉落的绝热泡沫都是最好的例证。这两起事故因为影响深远已被载入历史。虽然这两起事故几近无法预测，但很明显，一些人已经知道航天飞机本身有着一大堆的缺陷。

Then too there was the very idea of reusability. To hear the shuttle's most enthusiastic supporters tell it, turning the vehicle around between flights would mean little more than hosing it down, gassing it up and putting a little air in the tires — and if the reality had been anything like that, the economies of scale might have brought the price-per-pound of payload down to the one-tenth level Nixon promised. But a crewed vehicle requires complex life-support hardware, redundant safety systems and an overall degree of care that an unmanned booster can do without, and it takes a long time to get everything properly checked out between flights. Nixon might have foreseen a spacecraft that could fly to space 100 times, but the most well-traveled of the five shuttles was Discovery, which made only 38 trips in 28 years. Challenger, the least flown, managed just 10 before its destruction in 1986. The greatest number of missions ever flown in a single year was nine, in 1985.

       航天飞机的另外一个特点就是可以重复使用。很多航天飞机的支持者认为只需要稍微冲洗一下、重新加注燃料，然后再给轮胎打打气，航天飞机便可以再次出发。而且如果按照这样计算下来，相较于普通火箭，每磅的运送花费将会下降90%，就像尼克松当初承诺的那样。然而这些乐观主义者似乎忘记了一些东西，航天飞机需要一套复杂的生命支持系统、冗余安全装置 以及全方位的维护保养，这些都是普通火箭所不需要的。更别提航天飞机每次飞行都要花费数月时间来进行检查维护。此外，尼克松还预计航天飞机将可重复使用100次左右。然而在28年的时间当中，升空次数最多的“发现号”总共才发射38次。而在1986年事故当中毁于一旦的挑战者号，只发射了10次。 再者，航天飞机升空次数最多的年份是1985年。一共发射了9次。

As the lags between flights grew longer and longer and the cost of renting payload space remained high, customers fled back to the commercial boosters like the Atlas and Delta. That pushed NASA to cut corners and rush launches which, in the case of Challenger, was a proximate cause of the disaster, as the ship lifted off during a Florida freeze when its O-rings had become dangerously brittle. By the time the shuttles were certified to fly after all of the post-Challenger investigations were complete, they would be used largely as space trucks for the military or for NASA's own missions, such as space-station construction.

　　随着两次飞行中间的间隔时间越来越长，和依旧高昂的发射费用，客户开始将他们的注意力转向了包括宇宙神和德尔塔系列火箭在内的商业发射服务。在这些压力面前，NASA不得不简化流程，节约时间，甚至不惜违规操作。这样做所造成的隐患显而易见，而挑战者号恰好就成了这些隐患下的牺牲者。1986年，在降温天气笼罩佛罗里达上空、气温并不适合进行发射的情况下，NASA依旧点燃了挑战者号的发动机。最后，因为气温过低引起O形密封圈失灵而引发的连锁反应，最终导致了挑战者号的毁灭。随后，航天飞机被停飞直到所有调查全部完成后才获准重上蓝天。但因为商业订单锐减，之后的发射活动多半也只是在为军方以及诸如国际空间站之类的NASA自有项目提供服务。

Now, with the space station built and the shuttles gone creaky (the first of them rolled off the assembly line in 1979), nothing will quite become the overall program like the ending of it. And yet it will be impossible not to miss the cursed vehicles at least a little. There was always a just-do-it-ness to the decision to fly the shuttles. Tiles fell from one ship and the next one was glued together better and rolled out to the pad. Launches were scrubbed for this or that glitch six or seven times in a row, and the astronauts would gamely suit up for try No. 8. Seven people died and the crews kept coming. Seven more were lost and still they came.

　　现在，随着空间站的建成，航天飞机也渐渐显的老旧而又毫无用处（第一架航天飞机于1979年下线），这样来看，光荣退役显然是航天飞机项目的最好结局。当然，叫人不去怀念这些充满悲剧色彩的航天飞机是不可能的。它们的每次升空都敢想敢做、毫无畏惧。即使隔热瓦从航天飞机表面脱落下来，下一艘航天飞机也必定会将其贴合的更好。哪怕航天飞机的发射因为小故障而连续延误了6次或者是7次，宇航员们也仍然坚守岗位，耐心等待第8次升空。就算在挑战者号和哥伦比亚号的事故中有宇航员不幸殉职，但后来者并没有停止他们探索太空的步伐，依旧勇往直前。

The astronauts and the flight controllers were, by any measure, better than the ships they were given to fly, but the shuttles we had were the shuttles we were capable of building at the time. Two of the missions may have ended in tragedy, but assuming Atlantis returns from its final flight safely, 133 will have concluded with a safe, rolling stop on a familiar earthly runway. We will never get back the billions we spent on the program, and the lives that were lost are lost forever. Still, when the ledger is tallied — when all of the technological, scientific, mortal and moral variables are factored together — we might, just might, end up on the plus side of the page. It's probably fair to give both Nixon and NASA a pass on this one — provided we all learn from the mistakes we've made.

       尽管与我们杰出的宇航员和地面控制人员相比较，有着各种问题的航天飞机并没有显得那么优秀，但它仍然是在受当时技所限的情况下，所能造出来的最好的航天器。虽然有两次飞行任务最后以悲剧告终，但将这次亚特兰帝斯的升空计算在内，它们依旧围绕熟悉的地球轨道飞行了133次。而那些逝去的，则已经永远逝去，无论是14位优秀的宇航员，还是整个项目当中所耗费的巨大财力。不过，如果整个项目的账目与实际支出相吻合，在将包括技术上、科学上、极端环境在内的各种因素、以及道德考虑考虑进来后，我们也许，仅仅是也许，可以将整个航天飞机项目好的一面作为我们对其最后的总结，但却很难给予尼克松以及NASA一个合格的分数。这个犯了30年的错误将用来不断的警示我们自己和后人。