螺纹钢期货怎么炒:How far will China's navy reach ?

来源:百度文库 编辑:九乡新闻网 时间:2024/04/19 08:34:42

How far will China's navy reach ?




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A recent editorial in The New York Times highlighted what it saw as China's intention to challenge US naval supremacy in the Western Pacific, its aggressive pursuit of the disputed offshore islands in the East and South China Seas and how "Washington must respond, carefully but firmly."


Should we be really concerned? The short answer is yes - and not because China seeks to become a belligerent power. There is currently no evidence to suggest that China seeks to exercise the kind of global hegemonic ambitions often depicted by hawks and the far-right in American, Indian and Japanese political circles. Yet, China's naval power merits concern because the maritime realm is the most probable dimension in which a Chinese-related military conflict will be triggered and fought. There are several reasons for this.


To be sure, China has been slow to shift away from its deeply entrenched continental mindset. After all, 14 land powers share territorial frontiers with China, while only six maritime countries surround the Chinese coast. However, now that China has settled 12 out of 14 land border disputes with its neighbors, the sea is the final frontier that Beijing feels compelled to secure.

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There is some urgency in this quest. The bulk of global trade is only possible by sea-borne freight. Beijing feels it must protect the sea lanes that make both the movement of goods (about 90 percent of its import and exports) and the importation of resources and energy possible, without which China's economy would come to a standstill. The Chinese leadership also feels that it must protect what they perceive to be its maritime territorial sovereignty. As a matter of "coastal defense", the Chinese Navy is compelled to secure its 18,000-kilometer shoreline.



Not only economic interests but also geopolitical ones are fueling China's naval prowess, particularly in the Taiwan Straits - the most likely naval flashpoint. Beijing's option to unify Taiwan with the mainland by military force if necessary is no longer fuelled by ideology but geopolitics. As a 2008 US government report correctly put it, Taiwan is regarded as the focal point from which Beijing can 'break out' from its centuries-long containment along the Pacific littoral" and secure its immediate security environment within the Asia-Pacific region.


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This 'line of containment' is also known as the oft-mentioned "first-island chain" running south from the Japanese archipelago to the Philippines, which naturally denies the mainland from having unfettered access to the oceanic thoroughfare. The possession of Taiwan would permanently break China's geographical curse. As a result, the Taiwan Straits - as well as the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea - have become pressing geopolitical priorities that drive China's expansive military planning and procurement.



Moreover, it must be said that China's growing 'naval power' is not only about an expanding fleet of ships and submarines. All militaries advancing towards greater sophistication seek to integrate their sea, air, land and space capabilities in order to increase overall lethality, efficiency and effectiveness. The Chinese Navy is but one head of the country's military hydra. In a larger sense, the Chinese Navy should be regarded as a placeholder for the sea, air, land, and space-related capabilities that China will bring to bear against an adversary in the maritime realm of conflict.

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US strategic planners have been increasingly concerned with China's recent development and impending deployment of certain air, land, and space-related capabilities, which affect Taiwan's ability to impede a Chinese naval advance toward its shores and also the US Navy's capacity to project its military power in the Straits. Some of these developments include an aircraft carrier, anti-ship ballistic missiles, stealth fighter-aircraft and anti-satellite missiles.


It appears to have been given the mandate to venture "as far as [its] capabilities will allow it to operate task forces out at sea with the requisite amount of support and security." The question that should now be asked is how much maritime security is really enough for Beijing. The answer determines how far Beijing will ask its navy to go.