解放军总装备部家属院:The Libyan crisis - Three lessons for global ...

来源:百度文库 编辑:九乡新闻网 时间:2024/04/28 04:13:19

The Libyan crisis - Three lessons for global politics

 


By Yogesh Joshi


After weeks of debate followed by days of confusion, the international coalition enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya has finally taken shape. Spearheaded by the U.S., the U.K. and France, Operation Odyssey Dawn now also includes Canada, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, all of whom have intervened to stop Col. Moammar Gadhafi from carrying out a threatened massacre against his own citizens.


Although the ultimate outcome of the intervention remains uncertain, the Libyan episode has already revealed three important features of contemporary global politics.


First is the issue of U.S. leadership and its global responsibilities. After the debacle in Iraq and the debilitating financial crisis, many expected that the U.S. would consciously limit itself when it came to undertaking global humanitarian missions. Moreover, it was widely believed that with the change in leadership at the White House, the Obama administration would take a step back from its predecessor's emphasis on democracy-promotion. However, the United States' readiness to impose the mandate of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 proved both of those hypotheses wrong.


Despite many claims to the contrary, American global primacy remains intact -- the U.S. is still the only country with the wherewithal to undertake simultaneous military actions all over the world. The image of American military forces delivering humanitarian aid to tsunami-stricken Japan and at the same time patrolling the Mediterranean Sea, all while maintaining significant operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as commitments in East Asia, underscores that point. France and the U.K. had both lobbied for air strikes on Libyan government forces from the very outset of the anti-Gadhafi uprising. However, those calls to action would have likely remained unheeded had Washington declined to take part in the mission. Between action and rhetoric on intervention, in Libya and elsewhere, lies the United States. The military intervention also underlined the fact that, in domestic U.S. politics, both political parties have internalized democracy-promotion as a core foreign policy goal.


Second is the role of emerging powers, in particular India, Russia, Brazil and China, all of whom notably abstained from the vote on Resolution 1973. These countries acknowledged that the Libyan tyrant's actions were creating a humanitarian crisis and that the violence against civilians needed to be halted immediately. But they opposed resorting to military action, as advocated by Western democracies. Their inhibitions against intervention emanate in part from the fact that their own internal nation-building projects remain incomplete. Nonetheless, none of these countries voted against the resolution -- they merely abstained. If their misgivings with the resolution were so stark, why not register a stronger protest? China and Russia could have easily vetoed the measure.


Why let the resolution pass, then? First, the emerging major powers fully understand that an intervention within their sovereign boundaries by Western democracies is simply inconceivable. There are limits to any precedent set by a Libya-style intervention, and the West's ideological solidarity with liberal emancipation will not trump considerations of power politics when dealing with the emerging powers. Second, their decision to abstain but not vote against or veto the resolution also stems from a desire to see the global order defended, even if they themselves are unwilling to take on global responsibilities. The crisis in Libya has threatened regional stability and induced volatility in oil markets. Allowing Gadhafi to continue the bloodbath by blocking international action would also have sent dangerous signals to tyrants around the world, while also potentially driving ordinary people fighting against dictators to embrace terrorist organizations as their only avenue of resistance. By abstaining from voting, the emerging powers registered a tacit acceptance of the humanitarian mission, thereby enjoying the benefits of the coalition's action without sharing in the real burden of military intervention.


The third major lesson of the Libyan crisis is that when it comes to contested norms of international politics, what matters is the willingness and wherewithal to support one's perspective. The norm of nonintervention in the internal matters of sovereign states has been severely challenged, especially in cases of gross human rights violations and mass killings perpetrated by unyielding dictatorships. With the growing acceptance of the "responsibility to protect," the norm of nonintervention has slipped from a position of universal acceptance during the Cold War into a one of moral contestation.


Anti-interventionists are correct when they argue that military action leads to collateral damage and civilian deaths, and often masks the pursuit of self-interest on the part of intervening countries. However, these arguments do not diminish the urgency of assisting those suffering from violence perpetrated by a cruel tyrant.


The Libyan crisis therefore tells us three things about the future of international politics. First, American primacy will remain an incontrovertible feature of global politics for some time to come. Second, one cannot expect the emerging powers to take up the mantle of global responsibility any time soon, even as they depend upon the hegemon to provide them with international public goods. Third, the contestation of norms of international conduct will intensify, not diminish -- as will the need to back one's view of international norms with material resources.