黑白古风头像男有意境:黄陀:煽动颠覆罪的兴衰——言论自由六日谈(2)(2)

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黄陀:煽动颠覆罪的兴衰——言论自由六日谈(2)(2)

发布时间:2011-10-14 13:43 作者:黄陀 字号:大 中 小 点击:172次


  因此,以“剧场中谎称失火要受到惩罚”来佐证“惩治反政府、反社会、反体制言论有理”,是毫无道理的。第一,剧场中谎称失火要受到惩罚,并不意味着任何有可能造成严重恶劣后果的言论都应当受到惩治;换言之,并非所有的煽动性言论都可以和剧场中谎称失火类比,因为不是所有的言论都和恶劣后果之间有确定和紧密的联系。第二,即便言论和后果之间存在紧密的因果关系,也并非所有的后果都可以和剧场中听到“失火”后惊慌的人群互相踩踏的惨剧相比。在一个拥挤的公共空间谎称失火、造成踩踏固然是不可接受的,但以维护秩序为名禁止在公共空间发表任何有可能造成恶果的言论同样是不可接受的。


  由此可以看出,类似于《史密斯法案》煽动颠覆罪的一切煽动颠覆国家政权罪名,从根本上讲就是荒谬的。如布兰戴斯所言,自由的人民无惧政治变革,而如果不允许对现存体制的抨击与批评,任何政治上的进步与变革都是不可能的;[33] 社会也不可以仅仅因为某些言论令人反感而加以禁止。[34] 历史上有多少令人反感的言论最终被证明是真理?公共法律所能做的,只是维持社会的秩序,使讨论能够和平理性地进行。而如果言论真的会触发打砸抢等暴力事件,那么又进入了普通刑法惩治暴力犯罪的领域。在纽约街头,激进穆斯林可以随意宣扬对美国发动更多的恐怖袭击、进行“圣战”,联邦调查局探员只能在一旁干瞪眼[35];但一旦这些人的行为进入了实质性的组织、谋划恐怖袭击的行为,将立即受到法律的严惩。


  所以,如果仅仅是为了防止暴力事件,那么在暴力迫在眉睫、极有可能发生时应当直接应用普通刑法维护社会秩序;而如果是为了钳制人民思想、防止人民发出反政府反体制的声音,那么煽动颠覆罪名的设立很明显是对言论自由最直接、最恶劣的侵犯。故包括《史密斯法案》在内的一切的煽动颠覆国家政权罪,从根本上讲都是荒谬的。


  中华民国一〇〇年十月十日 美国 康州 纽黑文


  【附】惠尼案中布兰戴斯大法官的协同意见节选


  Those who won our independence


  believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their


  faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail


  over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They


  believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of


  liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you


  think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth;


  that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with


  them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the


  dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an


  inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should


  be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the


  risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order


  cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it


  is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds


  repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government;


  that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed


  grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels


  is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public


  discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law — the argument of force in


  its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities,


  they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be


  guaranteed.


  Fear of serious injury cannot


  alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and


  burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of


  irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be


  reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is


  practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger


  apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the


  evil to be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends


  in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it.


  Condonation of a breach


  enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability.


  Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it.


  Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of


  violation, however, reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying


  free speech where the advocacy falls sort of incitement and there is nothing to


  indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference


  between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between


  assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding


  of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious


  violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct


  furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.


  Those who won our independence


  by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did


  not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with


  confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the


  processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed


  clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent


  that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be


  time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the


  evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,


  not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be


  the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is


  the command of the Constitution. It is therefore always open to Americans to


  challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there was no


  emergency justifying it.


  [1] Act of June 15, 1917, ch.


  30, tit. I, §3, 40 Stat. 219.


  [2] Act of May 16, 1918, ch.


  75, §1, 40 Stat. 553. (1921年废除)


  [3] 255 F. at 887-888.


  [4] 249 U.S. at 51.


  [5] Id.


  [6] 250 U.S. at 621.


  [7] Id. at 624.


  [8]申克案中,九名大法官一致支持维持被告言论有罪的判决,判决书为霍尔姆斯所作;而在亚伯兰斯案中,最终结果仍然是被告有罪,但并非全院一致同意:七名大法官同意维持原判,霍尔姆斯和布兰戴斯反对(dissent)。


  [9] 除一些特殊情况外,最高法院有9名大法官,作出一个判决只需要简单多数,即9名大法官中有5人以上赞成,这些人是该案中的多数派(majority);一般会由多数派中选出一人来起草判决书,其他人表示附议(join),这份判决书便是最高法院的“官方”意见(opinion of the Court)。多数派中的其他人可以单独发表协同意见(concurring opinion)。少数派也可以在多数意见后自行选择发布反对意见(dissenting opinion);反对意见对判决本身无影响,但可以为法律界和社会大众在这个问题上的继续辩论提供素材,可以被一方观点的支持者引用;甚至有朝一日,当最高法院本身需要在同一个问题上作出新的决定时 ,可以宣布先前的反对意见所表达的观点是新的正确意见。


  [10] William B. Fisch,


  American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the


  XVith International Congress Of Comparative Law: Section IV Hate Speech in the


  Constitutional Law of the United States, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 463, 472, n.29


  (2002)


  [11] 250 U.S. at 627, 629.


  [12] Id. at 627-29.


  [13] 268 U.S. at 655, 657-58.


  [14] N.Y. Penal Law §§ 160,


  161.


  [15] 268 U.S. at 670-71.


  [16] Id. at 673 (Holmes, J.,


  dissenting).


  [17] Supra note 15.


  [18] 268 U.S. at 370.


  [19] Id. at 375-77, emphasis


  added.


  [20] 18 U.S.C. §§ 2383, 2385.


  [21] Whitney v. California,


  274 U.S. at 377.


  [22] 341 U.S. at 511.


  [23] Ted Morgan, Reds:


  McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America, 543 (2004).


  [24] Seth Stern & Stephen


  Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion, Chpt. 3 (2010).


  [25] Id.


  [26] Yates v. United States,


  354 U.S. at 318.


  [27] Id. at 322.


  [28] Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395


  U.S. at 447.


  [29] Id. at 452 (Douglas, J.,


  concurring).


  [30] Abrams v. United States,


  250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).


  [31] Id. at 628.


  [32] Schenck v. United States,


  at 52.


  [33] Whitney v. California,


  274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).


  [34] Texas v. Johnson, 491


  U.S. 397, 414 (1989).


  [35] CNN Transcript,


  11/6/2009. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0911/06/acd.02.html