重生之天蓬元帅:中国地方债濒危 China’s emerging municipal

It has been clear for some time that China’s municipalities ran up big debts during the country’s heroic post-crisis stimulus in 2009. But only now are the full consequences of this binge emerging.

自中国政府2009年启动应对金融危机的宏大经济刺激计划以来，中国地方政府积累了大量债务。这一问题人们早已意识到。但直到现在，这场“狂欢”的全部后果才逐渐清晰。

It is not pretty. According to the country’s first audit of local government finances, municipalities have run up debts of Rmb10,700bn ($1,656bn), equivalent to about 30 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product. The quality of many of these loans is thought to be poor. Collectively they threaten an upsurge of non-performing loans in the banking system.

情况不太好。中国首次针对地方财政状况开展的审计显示，各地方政府的债务总额达到10.7万亿元人民币（合1.656万亿美元），相当于中国国内生产总值(GDP)的近30%。其中有许多贷款被认为质量不高。总体上，它们可能会导致银行系统不良贷款激增。

The main reason for the towering total is that municipalities were let off the financial leash following the crisis. Beijing tacitly allowed them to circumvent a rule restricting their ability to borrow from banks by setting up so-called local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). This licence led to the creation of a hidden overhang of loans. Many of these were invested unwisely in poorly monitored projects, roughly a quarter of which generate no revenue, according to a Chinese official.

债务总额激增的主要原因，是金融危机之后地方政府在财政方面的限制得到放松。中央政府建立了所谓的地方政府融资平台，默许地方政府绕开一项限制它们从银行贷款的规定。这一政策催生了隐性的债务积压。一位中国官员表示，这些债务中有许多投资去向不够明智，投入到了监管松懈的项目中，其中大约四分之一无法产生收入。

Beijing’s forbearance in letting local governments indulge in a reckless debt-fuelled splurge was admittedly the key factor that powered the post-crisis rebound. Bank capital acted as a sort of force magnifier to the official stimulus package. But problems are now bubbling to the surface. It appears that some municipalities borrowed heavily from the banks, taking the view that the bigger the financial problem they generated the more likely the central government would ultimately be to bail them out. Many may now be unable to repay what they owe.

诚然，中央容许地方政府沉湎于无节制的、导致负债的挥霍，是金融危机后中国经济反弹的一个关键原因。银行资本为政府刺激方案充当了某种形式的力量“放大器”。然而，问题如今正浮出水面。从目前情况看，一些地方政府从银行大举借贷，它们认为，自己造成的财政问题越大，中央政府最终为其纾困的可能性也就越大。许多地方政府现在可能已无力偿还欠下的债务。

Beijing is unlikely to step aside and let large numbers of LGFVs fail, not least because that would cause knock-on problems for the state-controlled financial sector. But it must also get a grip on what is an abusive system of local government finance before this becomes a bigger problem.

中央政府不太可能坐视不管，任由大量地方政府融资平台垮掉，一个重要原因在于：这会给国有的金融部门造成极大冲击。但是，中央政府也必须对不负责任的地方政府财政体系加以控制，以避免问题进一步扩大。

The answer is not to stop local governments from raising external finance, but to ensure that they do so responsibly. Rather than borrowing from banks, they should be able to issue bonds. This would require municipalities to be more transparent about their finances. It would also force them to be more disciplined, leading hopefully to better investment decisions.

答案不是停止地方政府从外部融资，而是要确保他们负责任地融资。应当允许他们发行债券，而不是从银行贷款。这种做法要求地方政府的财政状况更加透明，也会迫使地方政府更加自律，有可能促使他们作出更好的投资决策。

Greater fiscal autonomy for local government may not be top of Beijing’s to-do list. But sticking with the alternative would be to perpetuate a wasteful and unaccountable system, the financial perils of which are now all too evident.

赋予地方政府更大的财政自主权，或许不是北京方面的首要任务之一。然而坚持不这样做，可能会维持一个浪费、不负责任的体系，它所构成的财政风险眼下已非常明显。