陈正雷74老架一路视频:Lucian Arye Bebchuk 卢西恩阿里耶别布丘克

Lucian Arye Bebchuk 卢西恩阿里耶别布丘克
Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 哈佛大学法学院;国家经济研究局（国家经济研究局）

Abstract: 摘要：
This paper critiques the proposed emergency legislation for spending $700 billion on purchasing financial firms' troubled assets to address the 2008 financial crisis. 本文批评紧急立法的7,000亿美元支出以购买金融公司陷入困境的资产来解决2008年的金融危机。 It also puts forward a superior alternative for advancing the two goals of the proposed legislation - restoring stability to the financial markets and protecting taxpayers. 它还提出了卓越的替代推进两个目标的立法建议-恢复稳定金融市场和保护纳税人。

I show that the proposed legislation can be redesigned to limit greatly the cost to taxpayers while doing much better in terms of restoring stability to the financial markets. 本人表明，所提出的立法可以重新设计，极大地限制了纳税人的成本，而这样做会更好的恢复稳定金融市场。 The proposed redesign is based on four interrelated elements: 拟议的设计是基于四个相互关联的因素：

* No overpaying for troubled assets: The Treasury's authority to purchase troubled assets should be limited to doing so at fair market value. *没有过多的麻烦资产：美国财政部应以公平的市场价值，购买陷入困境的资产。

* Addressing undercapitalization problems directly: Because the purchase of troubled assets at fair market value may leave financial firms severely under-capitalized, the Treasury's authority should be expanded to allow purchasing, again at fair market value, new securities issued by financial institutions in need of additional capital. *解决投资不足的直接问题：因为购置困扰资产可能使金融机构严重不足资本，财政部应在公平的市场价值扩大采购，并允许新发行的证券金融机构加注更多的资本。

* Market-based discipline: to ensure that purchases are made at fair market value, the Treasury should conduct them through multi-buyer competitive processes with appropriate incentives. *以市场为基础的纪律：确保采购是在公平的市场价值，财政部应进行他们通过多方买方竞争力的过程，适当的奖励。

* Inducing infusion of private capital: to further expand the capital available to the financial sector, and to reduce the use of public funds for this purpose, financial firms should be required or induced to raise capital through right offerings to their existing shareholders. *诱导注入私人资本：进一步扩大资本提供给金融部门，并减少使用公共资金为此，金融机构应当要求或诱导，提高资本通过正确的产品，其现有股东的利益。

Compared with the Treasury's proposed legislation, the alternative proposal put forward in this paper would provide a far better way to use taxpayers' funds to address the financial crisis. 相对于财政部提出的立法，替代提出的建议，本文将提供一个更好的方法，可使用纳税人的资金来解决金融危机.

A PLAN FOR ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School

A PLAN FOR ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

Lucian A. Bebchuk.

Abstract

This paper critiques the proposed emergency legislation for

spending $700 billion on purchasing financial firms’ troubled assets to

address the 2008 financial crisis. It also puts forward a superior

alternative for advancing the two goals of the proposed legislation –

restoring stability to the financial markets and protecting taxpayers.

I show that the proposed legislation can be redesigned to limit

greatly the cost to taxpayers while doing much better in terms of

restoring stability to the financial markets. The proposed redesign is

based on four interrelated elements:

. No overpaying for troubled assets: The Treasury’s authority to

purchase troubled assets should be limited to doing so at fair

market value.

. Addressing undercapitalization problems directly: Because the

purchase of troubled assets at fair market value may leave

financial firms severely under-capitalized, the Treasury’s

authority should be expanded to allow purchasing, again at fair

market value, new securities issued by financial institutions in

need of additional capital.

. Market-based discipline: to ensure that purchases are made at

fair market value, the Treasury should conduct them through

multi-buyer competitive processes with appropriate incentives.

. Inducing infusion of private capital: to further expand the

capital available to the financial sector, and to reduce the use of

public funds for this purpose, financial firms should be

required or induced to raise capital through right offerings to

their existing shareholders.

Compared with the Treasury’s proposed legislation, the alternative

proposal put forward in this paper would provide a far better way to

use taxpayers’ funds to address the financial crisis.

 Key words: Financial crisis, bailout, subprime mortgages, creditor run.

 JEL classification: E5, G1, G2, H3, H5, H6, K2, N2

.William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law,

Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate

Governance, Harvard Law School; Research Associate, National Bureau of

Economic Research.

 For helpful comments and discussions, I would like to thank Jesse Fried

and Holger Spamann. For financial support, I am grateful to the Harvard Law

School Program on Corporate Governance, and the Harvard Law School

John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.

1 Section 3 of the draft legislation directs the Treasury to focus on two

considerations: “(1) providing stability or preventing disruption to the

financial markets or banking system and (2) protecting the taxpayer.”

The current financial crisis is widely viewed as the most

serious since the Great Depression. Last week, facing a severe

market reaction to the failures of AIG and Lehman Brothers, the

US Treasury Department put forward a bold and massive program

of spending up to $700 billion on purchasing “troubled assets”

from financial institutions. The Treasury Department submitted to

Congress proposed emergency legislation that is now being

considered. This paper offers a constructive critique of this plan. I

argue that the proposed legislation has major flaws that would

undermine its effectiveness in achieving its stated goals. My

critique is constructive, however, in that I show how the plan can

be redesigned to serve its stated objectives better and at a much

lower cost to taxpayers.

Although it is widely accepted that the current problems in

the financial system result from the problems in the housing

market, the emergency legislation, and my analysis in this paper,

focus on the current crisis of liquidity, capitalization, and

confidence in the financial sector. Throughout, I accept the two

stated objectives of the Treasury’s plan – restoring stability to the

financial sector and protecting taxpayers – and show how they can

be better served.1

In Sections I-III, I discuss three key problems with the

Treasury’s plan and how they can be addressed by an appropriate

redesign of the plan. In particular, I consider the principles that

should guide the government’s purchase of troubled assets

(section I), the need for accompanying authority to purchase

newly issued securities by financial firms that need capital

(section II), and how the government should conduct purchases of

either troubled assets or newly issued securities (section III).

Section IV argues that the use of public funds to purchase

troubled assets or infuse new capital to financial firms should be

accompanied by measures that force or strongly induce financial

firms to raise capital from private sources and, in particular,

through rights offerings to existing shareholders. Finally, section

V concludes.

I. PURCHASING TROUBLED ASSETS

The premise of the Treasury’s plan is that the current crisis

is due to the presence of “toxic” real-estate paper on the balance

sheets. Financial firms can currently sell these “troubled assets”

only at an extremely deep discount to face value if at all. The

Treasury believes that the presence of these illiquid troubled

assets “clogs” the financial system and is “choking off the flow of

credit.” Because of the substantial presence of these illiquid

troubled assets on the balance sheets of financial firms, the

Treasury believes, financial firms have difficulty raising capital,

are subject to risks of creditor runs, and are reluctant to carry out

fully their role in financing the real economy.

One reason why troubled assets cannot currently be sold at

face value is probably due to the decline in the fundamental

economic value of these assets due to the correction in the

housing market. The Treasury believes, however, that financial

firms cannot currently sell these assets even at their reduced

fundamental value. In a normal, well-functioning market, with

sufficient supply of interested buyers, such assets can be expected

to trade at their fundamental value – the discounted present value

of their “hold-to-maturity value.” The Treasury believes,

however, that we currently do not have such a normal, well-

functioning market. Rather we have a “limits to arbitrage”

situation in which money managers that would otherwise be

willing to purchase financial assets at any price below their

fundamental value do not have sufficient liquidity to keep prices

at fundamental values. The proposed legislation seeks to provide

such liquidity through the use of public funds.

Accepting the need and desirability of using public funds to

provide liquidity to the market for troubled assets, the critical

issue concerns the price at which the Treasury would attempt to

buy these assets. The Treasury’s official statements about the plan

contemplate purchasing troubled assets at fair value: “The price of

assets purchased will be established through market mechanism

where possible, such as reverse auctions.” Such an approach is

appealing, of course, because purchasing assets at fair market

value might enable taxpayers to get an adequate return on their

investment.

While the Treasury’s statements contemplate purchases at

fair market value, however, the draft legislation is careful to grant

the Treasury full authority to pay higher prices for troubled assets.

The draft would permit the Treasury, if it so chooses, to spend,

say, $700 billion for troubled assets with a fair value of only $200

billion, making taxpayers poorer by half a trillion dollars.

This freedom to confer massive gifts on private parties is

highly problematic. It should be constrained: the legislation

should direct the Treasury to buy assets at fair market value.

Some might ask whether directing the Treasury to purchase

troubled assets only at fair market value might not make the

purchase program inconsequential. Would this prescription not

lead the Treasury to purchase troubled assets at fire sale prices

and thus not add significantly to the options available to firms.

Accepting the diagnosis of our current predicament underlying the

Treasury’s proposal, the answer is no. At present, the prices are

viewed as substantially below fundamental value due to the

drying up of liquidity and the lack of fund supply that ensures

pricing at fundamental value in normal times. Thus, the fair

market value that the Treasury would pay would be one that

would reflect market outcomes under conditions of adequate

liquidity. What mechanism will best ensure that the prices paid for

troubled assets purchased for taxpayers would indeed reflect such

outcomes is a question I will take up in Section III.

2 In addition to legislation authorizing the Treasury to purchase newly

issued securities and not only pre-existing troubled assets, there is another

II. DEALING DIRECTLY WITH

UNDERCAPITALIZATION PROBLEMS

By itself, imposing the fair market value constraint on

purchases of troubled assets might leave us with stability concerns

that the Treasury sought to address by retaining the power to

overpay. Because the depressed housing market reduced the

fundamental value of troubled assets, some financial firms may

well remain seriously under-capitalized even if they could sell

troubled assets at fair value. The Treasury wants the power to

overpay for troubled assets to be able to improve the capital

position of these firms to restore stability and prevent creditor

runs.

Let us suppose for the time being, as the Treasury’s plan

does, that infusion of additional capital to financial firms must at

this point come, at least to a substantial degree, from the

government. Even so, such infusion of capital should not be done

by giving gifts to the shareholders and bondholders of financial

firms through over-paying for their assets. Rather, the provision of

such additional capital should be done directly, aboveboard, and

for consideration.