中国重走日本老路？How China could yet fail like Japan

Until 1990, Japan was the most successful large economy in the world. Almost nobody predicted what would happen to it in the succeeding decades. Today, people are yet more in awe of the achievements of China. Is it conceivable that this colossus could learn that spectacular success is a precursor of surprising failure? The answer is: yes.

直到1990年，日本都还是世界上最成功的大型经济体，几乎没有人预料到接下来的几十年里日本所发生的事情。今天，人们对中国取得的成就更为惊叹。这个巨大的经济体能够汲取教训、明白辉煌的成功通常预示着惊人的失败，这有可能吗？答案是肯定的。

Japan’s gross domestic product per head (at purchasing power parity) jumped from a fifth of US levels in 1950 to 90 per cent in 1990. But this spectacular convergence went into reverse: by 2010, Japan’s GDP per head had fallen to 76 per cent of US levels. China’s GDP per head jumped from 3 per cent of US levels in 1978, when Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” began, to a fifth of US levels today. Is this going to continue as spectacularly over the next few decades or could China, too, surprise on the downside?

日本按购买力平价计算的人均国内生产总值(GDP)在1950年相当于美国水平的五分之一，到 1990年跃升至美国水平的90%。不过这种壮观的趋同之势却出现逆转，到2010年，日本人均GDP下降到了美国水平的76%。1978年邓小平的“改革开放”政策开始实施时，中国的人均GDP仅为美国水平的3%，今天已经跃升至美国水平的五分之一。接下来的几十年中，中国是会继续这种令人瞩目的增长，还是也会让世界失望？

It is easy to make the optimistic case. First, China has a proved record of success, with an average rate of economic growth of 10 per cent between 1979 and 2010. Second, China is a long way from the living standards of the high-income countries. Relative to the US, its GDP per head is where Japan’s was in 1950, before a quarter century of further rapid growth. If China matched Japan’s performance, its GDP per head would be 70 per cent of US levels by 2035 and its economy would be bigger than those of the US and European Union, combined.

为持乐观态度辩护很容易。首先，中国有经事实证明的成功经历，1979年至2010年之间其年均经济增长率达10%。其次，中国的生活标准离达到高收入国家的水平还有很长的路要走。以美国为参照，中国现在的人均GDP仅为日本1950年的水平，日本在那之后又经历了四分之一个世纪的高速增长。如果中国能与日本的经济表现相当，那么到2035年其人均GDP将达到美国水平的70%，其经济规模将超过美国和欧盟经济规模的总和。

Yet counter-arguments do exist. One is that China’s size is a disadvantage: in particular, it makes its rise far more dramatic for the demand for resources than anything that has gone before. Another is that the political effects of such a transformation might be disruptive for a country run by a Communist party. It is also possible, however, to advance purely economic arguments for the idea that growth might slow more abruptly than most assume.

不过也存在反对的意见。首先，中国巨大的规模是一个劣势。具体来说，这种规模决定了中国的崛起会对资源需求造成远更巨大的影响，超出我们以往的经验。此外，这种转变造成的政治影响，可能会对一个共产党掌权的国家造成干扰。然而，也能以纯经济学的论证说明，经济增速的放缓会比多数人预期的更加突然。

Such arguments rest on two features of China’s situation. The first is that it is a middle-income country. Economists increasingly recognise a “middle-income trap”. Thus, sustaining rapid increases in productivity and managing huge structural shifts as the economy becomes more sophisticated is hard. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are almost the only economies to have managed this feat over the past 60 years.

这种论调的依据是中国现状的两个特征。其一，中国是一个中等收入国家。经济学家们日益认识到 “中等收入陷阱”的存在。因此，随着经济发展程度越来越高，维持生产力的快速增长并驾驭规模巨大的结构调整会很难。过去60年中成功完成这个任务的经济体几乎只有日本、韩国、台湾、香港和新加坡。

Happily, China has close cultural and economic similarities with these east Asian successes. Unhappily, China shares with these economies a model of investment-led growth that is both a strength and a weakness. Moreover, China’s version of this model is extreme. For this reason, it is arguable that the model will cause difficulties even before it did in the arguably less distorted case of Japan.

幸运的是，中国与这些成功的东亚经济体在文化和经济上极其相似。不幸的是，中国与这些经济体一样，经济增长模式都由投资主导，这既是优势又是劣势。而且这种模式在中国尤为极端。因此，有理由说这种模式在中国会比在日本（其情况可能没那么扭曲）更早造成问题。

Premier Wen Jiabao has himself described the economy as “unstable, unbalanced, unco-ordinated and ultimately unsustainable”. The nature of the challenge was made evident to me during discussions of the 12th five year plan at the China Development Forum 2011 in Beijing in March. This new plan calls for a sharp change in the pace and structure of economic growth. In particular, growth is forecast to decline to just 7 per cent a year. More important, the economy is expected to rebalance from investment, towards consumption and, partly as a result, from manufacturing towards services.

中国总理温家宝曾亲口表示中国经济“不稳定、不平衡、不协调、不可持续”。在3月北京召开的 2011年中国发展高层论坛(China Development Forum)上，就十二五规划展开的讨论让我清楚认识到中国所面临经济挑战的性质。这套新的规划要求对经济增长的步伐和结构做出重大调整。具体而言，经济年增长率预期将降至7%。更重要的是，预期中国经济将实现再平衡，从投资主导转向消费主导，并从制造业向服务业转移——后者在一定程度上是前者的结果。

The question is whether these shifts can be managed smoothly. Michael Pettis of Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management has argued that they cannot be. His argument rests on the view that in the investment-led growth model, repression of household incomes plays a central role by subsidising that investment. Removing that repression – a necessary condition for faster growth of consumption – risks causing a sharp slowdown in output and a still bigger slowdown in investment. Growth is driven as much by subsidised expansion of capacity as by the profitable matching of supply to final demand. This will end with a bump.

问题在于政府是否能够平稳实现这些转变。北京大学光华管理学院的迈克尔•佩蒂斯 (Michael Pettis)认为它们不能。他的观点基于下述看法：在投资导向型增长模式中，抑制家庭收入以补贴投资发挥了关键作用。消除这种抑制——加快消费增长的必要条件——可能会导致产出大幅放缓以及投资更大幅度的减缓。政府补贴的产能扩张对增长的推动作用， 不亚于供给与最终需求的有利匹配。而这可能会突然终止。

Investment has indeed grown far faster than GDP. From 2000 to 2010, growth of gross fixed investment averaged 13.3 per cent, while growth of private consumption averaged 7.8 per cent. Over the same period the share of private consumption in GDP collapsed from 46 per cent to a mere 34 per cent, while the share of fixed investment rose from 34 per cent to 46 per cent. (See charts.)

事实上，投资增长远远快于GDP。从2000到2010年，中国固定资产投资总额年均增速为13.3%，而个人消费年均增速为7.8%。同期，个人消费占GDP比重从46%骤降至34%，而固定资产投资占GDP比重则从34%，上升至了46%（见图表）。

Professor Pettis argues that suppression of wages, huge expansions of cheap credit and a repressed exchange rate were all ways of transferring incomes from households to business and so from consumption to investment. Dwight Perkins of Harvard argued at the China Development Forum that the “incremental capital output ratio” – the amount of capital needed for an extra unit of GDP – rose from 3.7 to one in the 1990s to 4.25 to one in the 2000s. This also suggests that returns have been falling at the margin.

佩蒂斯教授指出，抑制工资增长、大规模扩张廉价信贷与压制汇率，都是将收入从家庭向商业部门转移、进而从消费向投资转移的手段。哈佛大学(Harvard)的德怀特•帕金斯(Dwight Perkins)在中国发展高层论坛上指出，中国“增量资本产出率(ICOR)”——每多生产1单位GDP所需要的资本数量——从上世纪90年代的 3.7:1，上升至了本世纪头十年的4.25:1。这也表明边际回报率在不断下降。

If this pattern of growth is to reverse, as the government wishes, the growth of investment must fall well below that of GDP. This is what happened in Japan in the 1990s, with dire results. The thesis advanced by Prof Pettis is that a forced investment strategy will normally end with such a bump. The question is when. In China, it might be earlier in the growth process than in Japan because investment is so high. Much of the investment now undertaken would be unprofitable without the artificial support provided, he argues. One indicator, he suggests, is rapid growth of credit. George Magnus of UBS also noted in the FT of May 3 2011 that the credit-intensity of Chinese growth has increased sharply. This, too, is reminiscent of Japan as late as the 1980s, when the attempt to sustain growth in investment-led domestic demand led to a ruinous credit expansion.

这种增长模式若要如政府所希望的那样发生逆转，那么投资增长必须远远低于GDP的增长。这正是上世纪90年代日本所发生的情况，其后果是灾难性的。佩蒂斯提出的论点是，强制性投资策略通常都会突然终止。问题是究竟会在何时。在中国，鉴于投资规模如此庞大，它可能会在比日本更早的某个增长阶段发生。他认为，目前实施的投资中，有很大一部分如果没有那些人为的支持，将无利可图。他指出，信贷的迅速增长就是一个信号。瑞士银行(UBS)的乔治•马格纳斯(George Magnus)在2011年5月3日的英国《金融时报》上也撰文指出，中国经济增长的信贷密度在急剧变大。这也让我们回想起上世纪80年代的日本，当时，日本试图维持由投资引导的国内需求的增长，结果导致了毁灭性的信贷扩张。

As growth slows, the demand for investment is sure to shrink. At growth of 7 per cent, the needed rate of investment could fall by up to 15 per cent of GDP. But the attempt to shift income to households could force a yet bigger decline. From being an growth engine, investment could become a source of stagnation.

随着增长放缓，投资需求必将萎缩。按照7%的增长率计算，所需要的投资率（投资占GDP的比重）可能会下降多达15%。但将收入向家庭转移的尝试，可能会推动更大幅度的下降。投资这个增长引擎，可能会变成经济停滞的源头。

The optimistic view is that China’s growth potential is so great that it can manage the planned transition with ease. The pessimistic view is that it is hard for a country investing half of GDP to decelerate smoothly. I expect the transition to slower economic growth and greater reliance on consumption to be quite bumpy. The Chinese government is skilled. But it cannot walk on water. The water it is going to have to walk on over the next decade is going to be choppy. Watch out for the waves.

乐观的看法是，中国的增长潜力如此巨大，所以它可以轻松驾驭规划中的过渡。悲观的看法是，一个将一半GDP用来投资的国家很难顺利减速。我预期，中国放缓经济增速并加大对消费依赖的转型将困难重重。中国政府很有技巧。但它还没有在水上行走的本事。况且，未来十年它必须行走的水面将会波涛起伏。可要小心波浪啊！