藏族舞蹈基本动作手:US: Abandon Taiwan or not?

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US: Abandon Taiwan or not?



By Michael Mazza

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Washington strategic interest in Taiwan has grown in step with Beijing's advancing military modernization and increasing assertiveness. Yet some argue that the cross-Strait dispute is a relic of the Cold War--that there's no reason that Taiwan should continue to be a source of tension in US-China relations.


Many of these commentators point to Taiwan and Beijing's closer economic ties, arguing that the two sides are willingly pursuing political integration. Proponents of this line of reasoning ignore the fact that the PLA has continued its fast-paced build-up of missiles across the Strait in spite of greater economic integration.


Washington has continued to sell defense items to Taipei. But both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have also refused to sell those weapons that Taiwan most needs.


Indeed, Washington's mistake is in not taking a clear side in the cross-Strait dispute. The United States should be more vigorously supporting its long-time democratic friend and partner. There are clear strategic reasons for doing so--reasons that are only growing in importance.


Not least of these is the increasing importance for the United States to been seen as both a reliable friend and a supporter of democratization. As Beijing rises and puts increasing pressure on its neighbours--many of whom are Washington allies--it's essential that those allies consider the United States to be a dependable security partner.


Moreover, Taiwan's continued existence as an independent, democratic 'state'--and Washington support for it--can provide succour for liberals in Beijing, who want representative government for their own country.


From an American point of view, there is, of course, a military-strategic imperative as well for Taiwan's continued de facto independence. An annexed Taiwan almost certainly becomes a militarized Taiwan, home to both PLA air and naval bases. For Beijing, the benefits of such bases are threefold. First, in the event of conflict in East Asia, the 'unsinkable aircraft carrier,' will provide mainland with strategic depth that it currently lacks. Any US forces steaming into the region will have to contend with Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels operating from Taiwan. Neutralization of bases on the island will likely be necessary prior to pursuing other primary objectives, thus complicating US calculations and military planning.


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Second, an annexed Taiwan will allow Beijing to easily threaten Japan's southern flank, including US bases on Okinawa. Clashing strategic, economic, and nationalistic interests foreshadow a more antagonistic future for Sino-Japanese relations, and while Japan has foresworn the use of violence to settle international disputes, China most certainly hasn't. It will be much more difficult for Japan to defend itself--and for the United States to defend its ally--if the islands face PLA threats emanating from Taiwan, from China's east coast, and, perhaps one day, from the east coast of North Korea.


Finally, control of Taiwan will enable the PLA to more easily exert control over the Luzon Strait, the waterway connecting the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea. Control of the Strait is necessary for China to achieve its dual goals of enforcing its claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea and of keeping foreign military forces out of that body of water. Control of Taiwan and the Luzon Strait, moreover, will for the first time grant the PLA Navy easy access to the Philippine Sea and the Pacific Ocean beyond, providing China even greater strategic depth and, for the first time since 1941, allowing an Asian power to threaten Guam and Hawaii.


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Taiwan isn't a relic of the Cold War. Rather, it is situated at the geographic forefront of the strategic competition that very well may define the 21st century--that between the United States and China. The United States has long pursued a policy in Asia in which it provides security while promoting economic and political liberalization. The Taiwan of today is in many ways a fruit of that policy. Washington would soon regret any decision to drop its support for Taiwan and allow Beijing to annex the island nation. Only by continuing to nurture its relationship with Taipei and by continuing to steel the island against threats from the mainland can the United States hope to ensure continued peace in Asia.



Michael Mazza is a senior research associate at American Enterprise Institute .




To avoid war, stop Taiwan arms sales?


The argument over U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan has long been a raucous affair, but recently it took a particularly heated pitch with the publication of the essay “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” in the March/April edition of Foreign Affairs.


The article by Charles Glaser, a professor of political science and international relations at George Washington University, argues that given the risks surrounding the United States’ support for Taiwan, the U.S. should consider backing away from its commitments to the island.


It has led to a sharp backlash from many analysts and professors, who have said that a withdrawal of U.S. support for Taiwan would only fuel Beijing’s aggressiveness in areas where it has competing claims with its neighbors, including the Diaoyu Islands (known as the Senkaku in Japan, which also claims them) and its contested borders with India.


But like it or not, U.S. support for Taiwan may have already been scaled back, according to American Enterprise Institute fellow Dan Blumenthal and Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, a lobbying group led by former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.


Blumenthal’s take on Glaser’s essay: “Glaser should be commended for his effort to think through war avoidance with China. But…given what we have learned about China over the recent past, the answer to its aggressiveness is not more concessions—and certainly not the abandonment of a key partner in Asia’s long peace.”


Hammond-Chambers, whose reportwasn’t written in response to Glaser’s essay, points out that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010, which rankled Beijing into breaking off its military contact with the Washington, were a holdover from a previous deal under the George W. Bush administration. “Two years into Mr. Obama’s term in office, we have yet to see a single material action that suggests U.S. willingness to make Beijing pay a real cost for its aggressive cross-Strait military posture,” he wrote.


A U.S. Defense Department spokeswoman, Cmdr. Leslie Hull-Ryde said in a recent interview pertaining to a spy case that “in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, we make available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”


In 1982, the U.S. agreed to gradually reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, but Beijing continues to pressure the Washington to cease all weapons sales. At the National People’s Congress on Monday, Reuters quoted Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as saying, “We urge the United States to…stop selling arms to Taiwan and take concrete actions to support the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. This is very important in upholding the overall interests of China-U.S. relations.”


But in Taiwan, the ruling Kuomintang government has repeatedly called for a new package of arms, including the sale of new F-16 fighter jets. Lin Yu-fang, a KMT official and senior member of the Taiwan legislature’s defense committee, said in an interview last week that the U.S. delays were the main obstacle in the government’s plans to upgrade its defense.


“The money is available for buying F-16 C/Ds and submarines, but the problem is Washington does not want to offend the ‘PRC’,” he said. (From the Wall Street Journal)